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A central result in price theory is the law of one price: prices of a homoge-
neous good sold at different locations should be equal. Empirical studies of the
law of one price find that it is often violated.
In my dissertation I explore the allocation problem that suppliers face when
supplying multiple markets. I use the experimental method to examine the effect
of an increase in the number of suppliers in a market, ceteris paribus, has on the
allocation decisions of market participants. I also use the experimental method
to investigate suppliers that are strategic and show that market concentration and
transportation costs restrict the supplier’s ability to coordinate on an efficient equi-
librium.
A strategic supplier takes account his own effect on prices. Strategic supplies
face a difficult strategy coordination problem. If they cannot solve it, then an in-
efficient outcome may result. Coordination failure may result in price dispersion
across the markets. Resulting price signals do not inform suppliers who should
respond and by how much. Price signals are not sufficient for suppliers to solve
the strategy coordination problem. In the experiments, I observe that increasing
the quantity of suppliers, that is the Herfindahl index of concentration, in the mar-
ket will decrease the frequency of the equilibrium strategy to be played, holding
other things constant. Increasing the number of firms in a market, ceteris paribus,
increases price dispersion and coordination on an efficient market allocation is de-
iv
creased.
The experiments reveal that the ability of suppliers to coordinate is directly
correlated with the optimization premium: the expected payoff difference between
best responding to an opponents strategy and the payoff to an inferior response.
The incentive is greater to best respond when the optimization premium is larger.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: THE LAW OF ONE PRICE
A. Introduction
The law of one price states that in competitive market without trade barriers and
net of transportation costs, the price of homogeneous goods sold at different lo-
cations will be the same. There are three critical assumptions that allow us to
make such a strong statement about prices. First, we are describing a market that
is competitive. The second assumption is no trade barriers. This allows for the
free movement of goods and market participants to facilitate trade. The third as-
sumption is that the good must be homogeneous, that is similar enough so that
consumers do not prefer one over the other.
Throughout economic textbooks, the law of one price is standard economic
theory. In Lipsey, Courant and Ragan [33] they describe ”the law of one price
states that when a product that can be cheaply transported is traded throughout
the entire world, it will tend to have a single worldwide price - the world price.”
Also, O’Sullivan and Sheffrin [41] state the law of one price as ”the theory that
goods easily tradable across countries, should sell at the same price, expressed in
a common currency.”
Marshall [35] states, ”... the more nearly perfect a market is, the stronger is the
tendency for the same price to be paid for the same thing at the same time in all
parts of the market: but of course if the market is large, allowance must be made
for the expense of delivering the goods to different purchasers; each of whom must
This dissertation follows the style of Journal of Economic Theory.
2be supposed to pay in addition to the market price a special charge on account of
delivery.” Marshall clearly explains that prices tend toward equilibrium in their
market.
Cournot [10] describes a market as ”the entire territory of which the parts are
so united by the relations of unrestricted commerce that prices take the same level
throughout with ease and rapidity.” Stiglitz [51] wrote of the ”law of the single
price” when he states that ”under this law, there is a uniform price in the market
and price differences are quickly eliminated by arbitrage.”
Jevons [27] defines a market by stating: ”By a Market I shall mean much what
commercial men use it to express. Originally a market was a public place in a
town where provisions and other objects were exposed for sale; but the word has
been generalised, so as to mean any body of persons who are in intimate busi-
ness relations and carry on extensive transactions in any commodity. A great city
may contain as many markets as there are important branches of trade, and these
markets may or may not be localised. The central point of a market is the pub-
lic exchange, mart or auction rooms, where the traders agree to meet and transact
business. In London, the Stock Market, the Corn Market, the Coal Market, the
Sugar Market, and many others, are distinctly localised; in Manchester, the Cotton
Market, the Cotton Waste Market, and others. But this distinction of locality is not
necessary. The traders may be spread over a whole town, or region of country, and
yet make a market, if they are, by means of fairs, meetings, published price lists,
the post office, or otherwise, in close communication with each other. Thus, the
common expression Money Market denotes no locality: it is applied to the aggre-
gate of those bankers, capitalists, and other traders who lend or borrow money,
and who constantly exchange information concerning the course of business.”
McChesney, Shughart and Haddock [37] identify some of the problems in
3defining the law of one price and the problem with defining a market or market
boundaries. They explain that due to the difficulty in definitions, the modern law
becomes ”incoherent.” They explain the tautology in defining the law in a way that
also defines a market. If a market is one that is defined as a realm that where prices
”tend toward uniformity”, then a market and the law of one price are tautological.
Some of the confusion of the law of one price comes from the definition of a
market. A market for something is a mechanism for carrying out voluntary ex-
change between people who want to buy it and people who want to sell it subject
to the rules of the particular market mechanism. The location that trade takes place
is the marketplace. This can be in the town square, Wall Street, or cyberspace.
The simplest conception of a market is if all buyers and all sellers meet at the
same point or location and all trade occurs. This concept of a market allows the
law to be satisfied without trade impediments and transportation costs. When we
think of the impact of space on the law, it becomes more difficult for competition to
be transmitted across locations. Theoretically, time is irrelevant in the transmission
of competition that is perfect because time is assumed to be instantaneous. Other
complexities also occur such as trade barriers and transportation costs. Trade bar-
riers further complicate the application of the law of one price.
1. Why should the law of one price hold?
The logic behind the law of one price is simple. If a consumer is able to purchase a
good at a lower price from a different seller, he will do so. If consumers are always
trying to purchase the good from the low price seller, then only the low price seller
will sell the good. All other sellers will have to match that price to stay in the
market. This leaves the good being sold at the lowest price and all others at that
same price which is uniformity or the law of one price.
4When the good is found in a different location, they too are influenced by the
price the good is selling at this location. The consumer just needs to pay to get
the good to him. This is why the transportation costs are important. If the price is
less expensive by transportation costs and the price of the good, then he will buy
it from that location. The price in any location is being influenced by the price in
all other locations.
Another argument for the law of one price is arbitrage of a durable good.
According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary arbitrage is defined as ”the nearly
simultaneous purchase and sale of securities or foreign exchange in different mar-
kets in order to profit from price discrepancies.” When market participants seek
to take advantage of price discrepancies in multiple locations, the price is both
markets is driven to uniformity.
2. Interpretations of the law of one price
The law of one price is a static equilibrium result. But it can be interpreted as an
attractor of a disequilibrium dynamic. The law of one price states that in a compet-
itive market without trade barriers and net of transportation costs, homogeneous
goods sold at different locations will be equal. Krugman and Obstfeld [31] state the
definitions of the law is ”identical goods...must sell for the same price”, as though
the law is a concept of static equilibrium.
Because it has been well established that empirically the law of one price has
many violations, the law is sometimes referred to as an attractor. Stigler [50] states:
”A market, according to the masters, is the area within which the price of a com-
modity tends to uniformity, allowance being made for transportation costs.” It ap-
pears that many economists see the idea of the law of one price as an attractor.
When Stigler writes that prices ”tend to uniformity”, he is evidently speaking of
5an attractor, where price is being moved toward an equilibrium. And Marshall
[35] when speaking of the ”tendency” for the law to hold in a perfect market, he
too is speaking of the law as an attractor.
B. When should the law of one price hold?
1. Arbitrage argument
Arbitrage is the practice of taking advantage of a state of disequilibrium between
two or more locations. A buyer purchases a good in one location and simulta-
neously sells the good in another location for a higher price than the good was
purchased. Profit taking disequilibrium will drive prices in multiple locations to
converge, less any transportation or transaction costs that may be involved. Arbi-
trage in a frictionless economy will instantaneously converge prices. Arbitrage is
an argument for the law of one price to hold throughout all markets.
2. Competitive equilibrium
Price taking arguments depend on the assumption that market participants believe
that they have no influence on price. In theory this is represented as the number
of suppliers approaches infinity we say that no individual supplier has any effect
on price due to the infinitely small allocation by any one individual supplier. The
same holds for consumers of a good. In practice, we call a market competitive with
”many” market participants. Throughout I refer to price takers as market partic-
ipants that believe ”as if” they have no influence on market price even though
the number of market participants may not apply to the law of large numbers. In
experimental economics, experiments have demonstrated time and again that it
takes very few participants to obtain price taking behavior.
6When firms compete solely on price, a competitive equilbrium can be acheived
with as few as two suppliers. Bertrand pricing results when rival firms compete
solely on price. When suppliers compete on price, price reduces to marginal cost
which is the competitive outcome.
The Economist [14] contemplated how the internet would change pricing be-
havior by market participants. They state ”The explosive growth of the internet
promises a new age of perfectly competitive markets. With perfect information
about prices and products at their fingertips, consumers can quickly and easily find
the best deals. In this brave new world retailers’ profit margins will be competed
away, as they are all forced to price at cost.” As many economists have pointed
out, this has not occurred.
3. Market institutions
Most retail transactions occur predominantly in posted offer markets. A seller
posts a price and each buyer chooses a seller. Buyer search is the main competitive
force in such markets. If the prices posted are different at different locations, the
informed buyer will usually purchase at the lower price. Because search is costly,
it may be that posted prices for the same good may never be uniform leaving us
with price dispersion in a posted offer market.
Walras [54] described a general equilibrium model in which market partici-
pants come together in a central location to trade all goods. An auctioneer deter-
mines prices for goods by announcing a price vector for all goods and suppliers
and consumers submit quantities to purchase and sell and the announced price. If
there is excess demand or supply, the auctioneer adjusts the price vector accord-
ingly and reannounces. Once there is no excess supply or demand, the announced
price stands and trade takes place. The method by which the auctioneer arrives at
7a equilibrium price is referred to as the tatonnement price dynamic. In the taton-
nement price dynamic, trade occurs only after equilibrium occurs which satisfies
the law of demand and supply as well as the law of one price.
Under decentralized competition, there is no auctioneer coordinating the al-
location decisions of market participants. Instead, there are locations that clear
through a Marshallian or local auctioneer. The local auctioneer announces prices
for goods in a local market until the local market clears, regardless of market ac-
tivity in foreign locations. In the decentralized market structure, suppliers allocate
goods among the local markets without knowing the realized prices (or allocation
strategies of the other firms) in the economy. The mechanism by which suppli-
ers determine the delivery of their goods to a specific location is determined by
knowledge of the local markets, a prior history of the local demand structure and
the participation of other firms in that local market. Strategic suppliers have an
incentive allocate to the markets where the expected price is greatest allowing for
their own allocations to influence the market price. The markets themselves dic-
tate the quantities that should be delivered by the inherent willingness to pay for
such goods by the consumers.
There are many different auction market settings. They include double oral,
english, dutch, sealed bid and others. In each case the law of one price states
that the price should be equal for the good being sold if it is homogeneous, less
any transportation costs. The auction setting allows the buyer with the highest
willingness to pay to purchase the good. When looking at the law of one price
in this context, we must be cognizant of the fact that the distribution of buyers is
changing after each sale. Once a buyer, who had the highest willingness to pay at
that instant has exited the market, those left presumably have a lower willingness
to pay. It may also be that the different buyers have different discount rates and
8are more patient.
Osborne and Rubinstein [42] in their book on bargaining and market institu-
tions present various sequential bargaining models that arrive at the law of one
price. They show that even with agents bargaining over the surplus when there is
asymmetry in the number of buyers and sellers and they are randomly pairwise
matched, that over the time horizon, the law of one price results.
4. Search models and information
Consumers are supposed to maximize their consumer surplus. If we assume that
there is a violation in the law of one price and consumers face a distribution of
prices, then all consumers will search over the distribution to find the lowest price
and suppliers will all supply at the lowest price. If we also assume that it is costly
to search, then consumers will search for the lowest price until the expected gain
from searching is less than the cost to do so. Because search is costly, the price from
all suppliers will not converge to uniformity when suppliers know that it is costly
to search and there is rents to be obtained from consumers with a higher price.
Stigler’s [49] article in the Journal of Political Economy was a step forward
in the understanding of price dispersion. Stigler posited that information was
in effect a large culprit in the dispersion of prices for a homogeneous good. He
suggests that not all dispersion is due to ignorance but is also in part due to non-
homogeneity of commodities. An example cited in the paper is that of an automo-
bile at a new car dealership that is essentially homogeneous with a car at another
dealership. He found dispersion even in a local market that was significant. The
automobile may have been identical, but perhaps the service at the dealership was
distinct or the variety of stock or other unobserved heterogeneities. Stigler posits
that there should be a skewed distribution of prices due to the minimum being
9constrained by the costs, but there being no constraint on the maximum.
Another reason price dispersion exists is due to the costs of information. If an
individual wants to purchase a good, the probability of finding the lowest price
on the first inquiry depends on the distribution of the prices for that commodity.
There is diminishing returns to gathering price information. Once the costs out-
weigh the expected benefits from search an individual should stop searching. It is
this costly searching that allows price dispersion to exist. If information was cost-
less, the searcher would continue until the lowest price was found. All other firms
would exit the market or conform to the lowest price.
Another cost associated with price dispersion is the cost to the firms to ascer-
tain the dispersion of prices for a given commodity. All firms may be searching
and pricing accordingly and that requires that the search occur not only once but
at all points in time. This also becomes more difficult with rival suppliers entering
and exiting the market. A firm must know which rival firms are supplying the
good and consumers must also know this information to reduce dispersion in the
market. The greater the heterogeneity in the commodity the costlier the search for
both the consumer and the supplier. These costs quickly outweigh the benefit of
searching for both the consumer and the firm.
Advertising by firms helps to mitigate some of the costs for both the consumer
and the rival suppliers. It allows the cost of search to decrease. However, the
firm has an incentive to monopolize the private information regarding the product.
Advertising is not only meant to inform but to assist in price discrimination. The
firm wants the commodity to be distinguished from rival firms’ commodities and
by advertising can convey differences in rivals commodities.
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5. International trade models
Many theorems in economics rest on the assumption that the law of one price
holds. Mishken [39] states ”The theory of PPP is simply an application of the law
of one price to national price levels rather than to individual prices.” In the inter-
national trade literature, purchasing power parity (PPP) is a direct result of the
law of one price. Purchasing power parity states that the ratio of the two countries
price levels, Pi, Pj , equals the exchange rate, e = Pi/Pj . The law of one price is for
an individual good, so the exchange rate follows where the exchange rate, e, is the
ratio of a good k in country i and j, such that e = P ki /P kj . If the law of one price
holds then the purchasing power parity also holds.
Krugman and Obstfeld [31] state the law in even stronger terms ”The law of
one price states that in competitive markets free of transportation costs and offi-
cial barriers to trade (such as tariffs), identical goods sold in different countries
must sell for the same price when their prices are expressed in terms of the same
currency.” A trade barrier is a general term that describes any government policy
or regulation that restricts international trade. The following is a list of typical
barriers to trade: import duties, import licenses, export licenses, quotas, tariffs,
subsidies and other disincentives meant to discourage international trade. The net
effect of a trade barrier is to raise the price of the good.
Market participants, when there are barriers to trade, face higher retail prices
and reduced quantities sold. It also makes it easier for markets to be segmented
for the purpose of price discrimination. Segmenting markets involves reducing a
market into subgroups, it is derived from the recognition that the total market is
often made up of submarkets. When markets are segmented it is difficult for the
law of one price to be sustained due to price discrimination and complexity and
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cost of market transactions.
6. Transportation costs
The purest form of the law of one price assumes that there is frictionless trade
without transportation costs and trade barriers. With a good being sold in multiple
locations across the world, it is necessary to include transportation costs in the
theory. Assuming the good is can be purchased from any location, the consumer
will purchase the good from the lowest price seller that includes transportation
costs to the consumer’s door.
7. Bounded rationality
It is difficult and costly for the human mind to weigh all contingencies. It is also
costly to analyze all contingencies or possibilities. This is why market participants
adopt strategies that are consistent with their beliefs are far as they are able to
analyze them. Kreps [30] explains ”A boundedly rational individual attempts to
maximize but finds it costly to do so and, unable to anticipate all contingencies,
and aware of this inability, provides ex ante for the (almost inevitable) time ex post
when an ununforeseen contingency will arise.” So a boundedly rational1 agent has
limited computational abilities and in many cases imperfectly defined objectives,
as they make complex decisions that are not fully comprehended.
Bounded Rationality may help explain some of the observed price dispersion,
The quantal response equilibrium (QRE) is a model of bounded rational behavior.
In a QRE, market participants form beliefs about what other will do and calculate
the expected payoffs of different choices. This means that they may not choose
1For a more complete description of models of bounded rationality, see Ariel
Rubinstein’s Modeling Bounded Rationality [47]
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the the action with the highest expected payoff. Choices are made according to a
statistical rule in which better choices are chosen more often. The QRE is a model
that fits the data in experiments and allows for the possibility that market decision
makers are boundedly rational. The law of one price may be an attractor and the
QRE is a nice choice theory model that may help explain deviations from the one
price law.
Baye and Morgan [4] develop a model that helps explain why price dispersion
is ubiquitous in settings that closely approximate textbook Bertrand competition.
They show how bounded rationality among sellers helps to rationalize such dis-
persion. Using a variety of statistical tests, they show how bounded rationality
based theories of price dispersion organize the data suggesting violations in the
one price law.
8. Market concentration
Most models of price dispersion predict that as the number of market participants
increases, market power by sellers and buyers decreases and firms are less able to
price discriminate.
Baye and Morgan [3] presents a model in which consumers can be divided
into two distinct segmented populations. The first type of consumer is called a
shopper. This type of consumer is most sensitive to price. This means that they
will purchase the good at the lowest price outlet. The other type of consumer is
called a loyal. This refers to the preference that this consumer has for established
relationships and ease of transaction. A simple example is when a consumer is
looking for a book online. The loyal may already have an established relationship
with Amazon (an online book retailer). The loyal is less likely to search the internet
for a lower price due to the ease and simplicity of transaction with Amazon. The
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shopper on the other hand is more concerned with price and will scour the internet
looking for the lowest price. The shopper sees all firms as perfectly substitutable.
Firms then price at the lowest price stochastically. By doing so allows the firms to
avoid a Bertrand pricing trap that reduces price to marginal cost and removes all
profits to the firms.
The model predicts that as the number of firms increases, the expected price
paid by the informed (shopper) decreases and the expected price paid by the cap-
tive (loyal) consumer increases.
Many of Baye and Morgan’s articles use this same model of shoppers and loy-
als to describe price dispersion in the internet market. Their analysis suggests an
increasing number of activities that brands a homogeneous good thereby creating
a loyal customer and reducing the need to become the low price retailer. By do-
ing so, price dispersion decreases, raises prices and transfers rents from consumers
and e-retailers to advertising market participants.
9. Disequilibrium and the optimization premium
The optimization premium, which is the difference between the earnings from a
giving a best response and the earnings from some other action, is key in models
that assume that participants are not perfectly rational. By incorporating models
suggesting that the smaller or flatter the optimization premium, it may be that sup-
pliers are unable to eliminate price dispersion as the incentive to do so decreases.
Models of disequilibrium may go a long way in explaining empirical price dis-
persion. When we think of a firm making a decision between any two actions, as
the increased payoff between any action and a best response shrinks small enough
that it is difficult for a firm to calculate the payoffs to a given action accurately, it
may not do so. Battalio, Samuelson and Van Huyck [2] provide statistically and
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economically significant evidence that the optimization premium helps explain
observed human behavior.
10. Cross-hauling
A seminal paper presented by Brander [6] develops a model of strategic trade.
When suppliers account for their influence of prices they engage in cross-hauling.
Cross-hauling being defined as the costly and bidirectional transporting of an iden-
tical product between two locations. Many economists in the reciprocal dumping
literature attribute this phenomenon to varied tastes and preferences where the
good is not perfectly substitutable. Brander showed that even with an identical or
homogeneous good, suppliers have an incentive to cross-haul their good. The set-
ting in which Brander describes this model is multiple firms in multiple locations
with constant marginal cost. Firms believe that if they export some portion of their
good to the foreign market, the price will be higher for the remaining stock in the
home market, thus generating higher profits.
Brander’s models employs simple game throetic techniques to model interna-
tional duopolists, assuming both firms are identical and having one firm in each
country. Each firm produces according to an identical cost function and identical
transport costs to the foreign market. By assuming constant marginal costs, Bran-
der is able to separate domestic and foreign markets. The transport costs are of the
iceberg type such that some percentage less than one arrives to the consumer and
is given by where is the shrinkage.
Firms then maximize the traditional profit function for both markets simulta-
neously as in the Cournot model. Once the firms are allowed to choose production
and allocate to maximize profits, the firms allocate to both markets paying the
transport costs associated with this allocation.
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C. Evidence of price dispersion
Empirical tests of the one price law usually reject it.
1. International trade
International trade is clearly one of the places in the literature that attempts to
reconcile the law with empirical evidence.
a. Trade barriers
Kravis and Lipsey [29], discuss the law of one price and purchasing power parity
with tradable and nontradable goods. They find that nontradable goods are more
likely to have less price dispersion than their tradable counterparts. The result is
believed to be due in part to nominal sticky prices of nontradable goods. They
also find that across countries, national price levels increase systematically with
the level of a country’s per capita income. As the per capita income increases, the
ratio of tradable to nontradable prices decreases. This is in large part due to the
stability of nontradable goods prices and price fluctuations that arise with tradable
goods due to exchange rate fluctuations and external pressures.
Isard [25] presents evidence that exchange rate changes change the relative
dollar-equivalent prices of a narrowly defined set of goods. By defining the goods
in this narrow manner, Isard is able to match more closely the relative prices in
other countries. The mechanism that Isard describes as the enforcement of the law
of one price is commodity arbitrage. However, even with commodity arbitrage,
there may be in place restrictions to free markets, such as discriminating monopo-
lies, tariffs, subsidies and other trade restrictions. These external forces create bar-
riers to arbitrage and decrease the possibility of satisfying the one price law. The
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other hurdle that Isard attempts to overcome is the homogeneity of goods. The
smallest perceived differences may change preference is one country or another.
Isard uses data from the United States, Germany and Japan. The monthly
wholesale export prices in a time series from 1968-1975. The evidence is strong
throughout that the relative prices of these commodities does not fluctuate around
a mean, but are serially correlated or influenced heavily by the exchange rate. At
least in the German and the Japanese cases, the significance of the exchange rate
levels suggest that the shocks have persistent and long lasting effects to relative
prices of closely matched goods.
The segmentation in markets across countries is believed to be one of the main
reasons that the law of one price does not hold in an international setting. Typi-
cally international economists define a single country as a single market. By defin-
ing each country as its own market, economists have found large price dispersion
from one country to another. This is believed to be due to market segmentation,
such that firms are able to use trade barriers, asymmetric information and trans-
portation costs to increase profits in certain markets.
b. Exchange rates
Engel and Rogers [18] look at the impact of the euro on European price dispersion
and integration relative to multiple currencies. One impact of the euro has been
increased economic integration. By removing currency conversions and costs as-
sociated with conversion, market participants may more freely perform market
transactions without the risk that is inherent with multiple currencies such as ex-
change rate fluctuations. A single currency encourages travel, encourages busi-
nesses to engage in trade beyond their borders, and encourages arbitrage because
it reduces the complexity of calculating prices. All of these simplifications should
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reduce deviations in the law of one price.
The euro is the official currency of the European Union (Austria, Belgium,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Portugal and Spain), known as the Eurozone, and single currency for over 300
million Europeans. Non-European members participating in the official use of the
euro include: Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City. It is the de facto currency
of Andorra, Kosovo and Montenegro. The euro was introduced to world financial
markets as an accounting currency in 1999 and launched as physical coins and
banknotes in 20022.
Engel and Rogers use data which covers the period from 1990-2003 and is from
a survey conducted by the Economist Intelligence Unit, which includes data on 101
narrowly defined traded goods from 18 European cities in 11 Eurozone countries.
They also use data on 38 non-traded goods. The comparison group is 7 cities in
Europe which are not part of the Eurozone.
There results are very interesting. First they state that unconditionally there
is a decline in price disperion over much of the 1990’s but there is little evidence
of further decline since 1999. The evidence applies to cities within the Eurozone
and to other European cities outside of the Eurozone. It is suggested that many
European countries took significant steps in the 1990’s to reduce trade frictions
and create a climate for trade to be simplified. This may have led to the reduction
in price dispersion over that period. It is a curiosity that with the introduction of
the euro in 1999, that price dispersion did not further decrease. It may be that the
sample is taken too soon after the transformation, or that currency conversion is
not costly enough to show real reductions in price dispersion.
2See also Goldberg and Knetter [21], for a discussion on exchange rates.
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Asplund and Friberg [1] found an interesting violation in the law of one price
due entirely to currency fluctuations where price is listed in two currencies on the
same good at the same location at the same time. The data used is taken from three
Scandinavian duty-free outlets, where each good is priced in Swedish kroner (SEK)
and Finnish markka (FIM) at the same time in the same location. The data is taken
from the Birka Line ferry operation between Sweden and Finland. The pricing of
the good in two currencies simultaneously allows consumers to purchase the good
in the currency of choice, and presumably the lower price currency, however, this
did not always occur. The nominal price was usually adjusted just once a year.
There is menu and other costs associated with price adjustment.
By pricing in two currencies simultaneously, an opportunity for arbitrage oc-
curs because nominal prices do not instantaneously adjust as currency fluctuations
occur. There was no mention of individuals trying to arbitrage while on the boat.
A very nice natural experiment is presented where the law of one price does not
hold even when there are no search or transportation costs. However, there does
exist some cost to arbitrage. Even these small costs may prohibit consumers from
being able to arbitrage the good. This allows the duty-free shops to list the price
of the good in two different currencies simultaneously and not have to change the
nominal price with currency fluctuations.
Rogoff, Froot and Kim [46] examine price dispersion over the past 700 years.
Along the lines of Stigler, it is natural to assume that price dispersion would ex-
ist many centeries ago due to the lack of information about foreign prices. The
surprising result is that with the advent of a quick transmission of foreign prices,
volatility and price dispersion has not declined. The data that Rogoff et al. [46]
piece together dates back to 1273. The commodity prices examined are barley, but-
ter, cheese, oats, peas, silver and wheat.
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Deviations in the law have remained quite stable over the past 700 years in
commodity prices. It is remarkable including the decline in transportation costs,
wars, pestilence, disease and information changes that have occurred over the
same period. They describe much of the violations to a non-integrated market.
As this may be some of the reason for the deviations, we will show that even in
a framework of a completely integrated market, suppliers are not always able to
allocate such that the law of one price is achieved.
c. Borders
Borders or political boundaries may segment markets by making trade costly and
complex. By segmenting markets, arbitrage becomes more difficult and firms are
more able to price discriminate. Political entities introduce trade restrictions in the
form of quotas, tariffs, different currencies, etc. Many articles have demonstrated
the increase in price dispersion across countries or borders. Some of the dispersion
is explained by the border effect and some is not.
Engel and Rogers [20] find large border effects on prices when they looked
at border states in the United States and Canada. Distance explained some of the
variability of prices of similar goods, but does not explain much of the segmenta-
tion that borders create. They looked at the border effect on the prices of goods
within the United States and across the border that were similar distances and
similar transport costs. After accounting for these differences, there remained a
large portion of price variation that is not explained by the transport costs or the
distance.
Lutz [34] uses micro level data from the European car market to examine why
there are violations in the law of one price. With cars, the incentive to shop and
find the lowest price is greater because the potential savings are greater. It would
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be natural to expect that prices would converge. However, this is not the case. This
is due in part to cross-border effects as well as information and transaction costs.
Lutz finds that borders make it more difficult for market participants to arbitrage
across borders and this makes it easier to have market segmentation. Contrary
to Engel and Rogers [18], he finds that a single currency lowers price differences
significantly.
McCallum [36] and Helliwell [24] looked at trade volumes and they both
found large border effects relative to the volume of trade within a country but with
similar distances and transportation costs. Goldberg and Verboven [22] looked at
market integration in Europe as the Europeans were attempting to integrate their
markets. The data set was composed from the European car market from 1970-
2000. They find that convergence to the law of one price has indeed taken place
during the period of their data set and that the persistence of shocks has been re-
duced by a third from 5-6 years across countries to just 1.5 - 1.6 years. It is interest-
ing to note that Engel and Rogers [20] find the same result, but after the integration
of the currency in 1999, they do not see further integration.
As Engel and Rogers [19] point out, there appears to exist market segmenta-
tion within country as well as across country. If transportation costs are the cul-
prit, then the same market segmentation that is seen internationally should apply
within a country. However, many recent papers have looked at the price disper-
sion within the United States and across the border in Canada to determine how
much market segmentation exists.
2. Transportation costs
We would expect price to fall within the cost of transport, especially within close
proximity. The following articles find that that may not be the case in practice.
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Elzinga and Hogarty [17] found that the price of coal in different parts of the
state of Kentucky sold for prices that differed much more than the cost of trans-
port. The example from a report in 1975 stated that the fob (free on board) price
of bituminous coal was $27.03 per ton in eastern Kentucky and only $13.75 per ton
in western Kentucky. The shipping cost via rail averaged $5.00 per ton. The price
difference should be no greater than the shipping cost or $18.75.
Engel and Rogers [19] investigate violations in the one price law. They use
disaggregated data of consumer prices to describe differences in prices across the
United States of similar goods. They posit that price dispersion is due in part to
market segmentation and also nominal sticky prices. They also look price variation
as it relates to the tradeability of a good, tradeable or nontradeable, and find that
price dispersion is greater for traded goods. They are not able to look directly
at the law of one price because they are constrained by the data. They instead
look what they call the ”proportional law of one price” (PLOP) which uses price
indexes instead of direct prices of individual goods. Their main findings indicate
that when goods are sold in distant cities, the economic forces that would work
to equalize prices is weaker. This is most likely due to transportation costs. The
second result which states that non-traded goods have smaller price dispersion is
due to greater nominal price stickiness for non-traded goods.
3. Information costs
Brynjolfsson and Smith [7] find there still exists frictions throughout internet mar-
kets for books and CD’s and that price dispersion still exists on the range of 30%.
Ellison and Ellison [16] find that a fairly homogeneous good such as computer
memory has a price dispersion of only 4%. This may be due to the type of con-
sumer that purchases computer memory or the type of purchase such as impul-
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siveness of buying a book relative to memory.
Baye, Morgan, and Scholten [5] use an internet website where suppliers of a
good advertise their product on a leading price comparison website, in this case
Shopper.com. They compile a data set containing 4 million price observations in
the consumer electronics market. The data are daily price quotes from merchants
selling the the top 1000 products covered by Shopper.com. The data was collected
from August 2, 2000 through March 31, 2001. They find systematic differences
in the level of price dispersion depending on the number of firms. When there
was only 2 firms listed, the range of prices averages 22%. When there was 17
firms listed, the range in prices averaged 35%. They also find little evidence of any
convergence to the law of one price.
Sorensen [48] presents an empirical study in which he looks at pricing of phar-
maceuticals in separate geographical locations but within the same market. They
find that pharmacy heterogeneity accounts for at most one third the observed price
disperion. It is not surprising that the empirical results they find of observed dis-
persion in price is dependent on consumers incentives to price shop. The consumer
is more sensitive to price and is more willing to seek lower costs when the phar-
maceuticals is purchased regularly and frequently. Suppliers would prefer to be
able to price discriminate. This is consistent with the typical search model where
cost of search is weighed against potential reduction in price.
Sorensen looked at prescription drug prices at competing pharmacies in the
same locality. Due to a law in New York requiring pharmacies to post prices for
the top 152 top-selling prescriptions. The data used comes from the towns of Mid-
dletown and Newburgh, New York in March 1998. Both towns were fairly isolated
from nearby towns and consisted of 10 and 11 pharmacies respectively, also, the
posted price was required by law to be respected at the request of the consumer.
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He finds that frequently purchased pharmaceuticals have a reduced abso-
lute price dispersion relative to pharmaceuticals that are single or irregularly pur-
chased. He also suggests that some of the price dispersion is due to the pharmacy
heterogeneity.
Dahlby and West [11] look at price dispersion involving the price of auto in-
surance policies to test the prediction of a dispersion model due to Carlson and
McAfee [8]. They come to the same conclusion that Sorensen found, which is that
costly search prohibits or at least hinders the collapse of price to marginal cost.
Meyer, Van Huyck, Battalio and Saving [38] ran an experiment that used a
recontracting mechanism. The recontracting mechanism is a sequential quantity
allocation mechanism. Each supplier was asked in sequence to make an allocation
decision. After each allocation the choice was posted and other suppliers could
then see the decisions of their rival suppliers. This was continued in sequence
until all suppliers were always satisfied with their allocation decisions. In each
period of this treatment the law of one price was perfectly satisfied.
4. Reputation
Reputation is one method that helps firms price discriminate. Pan, Shankar and
Ratchford [43] find that online retailers are able to charge more for a homogeneous
good if they have a bricks and mortar storefront. They conclude that online shop-
pers are willing to pay a premium for certain intangibles surrounding the sale of
the good. They also find that if an online only store enters the market early, this
helps create a reputation that allows them to charge higher prices. They see that
the prices charged by the online only firms are less and they are competing on
price, whereas bricks and mortar and online stores have a stronger reputational
effect and may offer better service.
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Graddy [23] gathered data from the Fulton fish market in New York City.
There are about 35 dealers, but not all dealers carry all types of fish. There are
no posted prices and each dealer is free to charge a different price to every cus-
tomer. There is no bargaining over prices except on very large orders. Most of the
customers are repeat customers. Graddy finds that there is significant price disper-
sion in the market for whiting fish. Price dispersion intraday also existed and was
significant. The average price per pound was $0.821 and the standard deviation
was 0.304. She also found that prices were less for Asians than for white people.
Asians made up 62% of the total quantity sold and the buyers were almost exclu-
sively men. Almost all of the owners and sales people are white. Other studies
have found the same result in other fish markets, in particular Kirman and Vignes
[28] find evidence of persistent price dispersion at the Marseilles fish market.
5. Disequilibrium
Meyer, Van Huyck, Battalio and Saving [38] present an innovative way of look-
ing at deviations from the law of one price and ”considered the question of how
the equal prices or rates of return across markets that are the result of competitive
equilibrium produce the resource allocation consistent with these same prices and
rates of return.” They suggest that suppliers confront an information/incentive
problem and use experiments to test the importance of history’s role on future al-
location decisions. They find that naive subjects are not able to coordinate on use-
ful precedents and ”while naive subjects learn to respond to systematic violations
in the law of one price, this behavior produces non-stationary, rather than equilib-
rium, time series for market aggregates.” Experienced subjects did use historical
precedents to coordinate on pure-strategy outcomes.
25
D. Dissertation motivation
It is interesting that so many investigators find violations of the law of one price.
An explanation that is not often considered is that when the number of suppliers
is large any individual supplier has a small optimization premium. Meyer et al.
[38] note that when suppliers behave ”as if” they have no effect on price and the
law of one price is satisfied, then there is no pecuniary incentive to conform to the
strategic equilibrium. When it is violated, strategic uncertainty makes observed
price differences an unreliable indicator of a profit opportunity because the vio-
lation does not indicate who should respond or by how much. The optimization
premium is the incentive a supplier has to best respond.
Price dispersion is not fully explained by trade barriers, exchange rates, bor-
ders, transportation costs or information costs. My thesis is that observed price
dispersion or violations in the law of one price are the result of a difficult strategy
coordination problem and that sufficiently small suppliers will not have a large
enough optimization premium or incentive to eliminate price dispersion.
When there are very few suppliers in a market, the incentives or optimiza-
tion premium is greater than when there are many suppliers. As the number of
suppliers increases, the incentive to best respond becomes very small. The num-
ber of suppliers also increases the complexity of the best response decision and it
becomes costly and complex to make such calculations. When the decisions to op-
timize accurately has a small penalty, the market participant may not do so with
price dispersion being the end result.
Information costs are greater and incentives to do the right thing are smaller
as the number of suppliers increase in a market. As the optimization premium
increases suppliers will behave more strategically. Brander [6] showed that strate-
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gic suppliers will engage in cross-hauling. As the number of firms supplying the
market increases, the optimization premium falls and the amount of inefficient
cross-hauling falls. Transportation costs may answer the question of which sup-
plier should respond to a violation of the law of one price. Transportation costs
help coordinate the market allocation but introduce inefficient cross-hauling.
Chapter II examines the influence of the number of suppliers on the ability
of suppliers to eliminate price dispersion. The analysis presented in chapter II is
without transportation costs. The reason that transportation costs are eliminated is
to allow a clean interpretation of the optimization premium on the behavior of the
subjects to optimally allocate. Without transportation costs, any aggregate alloca-
tion that solves the law of one price is efficient. However, a strategic supplier has
an incentive to deviate if the aggregate allocation is not at the unique equilibrium
allocation.
Without transportation costs, any allocation that satisfies the law of one price
is efficient including the unique strategic equilibrium. However, with the inclu-
sion of transportion costs, there is only one allocation that is Pareto optimal which
differs from the strategic equilibrium. In chapter III we implement a two-by-two
design. There were 4 treatments: 2 without transportation costs and 2 with hetero-
geneous transportation costs. Transportation costs signal to the suppliers where
they should allocate. We test whether subjects behave as price takers, whether in-
creasing the number of suppliers decreases price dispersion and whether increas-
ing the number of suppliers decreases less efficient cross-hauling.
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CHAPTER II
MARKET CONCENTRATION, STRATEGIC SUPPLIERS, AND PRICE
DISPERSION
A. Introduction
A central result in price theory is the law of one price: prices of a homogeneous
good sold at different locations should be equal. Empirical studies of the law
of one price find that it is often violated. Isard [25] describes the law as being
”. . . flagrantly and systematically violated by empirical data.” He finds that viola-
tions in the law can be attributed to product differentiation and trade restrictions,
such as discriminating monopolies, tariffs, and subsidies. These external forces
create barriers to arbitrage and decrease the possibility of satisfying the one price
law. Parsley and Wei [44] and Engel and Rogers [19] looked at price fluctuations
within the United States, and found that violations could not be not be accounted
for by trade barriers, distance, preferences, tariffs or subsidies. Rogoff, Froot and
Kim [46] describe volatility, magnitude and persistence of deviations from the one
price law have not declined much in the period from 1273 to the present despite
lower transportation costs, reduced trade restrictions and fewer wars and plagues
today.
Baye and Morgan [4] looked at price dispersion on the internet where there
were no trade barriers, products were homogeneous and the cost of information
was relatively small. They attribute price dispersion in the internet market to
strategic rather than price taking behavior. They also tested this claim in the labo-
ratory and found similar results.
Meyer, Van Huyck, Battalio and Saving [38] describe the incentive-information
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problem that arises when allocation decisions are determined exclusively by price
signals. If the law of one price is satisfied, then there is no pecuniary incentive to
conform to the equilibrium. When it is violated, strategic uncertainty makes ob-
served price differences an unreliable indicator of a profit opportunity because the
violation does not indicate who should respond or by how much.
This paper uses the experimental method to investigate the possibility that
the observed price dispersion or violations in the law of one price of a homoge-
neous good is the result of this difficult strategy coordination1 problem. Using
the experimental method allows us to control for the possibility that sufficiently
small suppliers will not have a large enough optimization premium or incentive
to eliminate price dispersion. (See Van Huyck [52])
In the real world it is difficult if not impossible to determine the true optimiza-
tion premium of a firm. When it becomes too costly to analyze all contingencies
or possibilities, market participants adopt strategies that are consistent with their
beliefs are far as they are able to analyze them. Using the experimental method
allows us to control for the possibility that when a supplier faces an allocation
decision, there may not be enough incentive for them to correctly determine the
optimal allocation strategies. Under these circumstances that suppliers may not be
able to eliminate price dispersion across markets.




To focus the analysis, consider an economy of m islands, see Phelps [45]. On each
island there is a Marshallian [35] fish market.2 Hence, each island has a local mar-
ket for fish. In the morning of each day, fisherman i makes the half day sail to the
fishing grounds, where his fleet of m boats catch xi units of fish. The fisherman
must decide how to divide up the catch, sij , amongst his m boats, which spend the
afternoon delivering the catch to the m islands. Just before dinner, consumers on
each island come down to the dock to purchase the catch of the day, which sells
for price Pj on island j. Any fish not eaten at dinner that market day spoils. That
evening fisherman i’s fleet returns to his home island with his profits for the day,
pii .
In this economy, there are n suppliers indexed i ∈ I = 1, 2, . . . , n. Each
supplier is endowed with xi units of a homogeneous good. The total catch is
x =
∑n
i=1 xi. There are m locations, indexed j ∈ J = 1, 2, . . . ,m. Let I denote
the set of suppliers and J denote the set of locations. Supplier i delivers sijxi units
of the homogeneous good to location j.
A supplier must decide what share of the catch to deliver to each location,
which can be represented by the 1 × m vector si = (si1, si2, . . . , sim). Supplier i’s
decision must satisfy the feasibility constraint that
∑m
j=1 sij = 1 and sij ≥ 0. Denote
supplier i’s set of feasible deliveries Si and si ∈ Si. Supplier i delivers qij = sijxi
units to location j.
2Marshall writes, ”...when a thing already made has to be sold, the price which
people will be willing to pay for it will be governed by their desire to have it,
together with the amount they can afford to spend on it.... This, for instance, is the
case with a fish market, in which the value of fish for the day is governed almost
exclusively by the stock on the slabs in relation to demand...[p.290].”
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An allocation is an n×m matrix of supplier choices denoted s = (s1, . . . , sn)T .
The set of feasible allocations is denoted S. An allocation s determines the total
quantity of the good supplied to each location j, denoted Qsj , and defined Qsj =∑n
i=1 qij =
∑n
i=1 sijxi. All units of the good delivered to location j are sold for
price Pj .
The profit from a delivery of qij units is the prevailing price Pj times the quan-
tity delivered, Pjqij . Supplier i chooses the vector si to maximize the realized profit
function given what the supplier believes is the expected price E[Pj], which is the








A price taking supplier knows Pj and behaves as if the expected price will be
the prevailing price E[Pj] = Pj , such that Pj is exogenous rather than endogenous
variable.3 Given a 1×m vector of prices Pi = (Pi1, . . . , Pim), a price taking supplier
i maximizes total profits when s?i satisfies:∑
j∈J¯i
s?ij = 1, (2.2)
where J¯ i = {j ∈ J : P ?i = max(Pi1, . . . , Pim)}. J¯ i is the set of locations with the
highest price.
A price taking supplier would not voluntarily choose positive deliveries to
location k if Pik < P ?i , which implies that s?ik = 0 for k /∈ J¯ i. However, a price
taking supplier is indifferent about the quantity delivered to locations contained
in the set of highest price locations, J¯ i.
3Results in experimental economics have demonstrated time and again that it
takes very few participants to obtain price taking behavior. A common rule of
thumb is four participants gives price taking behavior.
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At each location there is demand for the good, which is represented by a de-
mand function that determines quantity demanded Qdj at location j given the pre-
vailing price, Pj :
Qdj = D(Pj,Wj), forj ∈ J ; (2.3)
where Wj is a parameter representing the influence of the number, wealth, and
preferences of consumers at location j on market demand. Assume that the quan-
tity demanded is decreasing in Pj and increasing in Wj .
Local market clearing requires that the quantity supplied equals the quantity
demanded at location j, that is, Qsj = Qdj = Qj , where Qj is the quantity exchanged
in location j. Prices will adjust to clear the m locations. A component needed to
complete the analytical framework is a specification of how the 1×m vector of mar-
ket clearing prices P ? is determined. Two hypothetical price setting institutions are
a centralized [Walrasian] auction and m decentralized [Marshallian] auctions.
The theory predicts that regardless of the number of suppliers, the law will
be satisfied at the equilibrium. It is traditionally assumed that by increasing the
number of suppliers, price dispersion should decrease or be eliminated. I want
to test the law of one price using the experimental method, which allows me to
control for the possibility that sufficiently small suppliers may not have a large
enough optimization premium to eliminate price dispersion. By increasing the
number of suppliers, the optimization premium of the supplier decreases. The
reduction in the premium to best respond means that suppliers may not have an
incentive to eliminate price dispersion.
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C. The experimental framework
The experiment consists of two treatments (See Table I). Each treatment consists of
five cohorts. The first treatment consists of 6 ”large” suppliers. The second treat-
ment consists of 12 ”small” suppliers. Each session was repeated for 50 periods.
The subjects had common and complete information about their own and every-
body else’s earning’s matrix. We assumed linear demand, Pj = 0.70 − 0.11667Qj ,
and two markets, A and B, without transportation costs. Symmetric demand
was simulated across both markets using a computer to determine quantities pur-
chased at quantities delivered.
Table I. Experimental design
Eqbm. Equilibrium
Treatment Cohort Stock Allocation Periods Profits
6 Suppliers 5 2 50% 50 $0.70
12 Suppliers 5 1 50% 50 $0.35
The total stock in the economy remained the same in both treatments, xin = X .
Each period each large supplier received a divisible allocation of two, xi = 2, and
each small supplier received an allocation of one, xi = 1.
Varying the number of suppliers in the economy, while holding the total stock
in the economy constant, allowed us to test whether increased market concentra-
tion, which increases the optimization premium suppliers faced, lowered price
dispersion.
The strategic supplier i optimizes by choosing s∗iA to maximize the following
profit function:
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pii = xisiAPA(siA, s−iA) + xi(1− siA)PB(siA, s−iA) (2.4)
where Pj is determined by the allocation decisions of all of the market suppliers.









The market statistic, m−iA, is the average allocation of the other suppliers,
m−iA = 1(n−1)
∑







To satisfy the feasibility constraints, siA+siB = 1, where s ∈ [0, 1], the subject’s




0 if m−iA > 0.7
(1.75− 2.5m−ij) if 0.3 ≤ m−iA ≤ 0.7
1 if m−iA < 0.3
(2.7)
In the treatment with 12 small suppliers the best response function becomes
ri(m−ij) =

0 if m−ij > 13/22
(3.25− 5.5m−ij) if 9/22 ≤ m−ij ≤ 13/22
1 if m−ij < 9/22
(2.8)












and the equilibrium price is in each market becomes $0.35 for both treatments. The
equilibrium profits for each supplier then become
pi∗i = xiP
∗ = xi($0.35). (2.10)
1. Optimization incentives
The two treatments differ in the size of the premium (penalty) for (not) best re-
sponding to allocation assignments by other suppliers. We refer to this incentive
to best respond as the optimization premium. Let piG(ri(s−i), s−i) denote the ex-
pected payoff to a player in game G who plays ri(s−i). Let piG(si, s−i) be defined as
the expected payoff to player i for playing si. Then the optimization premium for
game G is the function uG(si, s−i) : [0, 1]→ < given by
uG(si, s−i) = piG(ri(s−i), s−i)− piG(si, s−i) (2.11)
The intuition behind the optimization premium is that a larger optimization
premium creates a larger incentive for the supplier to best respond to rival firms.
The optimization premium has been shown to influence the coordination of sub-
jects and the speed of convergence to a stable equilibrium. (see Battalio, Samuelson
and Van Huyck [2]) The small suppliers have a smaller optimization premium thus
penalizing the suppliers less for not having best responded.
The small suppliers have a smaller optimization premium to best responding
correctly. The following equations indicates that by increasing the individual stock
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ceteris paribus increases the optimization premium.
uG(si,m−ij) =

−0.11667x2si(2si + (2m−ij − 1)(n− 1)) if sBRi = 0
−0.23333x2(sBRi − si)2 if 0 < sBRi < 1
−0.11667x2(2(s2i +m−ij(n− 1)(si − 1)))+
[−0.11667x2(si(n+ 1) + (n− 1))] if sBRi = 1
(2.12)
Equation (2.12) indicates that the optimization premium for the large suppliers is
four times as large as the small suppliers in the region, 0 < sBRi < 1, around the
unique equilibrium allocation. The penalty for the small suppliers to not best re-
spond is much smaller than the large suppliers creating less incentive to coordinate
on the strategic equilibrium. Figures 1 and 2 represent the optimization premium
described in equation 2.12. Each contour line represents a five cent penalty for not
having best responded. The figures represent the increased penalty faced by the
large suppliers for not best responding.
2. Experimental design
Figure 3 diagrams the best response functions from functions 2.7 and 2.8. The
vertical axes depict the allocation choice of the strategic supplier to Market A. The
horizontal axes depict the average allocation of the rival suppliers. Because the
axes are denoted in shares allocated to the Market A, the relevant portion of the
figure is from zero to one.
The participants were students that were randomly recruited throughout Texas



























































































































































































Fig. 1. Optimization premium, where each contour line represents a $0.05 penalty
for not having best responded (6 large suppliers)
and the nature of the experiments. If more subjects wanted to participate than
were needed, the subjects needed were randomly chosen from the group, the oth-
ers were paid a ”show-up” fee and were not allowed to participate. The subjects
were then read the instructions as they followed along on their computer. The
subjects were also told that their earnings would vary according to the decisions
that they made during the experiments and that the experiments would last from
one to three hours depending on the decisions of the people in their cohort. Af-











































































































Fig. 2. Optimization premium, where each contour line represents a $0.05 penalty
for not having best responded (12 small suppliers)
filled out a questionnaire to determine that they could understand how to read the
payoff tables.
The experiment uses the ERL (Economics Research Laboratory) Gray Box soft-
ware (see Figure 4). The subjects participated in a two treatment design with a
specified number of goods. The subjects were not allowed to talk or communi-
cate with one another, or look at another subject’s work. As each subject looked at























Fig. 3. Best response functions for the large and small suppliers (where
m−ij = 1/(n− 1)
∑
−i s−ij)
market players would supply to each market. This is called the market statistic
(MS).
To better depict the best response curves from Figure 3, the Gray Box soft-
ware depicts the payoffs for each allocation strategy in a shaded contour inter-
face. Lighter shades denotes higher values by a gradient of shading where lighter
shades indicate higher values. The subjects were allowed to supply any whole
percent to either Market A or Market B giving the subjects a choice from 0 to 100
percent of their product. The payoff for each subject was determined by the alloca-
tive decisions of the other members of the cohort.
The market statistic (MS) is what the subjects see as a horizontal yellow line
in Figure 4. They can slide the market statistic over the contour surface until they
think they find what they think is the expected choice of other suppliers to market.
They then can move what they see as a vertical green line, which is their own
participation in market, up and down until they have found a best response to
the market statistic. The payoffs to each MS and their own allocation choice are
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Figure 1: Example of ERL Gray Box GUI.
Fig. 4. Example of ERL Gray Box GUI
displayed next to the green vertical line.
The interface also displayed a history of their choices and the choices of the
other suppliers. The history displayed the choice of the subject, the MS, the payoff
realized and a running total for all previously completed periods. There was no
time limit for the subjects to make a choice in any of the periods.
Once the subjects confirm their choice and once all other participants have
made their choice, their own payoff is displayed along with the true market statis-
tic. The game is repeated for 50 periods. The subjects earned from $16.47 to $35.01
plus a $5.00 fee for participating. After the experiment the subjects were all paid
in cash and in private and were allowed to leave. Equilibrium play throughout the
experiment would have resulted in earnings of $17.50 for each small suppliers and
$35.00 for each large suppliers.
The novelty of the Gray Box software is the clear depiction of the optimization
premium to the subjects. The contour shading indicates a better and best response
to all allocation choices by rival suppliers. The subject is not left to randomly search
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the grid for a better response to a response by other suppliers. The contour clearly
demarcates the better and best responses to others allocation choices.
D. Experimental results
The results are quite shocking in two areas. First, the magnitude of price dispersion
was greater for the 12 small suppliers. Indicating that decreased market concentra-
tion may result in greater disperion of prices. Second, the allocation decisions of
the 12 small suppliers varied greatly throughout the experiments and coordinated
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Fig. 5. The closing price in Market A by round (6 large suppliers, by cohort)
Figures 5 and 6 indicate the price that clears the market for Market A in each
period. The law of one price suggests a market clearing price of $0.35 each period.
Deviations from that price are inefficient. Prices are fairly stable around $0.35. In
4The play of the subjects is analyzed as well as the first and last 25 periods.
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Fig. 6. The closing price in Market A by round (12 small suppliers, by cohort)
Figure 5, for the six large suppliers, the average market clearing price was $0.3483
with a standard deviation of $0.0456. Figure 6 depicts the twelve small suppliers
and their average market clearing price is $0.3478 with a standard deviation of
$0.0527.
Figures 7 and 8 depict the price dispersion between the markets defined as the
absolute value between the market clearing prices in each period. The mean price
dispersion5 for the six large suppliers is $0.063. For the small suppliers the mean
price dispersion is $0.078. The price disperion is statistically significantly different
from one another. A decrease in market concentration increases price dispersion
in the markets.
Measures of price dispersion that are unitless are helpful when comparing
across products. Suppose the prices across markets is drawn from a distribution,
5Price dispersion is measured as the absolute difference in the price in Market
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Cohort 1 Cohort 2 Cohort 3
Cohort 4 Cohort 5
Fig. 7. The difference in price between Market A and Market B by round (6 large
suppliers, by cohort)
F , with mean µ and variance σ2. The coefficient of variation, CV = σ/µ, has been
used by Carlson-Pescatrice [9], Sorensen [48] and Baye, Morgan and Scholten [5]
and others, to measure price dispersion in traditional retail markets. The coeffi-
cient of variation for the large suppliers is 0.131 and for the small suppliers the
coefficient of variation is 0.151. A t-test indicates that the two coefficients are sta-
tistically different from one another with a p 0.000.
Table II describes the difference from equilibrium play. We then measured the
absolute difference in price from location A less the price in location B from s∗i .
Throughout the experiment, the large suppliers consistently have less variance in
their allocation decisions. We also looked at the first and last 25 periods. The mean
allocation difference from the unique equilibrium, s∗i , for the large suppliers was
9.79 percentage points throughout the experiment and 19.484 percentage points
for the small suppliers. When we only consider the first 25 periods, the mean
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By Cohort - 12 Small Suppliers
Cohort 1 Cohort 2 Cohort 3
Cohort 4 Cohort 5
Fig. 8. The difference in price between Market A and Market B by round (12 small
suppliers, by cohort)
a p-value of less than 1%. The difference is even more visible for the last 25 periods
where the mean difference for the large suppliers was 4.45 and 16.70 for the small
suppliers again with a p-value substantially less than 1.
In Table III, we looked at the difference in the play of the subjects over the
first half of the experiment and the last half of the experiment. For both treatments
the mean allocation is 50% to both markets. It becomes clearer as the experiments
continue that the coordination is less likely to occur in later rounds in the small
suppliers treatment. The standard deviation for the large suppliers drops to 9.6 for
the last 25 periods of the experiment whereas the standard deviation for the small
suppliers decreases some but is still 24.69.
The small and the large suppliers treatments have a mean allocation over the
50 periods that does not deviate much from the equilibrium. However, the stan-
dard deviation for the small suppliers is much greater than for the large suppliers.
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Table II. Means test of difference from unique equilibrium, s∗i
Firms Obs. Mean s.e. std. dev. 95% Conf. Int.
All Rounds
6 1500 9.789 0.3740 14.484 9.056 10.523
12 3000 19.484 0.3391 18.576 18.819 20.149
Combined 4500 16.252 0.2670 17.911 15.729 16.776
Difference −9.695∗∗∗ 0.5048 -10.68 -8.700
(-19.203)
First 25 Periods
6 750 15.12 0.622 17.04 13.91 16.35
12 1,500 22.27 0.479 18.55 21.33 23.21
Combined 2,250 19.89 0.387 18.37 19.13 20.65
Difference −7.14∗∗∗ 0.808 -8.72 -5.56
(-8.84)
Last 25 Periods
6 300 4.45 0.311 8.50 3.84 5.06
12 600 16.70 0.470 18.19 15.78 17.62
Combined 900 12.62 0.351 16.67 11.93 13.31
Difference −12.25∗∗∗ 0.699 -13.62 -10.88
(-17.51)
*** Significant at the 1% level, t-statistic in parentheses
The large suppliers find the equilibrium and stay there.
Table IV describes the unique equilibrium strategy, s∗i , played by the subjects
by cohort for the first and last 25 periods of the experiments as well as an aggregate
equilibrium play by treatment. From Table IV, it becomes apparent that the large
suppliers are more likely to play the unique equilibrium strategy than the small
suppliers. Even once the dispersion in price becomes more stable in the last 25
periods, the small suppliers are still a lost less likely to play the unique strategy
equilibrium.
The level of equilibrium play was greater for the large suppliers due to the
increased incentive to optimize. From the Fisher tests in Table V we can see that
the rates at which the individual suppliers supply at the unique equilibrium is
distinct.
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Table III. A measure of variance in play by treatment
Treatment Obs. s∗i Mean std. dev. Min Max
All Rounds
All 6 Large Suppliers 1,500 50 50.24 17.48 0 100
All 12 Small Suppliers 3,000 50 50.32 26.92 0 100
First 25 Periods
All 6 Large Suppliers 750 50 50.33 22.79 0 100
All 12 Small Suppliers 1,500 50 50.29 28.99 0 100
Last 25 Periods
All 6 Large Suppliers 750 50 50.15 9.60 1 100
All 12 Small Suppliers 1,500 50 50.35 24.69 0 100
The large suppliers were more likely to supply both markets at the unique
equilibrium than their small supplier counterparts. The small suppliers were slower
to find the unique equilibrium and were less able to coordinate. Figure 9 through
Figure 14 describe the allocation decisions of each supplier throughout the 50 peri-
ods. Next to the name of the figure is the treatment that each subject participated.
The straight line through the data is a fitted regression line and denotes the trend in
the allocation choices of the players. Figure 9 is divided up into cells that represent
the cohort and player.
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Table IV. Play of s∗i during the first and last 25 periods
First 25 Periods Last 25 Periods
# of times # of times




1st Cohort 36 24.00 77 51.33
2nd Cohort 49 32.67 92 61.33
3rd Cohort 28 18.67 55 36.67
4th Cohort 45 30.00 67 44.67
5th Cohort 42 28.00 131 87.33
12 Small Suppliers
1st Cohort 40 13.33 65 21.67
2nd Cohort 23 7.67 35 11.67
3rd Cohort 87 29.00 145 48.33
4th Cohort 52 17.33 84 28.00
5th Cohort 50 16.67 97 32.33
Totals by Treatment
6 Large Suppliers 200 26.67 422 56.27
12 Small Suppliers 252 16.80 426 28.40
Table V. Fisher exact tests (aggregated by treatment)




6 Large Suppliers 550 73% 200 27% 750
12 Small Suppliers 1,248 83% 252 17% 1,500
Total 1,798 80% 452 20% 2,250
Left Tail (Pr ≤ F ) 3.980× 10−8
Right Tail (Pr ≥ F ) 0.999
Two-Tailed (Pr ≤ p− value) 7.452× 10−8
Last 25 Periods
6 Large Suppliers 328 44% 422 56% 750
12 Small Suppliers 1,074 72% 426 28% 1,500
Total 1,402 62% 848 38% 2,250
Left Tail (Pr ≤ F ) 1.874× 10−37
Right Tail (Pr ≥ F ) 1.0
Two-Tailed (Pr ≤ p− value) 2.389× 10−37
All Periods
6 Large Suppliers 878 59% 622 41% 1,500
12 Small Suppliers 2,322 77% 678 23% 3,000
Total 3,200 71% 1,300 29% 4,500
Left Tail (Pr ≤ F ) 1.234× 10−38
Right Tail (Pr ≥ F ) 1.0
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Graphs by Player - Cohort 4
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Graphs by Player - Cohort 5
Player 0 Player 1
Player 4








Fig. 14. Allocation decisions by round (12 small suppliers, 5th cohort)
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Figures 15 and 16 describe the level of aggregate efficiency in the economy.
The large suppliers extract more of the surplus, about 98.17%. In Figure 16, which
describes the small suppliers, the average efficiency is 97.45%. This is a about a 1%
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Mean Efficiency = 
0.9712 
Mean Efficiency = 
0.9732
Mean Efficiency = 
0.9823 
Mean Efficiency = 
0.9930 
Mean Efficiency = 
0.9888 
Fig. 15. Market efficiency by round relative to the unique equilibrium (6 large sup-
pliers, by cohort)
Theory suggests the small and large suppliers use s∗i . Suppliers can play the
secure strategy and be efficient. When we look at Figure 16 we see the small sup-
pliers are not able to extract as much of the surplus.
Table XV tests whether the subjects play is statistically different. The means
are percentages of efficiency relative to the maximum producer surplus available
in the economy. Again the treatments were split up into the first and last 25 periods
to allow for coordination to take place. This measure of efficiency is less concerned
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Mean Efficiency = 
0.9790 
Mean Efficiency = 
0.9703 
Mean Efficiency = 
0.9714 
Mean Efficiency = 
0.9884 
Mean Efficiency = 
0.9634 
Aggregated Efficiency: 
Mean Efficiency = 0.9745 
Std. Dev. = 0.0419
Fig. 16. Market efficiency by round relative to the unique equilibrium (12 small sup-
pliers, by cohort)
riods, there is not much difference in the level of efficiency that is exhibited. The
last 25 periods, the small firms were less efficient in coordinating on an efficient
outcome. Tables XVI through XIX in Appendix A1, test the theory as proposed in
Meyer et al. [38] that there is a weighted attraction such that once a supplier no-
tices the price below or above P ∗ in period t, do they remain there in period t + 1.
χ2 tests are used to check for random play.
Figure 17 depicts the empirical distribution function for the two different treat-
ments and a Kolmogorov-Smirnof test was performed which soundly rejects the
hypothesis that the two distributions were drawn from the same population. The
largest difference in the two distributions was 0.1343 and there were 4,500 observa-
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Fig. 17. The empirical distribution function as a percentage of allocation to Market
A
from the figure that the small suppliers were more widely dispersed throughout
the distribution and the large suppliers were more likely to play s∗i .
1. Naive best-responders
A naive market participant that simply best responds would react to the play in
previous period by best-responding information from only the previous period. A
model was used to test the theory of the naive best responder where
Ownmovei = β0 + β1ri(m−iA) + ² (2.13)
where Ownmove is the allocation choice in the current period, ri(m−iA) is the best-
reply to the market statistic from the previous period. The results were tested
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where H0 : β1 = 1. An F -test confirms that the subjects are not naively best re-
sponding. Table VI describes the results form equation 2.13.
Table VI. Naive best-responders
Variable 6 Large Suppliers 12 Small Suppliers




Standard errors in parentheses
2. Autocorrelation and independence
A runs test was performed on each of the suppliers looking at random play by
the suppliers. The results for treatment of 12 small suppliers indicates that 17 of
the 60 suppliers allocations may not be serially independent at the 5% level of
significance. The results for the large suppliers indicates that 9 of the 30 suppliers
allocations may not be serially independent at the 5% level of significance.
An up and down test was also used to look at auto-correlation between rounds.
The test show that 14 of the large suppliers and 21 of the small suppliers indicates
a rejection of auto-correlation at the 5% level of significance.
We wanted to know whether the dispersion of prices is similar to that of ran-
dom play so we solved for the theoretical variance, E[(P1 − P2)]2, if the suppliers
were to allocate using a random draw from a uniform distribution, si ∈ [0, 1]. The
theoretical variance (see Appendix A3 for proof) is
E[(P1 − P2)2]6 = $0.02722
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E[(P1 − P2)2]12 = $0.01361
where the subscripts denote the large and small suppliers respectively. The actual
or observed price dispersion was
(P1 − P2)26 = $0.00834
(P1 − P2)212 = $.01110
A means test was performed. The 6 large suppliers clearly had a variance in
price dispersion that was much less than the theoretical with a p-value of ∼0.000.
The theoretical prediction decreases with the number of suppliers. This is not the
case with the observed data. The price dispersion increases. The t-test on the small
suppliers also suggested that the observed was less than the theoretical prediction
at the 5% level of significance with a p-value of 0.027.
E. Conclusion
Market concentration was found to influence price dispersion. As the number
of suppliers, ceteris paribus, increases, the optimization premium is reduced re-
sulting in increased price disperion. The ability of suppliers to coordinate in this
setting is correlated with the optimization premium.
The coordination at the strategic equilibrium as the market concentration in-
creases is demonstrated in Figures 18-19 and suggests the difficulty associated with
a smaller optimization premium. The number of subjects that play the strategic
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Percentage of Subjects that Play
Unique Equilibrium
Aggregated Mean Unique 
Equilibrium Play: 
Mean Dispersion = 41.47% 
Fig. 18. The percentage of suppliers that allocate at the unique (s∗i ) equilibrium (6
large suppliers)
tration decreases. Increasing the number of firms holding the stock in the economy
constant, increases the difficulty for firms to coordinate at the equilibrium.
Baye and Morgan [3] looked at an internet shopping site to analyze price
dispersion with very low information costs. They found on a website that lists
the price of many rival suppliers for a homogeneous good similar coefficients of
variation to our experiments. With 2 suppliers selling a homogeneous good the
CV = 0.229, with 4 suppliers: CV = 0.094 , with 8 suppliers: CV = 0.225 and with
12 suppliers: CV = 0.054. The magnitude of the coefficient of variation found by
Baye and Morgan is similar to what we observe in the laboratory.
The number of firms supplying the market has direct implications on the abil-
ity of suppliers to coordinate on the efficient equilibrium. In contrast to the notion
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Percentage of Subjects that Play
Unique Equilibrium
Aggregated Mean Unique 
Equilibrium Play: 
Mean Dispersion = 22.60%
Fig. 19. The percentage of suppliers that allocate at the unique (s∗i ) equilibrium (12
small suppliers)
price dispersion decreases, we expect and find just the opposite. We find that with
increased suppliers to an economy, the greater is the price dispersion. When we
hold markets demand constant and the quantity available to be allocated in each




MARKET CONCENTRATION, PRICE DISPERSION, AND INEFFICIENT
CROSS-HAULING
A. Introduction
A fundamental result is economics is the law of one price. There are many reasons
to expect a homogeneous good sold at different locations to sell for the same price.
Yet most investigators find violations of the law. Isard [25] describes the law as
being ”. . . flagrantly and systematically violated by empirical data” and finds that
violations in the law can be attributed to product differentiation and restrictions to
free markets, such as discriminating monopolies, tariffs, subsidies and other trade
restrictions. Parsley and Wei [44] and Engel and Rogers [19] looked at price fluc-
tuations within the United States, which allows them to control for trade barriers
such as those found by Isard. They still found price dispersion that could not be ac-
counted for by distance and preferences. Stigler [49] posited that information was
in effect a large culprit in the dispersion of prices for a homogeneous good. Stigler
suggests that ”Price dispersion is a manifestation– and, indeed, it is the measure–
of ignorance in the market.” Baye and Morgan [4] found price dispersion on the
Internet where there were no trade barriers, products were homogeneous and the
cost of information was negligible.
Deviations in the law have remained quite stable over the past 700 years in
commodity prices. Rogoff, Froot and Kim [46] examine price dispersions over the
past 700 years. The surprising result is that with the advent of a quick transmission
of foreign prices, volatility and price dispersion has not declined.
It is puzzling that so many investigators find violations of the law of one price.
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Many explanations have been offered. For example, information and transporta-
tion costs, borders, trade barriers, and exchange rates, among thers, have all been
offered as reasons that law does not hold empirically. When tested carefully these
new explanations explain only a very little part of the observed violations of the
law of one price.
An explanation that is not often considered is that when the number of sup-
pliers is large any individual supplier has a small optimization premium. A small
optimization premium results in markets experiencing long periods of disequilib-
rium dynamics. Meyer et al. [38] note that if the law of one price is satisfied, then
there is no pecuniary incentive to conform to the equilibrium. When it is violated,
strategic uncertainty makes observed price differences an unreliable indicator of
a profit opportunity because the violation does not indicate who should respond
or by how much. The optimization premium is the incentive a supplier has to
best respond. It is usually impossible to compute the optimization premium using
field data. This paper uses the experimental method to investigate whether ceteris
parabis lowering the number of suppliers and thus increasing the optimization
premium increases the frequency that the law of one price is satisfied.
As the optimization premium increases suppliers will behave more strategi-
cally. Brander [6] showed that strategic suppliers will engage in cross-hauling.
Cross-hauling is the bidirectional transporting of an identical product between
two locations, which decreases welfare when transportation is costly. As the num-
ber of firms supplying the market increases, the optimization premium falls and
the amount of inefficient cross-hauling falls. Transportation costs may answer the
question of which supplier should respond to a violation of the law of one price.




To focus the analysis, consider an economy of m islands.1 On each island there
is a Marshallian [35]) fish market.2 Hence, each island has a local market for fish.
In the morning of each day, fishermen i sails to their fishing grounds, where their
fleet of m boats catch xi units of fish. The fishermen must decide how to divide
up the catch, sij , amongst their m boats, which spend the afternoon delivering the
catch to the m islands. Just before dinner, consumers on each island come down to
the dock to purchase the catch of the day, which sells for price pj on island j. Any
fish not eaten at dinner that market day spoils. That evening fishermen i’s fleet
returns to their home island with their profits for the day, pii .
In this economy, there are n suppliers indexed i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Each supplier
is each endowed with xi units of a homogenous good. The total units of the ho-
mogenous good is x =
∑n
i=1 xi. There are m locations, indexed j = 1, 2, . . . ,m. Let
I denote the set of suppliers and J denote the set of locations. Supplier i delivers
qij = sijxi units of the homogenous good to location j.
A supplier must decide what share of the catch to deliver to each location,
which can be represented by the 1 × m vector si = (si1, si2, . . . , sim). Supplier i’s
decision must satisfy the feasibility constraint that
∑m
j=1 sij = 1 and sij ≥ 0. Denote
supplier i’s set of feasible deliveries Si and si ∈ Si.
1The analytical framework differs from Meyers, et al. [38] in two ways. The
allocation problem is continuous and transportation costs may not be zero. It is
based on Van Huyck [52]. Phelps [45] popularized the study of island economies.
2Marshall writes, ”...when a thing already made has to be sold, the price which
people will be willing to pay for it will be governed by their desire to have it,
together with the amount they can afford to spend on it.... This, for instance, is the
case with a fish market, in which the value of fish for the day is governed almost
exclusively by the stock on the slabs in relation to demand...[35].” A similar parable
with indivisible market delivery was used in Meyer et al. [38].
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An allocation is an n×m matrix of supplier choices denoted s = (s1, . . . , sn)T .
The set of feasible allocations is denoted S. An allocation s determines the total
quantity of the good supplied to each location j, denoted qsj , and defined qsj =∑n
i=1 qij =
∑n
i=1 sijxi. All units of the good delivered to location j are sold for
price pj .
Supplier i’s marginal transportation costs to location j are denoted cij and are
assumed to be a positive constant. The profit from a delivery of qij units is the
prevailing price times the quantity delivered, pjqij , less transportation costs, cijqij .
Supplier i chooses the vector si to maximize the realized profit function, which is




(pj − cij)qij =
m∑
j=1




where p¯ij is the prevailing price in market j net of supplier i’s transportation costs.
Before analyzing the model under the assumption of strategic behavior, we assume
suppliers are price takers. Results in experimental economics often demonstrate
that it takes very few participants to obtain price taking behavior.
A price taking supplier knows pj and behaves as if pj is an exogenous rather
than endogenous variable. Given a 1 ×m vector of net prices p¯i = (p¯i1, . . . , p¯im), a
price taking supplier i maximizes total profits when s?i satisfies:∑
j∈J¯i
s?ij = 1, (3.2)
where J¯ i = {j ∈ J : p¯ij = p¯?i = max(p¯i1, . . . , p¯im)}. J¯ i is the set of locations with the
highest price net of supplier i’s transportation costs.
A price taking supplier would not voluntarily choose positive deliveries to
location k if p¯ik < p¯?i , which implies that s?ik = 0 for k 6∈ J¯ i. However, a price taking
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supplier is indifferent about the quantity delivered to locations contained in the set
of highest price locations, J¯ i.3
At each location there is demand for the good, which is represented by a de-
mand function that determines quantity demanded qdj at location j given the pre-
vailing price, pj :
qdj = q(pj, wj), forj ∈ J ; (3.3)
wherewj is a parameter representing the influence of the number, wealth, and pref-
erences of consumers at location j on market demand. Assume that the quantity
demanded is decreasing in pj and increasing in wj .
Local market clearing requires that the quantity supplied equals the quantity
demanded at location j, that is, qsj = qdj = qj , where qj is the quantity exchanged
in location j. Prices will adjust to clear the m locations. A component needed
to complete the analytical framework is a specification of how the 1×m vector of
market clearing prices p? is determined. Two hypothetical price setting institutions
are a centralized [Walrasian] auction and m decentralized [Marshallian] auctions.
1. Centralized competition with recontracting and the law of one price
A conventional approach to the problem of general market clearing is to assume
a hypothetical central exchange where a complete set of contracts that require the
delivery of a specified quantity of a specified good on a specified date to a specified
location, are traded.4 Because it illustrates the coordination problem of a market
3Let p? = max(pi1, . . . , pim). If pj = p? for all j ∈ J¯ i, then a price taking supplier i
only delivers to the locations in the set of locations with their lowest transportation
cost.
4Debreu [12]) motivates these hypothetical contracts as being analogous to the
futures contracts for No.2 Red Winter Wheat traded in Chicago. Of course, ”Orga-
nized futures markets concern only a small number of goods, locations, and dates
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economy, allows a formal definition of the law of one price and because it will
characterize the efficient equilibrium in the experiment to follow, a useful bench-
mark case is to assume that a supplier could enter into a ”futures” contract for
the delivery of qsij units of the good to location j at price pj in a central exchange.
Having postulated the existence of a central exchange it is then possible to give
the following ”recontracting” rationalization for the determination of the general
market clearing price vector p?.5
At the beginning of the market day, the Walrasian auctioneer announces a
price vector p1 to the central exchange participants, which includes all n suppliers
and the unspecified consumers. Taking this announcement as given, each par-
ticipant fills out a ”ticket” listing their supply or demand for the good. If sup-
ply equals demand for all local markets, then the participants’ ”tickets” are ex-
changed for binding ”futures” contracts. However, if general market clearing is
not achieved the ”tickets” are returned and the Walrasian auctioneer announces
another price vector p2. This ”recontracting” process continues until general mar-
ket clearing is achieved.
a. The allocation problem with homogeneous transportation costs
Assume that all suppliers have homogeneous transportation costs, that is, cij = cj
for all j. A necessary condition for general market clearing is that all prices net of
transportation costs must be equal, that is, p¯?j = p¯? for all j in J . If not, then there
exits a location k such that it is not contained in the set of highest price markets, J¯ i.
Location k would not be served by any supplier and, hence, there would be excess
(not too distant in the future), ... [p.33].”
5Walras [54]) provides this rationalization, see also Edgeworth [15], Jaffe [26]
and Leijonhufvud [32].
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demand in location k. This necessary condition for an equilibrium is often called
the law of one price.
The introduction of a central exchange for a homogenous commodity supplied
to alternative locations would eliminate the economic distinction between local
markets. The law of one price implies that the m locations are integrated into one
central market for the homogenous commodity.
Merely announcing an equilibrium vector of prices (p?1, . . . , p?m), while nec-
essary, is not sufficient to insure general market clearing when suppliers have
homogenous transportation costs. While the equilibrium vector of prices leaves
suppliers indifferent between supplying the m locations, prices provide no infor-
mation to suppliers concerning where to actually deliver the good. Suppliers may
choose to deliver all of the good to a single location, which means that no location
satisfies the local market clearing condition, but any adjustment of prices to the
excess supply and demand in the local markets would violate the law of one price.
Consequently, information about excess demand or supply in the local mar-
kets is not sufficient to inform the Walrasian auctioneer’s groping for an equilib-
rium vector of prices. Instead, the Walrasian auctioneer must know how to reallo-
cate the tickets submitted so as to leave the suppliers indifferent and, yet, satisfy
the local market clearing conditions. In Walrasian models, the implicit conversion
of tickets into futures contracts hides an allocation problem.
While there is a unique equilibrium price vector, there are infinitely many
equilibrium allocations. Given an equilibrium price vector and homogenous trans-
portation costs, a feasible allocation s is contained in the set of Walrasian alloca-
tions, Sw, when the allocation satisfies the general market clearing condition, that
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is,






qij ≡ qsj = qdj (p?) ∀ j ∈ J } (3.4)
Walrasian allocations have the desirable property that they are Pareto efficient, see
Debreu [12].
The Walrasian auctioneer not only must announce an equilibrium price vec-
tor, but he must also assign an equilibrium allocation to the market participants,
that is, he must assign to each supplier a specific location for delivery. Because this
allocation problem is hidden in the implicit recontracting rationalization of equi-
librium, Walrasian models of general market clearing do not formalize and can not
analyze the allocation problem inherent in actual decentralized economies.6
b. Heterogenous transportation costs, market entry, and price taking suppliers
One reaction to the allocation problem is to argue that unformalized idiosyncratic
characteristics of the suppliers solve the allocation problem. For example, suppose
that locating operations at a specific location reduces a supplier’s transportation
costs associated with deliveries to that location. Then the suppliers’ location deci-
sion results in suppliers having heterogenous transportation costs. Assume that a
supplier’s location is predetermined by the condition that a fixed cost of entry is
equal to the shadow price of the endowment, that is, there is no incentive for new
suppliers to enter any local market.
Let a local supplier i to market k have a supplier specific cost cik equal to 0.
6Diamond [13] also emphasizes this shortcoming of Walrasian general market
clearing models and suggests using a search equilibrium framework. However,
search equilibria involve direct agent to agent exchanges, which introduces a dif-
ficult bilateral bargaining problem, see Osborne and Rubinstein [42]. Our model
of decentralized competition avoids this bargaining problem. Hayek was one of
the first to argue that the Walrasian framework does not formalize the essential
coordination problem of a decentralized economy, see O’Driscoll [40].
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Let Ij denote the set of suppliers local to market j, that is, Ij = { i ∈ I | cij = 0}.
A foreign supplier h to market j has marginal transportation costs chj greater than
0. Partition the set of suppliers, I , into m sets of local suppliers for market j, Ij ,
where I = I1 ∪ I2 ∪ . . . Im. Equilibrium entry makes it is feasible for local demand
to be served by local suppliers; specifically, let
∑




Given the assumed distribution of local suppliers, then the equilibrium price
vector (p?, . . . , p?) not only clears all markets but also implies a unique allocation.
When all markets have the same price p?, supplier i’s price net of transportation
costs p¯ij is highest in his local market j and supplier i only delivers to j, that is, J¯ i =
{j} for all i in Ij . Since J¯i contains a single element, price taking suppliers who are
local to market j maximizes total profits when they deliver everything to their
home market, that is, sij = 1 for j ∈ J¯ i and sik = 0 for k not in J¯ i. This individual
behavior is consistent with general market clearing, because it is feasible for local
suppliers to satisfy local demand at p?.
Heterogenous transportation costs solve the allocation problem, but weakens
the law of one price. Given supplier locations, there are now infinitely many price
vectors that motivate suppliers to implement allocation s?. Specifically, the local
price of the homogenous commodity can differ from p? as long as this variation
leaves the set of markets with maximal prices unchanged for all suppliers.
The equilibrium with all suppliers serving their local market is a unique equi-
librium that is also efficient. No transportation costs are incured. The transporta-
tion costs solve the allocation problem, but are not actually incurred, and there is
no social welfare loss due to transportation to foreign markets.
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2. Decentralized competition with strategic suppliers
Instead of a centralized futures market, suppose that each island has a spot market
for the good, that is, each location has a Marshallian auctioneer who discovers the
price, p∗j , at location j that equate demand to supply. The price is determined after
a supplier has delivered qij units of the good to location j. The good perishes just
after it has been delivered and cannot be transported to a second local market.7
Hence, the decision is irreversible and the supplier sells qij at the prevailing price,
p∗j . Given the quantity supplied to market j, qsj , the local auctioneer announces a
price p∗j that clears the local market, that is, qsj = qdj = q(pj, wj).
Inverting the demand function gives the local price pj as a function of the total
quantity supplied to market j, qsj :
p∗j = p(q
s




The inverse demand function p(qsj , wj) is assumed to be strictly positive on some
bounded interval (0, q¯ (wj)) on which it is twice continuously differentiable, de-
creasing in qsj , and increasing in wj . The inverse demand function is assumed to
be concave in qsj . For qsj ≥ q¯ (wj), p(qsj , wj) = 0. Since the locations are isolated it is
natural to assume that pj does not depend on deliveries to other locations.
Equation (5) maps a vector of quantities into a vector of prices, which is deter-
mined by an allocation s implemented by the n suppliers. The law of one price no
longer holds as the local price is what ever is necessary to clear the location. This
dispersion of realized prices does not provide convential arbitrage opportunities
for suppliers, because of the physical isolation of each local market. Competitive
suppliers would like to avoid making deliveries to locations not contained in the
7See Fisher [20] for an analysis of arbitrage across time.
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set of locations with maximal realized prices, J¯ i.
Increasing the share sij supplier i delivers to location j lowers the price p∗j
by the assumption of a negatively sloped demand curve. Instead of price taking
behavior, this section supposes that each supplier behaves strategically and takes
account of their influence on prices. The strategic interdependence amongst the
suppliers can be formalized as the following strategic market game: The n sup-
pliers make up the set of ”players”, I . Each supplier chooses from the set of the
feasible share vectors, si ∈ Si. An exclusive allocation for supplier i is an (n− 1)×m
matrix of supplier choices denoted s−i = {s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sn}T . Using equa-
tion (5), it is possible to rewrite supplier i’s realized profit function, equation (1),
in terms of si and s−i:








) − chj) sijxi. (3.6)
The market game Γ is defined by the pi = {pi1, . . . , pin}, S, and I .
Given an exclusive outcome s−i, a strategic supplier i chooses s∗i to maximize
the following Lagrangian function:




















sijxi − cijxi = λxi, for all j ∈ J, (3.8)
and xi =
∑m





)− cij + ∂pj
∂qsj
xisij = λ, for all j ∈ J. (3.9)
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Supplier i chooses s∗i such that marginal profits are the same at all locations
and equal to the shadow price of the endowed good. Unlike price taking be-
havior where the price net of transportation costs determines behavior, supplier
i also accounts for the effect an extra unit has on the profitability (which changes
by ∂pj/∂qsj ) of inframarginal units, qij = sijxi. The profit function is concave in
si. Hence, the second order conditions are satisfied and the first order condi-
tions are for a unique maximum. The solution to the first order conditions gives
the best response functions, rij (s−ij), for the strategic suppliers. Let ri (s−i) =
(ri1 (s−i1) , . . . , rim (s−im)).
A feasible outcome s∗ in game Γ is a mutual best response outcome when
pii( si, s
∗
−i) ≤ pii( s∗i , s∗−i), (3.10)
for all si ∈ Si and for all i ∈ I . No supplier can increase their profits by choos-
ing some other delivery vector given the other suppliers delivery vectors. An





for all i ∈ I .
C. The experiment’s framework
The framework established for the experiments was to use linear demand,
Pj(sij.s−ij) = wj − bj(xisij +
∑
−i x−is−ij), with two symmetric locations (location
A and B) where suppliers are symmetrically located. The transportation costs are
heterogeneous such that each supplier has a designated home location, h, without
a cost to transport, cih = 0 and a foreign location, j, that is costly to transport, cij 6=
0. The strategic supplier i optimizes by choosing s∗ih to maximize the following
profit function:
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pii = xisihPh(sih, s−ih) + xi(1− sih)Pj(sih, s−ih − cij) (3.11)












The market statistic, m−ij , is the average allocation of the other suppliers,
m−ij = [1/(n− 1)]
∑










To satisfy the feasibility constraints, siA + siB = 1, where s ∈ [0, 1].








When cij = 0, the equilibirum allocation is to allocate to both locations with half,
s∗ih = 1/2.
Revenue was determined by the quantity supplied, which was determined by
the decision of the individual, multiplied by the price. However, price was deter-
mined by the decisions of not only the individual, but of the decisions of the whole
cohort. Linear demand equations have a property that if the individual supplies
half to Market A and half to Market B, the profits paid to the individual is indiffer-
ent to decisions made by the other suppliers to the markets at the market equilib-
rium. This secure strategy equilibrium is also the cross-hauling strategic equilib-
rium where an individual does not incur transportation costs. The secure strategy
is not the optimal strategy for the suppliers with transportation costs. This secure




1. The optimization premium and market concentration
The four treatments differ in the size of the premium (penalty) for (not) best re-
sponding to allocation assignments by other suppliers. We refer to this incentive
to best respond as the optimization premium. Let piG(ri(s−i), s−i) denote the ex-
pected payoff to a player in game G who plays ri(s−i). Let piG(si, s−i) be defined as
the expected payoff to player i for playing si. Then the optimization premium for
game G is the function uG(i) : [0, 1]→ < given by
uG(si, s−i) = piG(ri(s−i), s−i)− piG(si, s−i) (3.15)
The intuition behind the optimization premium is that a larger optimization
premium creates a larger incentive for the supplier to best respond to rival firms.
The optimization premium has been shown to influence the coordination of sub-
jects and the speed of convergence to a stable equilibrium. The small suppliers
have a smaller optimization premium thus penalizing the suppliers less for not
having best responded. Figure 20 represents the optimization premia for the four
treatments. Each contour line represents a $0.05 penalty for not having best re-
sponded. Because the optimization premium is defined as the difference in the
best response to an alternative allocation, along the best response the premium for
deviating is zero. As is clear from the Figure 20, the treatments with large suppliers
have a much greater optimization premium than the small suppliers.
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Fig. 20. Optimization premium, where each contour line represents a $0.05 penalty
for not having best responded
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2. Inefficient cross-hauling
The efficient market outcome is one where the total welfare in the economy is maxi-
mized. Considering multiple markets and multiple firms with transportation costs
allows us to measure the welfare implications of other allocation strategies that sat-
isfy the law of one price. We denote Ω as the total welfare in the economy which
consists of the consumer surplus, Ψ, and the producer surplus, Π. Thus,




where pii· is the individual profits generated by firm i in all markets.
In the framework imposed on the subjects with transportation costs, there is
a unique Pareto optimal allocation. That is for each supplier to wholly allocate to
the location that does not incur a transportion cost. This is equivalent to the com-
petitive equilibrium, where each supplier behaves as a price taker and supplies the
location with the lowest transportation cost.
The unique equilibrium allocation when cij > 0 is not the Pareto optimal al-
location. The strategic equilibrium does not maximize welfare when firms face
transportation costs to foreign markets due to waste created by cross-hauling a
homogeneous good. A strategic supplier tries to influence the price to increase
profits. As we see in Equation 3.14, the supplier still has an incentive to allocate to
the location that is costly. Suppliers in both locations have the same incentive to
allocate a portion to the costly location creating an inefficiency in the market.










= pii − µi (3.17)
where µi is the cross hauling loss created by a strategic supplier delivering to a
location where transportation costs are incurred and pii is the efficient profits that
can be generated if all firms deliver solely to their home market.
To see the effect of an increase in the market concentration on the loss of wel-
fare we impose the ceteris paribus condition
xin = X (3.18)
where xi is the stock, n is the number of suppliers and X is the total stock in the
economy. The previous condition creates a clean ceteris paribus comparison of
increased market participation. By holding the stock constant across treatments,
optimization premium is reduced for the small suppliers. We then observe the
effect of the optimization premium on the law of one price which is the incentive
to strategically supply both markets. A large supplier can have a greater effect
of price, which creates an incentive for greater cross-hauling inefficiency. If we













P ∗ − X
n
(1− s∗ih)cij (3.19)
If we differentiate (3.19) with respect to n we can see the effect on µi, the cross-
hauling loss. If we define Πˆ = npii as the efficient market equilibrium, meaning
that all firms supply solely their home market, we can say that the welfare loss
to the economy when firms are not efficiently allocating the good is Φ = Πˆ − npi∗i
which is the efficient profits they could have earned without cross-hauling minus
the amount that a perfectly strategic supplier would receive. The total producer








indicating that less market concentration, the smaller the loss in welfare due to
cross-hauling. Firms are more likely to supply their home markets rather than
paying the transportation cost and cross-hauling to the foreign market. The in-
crease in the number of firms to the market monotonically decreases the welfare
loss to the firms when allocating at the strategic equilibrium.
A strategic supplier will no longer allocate to the costly location when cij ≥
xibj(n + 1). At this boundry condition, the cost to allocate to the costly location
outweighs the potential benefit.
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E. The experimental design
Table VII. Experimental design - 2× 2 design
Suppliers
per Transport
Treatment Sessions Session Stock Costs Periods
1 5 2 3 $0.00 50
2 5 6 1 $0.00 50
3 5 2 3 $0.07 50
4 5 6 1 $0.07 50
The experiment uses a 2 × 2 design, which results in four treatments. (see
Table VII) The first blocking variable is the number of suppliers, n, either 2 or 6.
The second blocking variable is transportation costs to either $0.00 or $0.07. The
design used twenty cohorts. Five cohorts for each treatment. The design tests the
following hypotheses:
• H0: Increasing n ceteris paribus decreases observed price dispersion.
• H1: With transportation costs, increasing n ceteris paribus results in less in-
efficient cross-hauling.
• H2: When n = 6 subjects behave as if they are price takers.
• H3: When n = 2 subjects are more likely to use their unique equilibrium
strategy.
Suppliers are symmetrically endowed in each treatment. We endow the large8
suppliers with three each period, xi = 3, and we endow the small suppliers with
8We will refer to the first and third treatments, which have two suppliers, as
large supplier treatments, and the second and forth treatments, which have six
suppliers, as small supplier treatments.
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one such that xi = 1. Holding the total stock in the economy constant improves
the identification of implications that increased market concentration have on the
law of one price as well as the incentive to strategically supply to both markets.
The inverse demand function at location j is given by Pj = 0.70− 0.11667Qj9.
The equilibrium price for both market locations is $0.35 in all treatments. The
best response functions for the linear case which are used in the experiments are
derived from the profit conditions and follow from Equation (3.12) such that the
















0 if m−ij > 0.7
(1.75− 2.5m−ij) if 0.3 ≤ m−ij ≤ 0.7
1 if m−ij < 0.3
(3.23)
and the unique equilibrium allocation is
9The profit function was chosen because it follows from Meyer et al. [38] where
the linear demand function in this paper is tangent to the iso-elastic demand func-






The equilibrium profits without transport costs become
pi∗i = xP
∗ = pˆii (3.25)
due to the fact there is no transport cost to the foreign market, all allocations that
satisfy the law of one price, including the equilibrium, are efficient.
The transportation cost in both treatments 3 and 4 is cij = $0.07. With trans-






s−ij ∀ m−ij ∈ [0, 1] (3.26)
where s∗ih = 0.60. Note how the allocation to the home market increases by includ-
ing transportation costs from 0.50 to 0.60. And for 6 small suppliers with transport
costs the best response function becomes
ri(m−ij) =

0 if m−ij > 0.76
(1.9− 2.5s−ij) if 0.36 ≤ m−ij ≤ 0.76
1 if m−ij < 0.36
(3.27)
where s∗ih = 0.80. With increased market participation, the amount of cross-hauling
decreases. We see that the large suppliers want to deliver 40% to the costly location
and the small suppliers only want to deliver 20% to the costly location.
The equilibrium profits for treatment two become
pi∗i = x
[







The efficient profits for the firms when all suppliers strictly deliver all of their
allocation to the home market gives
pii = xiP
∗ (3.29)
We call pii the efficient profits where the supplier is able to capture all of the
surplus without incurring any transport costs. If we consider the loss to cross
hauling






If we substitute in the endowment constraint x = X/n, we get






where µ is the cross-hauling loss due to strategically supplying the market. In-








Thus we see that increasing the number of suppliers, ceteris paribus, reduces
cross-hauling. The profits to each supplier is increased by reducing the incentive
to strategically cross-haul.
The loss in producer surplus is a direct result of a coordination failure as well
as firms strategically supplying the market with transportation costs. To strategi-
cally supply without transportation costs does not decrease producer surplus. It
is the suppliers that pay the transportation costs that cause a reduction in profits.
The total producer surplus loss to the economy decreases with an increase in firms
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Fig. 21. Best response curves with contour (lighter shades represent higher payoffs)
82
as shown in (3.19).
Figure 21 diagrams the best response functions to the subjects. The vertical
axis is the allocation, sih, of the supplier to their home location. The horizontal
axis depicts the average allocation decisions of the suppliers, m−ij . The dark line
depicts the best response curve for a supplier as viewed from the home market
allocation. Because the axes are denoted in share allocated to the home market, the
relevant portion of the figure is from zero to one.
Table VIII depicts the theoretical loss to suppliers that supply at the strategic
equilibrium. Suppliers without transportation costs lose nothing by transporting
the good to both markets. In aggregate, the total cross-hauling loss is 2µi = $0.168
in treatment 3 and for the six small small suppliers in treatment 4, the loss is 6µi =
$0.084, half the size of the large suppliers. Thus, the theoretical prediction for the
suppliers is a reduction in cross-hauling loss with an increase in the number of
suppliers.
Table VIII. Loss to suppliers from cross-hauling at strategic equilibrium
Cross-Haul
Treatment Suppliers Transport Costs Loss, µ
1 2 No $0.00
2 6 No $0.00
3 2 Yes $0.084
4 6 Yes $0.014
The experiment presented tests the theory of strategic suppliers that implies
that changing the market concentration and adding transportation costs, ceteris
paribus, will change the frequency with which cross-hauling is observed. Each
experimental session consisted of 50 periods.
The participants were students that were randomly recruited throughout Texas
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A&M University and were allowed to participate in only one session. The sub-
jects were read statements concerning the time required and the nature of the ex-
periments. If more subjects wanted to participate than were needed, the subjects
needed were randomly chosen from the group, the others were paid a ”show-up”
fee and were not allowed to participate. The subjects were then read the instruc-
tions as they followed along on their computer. The subjects were also told that
their earnings would vary according to the decisions that they made during the
experiments and that the experiments would last from one to three hours depend-
ing on the decisions of the people in their cohort. After reading the subjects the
instructions, but before the session began, the subjects filled out a questionnaire
to determine that they could understand how to read the payoff tables. Table IX
describes the efficient and equilbrium profits that can be attained in the different
treatments.
Table IX. Experimental design - equilibrium profits
Suppliers
per Transport Strategic Efficient
Treatment Session Stock Costs Equilibrium Equilibrium
1 2 3 $0.00 $1.05 $1.05
2 6 1 $0.00 $0.35 $0.35
3 2 3 $0.07 $0.966 $1.05
4 6 1 $0.07 $0.336 $0.35
The experiment uses the ERL (Economics Research Laboratory) Gray Box soft-
ware (see Figure 22). The subjects participated in a two market design with a spec-
ified number of goods. The novelty of the Gray Box software is the clear depiction
of the optimization premium to the subjects. The contour shading indicates a bet-
ter and best response to all allocation choices by rival suppliers. The subject is
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Fig. 22. Example of ERL Gray Box GUI (6 suppliers with transportation costs)
not left to randomly search the grid for a better response to a response by other
suppliers. The contour clearly demarcates the better and best responses to others
allocation choices.
The subjects were not allowed to communicate one with another during the
experiment. As each subject looked at the screen, they could determine what they
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thought the average of the other market players will supply to Market A, m−iA.
This is called the market statistic (MS). The market statistic is the average of the
other player’s choices. The market statistic excludes the choice made by the indi-
vidual. This is the viewed by the subjects as a horizontal yellow line in Figure 22.
They can slide the market statistic until they find what they think is the expected
choice of other suppliers to Market A. They then can move the vertical green line,
which is their own participation in market, up and down until they have found a
best response to the market statistic.
The graphical user interface (GUI) also displays a contour that reveals optimal
allocations for areas of a lighter shade. They then confirm their choice and once all
participants have made their choice, their own payoff is displayed along with the
true market statistic. This is one period. The game is then repeated for 50 periods.
The subjects earned from $14.37 to $52.50 plus a $5.00 fee for participating. After
the experiment the subjects were all paid in cash and in private and were allowed
to leave. The efficient allocation profits are $17.50 for the small suppliers and $52.50
for the large suppliers.
The interface used allows the subjects to know the collective decisions of their
cohort, which allows them to strategically determine their dominant strategy given
the prior history. All the hypothetical payoffs can be determined before the subject
makes a decision on how to proceed. There was no time limit for the subjects to
make a choice in any of the periods.
F. Experimental results
Figure 23 through Figure 26 reports the allocation decisions of each supplier through-
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Graphs by cohort and Player
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Fig. 27. Market clearing price in Market A by round (2 suppliers - no transport
cost)
is a fitted regression line and denotes the trend in the allocation choices of the
players. Figure 25 describes the allocation decisions by cohort and player. Also in
Figures 25 and 26, each graph is divided up into cells that represent the cohort and
player. Each row is a cohort and the first three cells in each row of Figure 26 depict
suppliers that are home to location A and the last three in each row are home to
location B.
1. Market concentration and price dispersion
Figures 27 through 30 report the price that clears the market in Market A in each
period. The law of one price suggests a market clearing price of $0.35 each period.
Deviations from that price represent the inability of suppliers to coordinate on an






















0 10 20 30 40 50







































0 10 20 30 40 50






































0 10 20 30 40 50
















Fig. 30. Market clearing price in Market A by round (6 suppliers - with transport
costs)
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Measures of price dispersion that are unitless are helpful when comparing
across products. Suppose the prices across markets is drawn from a distribution,
F , with mean µ and variance σ2. The coefficient of variation, CV = σ/µ, has
been used by Carlson-Pescatrice [9], Sorensen [48] and Baye, Morgan and Scholten
[5] and others, to measure price dispersion in traditional retail markets. The co-
efficient of variation for the two large suppliers treatment without transportation
costs is 0.065 and for the six small suppliers treatment without transportation costs
the coefficient of variation is 0.155. A t-test indicates that the two coefficients are
statistically different from one another with a p 0.000. The coefficient of variation
for the two large suppliers treatment with transportation costs is 0.140 and for the
six small suppliers treatment with transportation costs the coefficient of variation
is 0.163. A t-test indicates that the two coefficients are also statistically different
from one another with a p 0.000.
Figures 31 through 34 report the price dispersion by round for the four treat-
ments and Table X reports the price dispersion between the two markets. When
we test whether the price dispersion is the same as n increases, we can soundly re-
ject the null hypothesis that increasing n ceteris paribus decreases observed price
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Mean Dispersion = 
$0.0143
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Mean Dispersion = $0.0794
Std. Dev. = 0.0747
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Mean Dispersion = $0.0902
Std. Dev. = 0.0716
Fig. 34. Price dispersion between markets by round (6 suppliers - with transport
costs)
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Table X. Price dispersion - aggregated
Mean Coefficient
Transport Price of
Treatment Suppliers Costs Dispersion Variation
1 2 No $0.0143 0.065
2 6 No $0.0794 0.155
3 2 Yes $0.0647 0.140
4 6 Yes $0.0902 0.163
2. Inefficient cross-hauling
To measure inefficient cross-hauling, µi, it is necessary for transportation costs to
be present. Without transport costs it is not inefficient to supply multiple locations,
therefore we will focus our attention on treatments 3 and 4 with transport costs.
Tables XI and XII report the average allocation of suppliers, grouped by suppliers
located in the same location. The periods are also broken down by the first 25
rounds and the last 25 rounds due to stabilized prices.
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Table XI. A measure of cross-hauling & variance in play by suppliers (2 firms with
transport costs)
Home Unique
Player Market Equilibrium Mean std. dev. Min Max
All Rounds
1 A 60 66.964 10.125 30 100
2 B 40 32.580 12.239 15 99
1st 25 Periods
1 A 60 65.960 12.313 30 100
2 B 40 35.736 15.165 15 99
Last 25 Periods
1 A 60 67.968 7.227 34 100
2 B 40 29.424 7.123 16 67
Table XII. A measure of cross-hauling & variance in play by suppliers (6 firms with
transport costs)
Home Unique
Player Location Equilibrium Mean std. dev. Min Max
All Rounds
1-3 A 80 66.547 23.569 0 100
4-6 B 20 35.283 18.555 0 100
1st 25 Periods
1-3 A 80 64.336 25.188 0 100
4-6 B 20 37.629 19.505 0 100
Last 25 Periods
1-3 A 80 68.757 21.639 0 100
4-6 B 20 32.936 17.263 0 100
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In treatment 3 with two firms and transport costs tend to move toward less
cross-hauling as the periods increase. The strategic equilibrium for this treatment
is 60% of their allocation for those home to location A and they are supplying al-
most 67% to the home location. The same is true for those home to location B. With
the efficient outcome being all of their allocation delivered to the home location.
Suppliers were better off coordinating with the rival supplier closer toward the ef-
ficient allocation in the equilibrium allocation. The first 25 periods of the suppliers
home to location A supplied almost 66% of their allocation to the home location
and by the last 25 periods they were supplying almost 68% of their allocation to
the home location.
The small suppliers with six firms and transportation costs had a unique equi-
librium strategy of supplying 80% of their allocation to the home location. The
small suppliers in Table XII should supply 80% to their home location at the equi-
librium allocation, however, we see that the suppliers allocating only 66.5% to the
home location. By allocating more of their allocation to the foreign location, sup-
pliers were paying transportation costs above and beyond the strategic allocation
making the individual firms worse off.
We can also see from Table XII that the firms are actually moving toward the
strategic equilibrium. The first 25 periods the suppliers home to location A de-
liver 64% of their endowment to the home location and by the last 25 periods they
are delivering almost 69% of their endowment to the home location. The move
toward the unique equilibrium strategy also moves the firms toward the efficient
equilibrium as well.
To be able to test the second hypothesis, H1, that with transportation costs, in-
creasing n ceteris paribus results in less inefficient cross-hauling. In equation 3.33,
we wanted to test if increasing n affected the loss to the suppliers. In equation 3.33
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the indicator variable is for treatment 3 and 4, where treatment 3 was the ommited
variable. The results are displayed in Table XIII. At 6% level of significance we can
reject the null that there is no effect on cross-hauling loss by increasing the number
of suppliers.
Cross-Hauling Loss = β0 + β TREATMENT + error (3.33)
Table XIII. Cross-hauling loss to economy
Cross-Haul Coef. Std. Err. t P<t [95% Conf. Interval]
Treatment 4 0.00655 0.00347 1.89000 0.06000 -0.00027 0.01337
Constant 0.13779 0.00245 56.16000 0.00000 0.13297 0.14261
The theoretical cross-hauling loss for the large suppliers, 2µ = $0.168 and for
the six small small suppliers, the theoretical loss is 6µ = $0.084. In treatment 3
with two suppliers, the average spent per round on transportion costs is $0.138
and in treatment 4, the average spent per round on transportation costs is $0.1443.
Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis that increases in the number of suppliers,
with transportation costs, results in more inefficient cross-hauling.
3. Do subjects in treatment 4 behave as price takers?
Results in experimental economics have demonstrated that it takes very few partic-
ipants to observe price taking behavior. We wanted to test H2, with n = 6 subjects
do we observe price taking behavior? If subjects were to behave as price takers
then they would supply at the competitive equilibrium. The competitive equilib-
rium for the suppliers without transportation costs is any allocation that satisfies
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the law of one price. With transportation costs there is only one efficient allocation
and that is to supply all of their allocation to their home location. Because price
takers behave as if the price is exogeneous, there is no incentive for them to deviate
from the competitive equilibrium.
We find evidence of the six small suppliers behaving strategically. With trans-
portation costs, a price taking supplier would not voluntarily choose positive de-
liveries to the location that is costly to deliver the good, if P¯ik < P¯ ?i . This means
that we should see each supplier delivering all of their allocation to the home lo-
cation. In treatment 4, suppliers allocated 34% of their allocation to the foreign
location, which is strictly greater than prediction of delivering none to the foreign
location with transportation costs.
4. Strategic suppliers
The strategic equilibrium suggests that the small and the large suppliers should
extract all the surplus from the location without transport costs. They are also able
to allocate efficiently if they can solve one of the many allocations that solve the
one price law. In Figure 35 we see the small suppliers without transport costs in
treatment 1 are much more efficient than treatment 3 without transport costs in
figure 36. The average efficiency for the small suppliers without transport costs is
97.58% which is almost 2% less than the large suppliers. When we compare Fig-
ure 37 and Figure 38 we see the same phenomenon happening that we saw with
the large suppliers. The suppliers with transportation costs are less efficient than
without those costs. The small suppliers with transport costs average 90.41% effi-
ciency. This is over 7% less efficient than the suppliers without transport costs. The
level of efficiency is relative to the maximum amount of surplus available to the
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Fig. 35. Aggregate earnings by cohort relative to the efficient equilibrium (2 sup-
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Fig. 36. Aggregate earnings by cohort relative to the efficient equilibrium (2 sup-
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Fig. 37. Aggregate earnings by cohort relative to the efficient equilibrium (6 sup-













0 10 20 30 40 50




























Fig. 38. Aggregate earnings by cohort relative to the efficient equilibrium (6 sup-
pliers - with transport costs)
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Figures 39 and 40 examine the level of efficiency that is available to the firms
relative to their strategic equilibrium. This is indicative of whether the suppliers
are cross-hauling and to what extent. They average 100.59% efficiency relative
to their equilibrium in the last 25 periods. This means that they are allocating be-
tween their strategic equilibrium and the efficient equilibrium. The small suppliers
average 94.18% efficient relative to the strategic equilibrium. The small suppliers
are cross-hauling more than their equilibrium strategy and this is reducing their
overall efficiency. The inefficiency is derived from the inability to coordinate their
decisions with the other firms as well as the transportation costs that are associ-
ated with cross-hauling. All firms would be better off if they were to only deliver
their allocation to their home location. They are much less efficient than the firms
without transportation costs.
In Appendix A4, Table XX describes the test of a difference in the mean effi-
ciency of the small suppliers. The mean for the six small suppliers without trans-
port costs is 97.58% efficient and 90.41% efficient for the suppliers with transport
costs. The difference is over 7% efficiency and is statistically significant at the 1%
level of significance. The same is true when we look at the difference between the
first and last 25 periods. Both the suppliers with and without transport costs in-
crease their efficiency by about 2% and again the statistical significance holds at
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Fig. 39. Aggregate earnings by cohort relative to the unique, s∗i , equilibrium (2 sup-
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Fig. 40. Aggregate earnings by cohort relative to the unique, s∗i , equilibrium (6 sup-
pliers - with transport costs)
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Table XXI describes the means testing on the large suppliers. The overall effi-
ciency of the large suppliers without transport costs is 99.56% efficient. They were
able to extract almost all the surplus and maximize revenue. The large suppliers
with transport costs were not able to extract as much surplus. Their mean effi-
ciency was 91.48% efficient. Again the means are statistically significant at the 1%
level of significance. This also holds for the first and last 25 periods.
In Table XXII and Table XXIII, we wanted to test that there was a difference in
the large and small suppliers with and without transport costs. All were found to
be statistically significant from one another. It is clear that adding market concen-
tration and transport costs changes the amount of surplus that the suppliers are
able to extract.
5. Decentralized competition and efficiency
As is clear from Figures 23 through 26, market concentration clearly impedes the
ability of the subjects to coordinate. By adding transportation costs we see that the
level of efficiency is reduced. In Figures 35 and 36, we see this drop in efficiency.
The large suppliers without transport costs depicted in Figure 35 extracts almost
all the profits available or about 99.56% of the surplus. Welfare is maximized in this
treatment. In Figure 36 the average efficiency is 91.48% for these firms or about an
8% decline in efficiency by adding transportation costs.
Table XXIV through Table XXX in the appendix test the theory as proposed
in Meyer et al. [38] that there is a weighted attraction such that once a supplier
notices the price below or above P ∗, then they remain there in period t + 1. The
tests are chi-square tests and the null hypothesis is that they randomly play each
cell. It is clear that the suppliers are not randomly assigning their allocation to the
markets.
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Table XIV. Times played unique, s∗i , equilibrium (all treatments)
Unique Transport Times Times Not % Times
Treatment Equilibrium Suppliers Costs Played Played Played
1 50% to Home Market 2 No 444 56 88.8%
2 50% to Home Market 6 No 405 1,095 27.0%
3 60% to Home Market 2 Yes 12 488 2.4%
4 80% to Home Market 6 Yes 62 1,438 4.1%
Table XIV reports the quantity and percentage of times that the supplier allo-
cates at the strategic equilibrium. The suppliers without transport costs are much
more likely to allocate as such. Also, market concentration leads to diminished
strategic equilibrium allocation. However, for the suppliers with transport costs,
the suppliers with more firms in the market tend to find the equilibrium with
greater frequency.
G. Conclusion
The law of one price is routinely rejected empirically. This paper has considered
the possibility that even in a complete information framework, it is difficult for
suppliers to eliminate price dispersion. Market concentration is one of the key
components in coordination for strategic firms. As the optimization premium is
increased, more subjects use their unique equilibrium strategy. As the number of
suppliers increases in the market, price dispersion increases.
With heterogeneous transportation costs, increasing the number of suppliers
in a market increases inefficiencies by making it costly to strategically supply both
markets. We do not see suppliers behave as price takers and supply at the Pareto
optimal allocation, which is for suppliers to solely supply the market with the
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smallest transportation cost. We find that decreased market concentration and
transportation costs lead to firms cross-hauling more inefficiently than with in-
creased market concentration. Strategy coordination failure decreases welfare in
the economy by creating price dispersion and inefficient cross-hauling.
Treatments with transportion costs had greater price dispersion than the treat-
ments without the transport costs. The ability of suppliers to coordinate in this
setting is directly correlated with the optimization premium. The number of sub-
jects that play the unique strategic equilibrium as a percentage of the whole cohort
is reduced as the market concentration decreases. Increasing the number of firms
ceteris paribus decreases the likelihood of satisfying the law of one price.
The conclusion to this paper is that market concentration matters. In contrast
to the notion that with increased market concentration or as you approach perfect
competition that price dispersion decreases, we find just the opposite. We find
that with increased suppliers to an economy leads to increased price disperion and




Price dispersion is not fully explained by trade barriers, exchange rates, borders,
transportation costs or information costs. My thesis is that observed price dis-
persion or violations in the law of one price are the result of a difficult strategy
coordination problem and that sufficiently small suppliers will not have a large
enough optimization premium or incentive to eliminate price dispersion.
When there are very few suppliers in a market, the incentives or optimiza-
tion premium is greater than when there are many suppliers. As the number of
suppliers increases, the incentive to best respond becomes very small. The num-
ber of suppliers also increases the complexity of the best response decision and it
becomes costly and complex to make such calculations. When the decisions to op-
timize accurately has a small penalty, the market participant may not do so with
price dispersion being the end result.
Information costs are greater and incentives to do the right thing are smaller
as the number of suppliers increase in a market. As the optimization premium
increases suppliers will behave more strategically. Brander [6] showed that strate-
gic suppliers will engage in cross-hauling. As the number of firms supplying the
market increases, the optimization premium falls and the amount of inefficient
cross-hauling falls. Transportation costs may answer the question of which sup-
plier should respond to a violation of the law of one price. Transportation costs
help coordinate the market allocation but introduce inefficient cross-hauling.
This dissertation examined the theoretical arguments surrounding the law of
one price. It also highlighted some of the literature describing failure of the law to
hold empirically. I examined the influence the number of suppliers had on the abil-
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ity of suppliers to eliminate price dispersion. I show that without transportation
costs, any aggregate allocation that solves the law of one price is efficient. How-
ever, a strategic supplier has an incentive to deviate if the aggregate allocation is
not at the unique equilibrium allocation.
I implement experiments to test the law of one price in a laboratory setting
and find that neither price signals nor transportation costs signal effectively to the
suppliers where they should allocate. I find that subjects do not behave as price
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APPENDIX A
A1: Chapter II data
Table XV. Means test of efficiency from s∗i (6 & 12 suppliers)
Firms Obs. Mean s.e. std. dev. 95% Conf. Int.
All Rounds
6 1,500 0.9817 0.0009 0.0359 0.9799 0.9835
12 3,000 0.9745 0.0008 0.0419 0.9730 0.9760
Combined 4,500 0.9769 0.0006 0.0402 0.9757 0.9781
Difference 0.0072∗∗∗ 0.0012 0.0049 0.0096
(6.0046)
First 25 Periods
6 750 0.9699 0.0017 0.0468 0.9665 0.9732
12 1,500 0.9667 0.0014 0.0533 0.9640 0.9694
Combined 2,250 0.9678 0.0011 0.0512 0.9656 0.9699
Difference 0.0032∗ 0.0022 -0.0011 0.0075
(1.4539)
Last 25 Periods
6 300 0.9935 0.0004 0.0104 0.9928 0.9943
12 1,500 0.9823 0.0006 0.0233 0.9811 0.9835
Combined 2,250 0.9860 0.0004 0.0207 0.9852 0.9869
Difference 0.0112∗∗∗ 0.0007 0.0098 0.0127
(15.7866)
* Significant at the 10% level, t-statistic in parentheses
*** Significant at the 1% level, t-statistic in parentheses
Note: Absolute difference from unique equilibrium.
Table XVI. Basin of attraction relative to random play (6 large suppliers)
< p(t+ 1)
∗ = p(t+ 1)∗ > p(t+ 1)∗ Total p− value χ22
6 Large Suppliers
< p∗ 56 6 57 119 0.0000 42.874
= p∗ 4 11 4 19 0.9730 5.158
> p∗ 59 4 44 107 0.0000 45.327
Total 119 21 105 245
χ28 0.0000 196.074
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Table XVII. Basin of attraction relative to random play (12 small suppliers)
< p(t+ 1)
∗ = p(t+ 1)∗ > p(t+ 1)∗ Total p− value χ22
12 Small Suppliers
< p∗ 55 1 73 129 0.0000 65.30
= p∗ 2 0 0 2 0.1353 5.158
> p∗ 71 1 42 114 0.0000 65.11
Total 128 2 115 245
χ28 0.0000 312.08
Table XVIII. Basin of attraction relative to random play without equilibrium (6 large
suppliers)
< p(t+ 1)
∗ > p(t+ 1)∗ Total p− value χ22
12 Small Suppliers
< p∗ 56 57 113 0.9250 0.0089
> p∗ 59 44 103 0.1394 2.1845
Total 115 101 216
χ23 0.1099 6.0353
Note: Removing equilibrium play allows us to measure the basin of attraction for out of equilibrium play.
Table XIX. Basin of attraction relative to random play without equilibrium (12 small
suppliers)
< p(t+ 1)
∗ > p(t+ 1)∗ Total p− value χ22
12 Small Suppliers
< p∗ 55 73 128 0.1116 2.5313
> p∗ 71 42 113 0.0064 7.4425
Total 126 115 241
χ23 0.0001 20.648
Note: Removing equilibrium play allows us to measure the basin of attraction for out of equilibrium play.
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A2: Proof of expected variance with random play
X = total stock in the economy




i=1 xi = Nx
The total stock in the economy remains constant as the number of suppliers





P1 = a− bx
∑n
i=1 si
P2 = a− bx(N −
∑n
i=1 si)
(P1 − P2) = a− bx
n∑
i=1




= bxN − 2bx
∑
si






























































For the case where N = 6, 12
The theoretical predictions when s ∼ U [0, 1] are:
E[(P1 − P2)2]6 = $0.02722
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E[(P1 − P2)2]12 = $0.013611
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A3: Proof of uniqueness for the stage game with symmetric markets and linear
demand
Firm i’s profit while allocating to 2 markets with a given allocation xi is given by
the following
pii = (a− bxi
n∑
i=1




To simplify notation, σ =
∑
k 6=i sk. All allocations to all firms is symmetric
such that xi = x. We will also drop the subscript for the allocation of the ith firm
such that si = s.
The firm’s profit function then becomes
pii = (a− bx(s+ σ)sx+ (a− bx(N − s− σ))(1− s)x
If we integrate over firm i’s profit for all possible distributions of σ, f(σ) is
defined as the p.d.f. of σ, we get
pii =
∫
[(a− bx(s+ σ)sx+ (a− bx(N − s− σ))(1− s)x]f(σ)dσ
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For any distribution of σ, s has a single best response. Q.E.D.
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A4: Chapter III Figures
Table XX. Means test of efficiency from s∗i (6 suppliers with and without transport
costs)
Firms Transport Costs Mean s.e. std. dev. 95% Conf. Int.
All Rounds
6 Yes 0.9041 0.0030 0.0479 0.8981 0.9101
6 No 0.9758 0.0030 0.0480 0.9698 0.9818
Combined 0.9400 0.0027 0.0598 0.9347 0.9452
Difference 0.0717∗∗ 0.0043 -0.0801 -0.0633
(-16.726)
1st 25 Periods
6 Yes 0.8909 0.0050 0.0557 0.8810 0.9007
6 No 0.9646 0.0056 0.0623 0.9536 0.9756
Combined 0.9277 0.0044 0.0696 0.9191 0.9364
Difference −0.0737∗∗∗ 0.0075 -0.0884 -0.0590
(-9.861)
Last 25 Periods
6 Yes 0.9174 0.0030 0.0339 0.9114 0.9233
6 No 0.9870 0.0020 0.0221 0.9831 0.9910
Combined 0.9522 0.0029 0.0451 0.9466 0.9578
Difference 0.0697∗∗∗ 0.0036 -0.0768 -0.0626
(-19.274)
*** Significant at the 1% level, t-statistic in parentheses
Note: Efficiency relative to the all suppliers allocating at the unique, s∗i , equilibrium.
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Table XXI. Means test of efficiency from s∗i (2 suppliers with and without transport
costs)
Firms Transport Costs Mean s.e. std. dev. 95% Conf. Int.
All Rounds
2 Yes 0.9148 0.0037 0.0577 0.9076 0.9220
2 No 0.9956 0.0014 0.0214 0.9929 0.9983
Combined 0.9552 0.0027 0.0594 0.9500 0.9604
Difference −0.0808∗∗ 0.0039 -0.0884 -0.0731
(-20.755)
1st 25 Periods
2 Yes 0.9008 0.0065 0.0729 0.8879 0.9137
2 No 0.9920 0.0026 0.0294 0.9868 0.9972
Combined 0.9464 0.0045 0.0719 0.9374 0.9554
Difference −0.0912∗∗∗ 0.0070 -0.1051 -0.0773
(-12.961)
Last 25 Periods
2 Yes 0.9288 0.0028 0.0312 0.9233 0.9343
2 No 0.9992 0.0005 0.0052 0.9983 1.0001
Combined 0.9640 0.0026 0.0417 0.9588 0.9692
Difference −0.0704∗∗∗ 0.0028 -0.0760 -0.0648
(-24.881)
*** Significant at the 1% level, t-statistic in parentheses
Note: Efficiency relative to the all suppliers allocating at the unique, s∗i , equilibrium.
Table XXII. Means test of efficiency from s∗i (2 & 6 suppliers with transport costs)
Firms Transport Costs Mean s.e. std. dev. 95% Conf. Int.
All Rounds
2 Yes 0.9148 0.0037 0.0577 0.9076 0.9220
6 Yes 0.9041 0.0030 0.0479 0.8981 0.9101
Combined 0.9095 0.0024 0.0532 0.9048 0.9141
Difference 0.0107∗∗ 0.0047 0.0014 0.0200
(2.2531)
1st 25 Periods
2 Yes 0.9008 0.0065 0.0729 0.8879 0.9137
6 Yes 0.8909 0.0050 0.0557 0.8810 0.9007
Combined 0.8958 0.0041 0.0650 0.8878 0.9039
Difference 0.0099 0.0082 -0.006 0.0261
(1.2112)
Last 25 Periods
2 Yes 0.9288 0.0028 0.0312 0.9233 0.9343
6 Yes 0.9174 0.0030 0.0339 0.9114 0.9233
Combined 0.9231 0.0021 0.0330 0.9190 0.9272
Difference 0.0114∗∗∗ 0.0041 0.0033 0.0195
(2.7752)
** Significant at the 5% level, t-statistic in parentheses
*** Significant at the 1% level, t-statistic in parentheses
Note: Efficiency relative to the all suppliers allocating at the unique, s∗i , equilibrium.
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Table XXIII. Means test of efficiency from s∗i (2 & 6 suppliers without transport
costs)
Firms Transport Costs Mean s.e. std. dev. 95% Conf. Int.
All Rounds
2 No 0.9956 0.0014 0.0214 0.9929 0.9983
6 No 0.9758 0.0030 0.0480 0.9698 0.9818
Combined 0.9857 0.0017 0.0384 0.9823 0.9891
Difference 0.0198∗∗∗ 0.0033 0.0132 0.0263
(5.9539)
1st 25 Periods
2 No 0.9920 0.0026 0.0294 0.9868 0.9972
6 No 0.9646 0.0056 0.0623 0.9536 0.9756
Combined 0.9783 0.0032 0.0505 0.9720 0.9846
Difference 0.0274∗∗∗ 0.0062 0.0152 0.0396
(4.4491)
Last 25 Periods
2 No 0.9992 0.0005 0.0052 0.9983 1.0001
6 No 0.9870 0.0020 0.0221 0.9831 0.9910
Combined 0.9931 0.0011 0.0171 0.9910 0.9953
Difference 0.0121∗∗∗ 0.0020 0.0081 0.0162
(5.9825)
*** Significant at the 1% level, t-statistic in parentheses
Note: Efficiency relative to the all suppliers allocating at the unique, s∗i , equilibrium.
Table XXIV. Basin of attraction relative to random play (6 small suppliers with
transport costs)




t+1 Total p− value χ22
6 Large Suppliers
< p∗ 68 3 68 139 0.000 60.79
= p∗ 3 0 1 4 0.174 3.50
> p∗ 66 2 34 102 0.000 60.24
Total 137 5 103 245
χ28 0.000 858.9
Table XXV. Basin of attraction relative to random play (6 small suppliers without
transport costs)




t+1 Total p− value χ22
6 Large Suppliers
< p∗ 68 0 63 131 0.000 65.78
= p∗ 1 0 0 1 0.368 2.00
> p∗ 61 1 51 113 0.000 54.87
Total 130 1 114 245
χ28 0.000 856.9
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Table XXVI. Basin of attraction relative to random play (2 large suppliers with
transport costs)




t+1 Total p− value χ22
6 Large Suppliers
< p∗ 61 2 38 101 0.000 52.53
= p∗ 6 3 5 14 0.607 1.00
> p∗ 35 8 87 130 0.000 74.42
Total 102 13 130 245
χ28 0.000 835.9
Table XXVII. Basin of attraction relative to random play (2 large suppliers without
transport costs)




t+1 Total p− value χ22
6 Large Suppliers
< p∗ 19 12 4 35 0.008 9.66
= p∗ 10 187 3 200 0.000 326.17
> p∗ 4 4 2 10 0.670 0.80
Total 33 203 9 245
χ28 0.000 1,623.6
Table XXVIII. Basin of attraction relative to random play without equilibrium (6
small suppliers with transport costs)
< p∗t+1 > p
∗
t+1 Total p− value χ22
12 Small Suppliers
< p∗ 68 68 136 1.000 0.00
> p∗ 66 34 100 0.001 10.24
Total 134 102 236
χ23 0.003 14.17
Note: Removing equilibrium play allows us to measure the basin of attraction for out of equilibrium play.
Table XXIX. Basin of attraction relative to random play without equilibrium (6
small suppliers without transport costs)
< p∗t+1 > p
∗
t+1 Total p− value χ22
12 Small Suppliers
< p∗ 68 63 131 0.662 0.19
> p∗ 61 51 112 0.345 0.89
Total 129 114 243
χ23 0.427 2.51
Note: Removing equilibrium play allows us to measure the basin of attraction for out of equilibrium play.
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Table XXX. Basin of attraction relative to random play without equilibrium (2 large
suppliers with transport costs)
< p∗t+1 > p
∗
t+1 Total p− value χ22
12 Small Suppliers
< p∗ 61 38 99 0.021 5.34
> p∗ 35 87 122 0.000 22.16
Total 96 125 221
χ23 0.000 31.65
Note: Removing equilibrium play allows us to measure the basin of attraction for out of equilibrium play.
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A5: Uniqueness
Proof of uniqueness for the stage game with symmetric markets and linear de-
mand.
Firm i’s profit while allocating to 2 markets with a given allocation xi is given
by the following
pii = (a− bxi
n∑
i=1
si)sixi + (a− bxi
n∑
i=1
(1− si)− cij)(1− si)xi
To simplify notation, σ =
∑
k 6=i sk. All allocations to all firms is symmetric
such that xi = x. We also drop the subscript for the allocation of the ith firm such
that si = s and cij = c.
The firm’s profit function then becomes
pii = (a− bx(s+ σ))sx+ (a− bx(N − s− σ)− c)(1− s)x
If we integrate over firm i’s profit for all possible distributions of σ, f(σ) is
defined as the p.d.f. of σ, we get
pii =
∫
[(a− bx(s+ σ))sx+ (a− bx(N − s− σ)− c)(1− s)x]f(σ)dσ


















For any distribution of σ, s has a single best response. Q.E.D.
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APPENDIX B
B1: Instructions 6 Large Suppliers No Transport Costs
I. Introduction 1
This is an experiment in the economics of strategic decision making. Various agen-
cies have provided funds for this research. If you follow the instructions and make
appropriate decisions, you can earn an appreciable amount of money. At the end
of today’s session, you will be paid in private and in cash.
It is important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If
you have any questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand
and an investigator will come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you
will be asked to leave and you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your
cooperation.
II. Main Screen
In this session, you will participate in a group of six people. You will be randomly
grouped with five other participants. You will remain grouped with these partici-
pants throughout the session. The session will last fifty periods.
In each period, every participant will pick a value for YOUR CHOICE. The values
of YOUR CHOICE that can be chosen are the numbers 0, 1, 2,. . . , 99, or 100. Each
1The following is the instructions for 6 subjects, the instructions for other treat-
ments is similar and is available upon request.
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period the choice made by the other participants in your group will be called the
MARKET STATISTIC. The value you pick for YOUR CHOICE and the MARKET
STATISTIC will determine the payoff you receive for that period. The relationship
between choices and earnings will not change.
Each period the choices made by the other five participants in your group will be
added together and divided by five.
• For example, to find the average value of the following five numbers:
300, 100, 250, 150, 200
• add the five numbers: 300 + 100 + 250 + 150 + 200 = 1000
• then divide by five: 1000 / 5 = 200
• So, in this example, the average is 200
You use the main screen to make your choices each period.
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Fig. 41. Main Screen
This screen contains:
• Two gray bars and a gray square that will help you understand how your
choice and the MARKET STATISTIC influences your earnings each period,
• a confirmation button at the bottom of the screen you must use to enter your
choice,
• and a record of the session.
The gray bar located at the top of the screen is labeled MARKET STATISTIC.
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Fig. 42. Market Statistic Gray Bar
If you click in this gray bar, the mouse cursor will be replaced by a yellow vertical
line, and a yellow vertical line also appears in the gray square. Immediately below
the gray square the current value that you have chosen for the hypothetical market
statistic appears as a yellow number. Directly below the value for the hypothetical
market statistic are three yellow question marks, ???. The question marks are there
to remind you that you do not select the market statistic. During the session the
market statistic will be determined each period by the other participant in your
group.
By moving your mouse left and right you can select any value between 0 and 100
for your choice of the hypothetical market statistic. You can click the mouse a
second time to select a value for the hypothetical market statistic and to restore the
cursor.
You can determine what your payoff would be for that hypothetical market statis-
tic by clicking on the gray bar labeled YOUR CHOICE and selecting a value. Your
mouse cursor is replaced by a green horizontal line in the gray bar labeled YOUR
CHOICE and in the gray square.
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Fig. 43. Hypothetical MARKET STATISTIC
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Fig. 44. YOUR CHOICE Gray Bar
The earnings associated with YOUR CHOICE and the current hypothetical MAR-
KET STATISTIC appears immediately to the right of the gray square. By moving
your mouse up and down you can read off the earnings associated with all of
your feasible choices and the currently selected hypothetical MARKET STATIS-
TIC. Click the mouse a second time to select a value for YOUR CHOICE and to
restore the cursor. At this point, your selection is not final. The procedure to con-
firm YOUR CHOICE will be discussed below. Higher payoffs are associated with
lighter shades in the gray square.
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Fig. 45. Hypothetical Earnings
You can click again on the gray bar labeled MARKET STATISTIC. By moving the
mouse left and right, you can read off the earnings associated with changes in the
MARKET STATISTIC and your currently selected choice. However, during the
session the MARKET STATISTIC is determined by the value chosen by the other
participant in your group.
An alternate method to determine hypothetical earnings involves clicking the mouse
in the gray square.
Moving the mouse here lets you change both YOUR CHOICE and the MARKET
STATISTIC. You may select any pair of values. Click the mouse a second time to
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Fig. 46. Gray Square
select a value of YOUR CHOICE and restore the cursor.
You can also choose a value without first selecting a hypothetical MARKET STATIS-
TIC. If you do so, three question marks will appear to the right of the value you
have chosen to remind you that your earnings will depend on the MARKET STATIS-
TIC selected by the other participant in your group.
In summary, the difference in the three active boxes is in what they control. Click-
ing on the horizontal bar allows you to change the hypothetical MARKET STATIS-
TIC, while leaving the value of YOUR CHOICE unchanged. Clicking on the verti-
cal bar allows you to change the value of YOUR CHOICE, while leaving the value
of the hypothetical MARKET STATISTIC unchanged. Clicking in the gray square
allows you to change both values simultaneously.
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Fig. 47. Confirm YOUR CHOICE
When you are ready to enter YOUR CHOICE click again to restore the cursor, then
click on the confirmation button located below the gray square. This button will
display YOUR CHOICE. If this is the value you wish to enter, you proceed by
clicking on the confirmation button. If you do not wish to enter the current value
of YOUR CHOICE, you can change YOUR CHOICE by clicking in the gray square
or in the gray bars. You may then make another choice by clicking on that value
and once again restoring the cursor. To proceed, click on the confirmation button
below the gray square.
To review, you make a choice by clicking on the gray square or the gray column
labeled YOUR CHOICE. Click the mouse a second time to select a value and to
restore the cursor. Click on CONFIRM. This is how YOUR CHOICE is selected
during the session.
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Fig. 48. Record Grid
The five columns on the right side of the screen report the following:
• the period of the outcome (the column labeled ”Period”)
• a record of your past choices (the column labeled ”Choice”)
• a record of the MARKET STATISTIC (the column labeled ”MS”)
• your earnings for each period of the session (the column labeled ”Earned”)
• and a running total of your earnings (the column labeled ”Balance”)
At the beginning of the first period your balance is zero. At the end of each period
your current period earnings will be added to your balance. At the end of this ses-




During a period, after everyone has made their choices, the outcome screen will
appear for fifteen seconds. The outcome screen summarizes what happened each
period. Your choice will be highlighted in green. The MARKET STATISTIC, de-
termined by the other participant in your group, will be highlighted in red. Your
earnings are reported next to your choice and on the record grid.
After each period’s outcome screen has been displayed for fifteen seconds, you
will automatically advance to the next period. You will remain in your group for
the entire session. Your main screen for the next period will appear and you may
then make a choice for that period whenever you are ready.
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Fig. 49. Outcome and Period Earnings
The example illustates an outcome for the arbitrarily chosen values of 71 as YOUR
CHOICE and 73 for the MARKET STATISTIC. The outcome screen will not be ac-
tive and your mouse cursor will not be present. The value displayed on the out-
come screen for YOUR CHOICE is the selection that you made, and the MARKET
STATISTIC is the choice of the other participants in your group.
IV. Questionnaire
We will now pass out a handout that summarizes how to determine your earnings
from YOUR CHOICE and the MARKET STATISTIC. Notice that outcomes with
higher earnings in the handout correspond to lighter shades in the gray square.
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We will now pass out a questionnaire to make sure that all participants understand
how to calculate their earnings. Please fill out the questionnaire now. Do not put
your name on the questionnaire. Raise your hand when you are finished. If there
are any mistakes on any questionnaire, I will go over the relevant part of the in-
structions again.
V. Summary
• Each of the participants in this room will be randomly assigned to a group of
size six.
• You will remain in the same group for the duration of the session: 50 periods.
• You make a choice by
1) selecting a value between 0 and 100 for YOUR CHOICE using the gray
bars and/or the gray square,
2) clicking the mouse a second time, to select YOUR CHOICE and restore
your cursor,
3) and then clicking on CONFIRM to enter and confirm YOUR CHOICE
for the current period.
• The value you pick for YOUR CHOICE and the value of the MARKET STATIS-
TIC (determined by the other participants in your group) will determine the
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payoff you receive for that period.
• The relationship between choices and earnings will not change.
• Your balance at the end of the session will be paid to you in private and in
cash.
We have completed the instructions. Again, it is important that you remain silent
and do not look at other people’s work.
If you have a question, please raise your hand, and an investigator will come to





Table XXXI.: Data from experiments: 6 large suppliers - no transport costs - Cohort 1
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
0 0 94 51 0.59939 0.59939 94 58 0 50 95 50
0 1 58 58 0.68208 0.68208 94 58 0 50 95 50
0 2 0 69 0.80500 0.80500 94 58 0 50 95 50
0 3 50 59 0.70000 0.70000 94 58 0 50 95 50
0 4 95 50 0.60550 0.60550 94 58 0 50 95 50
0 5 50 59 0.70000 0.70000 94 58 0 50 95 50
1 0 100 51 0.57167 1.17105 100 60 100 50 1 43
1 1 60 59 0.67433 1.35641 100 60 100 50 1 43
1 2 100 51 0.57167 1.37667 100 60 100 50 1 43
1 3 50 61 0.70000 1.40000 100 60 100 50 1 43
1 4 1 71 0.82805 1.43355 100 60 100 50 1 43
1 5 43 62 0.71731 1.41731 100 60 100 50 1 43
2 0 52 35 0.70681 1.87787 52 61 50 30 1 34
2 1 61 33 0.73799 2.09440 52 61 50 30 1 34
2 2 50 36 0.70000 2.07667 52 61 50 30 1 34
2 3 30 40 0.63467 2.03467 52 61 50 30 1 34
2 4 1 45 0.53079 1.96434 52 61 50 30 1 34
2 5 34 39 0.64699 2.06430 52 61 50 30 1 34
3 0 99 76 0.29069 2.16855 99 34 100 50 100 95
3 1 34 89 0.83365 2.92805 99 34 100 50 100 95
3 2 100 76 0.28000 2.35667 99 34 100 50 100 95
3 3 50 86 0.70000 2.73467 99 34 100 50 100 95
3 4 100 76 0.28000 2.24434 99 34 100 50 100 95
3 5 95 77 0.32200 2.38630 99 34 100 50 100 95
4 0 2 56 0.65968 2.82823 2 84 100 17 1 80
4 1 84 40 0.72539 3.65344 2 84 100 17 1 80
4 2 100 37 0.73500 3.09167 2 84 100 17 1 80
4 3 17 53 0.67228 3.40695 2 84 100 17 1 80
4 4 1 57 0.66799 2.91232 2 84 100 17 1 80
4 5 80 41 0.72100 3.10730 2 84 100 17 1 80
5 0 2 42 0.50288 3.33111 2 87 51 20 0 50
5 1 87 25 0.85195 4.50539 2 87 51 20 0 50
5 2 51 32 0.70415 3.79582 2 87 51 20 0 50
5 3 20 38 0.57400 3.98095 2 87 51 20 0 50
5 4 0 42 0.49000 3.40232 2 87 51 20 0 50
5 5 50 32 0.70000 3.80730 2 87 51 20 0 50
6 0 80 36 0.75600 4.08711 80 72 0 50 50 10
6 1 72 38 0.73901 5.24440 80 72 0 50 50 10
6 2 0 52 0.60667 4.40249 80 72 0 50 50 10
6 3 50 42 0.70000 4.68095 80 72 0 50 50 10
6 4 50 42 0.70000 4.10232 80 72 0 50 50 10
6 5 10 50 0.62533 4.43263 80 72 0 50 50 10
7 0 90 49 0.63467 4.72178 90 93 0 50 50 50
7 1 93 48 0.63378 5.87818 90 93 0 50 50 50
7 2 0 67 0.78167 5.18415 90 93 0 50 50 50
7 3 50 57 0.70000 5.38095 90 93 0 50 50 50
7 4 50 57 0.70000 4.80232 90 93 0 50 50 50
7 5 50 57 0.70000 5.13263 90 93 0 50 50 50
8 0 94 68 0.42485 5.14663 94 100 100 45 47 50
8 1 100 67 0.38500 6.26318 94 100 100 45 47 50
8 2 100 67 0.38500 5.56915 94 100 100 45 47 50
8 3 45 78 0.73150 6.11245 94 100 100 45 47 50
8 4 47 78 0.71918 5.52150 94 100 100 45 47 50
8 5 50 77 0.70000 5.83263 94 100 100 45 47 50
9 0 83 62 0.55678 5.70341 83 67 100 20 45 78
9 1 67 65 0.62701 6.89019 83 67 100 20 45 78
9 2 100 59 0.47833 6.04748 83 67 100 20 45 78
9 3 20 75 0.83300 6.94545 83 67 100 20 45 78
9 4 45 70 0.72217 6.24367 83 67 100 20 45 78
9 5 78 63 0.57848 6.41111 83 67 100 20 45 78
10 0 3 42 0.50918 6.21259 3 54 49 30 0 75
10 1 54 31 0.71699 7.60718 3 54 49 30 0 75
10 2 49 32 0.69575 6.74324 3 54 49 30 0 75
10 3 30 36 0.61600 7.56145 3 54 49 30 0 75
10 4 0 42 0.49000 6.73367 3 54 49 30 0 75
10 5 75 27 0.80500 7.21611 3 54 49 30 0 75
11 0 10 65 0.76533 6.97792 10 65 100 40 45 75
11 1 65 54 0.67550 8.28268 10 65 100 40 45 75
11 2 100 47 0.61833 7.36157 10 65 100 40 45 75
11 3 40 59 0.71633 8.27778 10 65 100 40 45 75
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Table XXXI.: (continued)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
11 4 45 58 0.70817 7.44184 10 65 100 40 45 75
11 5 75 52 0.65917 7.87528 10 65 100 40 45 75
12 0 9 49 0.61199 7.58991 9 76 48 36 40 46
12 1 76 36 0.75339 9.03607 9 76 48 36 40 46
12 2 48 41 0.69561 8.05718 9 76 48 36 40 46
12 3 36 44 0.67125 8.94903 9 76 48 36 40 46
12 4 40 43 0.67900 8.12084 9 76 48 36 40 46
12 5 46 42 0.69179 8.56707 9 76 48 36 40 46
13 0 20 68 0.78400 8.37391 20 100 100 40 50 50
13 1 100 52 0.56000 9.59607 20 100 100 40 50 50
13 2 100 52 0.56000 8.61718 20 100 100 40 50 50
13 3 40 64 0.72800 9.67703 20 100 100 40 50 50
13 4 50 62 0.70000 8.82084 20 100 100 40 50 50
13 5 50 62 0.70000 9.26707 20 100 100 40 50 50
14 0 4 53 0.63345 9.00736 4 72 52 40 50 53
14 1 72 40 0.72875 10.32481 4 72 52 40 50 53
14 2 52 44 0.70261 9.31980 4 72 52 40 50 53
14 3 40 46 0.68600 10.36303 4 72 52 40 50 53
14 4 50 44 0.70000 9.52084 4 72 52 40 50 53
14 5 53 44 0.70378 9.97085 4 72 52 40 50 53
15 0 50 51 0.70000 9.70736 50 67 50 40 50 50
15 1 67 48 0.69445 11.01926 50 67 50 40 50 50
15 2 50 51 0.70000 10.01980 50 67 50 40 50 50
15 3 40 53 0.70233 11.06537 50 67 50 40 50 50
15 4 50 51 0.70000 10.22084 50 67 50 40 50 50
15 5 50 51 0.70000 10.67085 50 67 50 40 50 50
16 0 65 56 0.66850 10.37586 65 75 48 40 50 65
16 1 75 54 0.64750 11.66676 65 75 48 40 50 65
16 2 48 59 0.70401 10.72381 65 75 48 40 50 65
16 3 40 61 0.72100 11.78637 65 75 48 40 50 65
16 4 50 59 0.70000 10.92084 65 75 48 40 50 65
16 5 65 56 0.66850 11.33935 65 75 48 40 50 65
17 0 30 39 0.63000 11.00586 30 0 55 40 50 50
17 1 0 45 0.52500 12.19176 30 0 55 40 50 50
17 2 55 34 0.71750 11.44131 30 0 55 40 50 50
17 3 40 37 0.66500 12.45137 30 0 55 40 50 50
17 4 50 35 0.70000 11.62084 30 0 55 40 50 50
17 5 50 35 0.70000 12.03935 30 0 55 40 50 50
18 0 50 40 0.70000 11.70586 50 23 60 40 50 28
18 1 23 46 0.64078 12.83254 50 23 60 40 50 28
18 2 60 38 0.72333 12.16464 50 23 60 40 50 28
18 3 40 42 0.67667 13.12803 50 23 60 40 50 28
18 4 50 40 0.70000 12.32084 50 23 60 40 50 28
18 5 28 45 0.65175 12.69109 50 23 60 40 50 28
19 0 57 52 0.69445 12.40031 57 84 53 55 50 20
19 1 84 47 0.66985 13.50239 57 84 53 55 50 20
19 2 53 53 0.69748 12.86212 57 84 53 55 50 20
19 3 55 53 0.69533 13.82337 57 84 53 55 50 20
19 4 50 54 0.70000 13.02084 57 84 53 55 50 20
19 5 20 60 0.72800 13.41909 57 84 53 55 50 20
20 0 20 50 0.65800 13.05831 20 70 60 20 50 50
20 1 70 40 0.72800 14.23039 20 70 60 20 50 50
20 2 60 42 0.71400 13.57612 20 70 60 20 50 50
20 3 20 50 0.65800 14.48137 20 70 60 20 50 50
20 4 50 44 0.70000 13.72084 20 70 60 20 50 50
20 5 50 44 0.70000 14.11909 20 70 60 20 50 50
21 0 17 52 0.66458 13.72289 17 70 69 20 50 50
21 1 70 41 0.72333 14.95373 17 70 69 20 50 50
21 2 69 41 0.72305 14.29918 17 70 69 20 50 50
21 3 20 51 0.66500 15.14637 17 70 69 20 50 50
21 4 50 45 0.70000 14.42084 17 70 69 20 50 50
21 5 50 45 0.70000 14.81909 17 70 69 20 50 50
22 0 39 63 0.72772 14.45061 39 67 70 80 50 50
22 1 67 58 0.65478 15.60851 39 67 70 80 50 50
22 2 70 57 0.64867 14.94784 39 67 70 80 50 50
22 3 80 55 0.62300 15.76937 39 67 70 80 50 50
22 4 50 61 0.70000 15.12084 39 67 70 80 50 50
22 5 50 61 0.70000 15.51909 39 67 70 80 50 50
23 0 25 49 0.66500 15.11561 25 40 55 50 50 52
23 1 40 46 0.68600 16.29451 25 40 55 50 50 52
23 2 55 43 0.70700 15.65484 25 40 55 50 50 52
23 3 50 44 0.70000 16.46937 25 40 55 50 50 52
23 4 50 44 0.70000 15.82084 25 40 55 50 50 52
23 5 52 44 0.70261 16.22171 25 40 55 50 50 52
24 0 3 59 0.69561 15.81122 3 50 53 50 50 90
24 1 50 49 0.70000 16.99451 3 50 53 50 50 90
24 2 53 49 0.70028 16.35512 3 50 53 50 50 90
24 3 50 49 0.70000 17.16937 3 50 53 50 50 90
24 4 50 49 0.70000 16.52084 3 50 53 50 50 90
24 5 90 41 0.70933 16.93104 3 50 53 50 50 90
25 0 16 44 0.59845 16.40967 16 50 58 50 50 10
25 1 50 37 0.70000 17.69451 16 50 58 50 50 10
25 2 58 35 0.72501 17.08014 16 50 58 50 50 10
25 3 50 37 0.70000 17.86937 16 50 58 50 50 10
25 4 50 37 0.70000 17.22084 16 50 58 50 50 10
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Table XXXI.: (continued)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
25 5 10 45 0.57867 17.50970 16 50 58 50 50 10
26 0 80 47 0.67900 17.08867 80 50 55 70 50 10
26 1 50 53 0.70000 18.39451 80 50 55 70 50 10
26 2 55 52 0.69650 17.77664 80 50 55 70 50 10
26 3 70 49 0.68600 18.55537 80 50 55 70 50 10
26 4 50 53 0.70000 17.92084 80 50 55 70 50 10
26 5 10 61 0.72800 18.23770 80 50 55 70 50 10
27 0 50 54 0.70000 17.78867 50 50 50 70 50 50
27 1 50 54 0.70000 19.09451 50 50 50 70 50 50
27 2 50 54 0.70000 18.47664 50 50 50 70 50 50
27 3 70 50 0.68133 19.23670 50 50 50 70 50 50
27 4 50 54 0.70000 18.62084 50 50 50 70 50 50
27 5 50 54 0.70000 18.93770 50 50 50 70 50 50
28 0 50 55 0.70000 18.48867 50 54 50 71 50 50
28 1 54 54 0.69552 19.79003 50 54 50 71 50 50
28 2 50 55 0.70000 19.17664 50 54 50 71 50 50
28 3 71 51 0.67452 19.91122 50 54 50 71 50 50
28 4 50 55 0.70000 19.32084 50 54 50 71 50 50
28 5 50 55 0.70000 19.63770 50 54 50 71 50 50
29 0 42 57 0.71008 19.19875 42 50 56 80 50 49
29 1 50 55 0.70000 20.49003 42 50 56 80 50 49
29 2 56 54 0.69272 19.86936 42 50 56 80 50 49
29 3 80 49 0.66500 20.57622 42 50 56 80 50 49
29 4 50 55 0.70000 20.02084 42 50 56 80 50 49
29 5 49 56 0.70135 20.33906 42 50 56 80 50 49
30 0 20 48 0.64400 19.84275 20 50 50 40 50 50
30 1 50 42 0.70000 21.19003 20 50 50 40 50 50
30 2 50 42 0.70000 20.56936 20 50 50 40 50 50
30 3 40 44 0.68133 21.25755 20 50 50 40 50 50
30 4 50 42 0.70000 20.72084 20 50 50 40 50 50
30 5 50 42 0.70000 21.03906 20 50 50 40 50 50
31 0 42 51 0.69888 20.54163 42 50 45 60 50 50
31 1 50 49 0.70000 21.89003 42 50 45 60 50 50
31 2 45 50 0.69883 21.26819 42 50 45 60 50 50
31 3 60 47 0.70233 21.95989 42 50 45 60 50 50
31 4 50 49 0.70000 21.42084 42 50 45 60 50 50
31 5 50 49 0.70000 21.73906 42 50 45 60 50 50
32 0 55 52 0.69650 21.23813 55 50 50 60 50 50
32 1 50 53 0.70000 22.59003 55 50 50 60 50 50
32 2 50 53 0.70000 21.96819 55 50 50 60 50 50
32 3 60 51 0.69300 22.65289 55 50 50 60 50 50
32 4 50 53 0.70000 22.12084 55 50 50 60 50 50
32 5 50 53 0.70000 22.43906 55 50 50 60 50 50
33 0 51 52 0.69949 21.93762 51 50 50 60 50 48
33 1 50 52 0.70000 23.29003 51 50 50 60 50 48
33 2 50 52 0.70000 22.66819 51 50 50 60 50 48
33 3 60 50 0.69533 23.34822 51 50 50 60 50 48
33 4 50 52 0.70000 22.82084 51 50 50 60 50 48
33 5 48 52 0.70075 23.13980 51 50 50 60 50 48
34 0 40 52 0.70000 22.63762 40 50 50 60 50 50
34 1 50 50 0.70000 23.99003 40 50 50 60 50 50
34 2 50 50 0.70000 23.36819 40 50 50 60 50 50
34 3 60 48 0.70000 24.04822 40 50 50 60 50 50
34 4 50 50 0.70000 23.52084 40 50 50 60 50 50
34 5 50 50 0.70000 23.83980 40 50 50 60 50 50
35 0 36 57 0.71372 23.35134 36 50 56 59 50 70
35 1 50 54 0.70000 24.69003 36 50 56 59 50 70
35 2 56 53 0.69412 24.06231 36 50 56 59 50 70
35 3 59 52 0.69202 24.74024 36 50 56 59 50 70
35 4 50 54 0.70000 24.22084 36 50 56 59 50 70
35 5 70 50 0.68133 24.52114 36 50 56 59 50 70
36 0 35 54 0.70350 24.05484 35 50 50 59 50 60
36 1 50 51 0.70000 25.39003 35 50 50 59 50 60
36 2 50 51 0.70000 24.76231 35 50 50 59 50 60
36 3 59 49 0.69832 25.43856 35 50 50 59 50 60
36 4 50 51 0.70000 24.92084 35 50 50 59 50 60
36 5 60 49 0.69767 25.21880 35 50 50 59 50 60
37 0 34 51 0.69179 24.74663 34 50 50 39 50 68
37 1 50 48 0.70000 26.09003 34 50 50 39 50 68
37 2 50 48 0.70000 25.46231 34 50 50 39 50 68
37 3 39 50 0.69435 26.13291 34 50 50 39 50 68
37 4 50 48 0.70000 25.62084 34 50 50 39 50 68
37 5 68 45 0.70588 25.92468 34 50 50 39 50 68
38 0 40 45 0.68367 25.43029 40 50 52 40 50 35
38 1 50 43 0.70000 26.79003 40 50 52 40 50 35
38 2 52 43 0.70308 26.16539 40 50 52 40 50 35
38 3 40 45 0.68367 26.81658 40 50 52 40 50 35
38 4 50 43 0.70000 26.32084 40 50 52 40 50 35
38 5 35 46 0.67550 26.60018 40 50 52 40 50 35
39 0 50 47 0.70000 26.13029 50 50 47 60 50 30
39 1 50 47 0.70000 27.49003 50 50 47 60 50 30
39 2 47 48 0.69818 26.86357 50 50 47 60 50 30
39 3 60 45 0.70700 27.52358 50 50 47 60 50 30
39 4 50 47 0.70000 27.02084 50 50 47 60 50 30
39 5 30 51 0.68600 27.28618 50 50 47 60 50 30
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Table XXXI.: (continued)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
40 0 52 46 0.70168 26.83197 52 50 50 60 50 20
40 1 50 46 0.70000 28.19003 52 50 50 60 50 20
40 2 50 46 0.70000 27.56357 52 50 50 60 50 20
40 3 60 44 0.70933 28.23291 52 50 50 60 50 20
40 4 50 46 0.70000 27.72084 52 50 50 60 50 20
40 5 20 52 0.67200 27.95818 52 50 50 60 50 20
41 0 55 54 0.69417 27.52614 55 50 54 60 64 40
41 1 50 55 0.70000 28.89003 55 50 54 60 64 40
41 2 54 54 0.69552 28.25909 55 50 54 60 64 40
41 3 60 53 0.68833 28.92125 55 50 54 60 64 40
41 4 64 52 0.68432 28.40516 55 50 54 60 64 40
41 5 40 57 0.71167 28.66985 55 50 54 60 64 40
42 0 43 51 0.69935 28.22549 43 50 50 60 50 45
42 1 50 50 0.70000 29.59003 43 50 50 60 50 45
42 2 50 50 0.70000 28.95909 43 50 50 60 50 45
42 3 60 48 0.70000 29.62125 43 50 50 60 50 45
42 4 50 50 0.70000 29.10516 43 50 50 60 50 45
42 5 45 51 0.70000 29.36985 43 50 50 60 50 45
43 0 47 52 0.70098 28.92647 47 50 50 59 50 49
43 1 50 51 0.70000 30.29003 47 50 50 59 50 49
43 2 50 51 0.70000 29.65909 47 50 50 59 50 49
43 3 59 49 0.69832 30.31957 47 50 50 59 50 49
43 4 50 51 0.70000 29.80516 47 50 50 59 50 49
43 5 49 51 0.70019 30.07004 47 50 50 59 50 49
44 0 45 48 0.69650 29.62297 45 50 50 40 50 49
44 1 50 47 0.70000 30.99003 45 50 50 40 50 49
44 2 50 47 0.70000 30.35909 45 50 50 40 50 49
44 3 40 49 0.69300 31.01257 45 50 50 40 50 49
44 4 50 47 0.70000 30.50516 45 50 50 40 50 49
44 5 49 47 0.69925 30.76929 45 50 50 40 50 49
45 0 50 55 0.70000 30.32297 50 50 52 60 51 60
45 1 50 55 0.70000 31.69003 50 50 52 60 51 60
45 2 52 54 0.69795 31.05704 50 50 52 60 51 60
45 3 60 53 0.68833 31.70090 50 50 52 60 51 60
45 4 51 54 0.69902 31.20418 50 50 52 60 51 60
45 5 60 53 0.68833 31.45762 50 50 52 60 51 60
46 0 43 47 0.69281 31.01578 43 50 50 40 50 47
46 1 50 46 0.70000 32.39003 43 50 50 40 50 47
46 2 50 46 0.70000 31.75704 43 50 50 40 50 47
46 3 40 48 0.69067 32.39157 43 50 50 40 50 47
46 4 50 46 0.70000 31.90418 43 50 50 40 50 47
46 5 47 47 0.69748 32.15510 43 50 50 40 50 47
47 0 50 48 0.70000 31.71578 50 50 48 40 50 50
47 1 50 48 0.70000 33.09003 50 50 48 40 50 50
47 2 48 48 0.69888 32.45592 50 50 48 40 50 50
47 3 40 50 0.69533 33.08690 50 50 48 40 50 50
47 4 50 48 0.70000 32.60418 50 50 48 40 50 50
47 5 50 48 0.70000 32.85510 50 50 48 40 50 50
48 0 51 48 0.70042 32.41620 51 50 50 40 50 50
48 1 50 48 0.70000 33.79003 51 50 50 40 50 50
48 2 50 48 0.70000 33.15592 51 50 50 40 50 50
48 3 40 50 0.69533 33.78223 51 50 50 40 50 50
48 4 50 48 0.70000 33.30418 51 50 50 40 50 50
48 5 50 48 0.70000 33.55510 51 50 50 40 50 50
49 0 50 48 0.70000 33.11620 50 50 50 40 50 51
49 1 50 48 0.70000 34.49003 50 50 50 40 50 51
49 2 50 48 0.70000 33.85592 50 50 50 40 50 51
49 3 40 50 0.69533 34.47757 50 50 50 40 50 51
49 4 50 48 0.70000 34.00418 50 50 50 40 50 51
49 5 51 48 0.70042 34.25552 50 50 50 40 50 51
Table XXXII.: Data from experiments: 6 large suppliers - no transport costs - Cohort 2
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
0 0 6 51 0.61992 0.61992 6 0 50 50 100 56
0 1 0 52 0.60667 0.60667 6 0 50 50 100 56
0 2 50 42 0.70000 0.70000 6 0 50 50 100 56
0 3 50 42 0.70000 0.70000 6 0 50 50 100 56
0 4 100 32 0.79333 0.79333 6 0 50 50 100 56
0 5 56 41 0.71092 0.71092 6 0 50 50 100 56
1 0 50 65 0.70000 1.31992 50 51 50 50 100 72
1 1 51 64 0.69669 1.30335 50 51 50 50 100 72
1 2 50 65 0.70000 1.40000 50 51 50 50 100 72
1 3 50 65 0.70000 1.40000 50 51 50 50 100 72
1 4 100 55 0.52500 1.31833 50 51 50 50 100 72
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Table XXXII.: (continued)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
1 5 72 60 0.62608 1.33700 50 51 50 50 100 72
2 0 100 34 0.77000 2.08992 100 41 50 50 0 30
2 1 41 46 0.68782 1.99117 100 41 50 50 0 30
2 2 50 44 0.70000 2.10000 100 41 50 50 0 30
2 3 50 44 0.70000 2.10000 100 41 50 50 0 30
2 4 0 54 0.63000 1.94833 100 41 50 50 0 30
2 5 30 48 0.67200 2.00900 100 41 50 50 0 30
3 0 0 41 0.47833 2.56825 0 55 50 50 0 50
3 1 55 30 0.72217 2.71334 0 55 50 50 0 50
3 2 50 31 0.70000 2.80000 0 55 50 50 0 50
3 3 50 31 0.70000 2.80000 0 55 50 50 0 50
3 4 0 41 0.47833 2.42667 0 55 50 50 0 50
3 5 50 31 0.70000 2.70900 0 55 50 50 0 50
4 0 50 52 0.70000 3.26825 50 0 50 52 79 80
4 1 0 62 0.72333 3.43667 50 0 50 52 79 80
4 2 50 52 0.70000 3.50000 50 0 50 52 79 80
4 3 52 52 0.69888 3.49888 50 0 50 52 79 80
4 4 79 46 0.68782 3.11449 50 0 50 52 79 80
4 5 80 46 0.68600 3.39500 50 0 50 52 79 80
5 0 100 67 0.38500 3.65325 100 100 50 51 85 50
5 1 100 67 0.38500 3.82167 100 100 50 51 85 50
5 2 50 77 0.70000 4.20000 100 100 50 51 85 50
5 3 51 77 0.69365 4.19253 100 100 50 51 85 50
5 4 85 70 0.47950 3.59398 100 100 50 51 85 50
5 5 50 77 0.70000 4.09500 100 100 50 51 85 50
6 0 100 42 0.67667 4.32992 100 100 50 50 0 11
6 1 100 42 0.67667 4.49834 100 100 50 50 0 11
6 2 50 52 0.70000 4.90000 100 100 50 50 0 11
6 3 50 52 0.70000 4.89253 100 100 50 50 0 11
6 4 0 62 0.72333 4.31732 100 100 50 50 0 11
6 5 11 60 0.72002 4.81502 100 100 50 50 0 11
7 0 18 33 0.52528 4.85520 18 51 50 50 0 13
7 1 51 26 0.70555 5.20389 18 51 50 50 0 13
7 2 50 26 0.70000 5.60000 18 51 50 50 0 13
7 3 50 26 0.70000 5.59253 18 51 50 50 0 13
7 4 0 36 0.42000 4.73732 18 51 50 50 0 13
7 5 13 34 0.49798 5.31300 18 51 50 50 0 13
8 0 22 38 0.58501 5.44021 22 0 50 51 21 68
8 1 0 42 0.49000 5.69389 22 0 50 51 21 68
8 2 50 32 0.70000 6.30000 22 0 50 51 21 68
8 3 51 32 0.70415 6.29669 22 0 50 51 21 68
8 4 21 38 0.57955 5.31687 22 0 50 51 21 68
8 5 68 29 0.77308 6.08608 22 0 50 51 21 68
9 0 49 49 0.69972 6.13993 49 51 50 51 20 71
9 1 51 48 0.70042 6.39431 49 51 50 51 20 71
9 2 50 48 0.70000 7.00000 49 51 50 51 20 71
9 3 51 48 0.70042 6.99711 49 51 50 51 20 71
9 4 20 54 0.68600 6.00287 49 51 50 51 20 71
9 5 71 44 0.70882 6.79490 49 51 50 51 20 71
10 0 81 49 0.66239 6.80232 81 50 50 50 28 68
10 1 50 55 0.70000 7.09431 81 50 50 50 28 68
10 2 50 55 0.70000 7.70000 81 50 50 50 28 68
10 3 50 55 0.70000 7.69711 81 50 50 50 28 68
10 4 28 60 0.72875 6.73162 81 50 50 50 28 68
10 5 68 52 0.67648 7.47138 81 50 50 50 28 68
11 0 68 49 0.68908 7.49140 68 60 50 50 17 69
11 1 60 51 0.69300 7.78731 68 60 50 50 17 69
11 2 50 53 0.70000 8.40000 68 60 50 50 17 69
11 3 50 53 0.70000 8.39711 68 60 50 50 17 69
11 4 17 59 0.71848 7.45010 68 60 50 50 17 69
11 5 69 49 0.68759 8.15897 68 60 50 50 17 69
12 0 0 45 0.52500 8.01640 0 60 50 50 17 50
12 1 60 33 0.73500 8.52231 0 60 50 50 17 50
12 2 50 35 0.70000 9.10000 0 60 50 50 17 50
12 3 50 35 0.70000 9.09711 0 60 50 50 17 50
12 4 17 42 0.58758 8.03768 0 60 50 50 17 50
12 5 50 35 0.70000 8.85897 0 60 50 50 17 50
13 0 100 59 0.47833 8.49473 100 40 50 51 83 72
13 1 40 71 0.74433 9.26665 100 40 50 51 83 72
13 2 50 69 0.70000 9.80000 100 40 50 51 83 72
13 3 51 69 0.69552 9.79263 100 40 50 51 83 72
13 4 83 63 0.54908 8.58676 100 40 50 51 83 72
13 5 72 65 0.60041 9.45938 100 40 50 51 83 72
14 0 64 56 0.67125 9.16598 64 61 50 51 35 83
14 1 61 57 0.67639 9.94303 64 61 50 51 35 83
14 2 50 59 0.70000 10.50000 64 61 50 51 35 83
14 3 51 59 0.69785 10.49048 64 61 50 51 35 83
14 4 35 62 0.73150 9.31826 64 61 50 51 35 83
14 5 83 52 0.63378 10.09316 64 61 50 51 35 83
15 0 28 52 0.68768 9.85366 28 65 50 49 32 63
15 1 65 44 0.71050 10.65353 28 65 50 49 32 63
15 2 50 47 0.70000 11.20000 28 65 50 49 32 63
15 3 49 48 0.69949 11.18997 28 65 50 49 32 63
15 4 32 51 0.68908 10.00734 28 65 50 49 32 63
15 5 63 45 0.70728 10.80044 28 65 50 49 32 63
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Table XXXII.: (continued)
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16 0 28 40 0.62608 10.47974 28 29 50 52 37 32
16 1 29 40 0.63042 11.28395 28 29 50 52 37 32
16 2 50 36 0.70000 11.90000 28 29 50 52 37 32
16 3 52 35 0.70681 11.89678 28 29 50 52 37 32
16 4 37 38 0.65571 10.66305 28 29 50 52 37 32
16 5 32 39 0.63868 11.43912 28 29 50 52 37 32
17 0 67 36 0.74205 11.22179 67 51 50 48 0 33
17 1 51 40 0.70229 11.98624 67 51 50 48 0 33
17 2 50 40 0.70000 12.60000 67 51 50 48 0 33
17 3 48 40 0.69515 12.59193 67 51 50 48 0 33
17 4 0 50 0.58333 11.24638 67 51 50 48 0 33
17 5 33 43 0.65875 12.09787 67 51 50 48 0 33
18 0 67 60 0.64685 11.86864 67 55 50 50 100 45
18 1 55 62 0.68483 12.67107 67 55 50 50 100 45
18 2 50 63 0.70000 13.30000 67 55 50 50 100 45
18 3 50 63 0.70000 13.29193 67 55 50 50 100 45
18 4 100 53 0.54833 11.79472 67 55 50 50 100 45
18 5 45 64 0.71517 12.81303 67 55 50 50 100 45
19 0 35 38 0.64750 12.51614 35 55 50 50 0 35
19 1 55 34 0.71750 13.38857 35 55 50 50 0 35
19 2 50 35 0.70000 14.00000 35 55 50 50 0 35
19 3 50 35 0.70000 13.99193 35 55 50 50 0 35
19 4 0 45 0.52500 12.31972 35 55 50 50 0 35
19 5 35 38 0.64750 13.46053 35 55 50 50 0 35
20 0 68 45 0.70588 13.22202 68 40 50 51 32 50
20 1 40 50 0.69533 14.08390 68 40 50 51 32 50
20 2 50 48 0.70000 14.70000 68 40 50 51 32 50
20 3 51 48 0.70042 14.69235 68 40 50 51 32 50
20 4 32 52 0.69328 13.01300 68 40 50 51 32 50
20 5 50 48 0.70000 14.16053 68 40 50 51 32 50
21 0 65 46 0.70350 13.92552 65 50 50 47 32 50
21 1 50 49 0.70000 14.78390 65 50 50 47 32 50
21 2 50 49 0.70000 15.40000 65 50 50 47 32 50
21 3 47 49 0.69888 15.39123 65 50 50 47 32 50
21 4 32 52 0.69328 13.70628 65 50 50 47 32 50
21 5 50 49 0.70000 14.86053 65 50 50 47 32 50
22 0 13 66 0.77425 14.69976 13 80 50 50 59 90
22 1 80 52 0.64400 15.42790 13 80 50 50 59 90
22 2 50 58 0.70000 16.10000 13 80 50 50 59 90
22 3 50 58 0.70000 16.09123 13 80 50 50 59 90
22 4 59 57 0.68152 14.38780 13 80 50 50 59 90
22 5 90 50 0.62533 15.48586 13 80 50 50 59 90
23 0 91 59 0.53545 15.23522 91 47 50 50 100 50
23 1 47 68 0.71218 16.14008 91 47 50 50 100 50
23 2 50 68 0.70000 16.80000 91 47 50 50 100 50
23 3 50 68 0.70000 16.79123 91 47 50 50 100 50
23 4 100 58 0.49000 14.87779 91 47 50 50 100 50
23 5 50 68 0.70000 16.18586 91 47 50 50 100 50
24 0 18 46 0.62235 15.85756 18 51 50 50 49 31
24 1 51 40 0.70229 16.84237 18 51 50 50 49 31
24 2 50 40 0.70000 17.50000 18 51 50 50 49 31
24 3 50 40 0.70000 17.49123 18 51 50 50 49 31
24 4 49 40 0.69762 15.57541 18 51 50 50 49 31
24 5 31 44 0.65655 16.84242 18 51 50 50 49 31
25 0 56 49 0.69972 16.55728 56 40 50 50 56 50
25 1 40 52 0.70000 17.54237 56 40 50 50 56 50
25 2 50 50 0.70000 18.20000 56 40 50 50 56 50
25 3 50 50 0.70000 18.19123 56 40 50 50 56 50
25 4 56 49 0.69972 16.27513 56 40 50 50 56 50
25 5 50 50 0.70000 17.54242 56 40 50 50 56 50
26 0 56 51 0.69692 17.25420 56 41 50 50 73 41
26 1 41 54 0.70462 18.24699 56 41 50 50 73 41
26 2 50 52 0.70000 18.90000 56 41 50 50 73 41
26 3 50 52 0.70000 18.89123 56 41 50 50 73 41
26 4 73 48 0.68605 16.96118 56 41 50 50 73 41
26 5 41 54 0.70462 18.24704 56 41 50 50 73 41
27 0 56 55 0.69132 17.94552 56 55 50 50 83 38
27 1 55 55 0.69300 18.93999 56 55 50 50 83 38
27 2 50 56 0.70000 19.60000 56 55 50 50 83 38
27 3 50 56 0.70000 19.59123 56 55 50 50 83 38
27 4 83 50 0.64918 17.61036 56 55 50 50 83 38
27 5 38 59 0.71848 18.96552 56 55 50 50 83 38
28 0 27 48 0.66458 18.61010 27 50 50 50 55 34
28 1 50 43 0.70000 19.63999 27 50 50 50 55 34
28 2 50 43 0.70000 20.30000 27 50 50 50 55 34
28 3 50 43 0.70000 20.29123 27 50 50 50 55 34
28 4 55 42 0.70817 18.31853 27 50 50 50 55 34
28 5 34 46 0.67312 19.63864 27 50 50 50 55 34
29 0 53 53 0.69748 19.30758 53 50 50 50 52 62
29 1 50 53 0.70000 20.33999 53 50 50 50 52 62
29 2 50 53 0.70000 21.00000 53 50 50 50 52 62
29 3 50 53 0.70000 20.99123 53 50 50 50 52 62
29 4 52 53 0.69841 19.01694 53 50 50 50 52 62
29 5 62 51 0.69048 20.32912 53 50 50 50 52 62
30 0 72 49 0.68255 19.99013 72 50 50 49 45 50
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30 1 50 53 0.70000 21.03999 72 50 50 49 45 50
30 2 50 53 0.70000 21.70000 72 50 50 49 45 50
30 3 49 53 0.70065 21.69188 72 50 50 49 45 50
30 4 45 54 0.70350 19.72044 72 50 50 49 45 50
30 5 50 53 0.70000 21.02912 72 50 50 49 45 50
31 0 72 50 0.67741 20.66754 72 51 50 50 50 47
31 1 51 54 0.69902 21.73901 72 51 50 50 50 47
31 2 50 54 0.70000 22.40000 72 51 50 50 50 47
31 3 50 54 0.70000 22.39188 72 51 50 50 50 47
31 4 50 54 0.70000 20.42044 72 51 50 50 50 47
31 5 47 55 0.70308 21.73220 72 51 50 50 50 47
32 0 53 50 0.69958 21.36712 53 51 50 51 51 45
32 1 51 50 0.69995 22.43896 53 51 50 51 51 45
32 2 50 50 0.70000 23.10000 53 51 50 51 51 45
32 3 51 50 0.69995 23.09183 53 51 50 51 51 45
32 4 51 50 0.69995 21.12039 53 51 50 51 51 45
32 5 45 51 0.70000 22.43220 53 51 50 51 51 45
33 0 52 50 0.69981 22.06694 52 50 50 50 48 53
33 1 50 51 0.70000 23.13896 52 50 50 50 48 53
33 2 50 51 0.70000 23.80000 52 50 50 50 48 53
33 3 50 51 0.70000 23.79183 52 50 50 50 48 53
33 4 48 51 0.70028 21.82067 52 50 50 50 48 53
33 5 53 50 0.69958 23.13178 52 50 50 50 48 53
34 0 52 54 0.69795 22.76488 52 50 50 49 70 50
34 1 50 54 0.70000 23.83896 52 50 50 49 70 50
34 2 50 54 0.70000 24.50000 52 50 50 49 70 50
34 3 49 54 0.70089 24.49272 52 50 50 49 70 50
34 4 70 50 0.68133 22.50201 52 50 50 49 70 50
34 5 50 54 0.70000 23.83178 52 50 50 49 70 50
35 0 50 47 0.70000 23.46488 50 52 50 50 45 40
35 1 52 47 0.70121 24.54018 50 52 50 50 45 40
35 2 50 47 0.70000 25.20000 50 52 50 50 45 40
35 3 50 47 0.70000 25.19272 50 52 50 50 45 40
35 4 45 48 0.69650 23.19851 50 52 50 50 45 40
35 5 40 49 0.69300 24.52478 50 52 50 50 45 40
36 0 51 49 0.70019 24.16507 51 47 50 50 50 50
36 1 47 50 0.69958 25.23976 51 47 50 50 50 50
36 2 50 50 0.70000 25.90000 51 47 50 50 50 50
36 3 50 50 0.70000 25.89272 51 47 50 50 50 50
36 4 50 50 0.70000 23.89851 51 47 50 50 50 50
36 5 50 50 0.70000 25.22478 51 47 50 50 50 50
37 0 51 61 0.69739 24.86246 51 50 50 50 100 55
37 1 50 61 0.70000 25.93976 51 50 50 50 100 55
37 2 50 61 0.70000 26.60000 51 50 50 50 100 55
37 3 50 61 0.70000 26.59272 51 50 50 50 100 55
37 4 100 51 0.57167 24.47017 51 50 50 50 100 55
37 5 55 60 0.68717 25.91194 51 50 50 50 100 55
38 0 47 46 0.69678 25.55924 47 50 50 50 32 50
38 1 50 46 0.70000 26.63976 47 50 50 50 32 50
38 2 50 46 0.70000 27.30000 47 50 50 50 32 50
38 3 50 46 0.70000 27.29272 47 50 50 50 32 50
38 4 32 49 0.68068 25.15085 47 50 50 50 32 50
38 5 50 46 0.70000 26.61194 47 50 50 50 32 50
39 0 49 42 0.69809 26.25732 49 50 50 50 48 10
39 1 50 41 0.70000 27.33976 49 50 50 50 48 10
39 2 50 41 0.70000 28.00000 49 50 50 50 48 10
39 3 50 41 0.70000 27.99272 49 50 50 50 48 10
39 4 48 42 0.69608 25.84693 49 50 50 50 48 10
39 5 10 49 0.61600 27.22794 49 50 50 50 48 10
40 0 50 51 0.70000 26.95732 50 50 50 50 53 50
40 1 50 51 0.70000 28.03976 50 50 50 50 53 50
40 2 50 51 0.70000 28.70000 50 50 50 50 53 50
40 3 50 51 0.70000 28.69272 50 50 50 50 53 50
40 4 53 50 0.69958 26.54651 50 50 50 50 53 50
40 5 50 51 0.70000 27.92794 50 50 50 50 53 50
41 0 50 51 0.70000 27.65732 50 50 50 50 53 50
41 1 50 51 0.70000 28.73976 50 50 50 50 53 50
41 2 50 51 0.70000 29.40000 50 50 50 50 53 50
41 3 50 51 0.70000 29.39272 50 50 50 50 53 50
41 4 53 50 0.69958 27.24609 50 50 50 50 53 50
41 5 50 51 0.70000 28.62794 50 50 50 50 53 50
42 0 50 50 0.70000 28.35732 50 51 50 51 50 50
42 1 51 50 0.69995 29.43971 50 51 50 51 50 50
42 2 50 50 0.70000 30.10000 50 51 50 51 50 50
42 3 51 50 0.69995 30.09267 50 51 50 51 50 50
42 4 50 50 0.70000 27.94609 50 51 50 51 50 50
42 5 50 50 0.70000 29.32794 50 51 50 51 50 50
43 0 50 47 0.70000 29.05732 50 49 50 50 34 50
43 1 49 47 0.69925 30.13896 50 49 50 50 34 50
43 2 50 47 0.70000 30.80000 50 49 50 50 34 50
43 3 50 47 0.70000 30.79267 50 49 50 50 34 50
43 4 34 50 0.68805 28.63415 50 49 50 50 34 50
43 5 50 47 0.70000 30.02794 50 49 50 50 34 50
44 0 50 54 0.70000 29.75732 50 49 50 50 50 71
44 1 49 54 0.70089 30.83985 50 49 50 50 50 71
150
Table XXXII.: (continued)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
44 2 50 54 0.70000 31.50000 50 49 50 50 50 71
44 3 50 54 0.70000 31.49267 50 49 50 50 50 71
44 4 50 54 0.70000 29.33415 50 49 50 50 50 71
44 5 71 50 0.67942 30.70736 50 49 50 50 50 71
45 0 50 49 0.70000 30.45732 50 50 50 50 45 50
45 1 50 49 0.70000 31.53985 50 50 50 50 45 50
45 2 50 49 0.70000 32.20000 50 50 50 50 45 50
45 3 50 49 0.70000 32.19267 50 50 50 50 45 50
45 4 45 50 0.69883 30.03298 50 50 50 50 45 50
45 5 50 49 0.70000 31.40736 50 50 50 50 45 50
46 0 50 50 0.70000 31.15732 50 50 50 50 50 50
46 1 50 50 0.70000 32.23985 50 50 50 50 50 50
46 2 50 50 0.70000 32.90000 50 50 50 50 50 50
46 3 50 50 0.70000 32.89267 50 50 50 50 50 50
46 4 50 50 0.70000 30.73298 50 50 50 50 50 50
46 5 50 50 0.70000 32.10736 50 50 50 50 50 50
47 0 49 50 0.69995 31.85728 49 50 50 50 50 50
47 1 50 50 0.70000 32.93985 49 50 50 50 50 50
47 2 50 50 0.70000 33.60000 49 50 50 50 50 50
47 3 50 50 0.70000 33.59267 49 50 50 50 50 50
47 4 50 50 0.70000 31.43298 49 50 50 50 50 50
47 5 50 50 0.70000 32.80736 49 50 50 50 50 50
48 0 51 50 0.69995 32.55723 51 50 50 50 50 50
48 1 50 50 0.70000 33.63985 51 50 50 50 50 50
48 2 50 50 0.70000 34.30000 51 50 50 50 50 50
48 3 50 50 0.70000 34.29267 51 50 50 50 50 50
48 4 50 50 0.70000 32.13298 51 50 50 50 50 50
48 5 50 50 0.70000 33.50736 51 50 50 50 50 50
49 0 50 50 0.70000 33.25723 50 50 50 50 50 50
49 1 50 50 0.70000 34.33985 50 50 50 50 50 50
49 2 50 50 0.70000 35.00000 50 50 50 50 50 50
49 3 50 50 0.70000 34.99267 50 50 50 50 50 50
49 4 50 50 0.70000 32.83298 50 50 50 50 50 50
49 5 50 50 0.70000 34.20736 50 50 50 50 50 50
Table XXXIII.: Data from experiments: 6 large suppliers - no transport costs - Cohort 3
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
0 0 85 34 0.77350 0.77350 85 6 50 80 13 23
0 1 6 50 0.60965 0.60965 85 6 50 80 13 23
0 2 50 41 0.70000 0.70000 85 6 50 80 13 23
0 3 80 35 0.76300 0.76300 85 6 50 80 13 23
0 4 13 49 0.62748 0.62748 85 6 50 80 13 23
0 5 23 47 0.64708 0.64708 85 6 50 80 13 23
1 0 73 56 0.64311 1.41661 73 79 45 43 60 51
1 1 79 54 0.63369 1.24334 73 79 45 43 60 51
1 2 45 61 0.71167 1.41167 73 79 45 43 60 51
1 3 43 62 0.71731 1.48031 73 79 45 43 60 51
1 4 60 58 0.67667 1.30415 73 79 45 43 60 51
1 5 51 60 0.69762 1.34470 73 79 45 43 60 51
2 0 63 52 0.68605 2.10266 63 58 56 78 30 37
2 1 58 53 0.69141 1.93475 63 58 56 78 30 37
2 2 56 53 0.69412 2.10579 63 58 56 78 30 37
2 3 78 49 0.66995 2.15026 63 58 56 78 30 37
2 4 30 58 0.71867 2.02281 63 58 56 78 30 37
2 5 37 57 0.71335 2.05805 63 58 56 78 30 37
3 0 70 37 0.74200 2.84466 70 44 50 20 25 44
3 1 44 42 0.68712 2.62187 70 44 50 20 25 44
3 2 50 41 0.70000 2.80579 70 44 50 20 25 44
3 3 20 47 0.63700 2.78726 70 44 50 20 25 44
3 4 25 46 0.64750 2.67031 70 44 50 20 25 44
3 5 44 42 0.68712 2.74517 70 44 50 20 25 44
4 0 64 47 0.70065 3.54531 64 44 45 57 20 70
4 1 44 51 0.69972 3.32159 64 44 45 57 20 70
4 2 45 51 0.70000 3.50579 64 44 45 57 20 70
4 3 57 49 0.69935 3.48661 64 44 45 57 20 70
4 4 20 56 0.70000 3.37031 64 44 45 57 20 70
4 5 70 46 0.70000 3.44517 64 44 45 57 20 70
5 0 73 34 0.76118 4.30649 73 55 50 0 10 55
5 1 55 38 0.71283 4.03443 73 55 50 0 10 55
5 2 50 39 0.70000 4.20579 73 55 50 0 10 55
5 3 0 49 0.57167 4.05827 73 55 50 0 10 55
5 4 10 47 0.59733 3.96765 73 55 50 0 10 55
5 5 55 38 0.71283 4.15800 73 55 50 0 10 55
6 0 87 50 0.63611 4.94261 87 65 50 45 15 75
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6 1 65 54 0.67550 4.70993 87 65 50 45 15 75
6 2 50 57 0.70000 4.90579 87 65 50 45 15 75
6 3 45 58 0.70817 4.76644 87 65 50 45 15 75
6 4 15 64 0.75717 4.72481 87 65 50 45 15 75
6 5 75 52 0.65917 4.81717 87 65 50 45 15 75
7 0 11 65 0.76552 5.70813 11 55 50 54 90 75
7 1 55 56 0.69183 5.40176 11 55 50 54 90 75
7 2 50 57 0.70000 5.60579 11 55 50 54 90 75
7 3 54 56 0.69365 5.46009 11 55 50 54 90 75
7 4 90 49 0.63467 5.35948 11 55 50 54 90 75
7 5 75 52 0.65917 5.47633 11 55 50 54 90 75
8 0 95 57 0.53200 6.24013 95 45 57 40 90 53
8 1 45 67 0.71867 6.12043 95 45 57 40 90 53
8 2 57 65 0.67321 6.27900 95 45 57 40 90 53
8 3 40 68 0.73733 6.19743 95 45 57 40 90 53
8 4 90 58 0.55067 5.91015 95 45 57 40 90 53
8 5 53 65 0.68908 6.16541 95 45 57 40 90 53
9 0 91 31 0.80332 7.04345 91 8 57 34 15 40
9 1 8 47 0.58828 6.70871 91 8 57 34 15 40
9 2 57 38 0.71731 6.99631 91 8 57 34 15 40
9 3 34 42 0.65819 6.85561 91 8 57 34 15 40
9 4 15 46 0.61017 6.52031 91 8 57 34 15 40
9 5 40 41 0.67433 6.83975 91 8 57 34 15 40
10 0 85 55 0.60200 7.64545 85 50 50 56 47 73
10 1 50 62 0.70000 7.40871 85 50 50 56 47 73
10 2 50 62 0.70000 7.69631 85 50 50 56 47 73
10 3 56 61 0.68292 7.53853 85 50 50 56 47 73
10 4 47 63 0.70868 7.22899 85 50 50 56 47 73
10 5 73 58 0.63238 7.47213 85 50 50 56 47 73
11 0 67 40 0.72618 8.37163 67 14 50 47 45 46
11 1 14 51 0.64792 8.05663 67 14 50 47 45 46
11 2 50 44 0.70000 8.39631 67 14 50 47 45 46
11 3 47 44 0.69538 8.23391 67 14 50 47 45 46
11 4 45 45 0.69300 7.92199 67 14 50 47 45 46
11 5 46 45 0.69459 8.16671 67 14 50 47 45 46
12 0 81 40 0.72749 9.09911 81 24 54 19 50 53
12 1 24 51 0.67452 8.73115 81 24 54 19 50 53
12 2 54 45 0.70392 9.10023 81 24 54 19 50 53
12 3 19 52 0.66962 8.90353 81 24 54 19 50 53
12 4 50 46 0.70000 8.62199 81 24 54 19 50 53
12 5 53 46 0.70238 8.86909 81 24 54 19 50 53
13 0 81 51 0.64792 9.74703 81 50 48 50 56 50
13 1 50 57 0.70000 9.43115 81 50 48 50 56 50
13 2 48 57 0.70308 9.80331 81 50 48 50 56 50
13 3 50 57 0.70000 9.60353 81 50 48 50 56 50
13 4 56 56 0.68992 9.31191 81 50 48 50 56 50
13 5 50 57 0.70000 9.56909 81 50 48 50 56 50
14 0 74 54 0.65072 10.39775 74 36 47 71 76 39
14 1 36 61 0.72679 10.15793 74 36 47 71 76 39
14 2 47 59 0.70588 10.50919 74 36 47 71 76 39
14 3 71 54 0.65982 10.26335 74 36 47 71 76 39
14 4 76 53 0.65025 9.96217 74 36 47 71 76 39
14 5 39 61 0.72259 10.29168 74 36 47 71 76 39
15 0 85 43 0.70000 11.09775 85 26 50 48 54 36
15 1 26 55 0.70112 10.85905 85 26 50 48 54 36
15 2 50 50 0.70000 11.20919 85 26 50 48 54 36
15 3 48 50 0.69981 10.96317 85 26 50 48 54 36
15 4 54 49 0.70019 10.66235 85 26 50 48 54 36
15 5 36 53 0.70065 10.99233 85 26 50 48 54 36
16 0 86 43 0.69832 11.79607 86 37 46 50 46 34
16 1 37 52 0.69818 11.55723 86 37 46 50 46 34
16 2 46 51 0.70019 11.90938 86 37 46 50 46 34
16 3 50 50 0.70000 11.66317 86 37 46 50 46 34
16 4 46 51 0.70019 11.36254 86 37 46 50 46 34
16 5 34 53 0.69925 11.69159 86 37 46 50 46 34
17 0 64 49 0.69412 12.49019 64 37 50 52 54 50
17 1 37 54 0.70425 12.26148 64 37 50 52 54 50
17 2 50 51 0.70000 12.60938 64 37 50 52 54 50
17 3 52 51 0.69935 12.36251 64 37 50 52 54 50
17 4 54 51 0.69832 12.06086 64 37 50 52 54 50
17 5 50 51 0.70000 12.39159 64 37 50 52 54 50
18 0 89 51 0.61992 13.11011 89 37 51 53 56 59
18 1 37 62 0.72851 12.98999 89 37 51 53 56 59
18 2 51 59 0.69785 13.30723 89 37 51 53 56 59
18 3 53 58 0.69398 13.05649 89 37 51 53 56 59
18 4 56 58 0.68712 12.74798 89 37 51 53 56 59
18 5 59 57 0.68152 13.07311 89 37 51 53 56 59
19 0 51 45 0.70112 13.81123 51 32 50 50 25 69
19 1 32 49 0.68068 13.67067 51 32 50 50 25 69
19 2 50 45 0.70000 14.00723 51 32 50 50 25 69
19 3 50 45 0.70000 13.75649 51 32 50 50 25 69
19 4 25 50 0.67083 13.41881 51 32 50 50 25 69
19 5 69 42 0.71862 13.79173 51 32 50 50 25 69
20 0 55 46 0.70350 14.51473 55 37 50 61 50 30
20 1 37 49 0.68908 14.35975 55 37 50 61 50 30
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20 2 50 47 0.70000 14.70723 55 37 50 61 50 30
20 3 61 44 0.70975 14.46625 55 37 50 61 50 30
20 4 50 47 0.70000 14.11881 55 37 50 61 50 30
20 5 30 51 0.68600 14.47773 55 37 50 61 50 30
21 0 56 49 0.69972 15.21445 56 50 48 48 48 50
21 1 50 50 0.70000 15.05975 56 50 48 48 48 50
21 2 48 50 0.69981 15.40705 56 50 48 48 48 50
21 3 48 50 0.69981 15.16606 56 50 48 48 48 50
21 4 48 50 0.69981 14.81863 56 50 48 48 48 50
21 5 50 50 0.70000 15.17773 56 50 48 48 48 50
22 0 61 51 0.69179 15.90624 61 52 50 53 51 50
22 1 52 53 0.69841 15.75817 61 52 50 53 51 50
22 2 50 53 0.70000 16.10705 61 52 50 53 51 50
22 3 53 53 0.69748 15.86354 61 52 50 53 51 50
22 4 51 53 0.69925 15.51788 61 52 50 53 51 50
22 5 50 53 0.70000 15.87773 61 52 50 53 51 50
23 0 54 52 0.69739 16.60363 54 38 50 58 52 60
23 1 38 55 0.70728 16.46545 54 38 50 58 52 60
23 2 50 52 0.70000 16.80705 54 38 50 58 52 60
23 3 58 51 0.69515 16.55869 54 38 50 58 52 60
23 4 52 52 0.69888 16.21676 54 38 50 58 52 60
23 5 60 50 0.69533 16.57306 54 38 50 58 52 60
24 0 56 48 0.70112 17.30475 56 40 50 50 49 50
24 1 40 51 0.69767 17.16311 56 40 50 50 49 50
24 2 50 49 0.70000 17.50705 56 40 50 50 49 50
24 3 50 49 0.70000 17.25869 56 40 50 50 49 50
24 4 49 49 0.69972 16.91648 56 40 50 50 49 50
24 5 50 49 0.70000 17.27306 56 40 50 50 49 50
25 0 61 56 0.67895 17.98370 61 50 50 47 80 52
25 1 50 58 0.70000 17.86311 61 50 50 47 80 52
25 2 50 58 0.70000 18.20705 61 50 50 47 80 52
25 3 47 59 0.70588 17.96457 61 50 50 47 80 52
25 4 80 52 0.64400 17.56048 61 50 50 47 80 52
25 5 52 58 0.69608 17.96914 61 50 50 47 80 52
26 0 52 47 0.70121 18.68491 52 34 52 55 43 50
26 1 34 50 0.68805 18.55117 52 34 52 55 43 50
26 2 52 47 0.70121 18.90826 52 34 52 55 43 50
26 3 55 46 0.70350 18.66807 52 34 52 55 43 50
26 4 43 49 0.69608 18.25656 52 34 52 55 43 50
26 5 50 47 0.70000 18.66914 52 34 52 55 43 50
27 0 59 51 0.69412 19.37903 59 58 50 50 49 50
27 1 58 52 0.69328 19.24445 59 58 50 50 49 50
27 2 50 53 0.70000 19.60826 59 58 50 50 49 50
27 3 50 53 0.70000 19.36807 59 58 50 50 49 50
27 4 49 53 0.70065 18.95721 59 58 50 50 49 50
27 5 50 53 0.70000 19.36914 59 58 50 50 49 50
28 0 56 51 0.69692 20.07595 56 42 50 57 54 51
28 1 42 54 0.70448 19.94893 56 42 50 57 54 51
28 2 50 52 0.70000 20.30826 56 42 50 57 54 51
28 3 57 51 0.69608 20.06415 56 42 50 57 54 51
28 4 54 51 0.69832 19.65553 56 42 50 57 54 51
28 5 51 52 0.69949 20.06863 56 42 50 57 54 51
29 0 87 49 0.64475 20.72070 87 45 50 52 47 50
29 1 45 57 0.70700 20.65593 87 45 50 52 47 50
29 2 50 56 0.70000 21.00826 87 45 50 52 47 50
29 3 52 56 0.69701 20.76116 87 45 50 52 47 50
29 4 47 57 0.70448 20.36001 87 45 50 52 47 50
29 5 50 56 0.70000 20.76863 87 45 50 52 47 50
30 0 55 45 0.70467 21.42537 55 43 50 34 63 36
30 1 43 48 0.69445 21.35037 55 43 50 34 63 36
30 2 50 46 0.70000 21.70826 55 43 50 34 63 36
30 3 34 49 0.68432 21.44548 55 43 50 34 63 36
30 4 63 44 0.71031 21.07032 55 43 50 34 63 36
30 5 36 49 0.68759 21.45621 55 43 50 34 63 36
31 0 55 48 0.70117 22.12653 55 54 51 50 43 40
31 1 54 48 0.70112 22.05149 55 54 51 50 43 40
31 2 51 48 0.70042 22.40868 55 54 51 50 43 40
31 3 50 49 0.70000 22.14548 55 54 51 50 43 40
31 4 43 50 0.69771 21.76804 55 54 51 50 43 40
31 5 40 51 0.69767 22.15388 55 54 51 50 43 40
32 0 49 50 0.69995 22.82649 49 57 50 50 46 49
32 1 57 49 0.69935 22.75084 49 57 50 50 46 49
32 2 50 50 0.70000 23.10868 49 57 50 50 46 49
32 3 50 50 0.70000 22.84548 49 57 50 50 46 49
32 4 46 51 0.70019 22.46822 49 57 50 50 46 49
32 5 49 50 0.69995 22.85383 49 57 50 50 46 49
33 0 50 49 0.70000 23.52649 50 50 50 40 51 55
33 1 50 49 0.70000 23.45084 50 50 50 40 51 55
33 2 50 49 0.70000 23.80868 50 50 50 40 51 55
33 3 40 51 0.69767 23.54315 50 50 50 40 51 55
33 4 51 49 0.70019 23.16841 50 50 50 40 51 55
33 5 55 48 0.70117 23.55500 50 50 50 40 51 55
34 0 51 50 0.69995 24.22644 51 53 50 50 46 53
34 1 53 50 0.69958 24.15042 51 53 50 50 46 53
34 2 50 51 0.70000 24.50868 51 53 50 50 46 53
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34 3 50 51 0.70000 24.24315 51 53 50 50 46 53
34 4 46 51 0.70019 23.86860 51 53 50 50 46 53
34 5 53 50 0.69958 24.25458 51 53 50 50 46 53
35 0 50 50 0.70000 24.92644 50 51 50 48 53 50
35 1 51 50 0.69995 24.85037 50 51 50 48 53 50
35 2 50 50 0.70000 25.20868 50 51 50 48 53 50
35 3 48 51 0.70028 24.94343 50 51 50 48 53 50
35 4 53 50 0.69958 24.56818 50 51 50 48 53 50
35 5 50 50 0.70000 24.95458 50 51 50 48 53 50
36 0 50 48 0.70000 25.62644 50 51 50 48 44 49
36 1 51 48 0.70042 25.55079 50 51 50 48 44 49
36 2 50 48 0.70000 25.90868 50 51 50 48 44 49
36 3 48 49 0.69935 25.64277 50 51 50 48 44 49
36 4 44 50 0.69832 25.26650 50 51 50 48 44 49
36 5 49 49 0.69972 25.65430 50 51 50 48 44 49
37 0 50 45 0.70000 26.32644 50 53 50 50 24 50
37 1 53 45 0.70308 26.25387 50 53 50 50 24 50
37 2 50 45 0.70000 26.60868 50 53 50 50 24 50
37 3 50 45 0.70000 26.34277 50 53 50 50 24 50
37 4 24 51 0.67452 25.94102 50 53 50 50 24 50
37 5 50 45 0.70000 26.35430 50 53 50 50 24 50
38 0 56 53 0.69412 27.02056 56 55 50 58 55 45
38 1 55 53 0.69533 26.94921 56 55 50 58 55 45
38 2 50 54 0.70000 27.30868 56 55 50 58 55 45
38 3 58 52 0.69328 27.03605 56 55 50 58 55 45
38 4 55 53 0.69533 26.63635 56 55 50 58 55 45
38 5 45 55 0.70467 27.05897 56 55 50 58 55 45
39 0 51 48 0.70042 27.72098 51 38 50 47 56 49
39 1 38 51 0.69608 27.64529 51 38 50 47 56 49
39 2 50 48 0.70000 28.00868 51 38 50 47 56 49
39 3 47 49 0.69888 27.73493 51 38 50 47 56 49
39 4 56 47 0.70252 27.33887 51 38 50 47 56 49
39 5 49 48 0.69949 27.75845 51 38 50 47 56 49
40 0 51 47 0.70065 28.42163 51 44 48 50 46 49
40 1 44 49 0.69692 28.34221 51 44 48 50 46 49
40 2 48 48 0.69888 28.70756 51 44 48 50 46 49
40 3 50 48 0.70000 28.43493 51 44 48 50 46 49
40 4 46 48 0.69739 28.03626 51 44 48 50 46 49
40 5 49 48 0.69949 28.45794 51 44 48 50 46 49
41 0 53 50 0.69958 29.12121 53 53 50 50 45 50
41 1 53 50 0.69958 29.04179 53 53 50 50 45 50
41 2 50 50 0.70000 29.40756 53 53 50 50 45 50
41 3 50 50 0.70000 29.13493 53 53 50 50 45 50
41 4 45 51 0.70000 28.73626 53 53 50 50 45 50
41 5 50 50 0.70000 29.15794 53 53 50 50 45 50
42 0 50 56 0.70000 29.82121 50 53 50 45 80 50
42 1 53 55 0.69608 29.73787 50 53 50 45 80 50
42 2 50 56 0.70000 30.10756 50 53 50 45 80 50
42 3 45 57 0.70700 29.84193 50 53 50 45 80 50
42 4 80 50 0.65800 29.39426 50 53 50 45 80 50
42 5 50 56 0.70000 29.85794 50 53 50 45 80 50
43 0 50 40 0.70000 30.52121 50 53 50 38 60 1
43 1 53 40 0.70658 30.44445 50 53 50 38 60 1
43 2 50 40 0.70000 30.80756 50 53 50 38 60 1
43 3 38 43 0.67368 30.51561 50 53 50 38 60 1
43 4 60 38 0.72333 30.11759 50 53 50 38 60 1
43 5 1 50 0.58795 30.44589 50 53 50 38 60 1
44 0 79 45 0.69459 31.21580 79 57 50 59 14 46
44 1 57 50 0.69771 31.14216 79 57 50 59 14 46
44 2 50 51 0.70000 31.50756 79 57 50 59 14 46
44 3 59 49 0.69832 31.21393 79 57 50 59 14 46
44 4 14 58 0.70672 30.82431 79 57 50 59 14 46
44 5 46 52 0.70112 31.14701 79 57 50 59 14 46
45 0 66 56 0.66565 31.88145 66 59 50 50 68 53
45 1 59 57 0.68152 31.82368 66 59 50 50 68 53
45 2 50 59 0.70000 32.20756 66 59 50 50 68 53
45 3 50 59 0.70000 31.91393 66 59 50 50 68 53
45 4 68 56 0.65968 31.48399 66 59 50 50 68 53
45 5 53 59 0.69328 31.84029 66 59 50 50 68 53
46 0 54 44 0.70485 32.58631 54 30 50 37 60 44
46 1 30 49 0.67667 32.50035 54 30 50 37 60 44
46 2 50 45 0.70000 32.90756 54 30 50 37 60 44
46 3 37 48 0.68605 32.59998 54 30 50 37 60 44
46 4 60 43 0.71167 32.19566 54 30 50 37 60 44
46 5 44 46 0.69272 32.53301 54 30 50 37 60 44
47 0 50 48 0.70000 33.28631 50 50 50 50 40 50
47 1 50 48 0.70000 33.20035 50 50 50 50 40 50
47 2 50 48 0.70000 33.60756 50 50 50 50 40 50
47 3 50 48 0.70000 33.29998 50 50 50 50 40 50
47 4 40 50 0.69533 32.89099 50 50 50 50 40 50
47 5 50 48 0.70000 33.23301 50 50 50 50 40 50
48 0 57 50 0.69771 33.98402 57 55 50 50 46 50
48 1 55 51 0.69767 33.89801 57 55 50 50 46 50
48 2 50 52 0.70000 34.30756 57 55 50 50 46 50
48 3 50 52 0.70000 33.99998 57 55 50 50 46 50
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48 4 46 52 0.70112 33.59211 57 55 50 50 46 50
48 5 50 52 0.70000 33.93301 57 55 50 50 46 50
49 0 50 51 0.70000 34.68402 50 50 50 50 56 50
49 1 50 51 0.70000 34.59801 50 50 50 50 56 50
49 2 50 51 0.70000 35.00756 50 50 50 50 56 50
49 3 50 51 0.70000 34.69998 50 50 50 50 56 50
49 4 56 50 0.69832 34.29043 50 50 50 50 56 50
49 5 50 51 0.70000 34.63301 50 50 50 50 56 50
Table XXXIV.: Data from experiments: 6 large suppliers - no transport costs - Cohort 4
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
0 0 30 44 0.65333 0.65333 30 100 50 0 50 20
0 1 100 30 0.81667 0.81667 30 100 50 0 50 20
0 2 50 40 0.70000 0.70000 30 100 50 0 50 20
0 3 0 50 0.58333 0.58333 30 100 50 0 50 20
0 4 50 40 0.70000 0.70000 30 100 50 0 50 20
0 5 20 46 0.63000 0.63000 30 100 50 0 50 20
1 0 100 55 0.52500 1.17833 100 94 50 0 59 70
1 1 94 56 0.54805 1.36472 100 94 50 0 59 70
1 2 50 65 0.70000 1.40000 100 94 50 0 59 70
1 3 0 75 0.87500 1.45833 100 94 50 0 59 70
1 4 59 63 0.66892 1.36892 100 94 50 0 59 70
1 5 70 61 0.63000 1.26000 100 94 50 0 59 70
2 0 50 32 0.70000 1.87833 50 8 51 0 2 100
2 1 8 41 0.52948 1.89420 50 8 51 0 2 100
2 2 51 32 0.70415 2.10415 50 8 51 0 2 100
2 3 0 42 0.49000 1.94833 50 8 51 0 2 100
2 4 2 42 0.50288 1.87180 50 8 51 0 2 100
2 5 100 22 0.91000 2.17000 50 8 51 0 2 100
3 0 40 46 0.68600 2.56433 40 100 53 0 50 25
3 1 100 34 0.77000 2.66420 40 100 53 0 50 25
3 2 53 43 0.70448 2.80863 40 100 53 0 50 25
3 3 0 54 0.63000 2.57833 40 100 53 0 50 25
3 4 50 44 0.70000 2.57180 40 100 53 0 50 25
3 5 25 49 0.66500 2.83500 40 100 53 0 50 25
4 0 0 50 0.58333 3.14767 0 100 50 1 50 50
4 1 100 30 0.81667 3.48087 0 100 50 1 50 50
4 2 50 40 0.70000 3.50863 0 100 50 1 50 50
4 3 1 50 0.58795 3.16629 0 100 50 1 50 50
4 4 50 40 0.70000 3.27180 0 100 50 1 50 50
4 5 50 40 0.70000 3.53500 0 100 50 1 50 50
5 0 50 44 0.70000 3.84767 50 100 50 0 50 20
5 1 100 34 0.77000 4.25087 50 100 50 0 50 20
5 2 50 44 0.70000 4.20863 50 100 50 0 50 20
5 3 0 54 0.63000 3.79629 50 100 50 0 50 20
5 4 50 44 0.70000 3.97180 50 100 50 0 50 20
5 5 20 50 0.65800 4.19300 50 100 50 0 50 20
6 0 60 67 0.65567 4.50333 60 100 50 83 50 50
6 1 100 59 0.47833 4.72920 60 100 50 83 50 50
6 2 50 69 0.70000 4.90863 60 100 50 83 50 50
6 3 83 62 0.55678 4.35307 60 100 50 83 50 50
6 4 50 69 0.70000 4.67180 60 100 50 83 50 50
6 5 50 69 0.70000 4.89300 60 100 50 83 50 50
7 0 100 29 0.82833 5.33167 100 90 50 2 4 0
7 1 90 31 0.80267 5.53187 100 90 50 2 4 0
7 2 50 39 0.70000 5.60863 100 90 50 2 4 0
7 3 2 49 0.58128 4.93434 100 90 50 2 4 0
7 4 4 48 0.57979 5.25159 100 90 50 2 4 0
7 5 0 49 0.57167 5.46467 100 90 50 2 4 0
8 0 60 57 0.67900 6.01067 60 99 52 36 50 50
8 1 99 50 0.58795 6.11982 60 99 52 36 50 50
8 2 52 59 0.69561 6.30425 60 99 52 36 50 50
8 3 36 62 0.73005 5.66440 60 99 52 36 50 50
8 4 50 59 0.70000 5.95159 60 99 52 36 50 50
8 5 50 59 0.70000 6.16467 60 99 52 36 50 50
9 0 100 44 0.65333 6.66400 100 85 49 16 50 20
9 1 85 47 0.66733 6.78715 100 85 49 16 50 20
9 2 49 54 0.70089 7.00513 100 85 49 16 50 20
9 3 16 61 0.73332 6.39772 100 85 49 16 50 20
9 4 50 54 0.70000 6.65159 100 85 49 16 50 20
9 5 20 60 0.72800 6.89267 100 85 49 16 50 20
10 0 50 62 0.70000 7.36400 50 100 50 40 50 70
10 1 100 52 0.56000 7.34715 50 100 50 40 50 70
10 2 50 62 0.70000 7.70513 50 100 50 40 50 70
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10 3 40 64 0.72800 7.12572 50 100 50 40 50 70
10 4 50 62 0.70000 7.35159 50 100 50 40 50 70
10 5 70 58 0.64400 7.53667 50 100 50 40 50 70
11 0 100 44 0.65333 8.01733 100 52 50 25 50 45
11 1 52 54 0.69795 8.04510 100 52 50 25 50 45
11 2 50 54 0.70000 8.40513 100 52 50 25 50 45
11 3 25 59 0.72333 7.84905 100 52 50 25 50 45
11 4 50 54 0.70000 8.05159 100 52 50 25 50 45
11 5 45 55 0.70467 8.24133 100 52 50 25 50 45
12 0 40 50 0.69533 8.71267 40 100 50 19 50 29
12 1 100 38 0.72333 8.76843 40 100 50 19 50 29
12 2 50 48 0.70000 9.10513 40 100 50 19 50 29
12 3 19 54 0.68409 8.53314 40 100 50 19 50 29
12 4 50 48 0.70000 8.75159 40 100 50 19 50 29
12 5 29 52 0.68922 8.93055 40 100 50 19 50 29
13 0 60 59 0.67433 9.38700 60 100 50 47 50 48
13 1 100 51 0.57167 9.34010 60 100 50 47 50 48
13 2 50 61 0.70000 9.80513 60 100 50 47 50 48
13 3 47 62 0.70798 9.24112 60 100 50 47 50 48
13 4 50 61 0.70000 9.45159 60 100 50 47 50 48
13 5 48 61 0.70495 9.63550 60 100 50 47 50 48
14 0 80 50 0.65800 10.04500 80 90 50 17 53 40
14 1 90 48 0.64400 9.98410 80 90 50 17 53 40
14 2 50 56 0.70000 10.50513 80 90 50 17 53 40
14 3 17 63 0.74928 9.99040 80 90 50 17 53 40
14 4 53 55 0.69608 10.14767 80 90 50 17 53 40
14 5 40 58 0.71400 10.34950 80 90 50 17 53 40
15 0 80 50 0.65800 10.70300 80 80 50 22 51 46
15 1 80 50 0.65800 10.64210 80 80 50 22 51 46
15 2 50 56 0.70000 11.20513 80 80 50 22 51 46
15 3 22 61 0.73528 10.72568 80 80 50 22 51 46
15 4 51 56 0.69855 10.84622 80 80 50 22 51 46
15 5 46 57 0.70579 11.05529 80 80 50 22 51 46
16 0 50 45 0.70000 11.40300 50 54 48 18 58 45
16 1 54 44 0.70485 11.34695 50 54 48 18 58 45
16 2 48 45 0.69748 11.90261 50 54 48 18 58 45
16 3 18 51 0.65968 11.38536 50 54 48 18 58 45
16 4 58 43 0.71008 11.55630 50 54 48 18 58 45
16 5 45 46 0.69417 11.74945 50 54 48 18 58 45
17 0 50 58 0.70000 12.10300 50 100 50 27 62 50
17 1 100 48 0.60667 11.95362 50 100 50 27 62 50
17 2 50 58 0.70000 12.60261 50 100 50 27 62 50
17 3 27 62 0.73971 12.12507 50 100 50 27 62 50
17 4 62 55 0.67928 12.23558 50 100 50 27 62 50
17 5 50 58 0.70000 12.44945 50 100 50 27 62 50
18 0 50 45 0.70000 12.80300 50 75 50 18 56 25
18 1 75 40 0.72917 12.68278 50 75 50 18 56 25
18 2 50 45 0.70000 13.30261 50 75 50 18 56 25
18 3 18 51 0.65968 12.78475 50 75 50 18 56 25
18 4 56 44 0.70672 12.94230 50 75 50 18 56 25
18 5 25 50 0.67083 13.12029 50 75 50 18 56 25
19 0 32 50 0.68488 13.48788 32 69 50 26 55 50
19 1 69 43 0.71419 13.39697 32 69 50 26 55 50
19 2 50 46 0.70000 14.00261 32 69 50 26 55 50
19 3 26 51 0.67872 13.46347 32 69 50 26 55 50
19 4 55 45 0.70467 13.64697 32 69 50 26 55 50
19 5 50 46 0.70000 13.82029 32 69 50 26 55 50
20 0 62 55 0.67928 14.16716 62 74 50 45 55 50
20 1 74 52 0.66192 14.05889 62 74 50 45 55 50
20 2 50 57 0.70000 14.70261 62 74 50 45 55 50
20 3 45 58 0.70817 14.17164 62 74 50 45 55 50
20 4 55 56 0.69183 14.33880 62 74 50 45 55 50
20 5 50 57 0.70000 14.52029 62 74 50 45 55 50
21 0 62 46 0.70448 14.87164 62 49 50 32 50 50
21 1 49 49 0.69972 14.75861 62 49 50 32 50 50
21 2 50 49 0.70000 15.40261 62 49 50 32 50 50
21 3 32 52 0.69328 14.86492 62 49 50 32 50 50
21 4 50 49 0.70000 15.03880 62 49 50 32 50 50
21 5 50 49 0.70000 15.22029 62 49 50 32 50 50
22 0 32 45 0.66388 15.53552 32 51 50 53 50 19
22 1 51 41 0.70205 15.46066 32 51 50 53 50 19
22 2 50 41 0.70000 16.10261 32 51 50 53 50 19
22 3 53 40 0.70658 15.57150 32 51 50 53 50 19
22 4 50 41 0.70000 15.73880 32 51 50 53 50 19
22 5 19 47 0.63345 15.85374 32 51 50 53 50 19
23 0 32 54 0.70168 16.23720 32 79 53 73 47 20
23 1 79 45 0.69459 16.15525 32 79 53 73 47 20
23 2 53 50 0.69958 16.80219 32 79 53 73 47 20
23 3 73 46 0.69678 16.26828 32 79 53 73 47 20
23 4 47 51 0.70028 16.43908 32 79 53 73 47 20
23 5 20 57 0.70700 16.56074 32 79 53 73 47 20
24 0 52 48 0.70075 16.93795 52 69 50 55 48 20
24 1 69 45 0.70532 16.86057 52 69 50 55 48 20
24 2 50 49 0.70000 17.50219 52 69 50 55 48 20
24 3 55 48 0.70117 16.96945 52 69 50 55 48 20
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24 4 48 49 0.69935 17.13843 52 69 50 55 48 20
24 5 20 55 0.69300 17.25374 52 69 50 55 48 20
25 0 32 52 0.69328 17.63123 32 75 50 65 50 20
25 1 75 43 0.71167 17.57224 32 75 50 65 50 20
25 2 50 48 0.70000 18.20219 32 75 50 65 50 20
25 3 65 45 0.70700 17.67645 32 75 50 65 50 20
25 4 50 48 0.70000 17.83843 32 75 50 65 50 20
25 5 20 54 0.68600 17.93974 32 75 50 65 50 20
26 0 53 61 0.69188 18.32311 53 70 50 52 100 35
26 1 70 58 0.64400 18.21624 53 70 50 52 100 35
26 2 50 62 0.70000 18.90219 53 70 50 52 100 35
26 3 52 62 0.69421 18.37066 53 70 50 52 100 35
26 4 100 52 0.56000 18.39843 53 70 50 52 100 35
26 5 35 65 0.74200 18.68174 53 70 50 52 100 35
27 0 62 44 0.71008 19.03319 62 64 49 31 50 24
27 1 64 43 0.71372 18.92996 62 64 49 31 50 24
27 2 49 46 0.69902 19.60121 62 64 49 31 50 24
27 3 31 50 0.68315 19.05381 62 64 49 31 50 24
27 4 50 46 0.70000 19.09843 62 64 49 31 50 24
27 5 24 51 0.67452 19.35626 62 64 49 31 50 24
28 0 32 48 0.67648 19.70966 32 70 50 58 50 10
28 1 70 40 0.72800 19.65796 32 70 50 58 50 10
28 2 50 44 0.70000 20.30121 32 70 50 58 50 10
28 3 58 42 0.71195 19.76576 32 70 50 58 50 10
28 4 50 44 0.70000 19.79843 32 70 50 58 50 10
28 5 10 52 0.64400 20.00026 32 70 50 58 50 10
29 0 10 50 0.62533 20.33500 10 73 50 63 50 13
29 1 73 37 0.74508 20.40304 10 73 50 63 50 13
29 2 50 42 0.70000 21.00121 10 73 50 63 50 13
29 3 63 39 0.72548 20.49124 10 73 50 63 50 13
29 4 50 42 0.70000 20.49843 10 73 50 63 50 13
29 5 13 49 0.62748 20.62774 10 73 50 63 50 13
30 0 32 61 0.73108 21.06608 32 73 50 82 50 50
30 1 73 53 0.65921 21.06225 32 73 50 82 50 50
30 2 50 57 0.70000 21.70121 32 73 50 82 50 50
30 3 82 51 0.64475 21.13599 32 73 50 82 50 50
30 4 50 57 0.70000 21.19843 32 73 50 82 50 50
30 5 50 57 0.70000 21.32774 32 73 50 82 50 50
31 0 62 50 0.69328 21.75936 62 60 50 20 40 80
31 1 60 50 0.69533 21.75758 62 60 50 20 40 80
31 2 50 52 0.70000 22.40121 62 60 50 20 40 80
31 3 20 58 0.71400 21.84999 62 60 50 20 40 80
31 4 40 54 0.70467 21.90309 62 60 50 20 40 80
31 5 80 46 0.68600 22.01374 62 60 50 20 40 80
32 0 15 41 0.56933 22.32869 15 50 51 40 38 24
32 1 50 34 0.70000 22.45758 15 50 51 40 38 24
32 2 51 33 0.70392 23.10513 15 50 51 40 38 24
32 3 40 36 0.66267 22.51265 15 50 51 40 38 24
32 4 38 36 0.65408 22.55717 15 50 51 40 38 24
32 5 24 39 0.60172 22.61546 15 50 51 40 38 24
33 0 32 55 0.70588 23.03457 32 90 55 70 50 12
33 1 90 44 0.68133 23.13892 32 90 55 70 50 12
33 2 55 51 0.69767 23.80280 32 90 55 70 50 12
33 3 70 48 0.69067 23.20332 32 90 55 70 50 12
33 4 50 52 0.70000 23.25717 32 90 55 70 50 12
33 5 12 59 0.71241 23.32787 32 90 55 70 50 12
34 0 62 58 0.67088 23.70545 62 76 50 50 50 63
34 1 76 55 0.63812 23.77704 62 76 50 50 50 63
34 2 50 60 0.70000 24.50280 62 76 50 50 50 63
34 3 50 60 0.70000 23.90332 62 76 50 50 50 63
34 4 50 60 0.70000 23.95717 62 76 50 50 50 63
34 5 63 58 0.66785 23.99572 62 76 50 50 50 63
35 0 62 49 0.69608 24.40153 62 53 50 37 42 63
35 1 53 51 0.69888 24.47592 62 53 50 37 42 63
35 2 50 51 0.70000 25.20280 62 53 50 37 42 63
35 3 37 54 0.70425 24.60756 62 53 50 37 42 63
35 4 42 53 0.70261 24.65979 62 53 50 37 42 63
35 5 63 49 0.69515 24.69087 62 53 50 37 42 63
36 0 45 48 0.69650 25.09803 45 50 50 45 47 50
36 1 50 47 0.70000 25.17592 45 50 50 45 47 50
36 2 50 47 0.70000 25.90280 45 50 50 45 47 50
36 3 45 48 0.69650 25.30406 45 50 50 45 47 50
36 4 47 48 0.69818 25.35797 45 50 50 45 47 50
36 5 50 47 0.70000 25.39087 45 50 50 45 47 50
37 0 32 55 0.70588 25.80391 32 59 51 67 50 50
37 1 59 50 0.69622 25.87214 32 59 51 67 50 50
37 2 51 52 0.69949 26.60229 32 59 51 67 50 50
37 3 67 48 0.69445 25.99851 32 59 51 67 50 50
37 4 50 52 0.70000 26.05797 32 59 51 67 50 50
37 5 50 52 0.70000 26.09087 32 59 51 67 50 50
38 0 38 44 0.67648 26.48039 38 50 50 20 50 50
38 1 50 42 0.70000 26.57214 38 50 50 20 50 50
38 2 50 42 0.70000 27.30229 38 50 50 20 50 50
38 3 20 48 0.64400 26.64251 38 50 50 20 50 50
38 4 50 42 0.70000 26.75797 38 50 50 20 50 50
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38 5 50 42 0.70000 26.79087 38 50 50 20 50 50
39 0 50 45 0.70000 27.18039 50 50 50 35 50 42
39 1 50 45 0.70000 27.27214 50 50 50 35 50 42
39 2 50 45 0.70000 28.00229 50 50 50 35 50 42
39 3 35 48 0.68250 27.32501 50 50 50 35 50 42
39 4 50 45 0.70000 27.45797 50 50 50 35 50 42
39 5 42 47 0.69141 27.48228 50 50 50 35 50 42
40 0 32 52 0.69328 27.87367 32 69 50 55 50 37
40 1 69 45 0.70532 27.97746 32 69 50 55 50 37
40 2 50 49 0.70000 28.70229 32 69 50 55 50 37
40 3 55 48 0.70117 28.02618 32 69 50 55 50 37
40 4 50 49 0.70000 28.15797 32 69 50 55 50 37
40 5 37 51 0.69515 28.17743 32 69 50 55 50 37
41 0 50 55 0.70000 28.57367 50 68 50 55 54 50
41 1 68 52 0.67648 28.65394 50 68 50 55 54 50
41 2 50 55 0.70000 29.40229 50 68 50 55 54 50
41 3 55 54 0.69417 28.72034 50 68 50 55 54 50
41 4 54 55 0.69459 28.85255 50 68 50 55 54 50
41 5 50 55 0.70000 28.87743 50 68 50 55 54 50
42 0 62 48 0.69888 29.27255 62 50 50 37 51 50
42 1 50 50 0.70000 29.35394 62 50 50 37 51 50
42 2 50 50 0.70000 30.10229 62 50 50 37 51 50
42 3 37 53 0.70121 29.42156 62 50 50 37 51 50
42 4 51 50 0.69995 29.55251 62 50 50 37 51 50
42 5 50 50 0.70000 29.57743 62 50 50 37 51 50
43 0 50 51 0.70000 29.97255 50 54 50 52 50 50
43 1 54 50 0.69925 30.05319 50 54 50 52 50 50
43 2 50 51 0.70000 30.80229 50 54 50 52 50 50
43 3 52 51 0.69935 30.12090 50 54 50 52 50 50
43 4 50 51 0.70000 30.25251 50 54 50 52 50 50
43 5 50 51 0.70000 30.27743 50 54 50 52 50 50
44 0 50 53 0.70000 30.67255 50 52 50 60 50 51
44 1 52 52 0.69888 30.75207 50 52 50 60 50 51
44 2 50 53 0.70000 31.50229 50 52 50 60 50 51
44 3 60 51 0.69300 30.81390 50 52 50 60 50 51
44 4 50 53 0.70000 30.95251 50 52 50 60 50 51
44 5 51 52 0.69949 30.97691 50 52 50 60 50 51
45 0 58 50 0.69701 31.36956 58 50 50 50 50 51
45 1 50 52 0.70000 31.45207 58 50 50 50 50 51
45 2 50 52 0.70000 32.20229 58 50 50 50 50 51
45 3 50 52 0.70000 31.51390 58 50 50 50 50 51
45 4 50 52 0.70000 31.65251 58 50 50 50 50 51
45 5 51 52 0.69949 31.67640 58 50 50 50 50 51
46 0 50 49 0.70000 32.06956 50 47 50 48 50 51
46 1 47 50 0.69958 32.15165 50 47 50 48 50 51
46 2 50 49 0.70000 32.90229 50 47 50 48 50 51
46 3 48 50 0.69981 32.21372 50 47 50 48 50 51
46 4 50 49 0.70000 32.35251 50 47 50 48 50 51
46 5 51 49 0.70019 32.37659 50 47 50 48 50 51
47 0 50 52 0.70000 32.76956 50 50 50 60 50 49
47 1 50 52 0.70000 32.85165 50 50 50 60 50 49
47 2 50 52 0.70000 33.60229 50 50 50 60 50 49
47 3 60 50 0.69533 32.90905 50 50 50 60 50 49
47 4 50 52 0.70000 33.05251 50 50 50 60 50 49
47 5 49 52 0.70042 33.07701 50 50 50 60 50 49
48 0 50 50 0.70000 33.46956 50 50 50 50 50 51
48 1 50 50 0.70000 33.55165 50 50 50 50 50 51
48 2 50 50 0.70000 34.30229 50 50 50 50 50 51
48 3 50 50 0.70000 33.60905 50 50 50 50 50 51
48 4 50 50 0.70000 33.75251 50 50 50 50 50 51
48 5 51 50 0.69995 33.77696 50 50 50 50 50 51
49 0 100 50 0.58333 34.05290 100 50 50 50 50 50
49 1 50 60 0.70000 34.25165 100 50 50 50 50 50
49 2 50 60 0.70000 35.00229 100 50 50 50 50 50
49 3 50 60 0.70000 34.30905 100 50 50 50 50 50
49 4 50 60 0.70000 34.45251 100 50 50 50 50 50
49 5 50 60 0.70000 34.47696 100 50 50 50 50 50
Table XXXV.: Data from experiments: 6 large suppliers - no transport costs - Cohort 5
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
0 0 96 45 0.65492 0.65492 96 68 44 50 50 12
0 1 68 50 0.68488 0.68488 96 68 44 50 50 12
0 2 44 55 0.70532 0.70532 96 68 44 50 50 12
0 3 50 54 0.70000 0.70000 96 68 44 50 50 12
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Table XXXV.: (continued)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
0 4 50 54 0.70000 0.70000 96 68 44 50 50 12
0 5 12 62 0.73901 0.73901 96 68 44 50 50 12
1 0 72 40 0.72875 1.38367 72 0 99 47 52 2
1 1 0 54 0.63000 1.31488 72 0 99 47 52 2
1 2 99 35 0.75945 1.46477 72 0 99 47 52 2
1 3 47 45 0.69608 1.39608 72 0 99 47 52 2
1 4 52 44 0.70261 1.40261 72 0 99 47 52 2
1 5 2 54 0.63728 1.37629 72 0 99 47 52 2
2 0 61 33 0.73799 2.12165 61 56 5 45 49 11
2 1 56 34 0.72072 2.03560 61 56 5 45 49 11
2 2 5 44 0.54250 2.00727 61 56 5 45 49 11
2 3 45 36 0.68250 2.07858 61 56 5 45 49 11
2 4 49 36 0.69669 2.09930 61 56 5 45 49 11
2 5 11 43 0.56532 1.94161 61 56 5 45 49 11
3 0 32 66 0.75208 2.87373 32 34 100 60 54 82
3 1 34 66 0.74779 2.78339 32 34 100 60 54 82
3 2 100 52 0.56000 2.56727 32 34 100 60 54 82
3 3 60 60 0.67200 2.75058 32 34 100 60 54 82
3 4 54 62 0.68805 2.78735 32 34 100 60 54 82
3 5 82 56 0.60741 2.54903 32 34 100 60 54 82
4 0 50 47 0.70000 3.57373 50 56 66 45 50 18
4 1 56 46 0.70392 3.48731 50 56 66 45 50 18
4 2 66 44 0.71045 3.27773 50 56 66 45 50 18
4 3 45 48 0.69650 3.44708 50 56 66 45 50 18
4 4 50 47 0.70000 3.48735 50 56 66 45 50 18
4 5 18 53 0.67461 3.22364 50 56 66 45 50 18
5 0 68 57 0.65548 4.22921 68 37 100 48 48 50
5 1 37 63 0.73155 4.21885 68 37 100 48 48 50
5 2 100 50 0.58333 3.86106 68 37 100 48 48 50
5 3 48 61 0.70495 4.15203 68 37 100 48 48 50
5 4 48 61 0.70495 4.19230 68 37 100 48 48 50
5 5 50 60 0.70000 3.92364 68 37 100 48 48 50
6 0 25 55 0.70000 4.92921 25 69 50 60 48 50
6 1 69 47 0.69645 4.91531 25 69 50 60 48 50
6 2 50 50 0.70000 4.56106 25 69 50 60 48 50
6 3 60 48 0.70000 4.85203 25 69 50 60 48 50
6 4 48 51 0.70028 4.89258 25 69 50 60 48 50
6 5 50 50 0.70000 4.62364 25 69 50 60 48 50
7 0 59 49 0.69832 5.62753 59 50 50 50 47 50
7 1 50 51 0.70000 5.61531 59 50 50 50 47 50
7 2 50 51 0.70000 5.26106 59 50 50 50 47 50
7 3 50 51 0.70000 5.55203 59 50 50 50 47 50
7 4 47 52 0.70098 5.59356 59 50 50 50 47 50
7 5 50 51 0.70000 5.32364 59 50 50 50 47 50
8 0 68 55 0.66388 6.29141 68 50 57 50 47 70
8 1 50 58 0.70000 6.31531 68 50 57 50 47 70
8 2 57 57 0.68628 5.94734 68 50 57 50 47 70
8 3 50 58 0.70000 6.25203 68 50 57 50 47 70
8 4 47 59 0.70588 6.29944 68 50 57 50 47 70
8 5 70 54 0.66267 5.98631 68 50 57 50 47 70
9 0 92 40 0.71568 7.00709 92 40 18 50 46 48
9 1 40 51 0.69767 7.01297 92 40 18 50 46 48
9 2 18 55 0.68955 6.63689 92 40 18 50 46 48
9 3 50 49 0.70000 6.95203 92 40 18 50 46 48
9 4 46 50 0.69925 6.99869 92 40 18 50 46 48
9 5 48 49 0.69935 6.68565 92 40 18 50 46 48
10 0 27 53 0.69141 7.69851 27 53 50 60 50 54
10 1 53 48 0.70098 7.71395 27 53 50 60 50 54
10 2 50 49 0.70000 7.33689 27 53 50 60 50 54
10 3 60 47 0.70233 7.65436 27 53 50 60 50 54
10 4 50 49 0.70000 7.69869 27 53 50 60 50 54
10 5 54 48 0.70112 7.38677 27 53 50 60 50 54
11 0 55 54 0.69417 8.39267 55 49 60 60 48 52
11 1 49 55 0.70112 8.41507 55 49 60 60 48 52
11 2 60 53 0.68833 8.02522 55 49 60 60 48 52
11 3 60 53 0.68833 8.34269 55 49 60 60 48 52
11 4 48 55 0.70215 8.40084 55 49 60 60 48 52
11 5 52 54 0.69795 8.08472 55 49 60 60 48 52
12 0 55 47 0.70233 9.09501 55 51 50 40 47 48
12 1 51 48 0.70042 9.11549 55 51 50 40 47 48
12 2 50 48 0.70000 8.72522 55 51 50 40 47 48
12 3 40 50 0.69533 9.03803 55 51 50 40 47 48
12 4 47 49 0.69888 9.09972 55 51 50 40 47 48
12 5 48 49 0.69935 8.78407 55 51 50 40 47 48
13 0 100 49 0.59500 9.69001 100 39 57 50 53 48
13 1 39 62 0.72515 9.84065 100 39 57 50 53 48
13 2 57 58 0.68465 9.40987 100 39 57 50 53 48
13 3 50 59 0.70000 9.73803 100 39 57 50 53 48
13 4 53 59 0.69328 9.79300 100 39 57 50 53 48
13 5 48 60 0.70448 9.48855 100 39 57 50 53 48
14 0 43 53 0.70261 10.39262 43 46 99 50 50 20
14 1 46 52 0.70112 10.54177 43 46 99 50 50 20
14 2 99 42 0.67942 10.08929 43 46 99 50 50 20
14 3 50 52 0.70000 10.43803 43 46 99 50 50 20
14 4 50 52 0.70000 10.49300 43 46 99 50 50 20
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Table XXXV.: (continued)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
14 5 20 58 0.71400 10.20255 43 46 99 50 50 20
15 0 51 51 0.69972 11.09234 51 50 62 60 49 32
15 1 50 51 0.70000 11.24177 51 50 62 60 49 32
15 2 62 48 0.69888 10.78817 51 50 62 60 49 32
15 3 60 49 0.69767 11.13569 51 50 62 60 49 32
15 4 49 51 0.70019 11.19319 51 50 62 60 49 32
15 5 32 54 0.70168 10.90423 51 50 62 60 49 32
16 0 39 40 0.66869 11.76103 39 49 52 50 49 2
16 1 49 38 0.69715 11.93892 39 49 52 50 49 2
16 2 52 38 0.70541 11.49358 39 49 52 50 49 2
16 3 50 38 0.70000 11.83569 39 49 52 50 49 2
16 4 49 38 0.69715 11.89034 39 49 52 50 49 2
16 5 2 48 0.57008 11.47431 39 49 52 50 49 2
17 0 53 50 0.69958 12.46061 53 50 39 55 56 52
17 1 50 51 0.70000 12.63892 53 50 39 55 56 52
17 2 39 53 0.70205 12.19563 53 50 39 55 56 52
17 3 55 50 0.69883 12.53453 53 50 39 55 56 52
17 4 56 50 0.69832 12.58866 53 50 39 55 56 52
17 5 52 51 0.69935 12.17365 53 50 39 55 56 52
18 0 65 43 0.71400 13.17461 65 30 40 45 50 50
18 1 30 50 0.68133 13.32025 65 30 40 45 50 50
18 2 40 48 0.69067 12.88630 65 30 40 45 50 50
18 3 45 47 0.69533 13.22986 65 30 40 45 50 50
18 4 50 46 0.70000 13.28866 65 30 40 45 50 50
18 5 50 46 0.70000 12.87365 65 30 40 45 50 50
19 0 38 47 0.68488 13.85949 38 49 50 50 52 35
19 1 49 45 0.69879 14.01904 38 49 50 50 52 35
19 2 50 45 0.70000 13.58630 38 49 50 50 52 35
19 3 50 45 0.70000 13.92986 38 49 50 50 52 35
19 4 52 44 0.70261 13.99127 38 49 50 50 52 35
19 5 35 48 0.68250 13.55615 38 49 50 50 52 35
20 0 4 51 0.61199 14.47147 4 45 47 50 57 54
20 1 45 42 0.68950 14.70854 4 45 47 50 57 54
20 2 47 42 0.69398 14.28028 4 45 47 50 57 54
20 3 50 41 0.70000 14.62986 4 45 47 50 57 54
20 4 57 40 0.71405 14.70532 4 45 47 50 57 54
20 5 54 41 0.70765 14.26381 4 45 47 50 57 54
21 0 40 53 0.70233 15.17381 40 55 50 50 60 50
21 1 55 50 0.69883 15.40737 40 55 50 50 60 50
21 2 50 51 0.70000 14.98028 40 55 50 50 60 50
21 3 50 51 0.70000 15.32986 40 55 50 50 60 50
21 4 60 49 0.69767 15.40299 40 55 50 50 60 50
21 5 50 51 0.70000 14.96381 40 55 50 50 60 50
22 0 52 50 0.69981 15.87362 52 50 50 50 50 49
22 1 50 50 0.70000 16.10737 52 50 50 50 50 49
22 2 50 50 0.70000 15.68028 52 50 50 50 50 49
22 3 50 50 0.70000 16.02986 52 50 50 50 50 49
22 4 50 50 0.70000 16.10299 52 50 50 50 50 49
22 5 49 50 0.69995 15.66376 52 50 50 50 50 49
23 0 40 50 0.69533 16.56895 40 48 50 50 50 50
23 1 48 48 0.69888 16.80625 40 48 50 50 50 50
23 2 50 48 0.70000 16.38028 40 48 50 50 50 50
23 3 50 48 0.70000 16.72986 40 48 50 50 50 50
23 4 50 48 0.70000 16.80299 40 48 50 50 50 50
23 5 50 48 0.70000 16.36376 40 48 50 50 50 50
24 0 51 51 0.69972 17.26867 51 50 50 65 50 38
24 1 50 51 0.70000 17.50625 51 50 50 65 50 38
24 2 50 51 0.70000 17.08028 51 50 50 65 50 38
24 3 65 48 0.69650 17.42636 51 50 50 65 50 38
24 4 50 51 0.70000 17.50299 51 50 50 65 50 38
24 5 38 53 0.70168 17.06544 51 50 50 65 50 38
25 0 77 51 0.65968 17.92835 77 50 50 60 50 47
25 1 50 57 0.70000 18.20625 77 50 50 60 50 47
25 2 50 57 0.70000 17.78028 77 50 50 60 50 47
25 3 60 55 0.68367 18.11003 77 50 50 60 50 47
25 4 50 57 0.70000 18.20299 77 50 50 60 50 47
25 5 47 57 0.70448 17.76992 77 50 50 60 50 47
26 0 51 51 0.69972 18.62807 51 50 51 50 48 55
26 1 50 51 0.70000 18.90625 51 50 51 50 48 55
26 2 51 51 0.69972 18.48000 51 50 51 50 48 55
26 3 50 51 0.70000 18.81003 51 50 51 50 48 55
26 4 48 51 0.70028 18.90327 51 50 51 50 48 55
26 5 55 50 0.69883 18.46875 51 50 51 50 48 55
27 0 50 51 0.70000 19.32807 50 57 50 50 48 50
27 1 57 50 0.69771 19.60397 50 57 50 50 48 50
27 2 50 51 0.70000 19.18000 50 57 50 50 48 50
27 3 50 51 0.70000 19.51003 50 57 50 50 48 50
27 4 48 51 0.70028 19.60355 50 57 50 50 48 50
27 5 50 51 0.70000 19.16875 50 57 50 50 48 50
28 0 51 50 0.69995 20.02803 51 50 50 50 48 50
28 1 50 50 0.70000 20.30397 51 50 50 50 48 50
28 2 50 50 0.70000 19.88000 51 50 50 50 48 50
28 3 50 50 0.70000 20.21003 51 50 50 50 48 50
28 4 48 50 0.69981 20.30336 51 50 50 50 48 50
28 5 50 50 0.70000 19.86875 51 50 50 50 48 50
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Table XXXV.: (continued)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
29 0 51 50 0.69995 20.72798 51 50 50 50 50 50
29 1 50 50 0.70000 21.00397 51 50 50 50 50 50
29 2 50 50 0.70000 20.58000 51 50 50 50 50 50
29 3 50 50 0.70000 20.91003 51 50 50 50 50 50
29 4 50 50 0.70000 21.00336 51 50 50 50 50 50
29 5 50 50 0.70000 20.56875 51 50 50 50 50 50
30 0 50 50 0.70000 21.42798 50 50 50 50 50 50
30 1 50 50 0.70000 21.70397 50 50 50 50 50 50
30 2 50 50 0.70000 21.28000 50 50 50 50 50 50
30 3 50 50 0.70000 21.61003 50 50 50 50 50 50
30 4 50 50 0.70000 21.70336 50 50 50 50 50 50
30 5 50 50 0.70000 21.26875 50 50 50 50 50 50
31 0 50 51 0.70000 22.12798 50 50 50 50 50 53
31 1 50 51 0.70000 22.40397 50 50 50 50 50 53
31 2 50 51 0.70000 21.98000 50 50 50 50 50 53
31 3 50 51 0.70000 22.31003 50 50 50 50 50 53
31 4 50 51 0.70000 22.40336 50 50 50 50 50 53
31 5 53 50 0.69958 21.96833 50 50 50 50 50 53
32 0 50 50 0.70000 22.82798 50 50 50 50 50 50
32 1 50 50 0.70000 23.10397 50 50 50 50 50 50
32 2 50 50 0.70000 22.68000 50 50 50 50 50 50
32 3 50 50 0.70000 23.01003 50 50 50 50 50 50
32 4 50 50 0.70000 23.10336 50 50 50 50 50 50
32 5 50 50 0.70000 22.66833 50 50 50 50 50 50
33 0 45 50 0.69883 23.52681 45 50 50 50 50 50
33 1 50 49 0.70000 23.80397 45 50 50 50 50 50
33 2 50 49 0.70000 23.38000 45 50 50 50 50 50
33 3 50 49 0.70000 23.71003 45 50 50 50 50 50
33 4 50 49 0.70000 23.80336 45 50 50 50 50 50
33 5 50 49 0.70000 23.36833 45 50 50 50 50 50
34 0 50 48 0.70000 24.22681 50 50 40 50 51 50
34 1 50 48 0.70000 24.50397 50 50 40 50 51 50
34 2 40 50 0.69533 24.07533 50 50 40 50 51 50
34 3 50 48 0.70000 24.41003 50 50 40 50 51 50
34 4 51 48 0.70042 24.50378 50 50 40 50 51 50
34 5 50 48 0.70000 24.06833 50 50 40 50 51 50
35 0 51 50 0.69995 24.92677 51 50 50 50 50 52
35 1 50 51 0.70000 25.20397 51 50 50 50 50 52
35 2 50 51 0.70000 24.77533 51 50 50 50 50 52
35 3 50 51 0.70000 25.11003 51 50 50 50 50 52
35 4 50 51 0.70000 25.20378 51 50 50 50 50 52
35 5 52 50 0.69981 24.76815 51 50 50 50 50 52
36 0 50 50 0.70000 25.62677 50 50 50 50 50 50
36 1 50 50 0.70000 25.90397 50 50 50 50 50 50
36 2 50 50 0.70000 25.47533 50 50 50 50 50 50
36 3 50 50 0.70000 25.81003 50 50 50 50 50 50
36 4 50 50 0.70000 25.90378 50 50 50 50 50 50
36 5 50 50 0.70000 25.46815 50 50 50 50 50 50
37 0 50 50 0.70000 26.32677 50 50 50 50 50 50
37 1 50 50 0.70000 26.60397 50 50 50 50 50 50
37 2 50 50 0.70000 26.17533 50 50 50 50 50 50
37 3 50 50 0.70000 26.51003 50 50 50 50 50 50
37 4 50 50 0.70000 26.60378 50 50 50 50 50 50
37 5 50 50 0.70000 26.16815 50 50 50 50 50 50
38 0 50 50 0.70000 27.02677 50 50 50 50 50 50
38 1 50 50 0.70000 27.30397 50 50 50 50 50 50
38 2 50 50 0.70000 26.87533 50 50 50 50 50 50
38 3 50 50 0.70000 27.21003 50 50 50 50 50 50
38 4 50 50 0.70000 27.30378 50 50 50 50 50 50
38 5 50 50 0.70000 26.86815 50 50 50 50 50 50
39 0 50 50 0.70000 27.72677 50 50 50 50 50 50
39 1 50 50 0.70000 28.00397 50 50 50 50 50 50
39 2 50 50 0.70000 27.57533 50 50 50 50 50 50
39 3 50 50 0.70000 27.91003 50 50 50 50 50 50
39 4 50 50 0.70000 28.00378 50 50 50 50 50 50
39 5 50 50 0.70000 27.56815 50 50 50 50 50 50
40 0 50 50 0.70000 28.42677 50 50 50 50 50 50
40 1 50 50 0.70000 28.70397 50 50 50 50 50 50
40 2 50 50 0.70000 28.27533 50 50 50 50 50 50
40 3 50 50 0.70000 28.61003 50 50 50 50 50 50
40 4 50 50 0.70000 28.70378 50 50 50 50 50 50
40 5 50 50 0.70000 28.26815 50 50 50 50 50 50
41 0 50 50 0.70000 29.12677 50 50 50 50 50 50
41 1 50 50 0.70000 29.40397 50 50 50 50 50 50
41 2 50 50 0.70000 28.97533 50 50 50 50 50 50
41 3 50 50 0.70000 29.31003 50 50 50 50 50 50
41 4 50 50 0.70000 29.40378 50 50 50 50 50 50
41 5 50 50 0.70000 28.96815 50 50 50 50 50 50
42 0 50 50 0.70000 29.82677 50 50 50 50 50 50
42 1 50 50 0.70000 30.10397 50 50 50 50 50 50
42 2 50 50 0.70000 29.67533 50 50 50 50 50 50
42 3 50 50 0.70000 30.01003 50 50 50 50 50 50
42 4 50 50 0.70000 30.10378 50 50 50 50 50 50
42 5 50 50 0.70000 29.66815 50 50 50 50 50 50
43 0 50 50 0.70000 30.52677 50 50 50 50 50 50
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Table XXXV.: (continued)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
43 1 50 50 0.70000 30.80397 50 50 50 50 50 50
43 2 50 50 0.70000 30.37533 50 50 50 50 50 50
43 3 50 50 0.70000 30.71003 50 50 50 50 50 50
43 4 50 50 0.70000 30.80378 50 50 50 50 50 50
43 5 50 50 0.70000 30.36815 50 50 50 50 50 50
44 0 50 50 0.70000 31.22677 50 50 50 50 50 50
44 1 50 50 0.70000 31.50397 50 50 50 50 50 50
44 2 50 50 0.70000 31.07533 50 50 50 50 50 50
44 3 50 50 0.70000 31.41003 50 50 50 50 50 50
44 4 50 50 0.70000 31.50378 50 50 50 50 50 50
44 5 50 50 0.70000 31.06815 50 50 50 50 50 50
45 0 50 50 0.70000 31.92677 50 50 50 50 50 50
45 1 50 50 0.70000 32.20397 50 50 50 50 50 50
45 2 50 50 0.70000 31.77533 50 50 50 50 50 50
45 3 50 50 0.70000 32.11003 50 50 50 50 50 50
45 4 50 50 0.70000 32.20378 50 50 50 50 50 50
45 5 50 50 0.70000 31.76815 50 50 50 50 50 50
46 0 50 50 0.70000 32.62677 50 50 50 50 48 50
46 1 50 50 0.70000 32.90397 50 50 50 50 48 50
46 2 50 50 0.70000 32.47533 50 50 50 50 48 50
46 3 50 50 0.70000 32.81003 50 50 50 50 48 50
46 4 48 50 0.69981 32.90359 50 50 50 50 48 50
46 5 50 50 0.70000 32.46815 50 50 50 50 48 50
47 0 50 50 0.70000 33.32677 50 50 50 50 50 50
47 1 50 50 0.70000 33.60397 50 50 50 50 50 50
47 2 50 50 0.70000 33.17533 50 50 50 50 50 50
47 3 50 50 0.70000 33.51003 50 50 50 50 50 50
47 4 50 50 0.70000 33.60359 50 50 50 50 50 50
47 5 50 50 0.70000 33.16815 50 50 50 50 50 50
48 0 50 50 0.70000 34.02677 50 50 50 50 50 50
48 1 50 50 0.70000 34.30397 50 50 50 50 50 50
48 2 50 50 0.70000 33.87533 50 50 50 50 50 50
48 3 50 50 0.70000 34.21003 50 50 50 50 50 50
48 4 50 50 0.70000 34.30359 50 50 50 50 50 50
48 5 50 50 0.70000 33.86815 50 50 50 50 50 50
49 0 50 50 0.70000 34.72677 50 50 50 50 50 50
49 1 50 50 0.70000 35.00397 50 50 50 50 50 50
49 2 50 50 0.70000 34.57533 50 50 50 50 50 50
49 3 50 50 0.70000 34.91003 50 50 50 50 50 50
49 4 50 50 0.70000 35.00359 50 50 50 50 50 50
49 5 50 50 0.70000 34.56815 50 50 50 50 50 50
Table XXXVI.: Data from experiments: 12 small suppliers - no transport costs - Cohort 1
Round Player OwnM MS Earn SubTot Pl0 Pl1 Pl2 Pl3 Pl4 Pl5 Pl6 Pl7 Pl8 Pl9 Pl10 Pl11
0 0 25 56 0.36196 0.36196 25 65 25 59 45 39 58 100 79 50 80 20
0 1 65 53 0.34160 0.34160 25 65 25 59 45 39 58 100 79 50 80 20
0 2 25 56 0.36196 0.36196 25 65 25 59 45 39 58 100 79 50 80 20
0 3 59 53 0.34559 0.34559 25 65 25 59 45 39 58 100 79 50 80 20
0 4 45 55 0.35292 0.35292 25 65 25 59 45 39 58 100 79 50 80 20
0 5 39 55 0.35565 0.35565 25 65 25 59 45 39 58 100 79 50 80 20
0 6 58 53 0.34617 0.34617 25 65 25 59 45 39 58 100 79 50 80 20
0 7 100 50 0.32083 0.32083 25 65 25 59 45 39 58 100 79 50 80 20
0 8 79 51 0.33647 0.33647 25 65 25 59 45 39 58 100 79 50 80 20
0 9 50 54 0.35000 0.35000 25 65 25 59 45 39 58 100 79 50 80 20
0 10 80 51 0.33565 0.33565 25 65 25 59 45 39 58 100 79 50 80 20
0 11 20 57 0.36645 0.36645 25 65 25 59 45 39 58 100 79 50 80 20
1 0 45 49 0.34907 0.71103 45 62 65 18 43 75 53 50 50 50 50 20
1 1 62 47 0.35294 0.69454 45 62 65 18 43 75 53 50 50 50 50 20
1 2 65 47 0.35315 0.71511 45 62 65 18 43 75 53 50 50 50 50 20
1 3 18 51 0.34216 0.68775 45 62 65 18 43 75 53 50 50 50 50 20
1 4 43 49 0.34853 0.70145 45 62 65 18 43 75 53 50 50 50 50 20
1 5 75 46 0.35554 0.71119 45 62 65 18 43 75 53 50 50 50 50 20
1 6 53 48 0.35067 0.69684 45 62 65 18 43 75 53 50 50 50 50 20
1 7 50 48 0.35000 0.67083 45 62 65 18 43 75 53 50 50 50 50 20
1 8 50 48 0.35000 0.68647 45 62 65 18 43 75 53 50 50 50 50 20
1 9 50 48 0.35000 0.70000 45 62 65 18 43 75 53 50 50 50 50 20
1 10 50 48 0.35000 0.68565 45 62 65 18 43 75 53 50 50 50 50 20
1 11 20 51 0.34335 0.70980 45 62 65 18 43 75 53 50 50 50 50 20
2 0 70 62 0.31453 1.02556 70 45 69 100 47 48 50 61 16 50 100 95
2 1 45 64 0.35869 1.05323 70 45 69 100 47 48 50 61 16 50 100 95
2 2 69 62 0.31653 1.03164 70 45 69 100 47 48 50 61 16 50 100 95
2 3 100 59 0.26308 0.95083 70 45 69 100 47 48 50 61 16 50 100 95
2 4 47 64 0.35529 1.05673 70 45 69 100 47 48 50 61 16 50 100 95
2 5 48 64 0.35355 1.06474 70 45 69 100 47 48 50 61 16 50 100 95
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Table XXXVI.: (continued)
Round Player OwnM MS Earn SubTot Pl0 Pl1 Pl2 Pl3 Pl4 Pl5 Pl6 Pl7 Pl8 Pl9 Pl10 Pl11
2 6 50 64 0.35000 1.04684 70 45 69 100 47 48 50 61 16 50 100 95
2 7 61 63 0.33024 1.00107 70 45 69 100 47 48 50 61 16 50 100 95
2 8 16 67 0.41069 1.09716 70 45 69 100 47 48 50 61 16 50 100 95
2 9 50 64 0.35000 1.05000 70 45 69 100 47 48 50 61 16 50 100 95
2 10 100 59 0.26308 0.94873 70 45 69 100 47 48 50 61 16 50 100 95
2 11 95 60 0.26862 0.97842 70 45 69 100 47 48 50 61 16 50 100 95
3 0 40 44 0.34113 1.36669 40 19 77 63 31 35 65 100 68 30 0 0
3 1 19 46 0.32287 1.37611 40 19 77 63 31 35 65 100 68 30 0 0
3 2 77 41 0.37268 1.40432 40 19 77 63 31 35 65 100 68 30 0 0
3 3 63 42 0.36138 1.31221 40 19 77 63 31 35 65 100 68 30 0 0
3 4 31 45 0.33360 1.39033 40 19 77 63 31 35 65 100 68 30 0 0
3 5 35 45 0.33775 1.40249 40 19 77 63 31 35 65 100 68 30 0 0
3 6 65 42 0.36278 1.40961 40 19 77 63 31 35 65 100 68 30 0 0
3 7 100 39 0.39142 1.39249 40 19 77 63 31 35 65 100 68 30 0 0
3 8 68 42 0.36470 1.46186 40 19 77 63 31 35 65 100 68 30 0 0
3 9 30 45 0.33250 1.38250 40 19 77 63 31 35 65 100 68 30 0 0
3 10 0 48 0.30800 1.25673 40 19 77 63 31 35 65 100 68 30 0 0
3 11 0 48 0.30800 1.28642 40 19 77 63 31 35 65 100 68 30 0 0
4 0 70 52 0.34020 1.70689 70 51 40 72 45 52 57 100 100 50 0 0
4 1 51 53 0.34960 1.72571 70 51 40 72 45 52 57 100 100 50 0 0
4 2 40 54 0.35397 1.75828 70 51 40 72 45 52 57 100 100 50 0 0
4 3 72 51 0.34153 1.65374 70 51 40 72 45 52 57 100 100 50 0 0
4 4 45 54 0.35228 1.74260 70 51 40 72 45 52 57 100 100 50 0 0
4 5 52 53 0.34918 1.75167 70 51 40 72 45 52 57 100 100 50 0 0
4 6 57 53 0.34673 1.75635 70 51 40 72 45 52 57 100 100 50 0 0
4 7 100 49 0.32725 1.71974 70 51 40 72 45 52 57 100 100 50 0 0
4 8 100 49 0.32725 1.78911 70 51 40 72 45 52 57 100 100 50 0 0
4 9 50 53 0.35000 1.73250 70 51 40 72 45 52 57 100 100 50 0 0
4 10 0 58 0.37217 1.62890 70 51 40 72 45 52 57 100 100 50 0 0
4 11 0 58 0.37217 1.65859 70 51 40 72 45 52 57 100 100 50 0 0
5 0 60 40 0.36167 2.06856 60 56 14 75 44 75 52 0 0 60 61 0
5 1 56 40 0.35728 2.08299 60 56 14 75 44 75 52 0 0 60 61 0
5 2 14 44 0.30716 2.06544 60 56 14 75 44 75 52 0 0 60 61 0
5 3 75 38 0.38121 2.03495 60 56 14 75 44 75 52 0 0 60 61 0
5 4 44 41 0.34265 2.08525 60 56 14 75 44 75 52 0 0 60 61 0
5 5 75 38 0.38121 2.13288 60 56 14 75 44 75 52 0 0 60 61 0
5 6 52 40 0.35252 2.10887 60 56 14 75 44 75 52 0 0 60 61 0
5 7 0 45 0.28875 2.00849 60 56 14 75 44 75 52 0 0 60 61 0
5 8 0 45 0.28875 2.07786 60 56 14 75 44 75 52 0 0 60 61 0
5 9 60 40 0.36167 2.09417 60 56 14 75 44 75 52 0 0 60 61 0
5 10 61 40 0.36271 1.99160 60 56 14 75 44 75 52 0 0 60 61 0
5 11 0 45 0.28875 1.94734 60 56 14 75 44 75 52 0 0 60 61 0
6 0 50 45 0.35000 2.41856 50 51 15 19 51 30 52 100 45 40 0 90
6 1 51 45 0.35063 2.43362 50 51 15 19 51 30 52 100 45 40 0 90
6 2 15 48 0.32672 2.39217 50 51 15 19 51 30 52 100 45 40 0 90
6 3 19 48 0.33083 2.36578 50 51 15 19 51 30 52 100 45 40 0 90
6 4 51 45 0.35063 2.43588 50 51 15 19 51 30 52 100 45 40 0 90
6 5 30 47 0.33763 2.47051 50 51 15 19 51 30 52 100 45 40 0 90
6 6 52 45 0.35124 2.46010 50 51 15 19 51 30 52 100 45 40 0 90
6 7 100 40 0.38500 2.39349 50 51 15 19 51 30 52 100 45 40 0 90
6 8 45 45 0.34650 2.42436 50 51 15 19 51 30 52 100 45 40 0 90
6 9 40 46 0.34370 2.43787 50 51 15 19 51 30 52 100 45 40 0 90
6 10 0 49 0.31442 2.30602 50 51 15 19 51 30 52 100 45 40 0 90
6 11 90 41 0.37753 2.32487 50 51 15 19 51 30 52 100 45 40 0 90
7 0 90 69 0.23380 2.65236 90 55 75 81 49 41 78 100 46 40 100 90
7 1 55 72 0.33559 2.76921 90 55 75 81 49 41 78 100 46 40 100 90
7 2 75 70 0.27854 2.67071 90 55 75 81 49 41 78 100 46 40 100 90
7 3 81 69 0.26320 2.62898 90 55 75 81 49 41 78 100 46 40 100 90
7 4 49 72 0.35281 2.78869 90 55 75 81 49 41 78 100 46 40 100 90
7 5 41 73 0.37562 2.84613 90 55 75 81 49 41 78 100 46 40 100 90
7 6 78 70 0.26899 2.72909 90 55 75 81 49 41 78 100 46 40 100 90
7 7 100 68 0.20533 2.59882 90 55 75 81 49 41 78 100 46 40 100 90
7 8 46 73 0.36162 2.78598 90 55 75 81 49 41 78 100 46 40 100 90
7 9 40 73 0.37835 2.81622 90 55 75 81 49 41 78 100 46 40 100 90
7 10 100 68 0.20533 2.51135 90 55 75 81 49 41 78 100 46 40 100 90
7 11 90 69 0.23380 2.55867 90 55 75 81 49 41 78 100 46 40 100 90
8 0 40 45 0.34242 2.99477 40 47 15 74 50 57 71 0 45 35 100 0
8 1 47 44 0.34758 3.11680 40 47 15 74 50 57 71 0 45 35 100 0
8 2 15 47 0.32223 2.99294 40 47 15 74 50 57 71 0 45 35 100 0
8 3 74 42 0.36792 2.99690 40 47 15 74 50 57 71 0 45 35 100 0
8 4 50 44 0.35000 3.13869 40 47 15 74 50 57 71 0 45 35 100 0
8 5 57 43 0.35572 3.20185 40 47 15 74 50 57 71 0 45 35 100 0
8 6 71 42 0.36642 3.09550 40 47 15 74 50 57 71 0 45 35 100 0
8 7 0 49 0.31442 2.91324 40 47 15 74 50 57 71 0 45 35 100 0
8 8 45 44 0.34586 3.13183 40 47 15 74 50 57 71 0 45 35 100 0
8 9 35 45 0.33775 3.15397 40 47 15 74 50 57 71 0 45 35 100 0
8 10 100 39 0.39142 2.90277 40 47 15 74 50 57 71 0 45 35 100 0
8 11 0 49 0.31442 2.87309 40 47 15 74 50 57 71 0 45 35 100 0
9 0 60 50 0.34883 3.34361 60 45 20 83 48 48 53 100 48 50 0 60
9 1 45 52 0.35099 3.46779 60 45 20 83 48 48 53 100 48 50 0 60
9 2 20 54 0.35490 3.34784 60 45 20 83 48 48 53 100 48 50 0 60
9 3 83 48 0.34576 3.34266 60 45 20 83 48 48 53 100 48 50 0 60
9 4 48 52 0.35047 3.48916 60 45 20 83 48 48 53 100 48 50 0 60
9 5 48 52 0.35047 3.55231 60 45 20 83 48 48 53 100 48 50 0 60
9 6 53 51 0.34951 3.44501 60 45 20 83 48 48 53 100 48 50 0 60
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9 7 100 47 0.34008 3.25332 60 45 20 83 48 48 53 100 48 50 0 60
9 8 48 52 0.35047 3.48230 60 45 20 83 48 48 53 100 48 50 0 60
9 9 50 51 0.35000 3.50397 60 45 20 83 48 48 53 100 48 50 0 60
9 10 0 56 0.35933 3.26210 60 45 20 83 48 48 53 100 48 50 0 60
9 11 60 50 0.34883 3.22192 60 45 20 83 48 48 53 100 48 50 0 60
10 0 65 48 0.35123 3.69483 65 46 12 14 45 51 63 50 42 50 100 50
10 1 46 49 0.34930 3.81709 65 46 12 14 45 51 63 50 42 50 100 50
10 2 12 52 0.34291 3.69075 65 46 12 14 45 51 63 50 42 50 100 50
10 3 14 52 0.34412 3.68678 65 46 12 14 45 51 63 50 42 50 100 50
10 4 45 49 0.34907 3.83823 65 46 12 14 45 51 63 50 42 50 100 50
10 5 51 49 0.35012 3.90243 65 46 12 14 45 51 63 50 42 50 100 50
10 6 63 48 0.35137 3.79638 65 46 12 14 45 51 63 50 42 50 100 50
10 7 50 49 0.35000 3.60332 65 46 12 14 45 51 63 50 42 50 100 50
10 8 42 50 0.34925 3.83155 65 46 12 14 45 51 63 50 42 50 100 50
10 9 50 49 0.35000 3.85397 65 46 12 14 45 51 63 50 42 50 100 50
10 10 100 44 0.35933 3.62144 65 46 12 14 45 51 63 50 42 50 100 50
10 11 50 49 0.35000 3.57192 65 46 12 14 45 51 63 50 42 50 100 50
11 0 70 53 0.33763 4.03247 70 47 10 81 44 49 55 50 94 50 0 100
11 1 47 55 0.35182 4.16891 70 47 10 81 44 49 55 50 94 50 0 100
11 2 10 58 0.37240 4.06315 70 47 10 81 44 49 55 50 94 50 0 100
11 3 81 52 0.33083 4.01761 70 47 10 81 44 49 55 50 94 50 0 100
11 4 44 55 0.35343 4.19166 70 47 10 81 44 49 55 50 94 50 0 100
11 5 49 55 0.35063 4.25306 70 47 10 81 44 49 55 50 94 50 0 100
11 6 55 54 0.34714 4.14352 70 47 10 81 44 49 55 50 94 50 0 100
11 7 50 55 0.35000 3.95332 70 47 10 81 44 49 55 50 94 50 0 100
11 8 94 51 0.32177 4.15332 70 47 10 81 44 49 55 50 94 50 0 100
11 9 50 55 0.35000 4.20397 70 47 10 81 44 49 55 50 94 50 0 100
11 10 0 59 0.37858 4.00002 70 47 10 81 44 49 55 50 94 50 0 100
11 11 100 50 0.32083 3.89276 70 47 10 81 44 49 55 50 94 50 0 100
12 0 80 46 0.35490 4.38737 80 59 6 28 37 0 53 23 52 45 100 100
12 1 59 48 0.35137 4.52027 80 59 6 28 37 0 53 23 52 45 100 100
12 2 6 52 0.33871 4.40186 80 59 6 28 37 0 53 23 52 45 100 100
12 3 28 50 0.34435 4.36197 80 59 6 28 37 0 53 23 52 45 100 100
12 4 37 50 0.34803 4.53969 80 59 6 28 37 0 53 23 52 45 100 100
12 5 0 53 0.34008 4.59314 80 59 6 28 37 0 53 23 52 45 100 100
12 6 53 48 0.35067 4.49419 80 59 6 28 37 0 53 23 52 45 100 100
12 7 23 51 0.34496 4.29828 80 59 6 28 37 0 53 23 52 45 100 100
12 8 52 48 0.35047 4.50379 80 59 6 28 37 0 53 23 52 45 100 100
12 9 45 49 0.34907 4.55303 80 59 6 28 37 0 53 23 52 45 100 100
12 10 100 44 0.35933 4.35935 80 59 6 28 37 0 53 23 52 45 100 100
12 11 100 44 0.35933 4.25209 80 59 6 28 37 0 53 23 52 45 100 100
13 0 80 51 0.33565 4.72302 80 50 22 50 42 100 53 50 50 43 0 100
13 1 50 54 0.35000 4.87027 80 50 22 50 42 100 53 50 50 43 0 100
13 2 22 56 0.36241 4.76427 80 50 22 50 42 100 53 50 50 43 0 100
13 3 50 54 0.35000 4.71197 80 50 22 50 42 100 53 50 50 43 0 100
13 4 42 54 0.35336 4.89305 80 50 22 50 42 100 53 50 50 43 0 100
13 5 100 49 0.32725 4.92039 80 50 22 50 42 100 53 50 50 43 0 100
13 6 53 53 0.34874 4.84293 80 50 22 50 42 100 53 50 50 43 0 100
13 7 50 54 0.35000 4.64828 80 50 22 50 42 100 53 50 50 43 0 100
13 8 50 54 0.35000 4.85379 80 50 22 50 42 100 53 50 50 43 0 100
13 9 43 54 0.35302 4.90606 80 50 22 50 42 100 53 50 50 43 0 100
13 10 0 58 0.37217 4.73152 80 50 22 50 42 100 53 50 50 43 0 100
13 11 100 49 0.32725 4.57934 80 50 22 50 42 100 53 50 50 43 0 100
14 0 70 52 0.34020 5.06322 70 57 3 35 32 100 51 0 94 55 100 50
14 1 57 54 0.34583 5.21611 70 57 3 35 32 100 51 0 94 55 100 50
14 2 3 59 0.37851 5.14278 70 57 3 35 32 100 51 0 94 55 100 50
14 3 35 56 0.35893 5.07089 70 57 3 35 32 100 51 0 94 55 100 50
14 4 32 56 0.36008 5.25313 70 57 3 35 32 100 51 0 94 55 100 50
14 5 100 50 0.32083 5.24123 70 57 3 35 32 100 51 0 94 55 100 50
14 6 51 54 0.34947 5.19240 70 57 3 35 32 100 51 0 94 55 100 50
14 7 0 59 0.37858 5.02686 70 57 3 35 32 100 51 0 94 55 100 50
14 8 94 50 0.32741 5.18120 70 57 3 35 32 100 51 0 94 55 100 50
14 9 55 54 0.34714 5.25320 70 57 3 35 32 100 51 0 94 55 100 50
14 10 100 50 0.32083 5.05235 70 57 3 35 32 100 51 0 94 55 100 50
14 11 50 54 0.35000 4.92934 70 57 3 35 32 100 51 0 94 55 100 50
15 0 50 33 0.35000 5.41322 50 55 2 28 36 71 50 0 16 55 50 0
15 1 55 33 0.36062 5.57672 50 55 2 28 36 71 50 0 16 55 50 0
15 2 2 37 0.24304 5.38582 50 55 2 28 36 71 50 0 16 55 50 0
15 3 28 35 0.30200 5.37290 50 55 2 28 36 71 50 0 16 55 50 0
15 4 36 34 0.31897 5.57209 50 55 2 28 36 71 50 0 16 55 50 0
15 5 71 31 0.39606 5.63729 50 55 2 28 36 71 50 0 16 55 50 0
15 6 50 33 0.35000 5.54240 50 55 2 28 36 71 50 0 16 55 50 0
15 7 0 38 0.24383 5.27070 50 55 2 28 36 71 50 0 16 55 50 0
15 8 16 36 0.27543 5.45663 50 55 2 28 36 71 50 0 16 55 50 0
15 9 55 33 0.36062 5.61381 50 55 2 28 36 71 50 0 16 55 50 0
15 10 50 33 0.35000 5.40235 50 55 2 28 36 71 50 0 16 55 50 0
15 11 0 38 0.24383 5.17317 50 55 2 28 36 71 50 0 16 55 50 0
16 0 30 32 0.29913 5.71235 30 48 5 32 44 58 67 0 48 55 0 0
16 1 48 31 0.34508 5.92180 30 48 5 32 44 58 67 0 48 55 0 0
16 2 5 35 0.23975 5.62557 30 48 5 32 44 58 67 0 48 55 0 0
16 3 32 32 0.30464 5.67754 30 48 5 32 44 58 67 0 48 55 0 0
16 4 44 31 0.33495 5.90704 30 48 5 32 44 58 67 0 48 55 0 0
16 5 58 30 0.36979 6.00707 30 48 5 32 44 58 67 0 48 55 0 0
16 6 67 29 0.39244 5.93484 30 48 5 32 44 58 67 0 48 55 0 0
16 7 0 35 0.22458 5.49528 30 48 5 32 44 58 67 0 48 55 0 0
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16 8 48 31 0.34508 5.80170 30 48 5 32 44 58 67 0 48 55 0 0
16 9 55 30 0.36254 5.97636 30 48 5 32 44 58 67 0 48 55 0 0
16 10 0 35 0.22458 5.62694 30 48 5 32 44 58 67 0 48 55 0 0
16 11 0 35 0.22458 5.39776 30 48 5 32 44 58 67 0 48 55 0 0
17 0 85 64 0.27282 5.98517 85 38 90 34 60 47 38 100 62 35 100 100
17 1 38 68 0.37604 6.29784 85 38 90 34 60 47 38 100 62 35 100 100
17 2 90 64 0.25947 5.88504 85 38 90 34 60 47 38 100 62 35 100 100
17 3 34 69 0.38603 6.06356 85 38 90 34 60 47 38 100 62 35 100 100
17 4 60 66 0.32830 6.23534 85 38 90 34 60 47 38 100 62 35 100 100
17 5 47 67 0.35644 6.36351 85 38 90 34 60 47 38 100 62 35 100 100
17 6 38 68 0.37604 6.31089 85 38 90 34 60 47 38 100 62 35 100 100
17 7 100 63 0.23742 5.73270 85 38 90 34 60 47 38 100 62 35 100 100
17 8 62 66 0.32368 6.12538 85 38 90 34 60 47 38 100 62 35 100 100
17 9 35 69 0.38395 6.36031 85 38 90 34 60 47 38 100 62 35 100 100
17 10 100 63 0.23742 5.86435 85 38 90 34 60 47 38 100 62 35 100 100
17 11 100 63 0.23742 5.63517 85 38 90 34 60 47 38 100 62 35 100 100
18 0 94 43 0.36694 6.35211 94 65 3 29 40 33 74 0 61 65 100 0
18 1 65 45 0.35700 6.65484 94 65 3 29 40 33 74 0 61 65 100 0
18 2 3 51 0.33026 6.21530 94 65 3 29 40 33 74 0 61 65 100 0
18 3 29 49 0.34216 6.40572 94 65 3 29 40 33 74 0 61 65 100 0
18 4 40 48 0.34627 6.58161 94 65 3 29 40 33 74 0 61 65 100 0
18 5 33 48 0.34226 6.70578 94 65 3 29 40 33 74 0 61 65 100 0
18 6 74 45 0.35868 6.66957 94 65 3 29 40 33 74 0 61 65 100 0
18 7 0 51 0.32725 6.05994 94 65 3 29 40 33 74 0 61 65 100 0
18 8 61 46 0.35424 6.47962 94 65 3 29 40 33 74 0 61 65 100 0
18 9 65 45 0.35700 6.71731 94 65 3 29 40 33 74 0 61 65 100 0
18 10 100 42 0.37217 6.23652 94 65 3 29 40 33 74 0 61 65 100 0
18 11 0 51 0.32725 5.96242 94 65 3 29 40 33 74 0 61 65 100 0
19 0 70 51 0.34277 6.69488 70 48 50 75 58 36 53 50 46 44 0 100
19 1 48 53 0.35072 7.00557 70 48 50 75 58 36 53 50 46 44 0 100
19 2 50 53 0.35000 6.56530 70 48 50 75 58 36 53 50 46 44 0 100
19 3 75 50 0.34271 6.74843 70 48 50 75 58 36 53 50 46 44 0 100
19 4 58 52 0.34720 6.92881 70 48 50 75 58 36 53 50 46 44 0 100
19 5 36 54 0.35490 7.06068 70 48 50 75 58 36 53 50 46 44 0 100
19 6 53 52 0.34912 7.01869 70 48 50 75 58 36 53 50 46 44 0 100
19 7 50 53 0.35000 6.40994 70 48 50 75 58 36 53 50 46 44 0 100
19 8 46 53 0.35135 6.83097 70 48 50 75 58 36 53 50 46 44 0 100
19 9 44 53 0.35189 7.06920 70 48 50 75 58 36 53 50 46 44 0 100
19 10 0 57 0.36575 6.60227 70 48 50 75 58 36 53 50 46 44 0 100
19 11 100 48 0.33367 6.29609 70 48 50 75 58 36 53 50 46 44 0 100
20 0 51 53 0.34960 7.04448 51 55 50 72 47 34 41 11 56 55 100 60
20 1 55 52 0.34842 7.35399 51 55 50 72 47 34 41 11 56 55 100 60
20 2 50 53 0.35000 6.91530 51 55 50 72 47 34 41 11 56 55 100 60
20 3 72 51 0.34153 7.08996 51 55 50 72 47 34 41 11 56 55 100 60
20 4 47 53 0.35105 7.27986 51 55 50 72 47 34 41 11 56 55 100 60
20 5 34 54 0.35523 7.41591 51 55 50 72 47 34 41 11 56 55 100 60
20 6 41 54 0.35368 7.37237 51 55 50 72 47 34 41 11 56 55 100 60
20 7 11 56 0.36229 6.77223 51 55 50 72 47 34 41 11 56 55 100 60
20 8 56 52 0.34804 7.17901 51 55 50 72 47 34 41 11 56 55 100 60
20 9 55 52 0.34842 7.41762 51 55 50 72 47 34 41 11 56 55 100 60
20 10 100 48 0.33367 6.93594 51 55 50 72 47 34 41 11 56 55 100 60
20 11 60 52 0.34627 6.64236 51 55 50 72 47 34 41 11 56 55 100 60
21 0 49 45 0.34935 7.39383 49 55 31 76 48 50 34 0 55 50 50 50
21 1 55 45 0.35292 7.70691 49 55 31 76 48 50 34 0 55 50 50 50
21 2 31 47 0.33847 7.25377 49 55 31 76 48 50 34 0 55 50 50 50
21 3 76 43 0.36547 7.45543 49 55 31 76 48 50 34 0 55 50 50 50
21 4 48 45 0.34867 7.62853 49 55 31 76 48 50 34 0 55 50 50 50
21 5 50 45 0.35000 7.76591 49 55 31 76 48 50 34 0 55 50 50 50
21 6 34 47 0.34085 7.71322 49 55 31 76 48 50 34 0 55 50 50 50
21 7 0 50 0.32083 7.09306 49 55 31 76 48 50 34 0 55 50 50 50
21 8 55 45 0.35292 7.53193 49 55 31 76 48 50 34 0 55 50 50 50
21 9 50 45 0.35000 7.76762 49 55 31 76 48 50 34 0 55 50 50 50
21 10 50 45 0.35000 7.28594 49 55 31 76 48 50 34 0 55 50 50 50
21 11 50 45 0.35000 6.99236 49 55 31 76 48 50 34 0 55 50 50 50
22 0 50 55 0.35000 7.74383 50 50 87 42 54 38 55 22 56 50 50 100
22 1 50 55 0.35000 8.05691 50 50 87 42 54 38 55 22 56 50 50 100
22 2 87 52 0.32453 7.57830 50 50 87 42 54 38 55 22 56 50 50 100
22 3 42 56 0.35541 7.81084 50 50 87 42 54 38 55 22 56 50 50 100
22 4 54 55 0.34725 7.97578 50 50 87 42 54 38 55 22 56 50 50 100
22 5 38 56 0.35756 8.12347 50 50 87 42 54 38 55 22 56 50 50 100
22 6 55 54 0.34714 8.06036 50 50 87 42 54 38 55 22 56 50 50 100
22 7 22 57 0.36601 7.45907 50 50 87 42 54 38 55 22 56 50 50 100
22 8 56 54 0.34650 7.87843 50 50 87 42 54 38 55 22 56 50 50 100
22 9 50 55 0.35000 8.11762 50 50 87 42 54 38 55 22 56 50 50 100
22 10 50 55 0.35000 7.63594 50 50 87 42 54 38 55 22 56 50 50 100
22 11 100 50 0.32083 7.31319 50 50 87 42 54 38 55 22 56 50 50 100
23 0 40 52 0.35140 8.09523 40 53 90 13 50 52 66 0 60 85 50 50
23 1 53 51 0.34951 8.40642 40 53 90 13 50 52 66 0 60 85 50 50
23 2 90 47 0.34673 7.92504 40 53 90 13 50 52 66 0 60 85 50 50
23 3 13 54 0.35302 8.16387 40 53 90 13 50 52 66 0 60 85 50 50
23 4 50 51 0.35000 8.32578 40 53 90 13 50 52 66 0 60 85 50 50
23 5 52 51 0.34970 8.47316 40 53 90 13 50 52 66 0 60 85 50 50
23 6 66 49 0.34907 8.40943 40 53 90 13 50 52 66 0 60 85 50 50
23 7 0 55 0.35292 7.81199 40 53 90 13 50 52 66 0 60 85 50 50
23 8 60 50 0.34883 8.22726 40 53 90 13 50 52 66 0 60 85 50 50
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23 9 85 48 0.34469 8.46231 40 53 90 13 50 52 66 0 60 85 50 50
23 10 50 51 0.35000 7.98594 40 53 90 13 50 52 66 0 60 85 50 50
23 11 50 51 0.35000 7.66319 40 53 90 13 50 52 66 0 60 85 50 50
24 0 42 47 0.34617 8.44140 42 62 90 54 46 46 46 0 47 25 50 50
24 1 62 45 0.35602 8.76244 42 62 90 54 46 46 46 0 47 25 50 50
24 2 90 43 0.36727 8.29230 42 62 90 54 46 46 46 0 47 25 50 50
24 3 54 46 0.35187 8.51573 42 62 90 54 46 46 46 0 47 25 50 50
24 4 46 47 0.34827 8.67405 42 62 90 54 46 46 46 0 47 25 50 50
24 5 46 47 0.34827 8.82144 42 62 90 54 46 46 46 0 47 25 50 50
24 6 46 47 0.34827 8.75770 42 62 90 54 46 46 46 0 47 25 50 50
24 7 0 51 0.32725 8.13924 42 62 90 54 46 46 46 0 47 25 50 50
24 8 47 46 0.34835 8.57562 42 62 90 54 46 46 46 0 47 25 50 50
24 9 25 48 0.33629 8.79860 42 62 90 54 46 46 46 0 47 25 50 50
24 10 50 46 0.35000 8.33594 42 62 90 54 46 46 46 0 47 25 50 50
24 11 50 46 0.35000 8.01319 42 62 90 54 46 46 46 0 47 25 50 50
25 0 25 40 0.31062 8.75203 25 51 90 65 35 3 51 0 47 50 45 0
25 1 51 37 0.35166 9.11409 25 51 90 65 35 3 51 0 47 50 45 0
25 2 90 34 0.41347 8.70577 25 51 90 65 35 3 51 0 47 50 45 0
25 3 65 36 0.37433 8.89006 25 51 90 65 35 3 51 0 47 50 45 0
25 4 35 39 0.32620 9.00025 25 51 90 65 35 3 51 0 47 50 45 0
25 5 3 42 0.27597 9.09741 25 51 90 65 35 3 51 0 47 50 45 0
25 6 51 37 0.35166 9.10936 25 51 90 65 35 3 51 0 47 50 45 0
25 7 0 42 0.26950 8.40874 25 51 90 65 35 3 51 0 47 50 45 0
25 8 47 38 0.34527 8.92089 25 51 90 65 35 3 51 0 47 50 45 0
25 9 50 37 0.35000 9.14860 25 51 90 65 35 3 51 0 47 50 45 0
25 10 45 38 0.34201 8.67795 25 51 90 65 35 3 51 0 47 50 45 0
25 11 0 42 0.26950 8.28269 25 51 90 65 35 3 51 0 47 50 45 0
26 0 15 56 0.36266 9.11469 15 47 95 78 45 48 61 50 32 65 50 50
26 1 47 54 0.35144 9.46553 15 47 95 78 45 48 61 50 32 65 50 50
26 2 95 49 0.33215 9.03792 15 47 95 78 45 48 61 50 32 65 50 50
26 3 78 51 0.33726 9.22732 15 47 95 78 45 48 61 50 32 65 50 50
26 4 45 54 0.35228 9.35252 15 47 95 78 45 48 61 50 32 65 50 50
26 5 48 53 0.35072 9.44813 15 47 95 78 45 48 61 50 32 65 50 50
26 6 61 52 0.34576 9.45512 15 47 95 78 45 48 61 50 32 65 50 50
26 7 50 53 0.35000 8.75874 15 47 95 78 45 48 61 50 32 65 50 50
26 8 32 55 0.35777 9.27866 15 47 95 78 45 48 61 50 32 65 50 50
26 9 65 52 0.34352 9.49213 15 47 95 78 45 48 61 50 32 65 50 50
26 10 50 53 0.35000 9.02795 15 47 95 78 45 48 61 50 32 65 50 50
26 11 50 53 0.35000 8.63269 15 47 95 78 45 48 61 50 32 65 50 50
27 0 50 48 0.35000 9.46469 50 59 95 40 47 56 48 0 34 50 79 20
27 1 59 47 0.35252 9.81805 50 59 95 40 47 56 48 0 34 50 79 20
27 2 95 44 0.36103 9.39895 50 59 95 40 47 56 48 0 34 50 79 20
27 3 40 49 0.34755 9.57487 50 59 95 40 47 56 48 0 34 50 79 20
27 4 47 48 0.34912 9.70165 50 59 95 40 47 56 48 0 34 50 79 20
27 5 56 47 0.35189 9.80002 50 59 95 40 47 56 48 0 34 50 79 20
27 6 48 48 0.34944 9.80456 50 59 95 40 47 56 48 0 34 50 79 20
27 7 0 53 0.34008 9.09882 50 59 95 40 47 56 48 0 34 50 79 20
27 8 34 49 0.34496 9.62362 50 59 95 40 47 56 48 0 34 50 79 20
27 9 50 48 0.35000 9.84213 50 59 95 40 47 56 48 0 34 50 79 20
27 10 79 45 0.35880 9.38674 50 59 95 40 47 56 48 0 34 50 79 20
27 11 20 51 0.34335 8.97604 50 59 95 40 47 56 48 0 34 50 79 20
28 0 50 50 0.35000 9.81469 50 52 97 32 45 40 49 34 32 50 34 90
28 1 52 50 0.34995 10.16800 50 52 97 32 45 40 49 34 32 50 34 90
28 2 97 46 0.34835 9.74730 50 52 97 32 45 40 49 34 32 50 34 90
28 3 32 52 0.35084 9.92571 50 52 97 32 45 40 49 34 32 50 34 90
28 4 45 51 0.35035 10.05200 50 52 97 32 45 40 49 34 32 50 34 90
28 5 40 51 0.35012 10.15014 50 52 97 32 45 40 49 34 32 50 34 90
28 6 49 51 0.35012 10.15468 50 52 97 32 45 40 49 34 32 50 34 90
28 7 34 52 0.35112 9.44994 50 52 97 32 45 40 49 34 32 50 34 90
28 8 32 52 0.35084 9.97446 50 52 97 32 45 40 49 34 32 50 34 90
28 9 50 50 0.35000 10.19213 50 52 97 32 45 40 49 34 32 50 34 90
28 10 34 52 0.35112 9.73786 50 52 97 32 45 40 49 34 32 50 34 90
28 11 90 47 0.34673 9.32277 50 52 97 32 45 40 49 34 32 50 34 90
29 0 40 48 0.34627 10.16095 40 55 78 32 43 57 50 0 45 50 66 50
29 1 55 46 0.35228 10.52028 40 55 78 32 43 57 50 0 45 50 66 50
29 2 78 44 0.36241 10.10971 40 55 78 32 43 57 50 0 45 50 66 50
29 3 32 49 0.34391 10.26962 40 55 78 32 43 57 50 0 45 50 66 50
29 4 43 48 0.34763 10.39963 40 55 78 32 43 57 50 0 45 50 66 50
29 5 57 46 0.35302 10.50316 40 55 78 32 43 57 50 0 45 50 66 50
29 6 50 47 0.35000 10.50468 40 55 78 32 43 57 50 0 45 50 66 50
29 7 0 51 0.32725 9.77719 40 55 78 32 43 57 50 0 45 50 66 50
29 8 45 47 0.34778 10.32225 40 55 78 32 43 57 50 0 45 50 66 50
29 9 50 47 0.35000 10.54213 40 55 78 32 43 57 50 0 45 50 66 50
29 10 66 45 0.35728 10.09514 40 55 78 32 43 57 50 0 45 50 66 50
29 11 50 47 0.35000 9.67277 40 55 78 32 43 57 50 0 45 50 66 50
30 0 50 56 0.35000 10.51095 50 53 80 68 45 49 50 100 47 40 33 50
30 1 53 56 0.34758 10.86786 50 53 80 68 45 49 50 100 47 40 33 50
30 2 80 53 0.32795 10.43766 50 53 80 68 45 49 50 100 47 40 33 50
30 3 68 54 0.33698 10.60660 50 53 80 68 45 49 50 100 47 40 33 50
30 4 45 56 0.35356 10.75319 50 53 80 68 45 49 50 100 47 40 33 50
30 5 49 56 0.35076 10.85392 50 53 80 68 45 49 50 100 47 40 33 50
30 6 50 56 0.35000 10.85468 50 53 80 68 45 49 50 100 47 40 33 50
30 7 100 51 0.31442 10.09161 50 53 80 68 45 49 50 100 47 40 33 50
30 8 47 56 0.35221 10.67445 50 53 80 68 45 49 50 100 47 40 33 50
30 9 40 57 0.35782 10.89995 50 53 80 68 45 49 50 100 47 40 33 50
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Table XXXVI.: (continued)
Round Player OwnM MS Earn SubTot Pl0 Pl1 Pl2 Pl3 Pl4 Pl5 Pl6 Pl7 Pl8 Pl9 Pl10 Pl11
30 10 33 57 0.36190 10.45704 50 53 80 68 45 49 50 100 47 40 33 50
30 11 50 56 0.35000 10.02277 50 53 80 68 45 49 50 100 47 40 33 50
31 0 48 48 0.34944 10.86039 48 45 20 71 43 44 50 17 60 60 76 45
31 1 45 49 0.34907 11.21693 48 45 20 71 43 44 50 17 60 60 76 45
31 2 20 51 0.34335 10.78101 48 45 20 71 43 44 50 17 60 60 76 45
31 3 71 46 0.35564 10.96223 48 45 20 71 43 44 50 17 60 60 76 45
31 4 43 49 0.34853 11.10172 48 45 20 71 43 44 50 17 60 60 76 45
31 5 44 49 0.34881 11.20273 48 45 20 71 43 44 50 17 60 60 76 45
31 6 50 48 0.35000 11.20468 48 45 20 71 43 44 50 17 60 60 76 45
31 7 17 51 0.34153 10.43314 48 45 20 71 43 44 50 17 60 60 76 45
31 8 60 47 0.35268 11.02713 48 45 20 71 43 44 50 17 60 60 76 45
31 9 60 47 0.35268 11.25263 48 45 20 71 43 44 50 17 60 60 76 45
31 10 76 46 0.35546 10.81250 48 45 20 71 43 44 50 17 60 60 76 45
31 11 45 49 0.34907 10.37184 48 45 20 71 43 44 50 17 60 60 76 45
32 0 48 49 0.34970 11.21009 48 49 95 37 45 54 50 50 57 40 22 45
32 1 49 49 0.34986 11.56679 48 49 95 37 45 54 50 50 57 40 22 45
32 2 95 45 0.35525 11.13626 48 49 95 37 45 54 50 50 57 40 22 45
32 3 37 50 0.34803 11.31026 48 49 95 37 45 54 50 50 57 40 22 45
32 4 45 50 0.34971 11.45143 48 49 95 37 45 54 50 50 57 40 22 45
32 5 54 49 0.35033 11.55306 48 49 95 37 45 54 50 50 57 40 22 45
32 6 50 49 0.35000 11.55468 48 49 95 37 45 54 50 50 57 40 22 45
32 7 50 49 0.35000 10.78314 48 49 95 37 45 54 50 50 57 40 22 45
32 8 57 49 0.35033 11.37746 48 49 95 37 45 54 50 50 57 40 22 45
32 9 40 50 0.34883 11.60146 48 49 95 37 45 54 50 50 57 40 22 45
32 10 22 52 0.34804 11.16054 48 49 95 37 45 54 50 50 57 40 22 45
32 11 45 50 0.34971 10.72155 48 49 95 37 45 54 50 50 57 40 22 45
33 0 48 64 0.35355 11.56364 48 53 95 63 58 42 60 72 53 40 72 100
33 1 53 64 0.34450 11.91129 48 53 95 63 58 42 60 72 53 40 72 100
33 2 95 60 0.26862 11.40489 48 53 95 63 58 42 60 72 53 40 72 100
33 3 63 63 0.32634 11.63660 48 53 95 63 58 42 60 72 53 40 72 100
33 4 58 63 0.33591 11.78733 48 53 95 63 58 42 60 72 53 40 72 100
33 5 42 65 0.36465 11.91771 48 53 95 63 58 42 60 72 53 40 72 100
33 6 60 63 0.33215 11.88683 48 53 95 63 58 42 60 72 53 40 72 100
33 7 72 62 0.31047 11.09361 48 53 95 63 58 42 60 72 53 40 72 100
33 8 53 64 0.34450 11.72197 48 53 95 63 58 42 60 72 53 40 72 100
33 9 40 65 0.36808 11.96955 48 53 95 63 58 42 60 72 53 40 72 100
33 10 72 62 0.31047 11.47102 48 53 95 63 58 42 60 72 53 40 72 100
33 11 100 60 0.25667 10.97821 48 53 95 63 58 42 60 72 53 40 72 100
34 0 50 44 0.35000 11.91364 50 57 5 68 47 42 50 0 55 65 0 97
34 1 57 44 0.35482 12.26611 50 57 5 68 47 42 50 0 55 65 0 97
34 2 5 48 0.31482 11.71971 50 57 5 68 47 42 50 0 55 65 0 97
34 3 68 43 0.36239 11.99899 50 57 5 68 47 42 50 0 55 65 0 97
34 4 47 44 0.34758 12.13492 50 57 5 68 47 42 50 0 55 65 0 97
34 5 42 45 0.34412 12.26183 50 57 5 68 47 42 50 0 55 65 0 97
34 6 50 44 0.35000 12.23683 50 57 5 68 47 42 50 0 55 65 0 97
34 7 0 49 0.31442 11.40803 50 57 5 68 47 42 50 0 55 65 0 97
34 8 55 44 0.35356 12.07552 50 57 5 68 47 42 50 0 55 65 0 97
34 9 65 43 0.36085 12.33040 50 57 5 68 47 42 50 0 55 65 0 97
34 10 0 49 0.31442 11.78543 50 57 5 68 47 42 50 0 55 65 0 97
34 11 97 40 0.38455 11.36276 50 57 5 68 47 42 50 0 55 65 0 97
35 0 47 59 0.35336 12.26700 47 49 70 36 45 45 50 50 51 50 100 100
35 1 49 59 0.35114 12.61726 47 49 70 36 45 45 50 50 51 50 100 100
35 2 70 57 0.32737 12.04708 47 49 70 36 45 45 50 50 51 50 100 100
35 3 36 60 0.36568 12.36467 47 49 70 36 45 45 50 50 51 50 100 100
35 4 45 59 0.35548 12.49040 47 49 70 36 45 45 50 50 51 50 100 100
35 5 45 59 0.35548 12.61731 47 49 70 36 45 45 50 50 51 50 100 100
35 6 50 58 0.35000 12.58683 47 49 70 36 45 45 50 50 51 50 100 100
35 7 50 58 0.35000 11.75803 47 49 70 36 45 45 50 50 51 50 100 100
35 8 51 58 0.34896 12.42449 47 49 70 36 45 45 50 50 51 50 100 100
35 9 50 58 0.35000 12.68040 47 49 70 36 45 45 50 50 51 50 100 100
35 10 100 54 0.29517 12.08060 47 49 70 36 45 45 50 50 51 50 100 100
35 11 100 54 0.29517 11.65793 47 49 70 36 45 45 50 50 51 50 100 100
36 0 48 49 0.34970 12.61669 48 54 90 34 45 46 50 50 53 58 0 60
36 1 54 49 0.35033 12.96758 48 54 90 34 45 46 50 50 53 58 0 60
36 2 90 45 0.35700 12.40408 48 54 90 34 45 46 50 50 53 58 0 60
36 3 34 50 0.34701 12.71168 48 54 90 34 45 46 50 50 53 58 0 60
36 4 45 49 0.34907 12.83947 48 54 90 34 45 46 50 50 53 58 0 60
36 5 46 49 0.34930 12.96661 48 54 90 34 45 46 50 50 53 58 0 60
36 6 50 49 0.35000 12.93683 48 54 90 34 45 46 50 50 53 58 0 60
36 7 50 49 0.35000 12.10803 48 54 90 34 45 46 50 50 53 58 0 60
36 8 53 49 0.35028 12.77477 48 54 90 34 45 46 50 50 53 58 0 60
36 9 58 48 0.35131 13.03170 48 54 90 34 45 46 50 50 53 58 0 60
36 10 0 53 0.34008 12.42068 48 54 90 34 45 46 50 50 53 58 0 60
36 11 60 48 0.35140 12.00933 48 54 90 34 45 46 50 50 53 58 0 60
37 0 48 53 0.35072 12.96742 48 53 15 59 45 57 50 50 47 48 100 60
37 1 53 53 0.34874 13.31632 48 53 15 59 45 57 50 50 47 48 100 60
37 2 15 56 0.36266 12.76674 48 53 15 59 45 57 50 50 47 48 100 60
37 3 59 52 0.34674 13.05843 48 53 15 59 45 57 50 50 47 48 100 60
37 4 45 53 0.35163 13.19110 48 53 15 59 45 57 50 50 47 48 100 60
37 5 57 52 0.34763 13.31425 48 53 15 59 45 57 50 50 47 48 100 60
37 6 50 53 0.35000 13.28683 48 53 15 59 45 57 50 50 47 48 100 60
37 7 50 53 0.35000 12.45803 48 53 15 59 45 57 50 50 47 48 100 60
37 8 47 53 0.35105 13.12582 48 53 15 59 45 57 50 50 47 48 100 60
37 9 48 53 0.35072 13.38243 48 53 15 59 45 57 50 50 47 48 100 60
37 10 100 48 0.33367 12.75435 48 53 15 59 45 57 50 50 47 48 100 60
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Table XXXVI.: (continued)
Round Player OwnM MS Earn SubTot Pl0 Pl1 Pl2 Pl3 Pl4 Pl5 Pl6 Pl7 Pl8 Pl9 Pl10 Pl11
37 11 60 52 0.34627 12.35559 48 53 15 59 45 57 50 50 47 48 100 60
38 0 35 55 0.35700 13.32442 35 48 84 30 45 43 54 50 46 50 100 60
38 1 48 54 0.35098 13.66730 35 48 84 30 45 43 54 50 46 50 100 60
38 2 84 51 0.33215 13.09889 35 48 84 30 45 43 54 50 46 50 100 60
38 3 30 56 0.36073 13.41916 35 48 84 30 45 43 54 50 46 50 100 60
38 4 45 55 0.35292 13.54402 35 48 84 30 45 43 54 50 46 50 100 60
38 5 43 55 0.35392 13.66817 35 48 84 30 45 43 54 50 46 50 100 60
38 6 54 54 0.34776 13.63459 35 48 84 30 45 43 54 50 46 50 100 60
38 7 50 54 0.35000 12.80803 35 48 84 30 45 43 54 50 46 50 100 60
38 8 46 54 0.35187 13.47768 35 48 84 30 45 43 54 50 46 50 100 60
38 9 50 54 0.35000 13.73243 35 48 84 30 45 43 54 50 46 50 100 60
38 10 100 50 0.32083 13.07518 35 48 84 30 45 43 54 50 46 50 100 60
38 11 60 53 0.34498 12.70058 35 48 84 30 45 43 54 50 46 50 100 60
39 0 52 51 0.34970 13.67411 52 50 40 50 41 48 50 48 53 58 50 70
39 1 50 51 0.35000 14.01730 52 50 40 50 41 48 50 48 53 58 50 70
39 2 40 52 0.35140 13.45029 52 50 40 50 41 48 50 48 53 58 50 70
39 3 50 51 0.35000 13.76916 52 50 40 50 41 48 50 48 53 58 50 70
39 4 41 52 0.35137 13.89538 52 50 40 50 41 48 50 48 53 58 50 70
39 5 48 51 0.35021 14.01838 52 50 40 50 41 48 50 48 53 58 50 70
39 6 50 51 0.35000 13.98459 52 50 40 50 41 48 50 48 53 58 50 70
39 7 48 51 0.35021 13.15824 52 50 40 50 41 48 50 48 53 58 50 70
39 8 53 51 0.34951 13.82719 52 50 40 50 41 48 50 48 53 58 50 70
39 9 58 50 0.34925 14.08168 52 50 40 50 41 48 50 48 53 58 50 70
39 10 50 51 0.35000 13.42518 52 50 40 50 41 48 50 48 53 58 50 70
39 11 70 49 0.34790 13.04848 52 50 40 50 41 48 50 48 53 58 50 70
40 0 49 48 0.34973 14.02385 49 41 30 50 47 46 50 58 46 50 50 60
40 1 41 49 0.34790 14.36520 49 41 30 50 47 46 50 58 46 50 50 60
40 2 30 50 0.34533 13.79562 49 41 30 50 47 46 50 58 46 50 50 60
40 3 50 48 0.35000 14.11916 49 41 30 50 47 46 50 58 46 50 50 60
40 4 47 48 0.34912 14.24451 49 41 30 50 47 46 50 58 46 50 50 60
40 5 46 48 0.34879 14.36716 49 41 30 50 47 46 50 58 46 50 50 60
40 6 50 48 0.35000 14.33459 49 41 30 50 47 46 50 58 46 50 50 60
40 7 58 47 0.35233 13.51057 49 41 30 50 47 46 50 58 46 50 50 60
40 8 46 48 0.34879 14.17598 49 41 30 50 47 46 50 58 46 50 50 60
40 9 50 48 0.35000 14.43168 49 41 30 50 47 46 50 58 46 50 50 60
40 10 50 48 0.35000 13.77518 49 41 30 50 47 46 50 58 46 50 50 60
40 11 60 47 0.35268 13.40116 49 41 30 50 47 46 50 58 46 50 50 60
41 0 54 50 0.34981 14.37366 54 44 60 50 46 17 50 100 18 48 50 70
41 1 44 51 0.35035 14.71555 54 44 60 50 46 17 50 100 18 48 50 70
41 2 60 50 0.34883 14.14446 54 44 60 50 46 17 50 100 18 48 50 70
41 3 50 51 0.35000 14.46916 54 44 60 50 46 17 50 100 18 48 50 70
41 4 46 51 0.35033 14.59484 54 44 60 50 46 17 50 100 18 48 50 70
41 5 17 54 0.35424 14.72140 54 44 60 50 46 17 50 100 18 48 50 70
41 6 50 51 0.35000 14.68459 54 44 60 50 46 17 50 100 18 48 50 70
41 7 100 46 0.34650 13.85707 54 44 60 50 46 17 50 100 18 48 50 70
41 8 18 54 0.35448 14.53046 54 44 60 50 46 17 50 100 18 48 50 70
41 9 48 51 0.35021 14.78189 54 44 60 50 46 17 50 100 18 48 50 70
41 10 50 51 0.35000 14.12518 54 44 60 50 46 17 50 100 18 48 50 70
41 11 70 49 0.34790 13.74906 54 44 60 50 46 17 50 100 18 48 50 70
42 0 48 49 0.34970 14.72336 48 54 75 50 45 79 50 40 18 50 54 20
42 1 54 48 0.35084 15.06639 48 54 75 50 45 79 50 40 18 50 54 20
42 2 75 46 0.35554 14.50000 48 54 75 50 45 79 50 40 18 50 54 20
42 3 50 48 0.35000 14.81916 48 54 75 50 45 79 50 40 18 50 54 20
42 4 45 49 0.34907 14.94390 48 54 75 50 45 79 50 40 18 50 54 20
42 5 79 46 0.35508 15.07647 48 54 75 50 45 79 50 40 18 50 54 20
42 6 50 48 0.35000 15.03459 48 54 75 50 45 79 50 40 18 50 54 20
42 7 40 49 0.34755 14.20462 48 54 75 50 45 79 50 40 18 50 54 20
42 8 18 51 0.34216 14.87262 48 54 75 50 45 79 50 40 18 50 54 20
42 9 50 48 0.35000 15.13189 48 54 75 50 45 79 50 40 18 50 54 20
42 10 54 48 0.35084 14.47602 48 54 75 50 45 79 50 40 18 50 54 20
42 11 20 51 0.34335 14.09241 48 54 75 50 45 79 50 40 18 50 54 20
43 0 49 53 0.35037 15.07373 49 53 75 50 45 48 50 50 58 50 42 60
43 1 53 52 0.34912 15.41552 49 53 75 50 45 48 50 50 58 50 42 60
43 2 75 50 0.34271 14.84271 49 53 75 50 45 48 50 50 58 50 42 60
43 3 50 53 0.35000 15.16916 49 53 75 50 45 48 50 50 58 50 42 60
43 4 45 53 0.35163 15.29554 49 53 75 50 45 48 50 50 58 50 42 60
43 5 48 53 0.35072 15.42720 49 53 75 50 45 48 50 50 58 50 42 60
43 6 50 53 0.35000 15.38459 49 53 75 50 45 48 50 50 58 50 42 60
43 7 50 53 0.35000 14.55462 49 53 75 50 45 48 50 50 58 50 42 60
43 8 58 52 0.34720 15.21982 49 53 75 50 45 48 50 50 58 50 42 60
43 9 50 53 0.35000 15.48189 49 53 75 50 45 48 50 50 58 50 42 60
43 10 42 53 0.35233 14.82836 49 53 75 50 45 48 50 50 58 50 42 60
43 11 60 52 0.34627 14.43868 49 53 75 50 45 48 50 50 58 50 42 60
44 0 46 58 0.35392 15.42765 46 58 76 50 45 64 50 92 32 50 61 55
44 1 58 56 0.34309 15.75861 46 58 76 50 45 64 50 92 32 50 61 55
44 2 76 55 0.32543 15.16814 46 58 76 50 45 64 50 92 32 50 61 55
44 3 50 57 0.35000 15.51916 46 58 76 50 45 64 50 92 32 50 61 55
44 4 45 58 0.35484 15.65038 46 58 76 50 45 64 50 92 32 50 61 55
44 5 64 56 0.33693 15.76413 46 58 76 50 45 64 50 92 32 50 61 55
44 6 50 57 0.35000 15.73459 46 58 76 50 45 64 50 92 32 50 61 55
44 7 92 53 0.31325 14.86787 46 58 76 50 45 64 50 92 32 50 61 55
44 8 32 59 0.36701 15.58683 46 58 76 50 45 64 50 92 32 50 61 55
44 9 50 57 0.35000 15.83189 46 58 76 50 45 64 50 92 32 50 61 55
44 10 61 56 0.34012 15.16847 46 58 76 50 45 64 50 92 32 50 61 55
44 11 55 57 0.34522 14.78389 46 58 76 50 45 64 50 92 32 50 61 55
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Table XXXVI.: (continued)
Round Player OwnM MS Earn SubTot Pl0 Pl1 Pl2 Pl3 Pl4 Pl5 Pl6 Pl7 Pl8 Pl9 Pl10 Pl11
45 0 52 47 0.35072 15.77837 52 58 80 49 45 41 50 50 32 60 54 0
45 1 58 47 0.35233 16.11094 52 58 80 49 45 41 50 50 32 60 54 0
45 2 80 45 0.35875 15.52689 52 58 80 49 45 41 50 50 32 60 54 0
45 3 49 47 0.34960 15.86877 52 58 80 49 45 41 50 50 32 60 54 0
45 4 45 48 0.34842 15.99880 52 58 80 49 45 41 50 50 32 60 54 0
45 5 41 48 0.34674 16.11087 52 58 80 49 45 41 50 50 32 60 54 0
45 6 50 47 0.35000 16.08459 52 58 80 49 45 41 50 50 32 60 54 0
45 7 50 47 0.35000 15.21787 52 58 80 49 45 41 50 50 32 60 54 0
45 8 32 49 0.34391 15.93074 52 58 80 49 45 41 50 50 32 60 54 0
45 9 60 46 0.35397 16.18586 52 58 80 49 45 41 50 50 32 60 54 0
45 10 54 47 0.35135 15.51983 52 58 80 49 45 41 50 50 32 60 54 0
45 11 0 52 0.33367 15.11756 52 58 80 49 45 41 50 50 32 60 54 0
46 0 48 46 0.34893 16.12730 48 57 40 50 45 44 50 1 32 45 100 44
46 1 57 45 0.35392 16.46486 48 57 40 50 45 44 50 1 32 45 100 44
46 2 40 47 0.34498 15.87187 48 57 40 50 45 44 50 1 32 45 100 44
46 3 50 46 0.35000 16.21877 48 57 40 50 45 44 50 1 32 45 100 44
46 4 45 46 0.34714 16.34594 48 57 40 50 45 44 50 1 32 45 100 44
46 5 44 47 0.34727 16.45814 48 57 40 50 45 44 50 1 32 45 100 44
46 6 50 46 0.35000 16.43459 48 57 40 50 45 44 50 1 32 45 100 44
46 7 1 50 0.32199 15.53986 48 57 40 50 45 44 50 1 32 45 100 44
46 8 32 48 0.34160 16.27234 48 57 40 50 45 44 50 1 32 45 100 44
46 9 45 46 0.34714 16.53300 48 57 40 50 45 44 50 1 32 45 100 44
46 10 100 41 0.37858 15.89841 48 57 40 50 45 44 50 1 32 45 100 44
46 11 44 47 0.34727 15.46483 48 57 40 50 45 44 50 1 32 45 100 44
47 0 50 47 0.35000 16.47730 50 53 85 51 50 45 50 50 46 40 0 45
47 1 53 47 0.35105 16.81591 50 53 85 51 50 45 50 50 46 40 0 45
47 2 85 44 0.36266 16.23453 50 53 85 51 50 45 50 50 46 40 0 45
47 3 51 47 0.35037 16.56914 50 53 85 51 50 45 50 50 46 40 0 45
47 4 50 47 0.35000 16.69594 50 53 85 51 50 45 50 50 46 40 0 45
47 5 45 47 0.34778 16.80593 50 53 85 51 50 45 50 50 46 40 0 45
47 6 50 47 0.35000 16.78459 50 53 85 51 50 45 50 50 46 40 0 45
47 7 50 47 0.35000 15.88986 50 53 85 51 50 45 50 50 46 40 0 45
47 8 46 47 0.34827 16.62061 50 53 85 51 50 45 50 50 46 40 0 45
47 9 40 48 0.34627 16.87926 50 53 85 51 50 45 50 50 46 40 0 45
47 10 0 51 0.32725 16.22566 50 53 85 51 50 45 50 50 46 40 0 45
47 11 45 47 0.34778 15.81261 50 53 85 51 50 45 50 50 46 40 0 45
48 0 50 53 0.35000 16.82730 50 60 55 52 54 49 50 50 48 50 50 68
48 1 60 52 0.34627 17.16218 50 60 55 52 54 49 50 50 48 50 50 68
48 2 55 53 0.34778 16.58231 50 60 55 52 54 49 50 50 48 50 50 68
48 3 52 53 0.34918 16.91832 50 60 55 52 54 49 50 50 48 50 50 68
48 4 54 53 0.34827 17.04422 50 60 55 52 54 49 50 50 48 50 50 68
48 5 49 53 0.35037 17.15630 50 60 55 52 54 49 50 50 48 50 50 68
48 6 50 53 0.35000 17.13459 50 60 55 52 54 49 50 50 48 50 50 68
48 7 50 53 0.35000 16.23986 50 60 55 52 54 49 50 50 48 50 50 68
48 8 48 53 0.35072 16.97134 50 60 55 52 54 49 50 50 48 50 50 68
48 9 50 53 0.35000 17.22926 50 60 55 52 54 49 50 50 48 50 50 68
48 10 50 53 0.35000 16.57566 50 60 55 52 54 49 50 50 48 50 50 68
48 11 68 52 0.34160 16.15421 50 60 55 52 54 49 50 50 48 50 50 68
49 0 49 49 0.34986 17.17716 49 57 15 50 45 55 49 100 33 50 50 39
49 1 57 49 0.35033 17.51251 49 57 15 50 45 55 49 100 33 50 50 39
49 2 15 52 0.34469 16.92700 49 57 15 50 45 55 49 100 33 50 50 39
49 3 50 49 0.35000 17.26832 49 57 15 50 45 55 49 100 33 50 50 39
49 4 45 50 0.34971 17.39393 49 57 15 50 45 55 49 100 33 50 50 39
49 5 55 49 0.35035 17.50665 49 57 15 50 45 55 49 100 33 50 50 39
49 6 49 49 0.34986 17.48445 49 57 15 50 45 55 49 100 33 50 50 39
49 7 100 45 0.35292 16.59277 49 57 15 50 45 55 49 100 33 50 50 39
49 8 33 51 0.34881 17.32015 49 57 15 50 45 55 49 100 33 50 50 39
49 9 50 49 0.35000 17.57926 49 57 15 50 45 55 49 100 33 50 50 39
49 10 50 49 0.35000 16.92566 49 57 15 50 45 55 49 100 33 50 50 39
49 11 39 50 0.34859 16.50280 49 57 15 50 45 55 49 100 33 50 50 39
Table XXXVII.: Data from experiments: 12 small suppliers - no transport costs - Cohort 2
Round Player OwnM MS Earn SubTot Pl0 Pl1 Pl2 Pl3 Pl4 Pl5 Pl6 Pl7 Pl8 Pl9 Pl10 Pl11
0 0 52 71 0.34456 0.34456 52 76 55 82 96 70 100 99 89 66 9 35
0 1 76 68 0.28205 0.28205 52 76 55 82 96 70 100 99 89 66 9 35
0 2 55 70 0.33687 0.33687 52 76 55 82 96 70 100 99 89 66 9 35
0 3 82 68 0.26413 0.26413 52 76 55 82 96 70 100 99 89 66 9 35
0 4 96 67 0.22496 0.22496 52 76 55 82 96 70 100 99 89 66 9 35
0 5 70 69 0.29657 0.29657 52 76 55 82 96 70 100 99 89 66 9 35
0 6 100 66 0.21817 0.21817 52 76 55 82 96 70 100 99 89 66 9 35
0 7 99 66 0.22137 0.22137 52 76 55 82 96 70 100 99 89 66 9 35
0 8 89 67 0.24717 0.24717 52 76 55 82 96 70 100 99 89 66 9 35
0 9 66 69 0.30800 0.30800 52 76 55 82 96 70 100 99 89 66 9 35
0 10 9 75 0.46193 0.46193 52 76 55 82 96 70 100 99 89 66 9 35
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Table XXXVII.: (continued)
Round Player OwnM MS Earn SubTot Pl0 Pl1 Pl2 Pl3 Pl4 Pl5 Pl6 Pl7 Pl8 Pl9 Pl10 Pl11
0 11 35 72 0.38973 0.38973 52 76 55 82 96 70 100 99 89 66 9 35
1 0 65 43 0.36085 0.70541 65 50 45 86 3 40 0 49 75 90 0 35
1 1 50 44 0.35000 0.63205 65 50 45 86 3 40 0 49 75 90 0 35
1 2 45 45 0.34650 0.68337 65 50 45 86 3 40 0 49 75 90 0 35
1 3 86 41 0.37646 0.64059 65 50 45 86 3 40 0 49 75 90 0 35
1 4 3 49 0.31820 0.54315 65 50 45 86 3 40 0 49 75 90 0 35
1 5 40 45 0.34242 0.63898 65 50 45 86 3 40 0 49 75 90 0 35
1 6 0 49 0.31442 0.53258 65 50 45 86 3 40 0 49 75 90 0 35
1 7 49 44 0.34922 0.57059 65 50 45 86 3 40 0 49 75 90 0 35
1 8 75 42 0.36838 0.61554 65 50 45 86 3 40 0 49 75 90 0 35
1 9 90 41 0.37753 0.68553 65 50 45 86 3 40 0 49 75 90 0 35
1 10 0 49 0.31442 0.77635 65 50 45 86 3 40 0 49 75 90 0 35
1 11 35 46 0.33967 0.72940 65 50 45 86 3 40 0 49 75 90 0 35
2 0 54 44 0.35289 1.05831 54 55 60 21 3 84 0 70 94 8 70 24
2 1 55 44 0.35356 0.98561 54 55 60 21 3 84 0 70 94 8 70 24
2 2 60 44 0.35653 1.03991 54 55 60 21 3 84 0 70 94 8 70 24
2 3 21 47 0.32902 0.96962 54 55 60 21 3 84 0 70 94 8 70 24
2 4 3 49 0.31820 0.86135 54 55 60 21 3 84 0 70 94 8 70 24
2 5 84 42 0.37142 1.01040 54 55 60 21 3 84 0 70 94 8 70 24
2 6 0 49 0.31442 0.84700 54 55 60 21 3 84 0 70 94 8 70 24
2 7 70 43 0.36330 0.93389 54 55 60 21 3 84 0 70 94 8 70 24
2 8 94 41 0.37823 0.99378 54 55 60 21 3 84 0 70 94 8 70 24
2 9 8 49 0.32403 1.00956 54 55 60 21 3 84 0 70 94 8 70 24
2 10 70 43 0.36330 1.13965 54 55 60 21 3 84 0 70 94 8 70 24
2 11 24 47 0.33210 1.06150 54 55 60 21 3 84 0 70 94 8 70 24
3 0 71 60 0.31790 1.37621 71 69 76 100 84 0 78 26 11 93 85 40
3 1 69 60 0.32140 1.30702 71 69 76 100 84 0 78 26 11 93 85 40
3 2 76 60 0.30875 1.34865 71 69 76 100 84 0 78 26 11 93 85 40
3 3 100 58 0.26950 1.23912 71 69 76 100 84 0 78 26 11 93 85 40
3 4 84 59 0.29724 1.15859 71 69 76 100 84 0 78 26 11 93 85 40
3 5 0 67 0.42992 1.44032 71 69 76 100 84 0 78 26 11 93 85 40
3 6 78 60 0.30492 1.15192 71 69 76 100 84 0 78 26 11 93 85 40
3 7 26 64 0.38640 1.32029 71 69 76 100 84 0 78 26 11 93 85 40
3 8 11 66 0.41234 1.40611 71 69 76 100 84 0 78 26 11 93 85 40
3 9 93 58 0.28428 1.29384 71 69 76 100 84 0 78 26 11 93 85 40
3 10 85 59 0.29528 1.43493 71 69 76 100 84 0 78 26 11 93 85 40
3 11 40 63 0.36552 1.42702 71 69 76 100 84 0 78 26 11 93 85 40
4 0 67 53 0.34008 1.71629 67 38 21 60 100 100 72 71 70 46 0 1
4 1 38 55 0.35602 1.66304 67 38 21 60 100 100 72 71 70 46 0 1
4 2 21 57 0.36624 1.71489 67 38 21 60 100 100 72 71 70 46 0 1
4 3 60 53 0.34498 1.58410 67 38 21 60 100 100 72 71 70 46 0 1
4 4 100 50 0.32083 1.47943 67 38 21 60 100 100 72 71 70 46 0 1
4 5 100 50 0.32083 1.76115 67 38 21 60 100 100 72 71 70 46 0 1
4 6 72 52 0.33871 1.49063 67 38 21 60 100 100 72 71 70 46 0 1
4 7 71 52 0.33946 1.65976 67 38 21 60 100 100 72 71 70 46 0 1
4 8 70 52 0.34020 1.74631 67 38 21 60 100 100 72 71 70 46 0 1
4 9 46 55 0.35238 1.64622 67 38 21 60 100 100 72 71 70 46 0 1
4 10 0 59 0.37858 1.81351 67 38 21 60 100 100 72 71 70 46 0 1
4 11 1 59 0.37858 1.80560 67 38 21 60 100 100 72 71 70 46 0 1
5 0 61 41 0.36129 2.07759 61 32 20 71 0 90 51 100 20 60 7 0
5 1 32 44 0.33236 1.99540 61 32 20 71 0 90 51 100 20 60 7 0
5 2 20 45 0.32025 2.03514 61 32 20 71 0 90 51 100 20 60 7 0
5 3 71 40 0.37181 1.95590 61 32 20 71 0 90 51 100 20 60 7 0
5 4 0 47 0.30158 1.78101 61 32 20 71 0 90 51 100 20 60 7 0
5 5 90 38 0.39293 2.15409 61 32 20 71 0 90 51 100 20 60 7 0
5 6 51 42 0.35102 1.84164 61 32 20 71 0 90 51 100 20 60 7 0
5 7 100 37 0.40425 2.06401 61 32 20 71 0 90 51 100 20 60 7 0
5 8 20 45 0.32025 2.06656 61 32 20 71 0 90 51 100 20 60 7 0
5 9 60 41 0.36038 2.00661 61 32 20 71 0 90 51 100 20 60 7 0
5 10 7 46 0.30635 2.11987 61 32 20 71 0 90 51 100 20 60 7 0
5 11 0 47 0.30158 2.10719 61 32 20 71 0 90 51 100 20 60 7 0
6 0 60 63 0.33215 2.40974 60 58 66 38 72 0 50 97 91 81 43 98
6 1 58 63 0.33591 2.33130 60 58 66 38 72 0 50 97 91 81 43 98
6 2 66 63 0.32032 2.35546 60 58 66 38 72 0 50 97 91 81 43 98
6 3 38 65 0.37142 2.32732 60 58 66 38 72 0 50 97 91 81 43 98
6 4 72 62 0.31047 2.09148 60 58 66 38 72 0 50 97 91 81 43 98
6 5 0 69 0.44275 2.59684 60 58 66 38 72 0 50 97 91 81 43 98
6 6 50 64 0.35000 2.19164 60 58 66 38 72 0 50 97 91 81 43 98
6 7 97 60 0.26391 2.32792 60 58 66 38 72 0 50 97 91 81 43 98
6 8 91 60 0.27777 2.34433 60 58 66 38 72 0 50 97 91 81 43 98
6 9 81 61 0.29503 2.30163 60 58 66 38 72 0 50 97 91 81 43 98
6 10 43 65 0.36290 2.48277 60 58 66 38 72 0 50 97 91 81 43 98
6 11 98 60 0.26152 2.36871 60 58 66 38 72 0 50 97 91 81 43 98
7 0 63 30 0.38140 2.79113 63 8 22 35 0 0 68 19 65 55 51 3
7 1 8 35 0.24857 2.57987 63 8 22 35 0 0 68 19 65 55 51 3
7 2 22 33 0.27977 2.63523 63 8 22 35 0 0 68 19 65 55 51 3
7 3 35 32 0.31272 2.64005 63 8 22 35 0 0 68 19 65 55 51 3
7 4 0 35 0.22458 2.31607 63 8 22 35 0 0 68 19 65 55 51 3
7 5 0 35 0.22458 2.82142 63 8 22 35 0 0 68 19 65 55 51 3
7 6 68 29 0.39473 2.58637 63 8 22 35 0 0 68 19 65 55 51 3
7 7 19 34 0.27513 2.60305 63 8 22 35 0 0 68 19 65 55 51 3
7 8 65 29 0.38780 2.73213 63 8 22 35 0 0 68 19 65 55 51 3
7 9 55 30 0.36254 2.66418 63 8 22 35 0 0 68 19 65 55 51 3
7 10 51 31 0.35243 2.83520 63 8 22 35 0 0 68 19 65 55 51 3
7 11 3 35 0.23375 2.60246 63 8 22 35 0 0 68 19 65 55 51 3
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8 0 62 51 0.34678 3.13791 62 60 56 70 0 100 83 17 7 65 51 48
8 1 60 51 0.34755 2.92742 62 60 56 70 0 100 83 17 7 65 51 48
8 2 56 51 0.34881 2.98404 62 60 56 70 0 100 83 17 7 65 51 48
8 3 70 50 0.34533 2.98538 62 60 56 70 0 100 83 17 7 65 51 48
8 4 0 56 0.35933 2.67540 62 60 56 70 0 100 83 17 7 65 51 48
8 5 100 47 0.34008 3.16150 62 60 56 70 0 100 83 17 7 65 51 48
8 6 83 49 0.34153 2.92790 62 60 56 70 0 100 83 17 7 65 51 48
8 7 17 55 0.35847 2.96152 62 60 56 70 0 100 83 17 7 65 51 48
8 8 7 56 0.36154 3.09367 62 60 56 70 0 100 83 17 7 65 51 48
8 9 65 50 0.34737 3.01155 62 60 56 70 0 100 83 17 7 65 51 48
8 10 51 52 0.34973 3.18493 62 60 56 70 0 100 83 17 7 65 51 48
8 11 48 52 0.35047 2.95293 62 60 56 70 0 100 83 17 7 65 51 48
9 0 63 66 0.32133 3.45925 63 56 48 43 94 100 77 25 95 38 100 47
9 1 56 66 0.33726 3.26468 63 56 48 43 94 100 77 25 95 38 100 47
9 2 48 67 0.35432 3.33836 63 56 48 43 94 100 77 25 95 38 100 47
9 3 43 68 0.36560 3.35098 63 56 48 43 94 100 77 25 95 38 100 47
9 4 94 63 0.25401 2.92941 63 56 48 43 94 100 77 25 95 38 100 47
9 5 100 62 0.24383 3.40534 63 56 48 43 94 100 77 25 95 38 100 47
9 6 77 64 0.29298 3.22089 63 56 48 43 94 100 77 25 95 38 100 47
9 7 25 69 0.40367 3.36519 63 56 48 43 94 100 77 25 95 38 100 47
9 8 95 63 0.25130 3.34497 63 56 48 43 94 100 77 25 95 38 100 47
9 9 38 68 0.37604 3.38759 63 56 48 43 94 100 77 25 95 38 100 47
9 10 100 62 0.24383 3.42876 63 56 48 43 94 100 77 25 95 38 100 47
9 11 47 67 0.35644 3.30937 63 56 48 43 94 100 77 25 95 38 100 47
10 0 58 47 0.35233 3.81158 58 50 20 71 100 0 76 21 81 69 0 27
10 1 50 48 0.35000 3.61468 58 50 20 71 100 0 76 21 81 69 0 27
10 2 20 50 0.33950 3.67786 58 50 20 71 100 0 76 21 81 69 0 27
10 3 71 46 0.35564 3.70662 58 50 20 71 100 0 76 21 81 69 0 27
10 4 100 43 0.36575 3.29516 58 50 20 71 100 0 76 21 81 69 0 27
10 5 0 52 0.33367 3.73900 58 50 20 71 100 0 76 21 81 69 0 27
10 6 76 45 0.35880 3.57968 58 50 20 71 100 0 76 21 81 69 0 27
10 7 21 50 0.34019 3.70538 58 50 20 71 100 0 76 21 81 69 0 27
10 8 81 45 0.35868 3.70365 58 50 20 71 100 0 76 21 81 69 0 27
10 9 69 46 0.35554 3.74313 58 50 20 71 100 0 76 21 81 69 0 27
10 10 0 52 0.33367 3.76243 58 50 20 71 100 0 76 21 81 69 0 27
10 11 27 50 0.34383 3.65319 58 50 20 71 100 0 76 21 81 69 0 27
11 0 59 52 0.34674 4.15833 59 50 68 40 90 70 87 31 73 37 0 28
11 1 50 53 0.35000 3.96468 59 50 68 40 90 70 87 31 73 37 0 28
11 2 68 51 0.34391 4.02177 59 50 68 40 90 70 87 31 73 37 0 28
11 3 40 54 0.35397 4.06058 59 50 68 40 90 70 87 31 73 37 0 28
11 4 90 49 0.33647 3.63162 59 50 68 40 90 70 87 31 73 37 0 28
11 5 70 51 0.34277 4.08177 59 50 68 40 90 70 87 31 73 37 0 28
11 6 87 50 0.33403 3.91371 59 50 68 40 90 70 87 31 73 37 0 28
11 7 31 55 0.35798 4.06336 59 50 68 40 90 70 87 31 73 37 0 28
11 8 73 51 0.34088 4.04453 59 50 68 40 90 70 87 31 73 37 0 28
11 9 37 54 0.35470 4.09783 59 50 68 40 90 70 87 31 73 37 0 28
11 10 0 58 0.37217 4.13460 59 50 68 40 90 70 87 31 73 37 0 28
11 11 28 55 0.35847 4.01166 59 50 68 40 90 70 87 31 73 37 0 28
12 0 72 43 0.36412 4.52244 72 53 45 57 10 19 77 25 67 63 34 19
12 1 53 44 0.35221 4.31689 72 53 45 57 10 19 77 25 67 63 34 19
12 2 45 45 0.34650 4.36827 72 53 45 57 10 19 77 25 67 63 34 19
12 3 57 44 0.35482 4.41540 72 53 45 57 10 19 77 25 67 63 34 19
12 4 10 48 0.32107 3.95269 72 53 45 57 10 19 77 25 67 63 34 19
12 5 19 47 0.32685 4.40862 72 53 45 57 10 19 77 25 67 63 34 19
12 6 77 42 0.36922 4.28293 72 53 45 57 10 19 77 25 67 63 34 19
12 7 25 47 0.33308 4.39644 72 53 45 57 10 19 77 25 67 63 34 19
12 8 67 43 0.36190 4.40643 72 53 45 57 10 19 77 25 67 63 34 19
12 9 63 43 0.35971 4.45754 72 53 45 57 10 19 77 25 67 63 34 19
12 10 34 46 0.33880 4.47340 72 53 45 57 10 19 77 25 67 63 34 19
12 11 19 47 0.32685 4.33852 72 53 45 57 10 19 77 25 67 63 34 19
13 0 64 51 0.34592 4.86836 64 44 80 40 50 50 85 35 40 33 83 21
13 1 44 53 0.35189 4.66878 64 44 80 40 50 50 85 35 40 33 83 21
13 2 80 50 0.33950 4.70777 64 44 80 40 50 50 85 35 40 33 83 21
13 3 40 53 0.35268 4.76808 64 44 80 40 50 50 85 35 40 33 83 21
13 4 50 52 0.35000 4.30269 64 44 80 40 50 50 85 35 40 33 83 21
13 5 50 52 0.35000 4.75862 64 44 80 40 50 50 85 35 40 33 83 21
13 6 85 49 0.34020 4.62313 64 44 80 40 50 50 85 35 40 33 83 21
13 7 35 54 0.35508 4.75152 64 44 80 40 50 50 85 35 40 33 83 21
13 8 40 53 0.35268 4.75911 64 44 80 40 50 50 85 35 40 33 83 21
13 9 33 54 0.35536 4.81290 64 44 80 40 50 50 85 35 40 33 83 21
13 10 83 49 0.34153 4.81493 64 44 80 40 50 50 85 35 40 33 83 21
13 11 21 55 0.35880 4.69731 64 44 80 40 50 50 85 35 40 33 83 21
14 0 54 45 0.35238 5.22074 54 60 50 38 50 50 52 39 52 74 0 28
14 1 60 44 0.35653 5.02531 54 60 50 38 50 50 52 39 52 74 0 28
14 2 50 45 0.35000 5.05777 54 60 50 38 50 50 52 39 52 74 0 28
14 3 38 46 0.34216 5.11024 54 60 50 38 50 50 52 39 52 74 0 28
14 4 50 45 0.35000 4.65269 54 60 50 38 50 50 52 39 52 74 0 28
14 5 50 45 0.35000 5.10862 54 60 50 38 50 50 52 39 52 74 0 28
14 6 52 45 0.35124 4.97436 54 60 50 38 50 50 52 39 52 74 0 28
14 7 39 46 0.34294 5.09446 54 60 50 38 50 50 52 39 52 74 0 28
14 8 52 45 0.35124 5.11035 54 60 50 38 50 50 52 39 52 74 0 28
14 9 74 43 0.36484 5.17774 54 60 50 38 50 50 52 39 52 74 0 28
14 10 0 50 0.32083 5.13576 54 60 50 38 50 50 52 39 52 74 0 28
14 11 28 47 0.33588 5.03320 54 60 50 38 50 50 52 39 52 74 0 28
15 0 75 44 0.36196 5.58270 75 40 53 63 50 50 69 37 16 66 42 0
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15 1 40 47 0.34498 5.37029 75 40 53 63 50 50 69 37 16 66 42 0
15 2 53 46 0.35144 5.40920 75 40 53 63 50 50 69 37 16 66 42 0
15 3 63 45 0.35637 5.46661 75 40 53 63 50 50 69 37 16 66 42 0
15 4 50 46 0.35000 5.00269 75 40 53 63 50 50 69 37 16 66 42 0
15 5 50 46 0.35000 5.45862 75 40 53 63 50 50 69 37 16 66 42 0
15 6 69 45 0.35798 5.33234 75 40 53 63 50 50 69 37 16 66 42 0
15 7 37 48 0.34469 5.43915 75 40 53 63 50 50 69 37 16 66 42 0
15 8 16 50 0.33651 5.44686 75 40 53 63 50 50 69 37 16 66 42 0
15 9 66 45 0.35728 5.53502 75 40 53 63 50 50 69 37 16 66 42 0
15 10 42 47 0.34617 5.48193 75 40 53 63 50 50 69 37 16 66 42 0
15 11 0 51 0.32725 5.36045 75 40 53 63 50 50 69 37 16 66 42 0
16 0 60 54 0.34370 5.92640 60 60 30 58 50 94 62 61 27 42 87 20
16 1 60 54 0.34370 5.71399 60 60 30 58 50 94 62 61 27 42 87 20
16 2 30 56 0.36073 5.76994 60 60 30 58 50 94 62 61 27 42 87 20
16 3 58 54 0.34515 5.81176 60 60 30 58 50 94 62 61 27 42 87 20
16 4 50 55 0.35000 5.35269 60 60 30 58 50 94 62 61 27 42 87 20
16 5 94 51 0.32177 5.78039 60 60 30 58 50 94 62 61 27 42 87 20
16 6 62 54 0.34216 5.67450 60 60 30 58 50 94 62 61 27 42 87 20
16 7 61 54 0.34294 5.78209 60 60 30 58 50 94 62 61 27 42 87 20
16 8 27 57 0.36449 5.81135 60 60 30 58 50 94 62 61 27 42 87 20
16 9 42 55 0.35439 5.88940 60 60 30 58 50 94 62 61 27 42 87 20
16 10 87 51 0.32928 5.81121 60 60 30 58 50 94 62 61 27 42 87 20
16 11 20 57 0.36645 5.72690 60 60 30 58 50 94 62 61 27 42 87 20
17 0 66 49 0.34907 6.27546 66 69 10 40 20 50 85 50 84 67 50 14
17 1 69 49 0.34823 6.06222 66 69 10 40 20 50 85 50 84 67 50 14
17 2 10 54 0.35187 6.12180 66 69 10 40 20 50 85 50 84 67 50 14
17 3 40 51 0.35012 6.16188 66 69 10 40 20 50 85 50 84 67 50 14
17 4 20 53 0.35105 5.70374 66 69 10 40 20 50 85 50 84 67 50 14
17 5 50 50 0.35000 6.13039 66 69 10 40 20 50 85 50 84 67 50 14
17 6 85 47 0.34918 6.02369 66 69 10 40 20 50 85 50 84 67 50 14
17 7 50 50 0.35000 6.13209 66 69 10 40 20 50 85 50 84 67 50 14
17 8 84 47 0.34960 6.16096 66 69 10 40 20 50 85 50 84 67 50 14
17 9 67 49 0.34881 6.23821 66 69 10 40 20 50 85 50 84 67 50 14
17 10 50 50 0.35000 6.16121 66 69 10 40 20 50 85 50 84 67 50 14
17 11 14 54 0.35336 6.08026 66 69 10 40 20 50 85 50 84 67 50 14
18 0 71 54 0.33407 6.60954 71 50 64 30 100 50 88 50 12 77 52 16
18 1 50 55 0.35000 6.41222 71 50 64 30 100 50 88 50 12 77 52 16
18 2 64 54 0.34053 6.46233 71 50 64 30 100 50 88 50 12 77 52 16
18 3 30 57 0.36330 6.52518 71 50 64 30 100 50 88 50 12 77 52 16
18 4 100 51 0.31442 6.01815 71 50 64 30 100 50 88 50 12 77 52 16
18 5 50 55 0.35000 6.48039 71 50 64 30 100 50 88 50 12 77 52 16
18 6 88 52 0.32340 6.34709 71 50 64 30 100 50 88 50 12 77 52 16
18 7 50 55 0.35000 6.48209 71 50 64 30 100 50 88 50 12 77 52 16
18 8 12 59 0.37704 6.53800 71 50 64 30 100 50 88 50 12 77 52 16
18 9 77 53 0.33110 6.56931 71 50 64 30 100 50 88 50 12 77 52 16
18 10 52 55 0.34867 6.50988 71 50 64 30 100 50 88 50 12 77 52 16
18 11 16 59 0.37578 6.45604 71 50 64 30 100 50 88 50 12 77 52 16
19 0 58 45 0.35439 6.96393 58 65 24 30 49 60 72 40 88 47 0 23
19 1 65 45 0.35700 6.76922 58 65 24 30 49 60 72 40 88 47 0 23
19 2 24 48 0.33544 6.79777 58 65 24 30 49 60 72 40 88 47 0 23
19 3 30 48 0.34020 6.86538 58 65 24 30 49 60 72 40 88 47 0 23
19 4 49 46 0.34947 6.36763 58 65 24 30 49 60 72 40 88 47 0 23
19 5 60 45 0.35525 6.83564 58 65 24 30 49 60 72 40 88 47 0 23
19 6 72 44 0.36129 6.70838 58 65 24 30 49 60 72 40 88 47 0 23
19 7 40 47 0.34498 6.82708 58 65 24 30 49 60 72 40 88 47 0 23
19 8 88 43 0.36729 6.90529 58 65 24 30 49 60 72 40 88 47 0 23
19 9 47 46 0.34835 6.91767 58 65 24 30 49 60 72 40 88 47 0 23
19 10 0 51 0.32725 6.83713 58 65 24 30 49 60 72 40 88 47 0 23
19 11 23 48 0.33456 6.79061 58 65 24 30 49 60 72 40 88 47 0 23
20 0 52 56 0.34841 7.31234 52 43 50 8 100 70 28 60 47 97 66 50
20 1 43 57 0.35572 7.12494 52 43 50 8 100 70 28 60 47 97 66 50
20 2 50 56 0.35000 7.14777 52 43 50 8 100 70 28 60 47 97 66 50
20 3 8 60 0.38332 7.24870 52 43 50 8 100 70 28 60 47 97 66 50
20 4 100 52 0.30800 6.67563 52 43 50 8 100 70 28 60 47 97 66 50
20 5 70 55 0.33250 7.16814 52 43 50 8 100 70 28 60 47 97 66 50
20 6 28 58 0.36694 7.07532 52 43 50 8 100 70 28 60 47 97 66 50
20 7 60 56 0.34113 7.16821 52 43 50 8 100 70 28 60 47 97 66 50
20 8 47 57 0.35259 7.25788 52 43 50 8 100 70 28 60 47 97 66 50
20 9 97 52 0.31216 7.22983 52 43 50 8 100 70 28 60 47 97 66 50
20 10 66 55 0.33675 7.17388 52 43 50 8 100 70 28 60 47 97 66 50
20 11 50 56 0.35000 7.14061 52 43 50 8 100 70 28 60 47 97 66 50
21 0 58 55 0.34412 7.65646 58 66 50 76 100 5 73 66 14 89 47 22
21 1 66 55 0.33675 7.46168 58 66 50 76 100 5 73 66 14 89 47 22
21 2 50 56 0.35000 7.49777 58 66 50 76 100 5 73 66 14 89 47 22
21 3 76 54 0.32877 7.57746 58 66 50 76 100 5 73 66 14 89 47 22
21 4 100 51 0.31442 6.99005 58 66 50 76 100 5 73 66 14 89 47 22
21 5 5 60 0.38413 7.55226 58 66 50 76 100 5 73 66 14 89 47 22
21 6 73 54 0.33202 7.40734 58 66 50 76 100 5 73 66 14 89 47 22
21 7 66 55 0.33675 7.50496 58 66 50 76 100 5 73 66 14 89 47 22
21 8 14 59 0.37646 7.63434 58 66 50 76 100 5 73 66 14 89 47 22
21 9 89 52 0.32224 7.55208 58 66 50 76 100 5 73 66 14 89 47 22
21 10 47 56 0.35221 7.52608 58 66 50 76 100 5 73 66 14 89 47 22
21 11 22 59 0.37319 7.51380 58 66 50 76 100 5 73 66 14 89 47 22
22 0 67 40 0.36845 8.02490 67 68 19 69 50 0 48 36 33 59 43 19
22 1 68 40 0.36932 7.83100 67 68 19 69 50 0 48 36 33 59 43 19
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22 2 19 45 0.31890 7.81667 67 68 19 69 50 0 48 36 33 59 43 19
22 3 69 40 0.37017 7.94764 67 68 19 69 50 0 48 36 33 59 43 19
22 4 50 42 0.35000 7.34005 67 68 19 69 50 0 48 36 33 59 43 19
22 5 0 46 0.29517 7.84743 67 68 19 69 50 0 48 36 33 59 43 19
22 6 48 42 0.34790 7.75524 67 68 19 69 50 0 48 36 33 59 43 19
22 7 36 43 0.33514 7.84009 67 68 19 69 50 0 48 36 33 59 43 19
22 8 33 43 0.33136 7.96570 67 68 19 69 50 0 48 36 33 59 43 19
22 9 59 41 0.35945 7.91153 67 68 19 69 50 0 48 36 33 59 43 19
22 10 43 43 0.34314 7.86922 67 68 19 69 50 0 48 36 33 59 43 19
22 11 19 45 0.31890 7.83270 67 68 19 69 50 0 48 36 33 59 43 19
23 0 67 34 0.38154 8.40644 67 40 80 24 0 30 29 50 18 8 48 46
23 1 40 36 0.33087 8.16187 67 40 80 24 0 30 29 50 18 8 48 46
23 2 80 33 0.40495 8.22162 67 40 80 24 0 30 29 50 18 8 48 46
23 3 24 38 0.30207 8.24971 67 40 80 24 0 30 29 50 18 8 48 46
23 4 0 40 0.25667 7.59671 67 40 80 24 0 30 29 50 18 8 48 46
23 5 30 37 0.31197 8.15940 67 40 80 24 0 30 29 50 18 8 48 46
23 6 29 37 0.30982 8.06506 67 40 80 24 0 30 29 50 18 8 48 46
23 7 50 35 0.35000 8.19009 67 40 80 24 0 30 29 50 18 8 48 46
23 8 18 38 0.28877 8.25447 67 40 80 24 0 30 29 50 18 8 48 46
23 9 8 39 0.27013 8.18166 67 40 80 24 0 30 29 50 18 8 48 46
23 10 48 36 0.34636 8.21558 67 40 80 24 0 30 29 50 18 8 48 46
23 11 46 36 0.34263 8.17532 67 40 80 24 0 30 29 50 18 8 48 46
24 0 67 64 0.31608 8.72252 67 40 76 39 0 89 60 60 92 52 100 100
24 1 40 67 0.37065 8.53252 67 40 76 39 0 89 60 60 92 52 100 100
24 2 76 64 0.29540 8.51702 67 40 76 39 0 89 60 60 92 52 100 100
24 3 39 67 0.37259 8.62230 67 40 76 39 0 89 60 60 92 52 100 100
24 4 0 70 0.44917 8.04588 67 40 76 39 0 89 60 60 92 52 100 100
24 5 89 62 0.27219 8.43159 67 40 76 39 0 89 60 60 92 52 100 100
24 6 60 65 0.32958 8.39464 67 40 76 39 0 89 60 60 92 52 100 100
24 7 60 65 0.32958 8.51968 67 40 76 39 0 89 60 60 92 52 100 100
24 8 92 62 0.26474 8.51921 67 40 76 39 0 89 60 60 92 52 100 100
24 9 52 66 0.34585 8.52750 67 40 76 39 0 89 60 60 92 52 100 100
24 10 100 61 0.25025 8.46583 67 40 76 39 0 89 60 60 92 52 100 100
24 11 100 61 0.25025 8.42557 67 40 76 39 0 89 60 60 92 52 100 100
25 0 64 50 0.34771 9.07024 64 69 46 65 100 22 66 30 50 62 21 20
25 1 69 50 0.34579 8.87831 64 69 46 65 100 22 66 30 50 62 21 20
25 2 46 52 0.35084 8.86786 64 69 46 65 100 22 66 30 50 62 21 20
25 3 65 50 0.34737 8.96967 64 69 46 65 100 22 66 30 50 62 21 20
25 4 100 47 0.34008 8.38596 64 69 46 65 100 22 66 30 50 62 21 20
25 5 22 54 0.35523 8.78682 64 69 46 65 100 22 66 30 50 62 21 20
25 6 66 50 0.34701 8.74166 64 69 46 65 100 22 66 30 50 62 21 20
25 7 30 53 0.35303 8.87271 64 69 46 65 100 22 66 30 50 62 21 20
25 8 50 51 0.35000 8.86921 64 69 46 65 100 22 66 30 50 62 21 20
25 9 62 50 0.34832 8.87582 64 69 46 65 100 22 66 30 50 62 21 20
25 10 21 54 0.35508 8.82091 64 69 46 65 100 22 66 30 50 62 21 20
25 11 20 54 0.35490 8.78047 64 69 46 65 100 22 66 30 50 62 21 20
26 0 63 59 0.33301 9.40325 63 68 61 98 100 31 88 30 55 55 30 30
26 1 68 58 0.32774 9.20605 63 68 61 98 100 31 88 30 55 55 30 30
26 2 61 59 0.33588 9.20374 63 68 61 98 100 31 88 30 55 55 30 30
26 3 98 56 0.28616 9.25583 63 68 61 98 100 31 88 30 55 55 30 30
26 4 100 55 0.28875 8.67471 63 68 61 98 100 31 88 30 55 55 30 30
26 5 31 62 0.37505 9.16187 63 68 61 98 100 31 88 30 55 55 30 30
26 6 88 56 0.30389 9.04555 63 68 61 98 100 31 88 30 55 55 30 30
26 7 30 62 0.37613 9.24884 63 68 61 98 100 31 88 30 55 55 30 30
26 8 55 59 0.34393 9.21314 63 68 61 98 100 31 88 30 55 55 30 30
26 9 55 59 0.34393 9.21976 63 68 61 98 100 31 88 30 55 55 30 30
26 10 30 62 0.37613 9.19704 63 68 61 98 100 31 88 30 55 55 30 30
26 11 30 62 0.37613 9.15661 63 68 61 98 100 31 88 30 55 55 30 30
27 0 77 37 0.38654 9.78979 77 70 25 76 50 10 37 29 1 61 36 9
27 1 70 37 0.37870 9.58475 77 70 25 76 50 10 37 29 1 61 36 9
27 2 25 41 0.31383 9.51757 77 70 25 76 50 10 37 29 1 61 36 9
27 3 76 37 0.38549 9.64132 77 70 25 76 50 10 37 29 1 61 36 9
27 4 50 39 0.35000 9.02471 77 70 25 76 50 10 37 29 1 61 36 9
27 5 10 43 0.29540 9.45727 77 70 25 76 50 10 37 29 1 61 36 9
27 6 37 40 0.33134 9.37690 77 70 25 76 50 10 37 29 1 61 36 9
27 7 29 41 0.32060 9.56944 77 70 25 76 50 10 37 29 1 61 36 9
27 8 1 44 0.28426 9.49740 77 70 25 76 50 10 37 29 1 61 36 9
27 9 61 38 0.36553 9.58529 77 70 25 76 50 10 37 29 1 61 36 9
27 10 36 40 0.32975 9.52679 77 70 25 76 50 10 37 29 1 61 36 9
27 11 9 43 0.29356 9.45016 77 70 25 76 50 10 37 29 1 61 36 9
28 0 87 50 0.33403 10.12382 87 44 50 36 49 100 50 35 69 72 19 29
28 1 44 54 0.35266 9.93741 87 44 50 36 49 100 50 35 69 72 19 29
28 2 50 54 0.35000 9.86757 87 44 50 36 49 100 50 35 69 72 19 29
28 3 36 55 0.35670 9.99802 87 44 50 36 49 100 50 35 69 72 19 29
28 4 49 54 0.35050 9.37521 87 44 50 36 49 100 50 35 69 72 19 29
28 5 100 49 0.32725 9.78452 87 44 50 36 49 100 50 35 69 72 19 29
28 6 50 54 0.35000 9.72690 87 44 50 36 49 100 50 35 69 72 19 29
28 7 35 55 0.35700 9.92644 87 44 50 36 49 100 50 35 69 72 19 29
28 8 69 52 0.34091 9.83831 87 44 50 36 49 100 50 35 69 72 19 29
28 9 72 52 0.33871 9.92399 87 44 50 36 49 100 50 35 69 72 19 29
28 10 19 56 0.36266 9.88945 87 44 50 36 49 100 50 35 69 72 19 29
28 11 29 56 0.36103 9.81119 87 44 50 36 49 100 50 35 69 72 19 29
29 0 81 36 0.39449 10.51831 81 45 50 30 3 40 50 30 79 57 0 17
29 1 45 40 0.34329 10.28070 81 45 50 30 3 40 50 30 79 57 0 17
29 2 50 39 0.35000 10.21757 81 45 50 30 3 40 50 30 79 57 0 17
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29 3 30 41 0.32223 10.32025 81 45 50 30 3 40 50 30 79 57 0 17
29 4 3 44 0.28804 9.66325 81 45 50 30 3 40 50 30 79 57 0 17
29 5 40 40 0.33600 10.12052 81 45 50 30 3 40 50 30 79 57 0 17
29 6 50 39 0.35000 10.07690 81 45 50 30 3 40 50 30 79 57 0 17
29 7 30 41 0.32223 10.24868 81 45 50 30 3 40 50 30 79 57 0 17
29 8 79 37 0.38857 10.22688 81 45 50 30 3 40 50 30 79 57 0 17
29 9 57 39 0.35931 10.28330 81 45 50 30 3 40 50 30 79 57 0 17
29 10 0 44 0.28233 10.17178 81 45 50 30 3 40 50 30 79 57 0 17
29 11 17 42 0.30341 10.11460 81 45 50 30 3 40 50 30 79 57 0 17
30 0 81 54 0.32287 10.84118 81 40 94 65 50 20 99 33 36 99 18 41
30 1 40 58 0.35910 10.63980 81 40 94 65 50 20 99 33 36 99 18 41
30 2 94 53 0.31047 10.52805 81 40 94 65 50 20 99 33 36 99 18 41
30 3 65 56 0.33582 10.65608 81 40 94 65 50 20 99 33 36 99 18 41
30 4 50 57 0.35000 10.01325 81 40 94 65 50 20 99 33 36 99 18 41
30 5 20 60 0.37800 10.49852 81 40 94 65 50 20 99 33 36 99 18 41
30 6 99 52 0.30941 10.38631 81 40 94 65 50 20 99 33 36 99 18 41
30 7 33 58 0.36408 10.61276 81 40 94 65 50 20 99 33 36 99 18 41
30 8 36 58 0.36209 10.58897 81 40 94 65 50 20 99 33 36 99 18 41
30 9 99 52 0.30941 10.59271 81 40 94 65 50 20 99 33 36 99 18 41
30 10 18 60 0.37912 10.55090 81 40 94 65 50 20 99 33 36 99 18 41
30 11 41 58 0.35830 10.47290 81 40 94 65 50 20 99 33 36 99 18 41
31 0 76 46 0.35546 11.19664 76 68 17 34 100 40 50 29 89 43 18 18
31 1 68 47 0.35315 10.99295 76 68 17 34 100 40 50 29 89 43 18 18
31 2 17 51 0.34153 10.86958 76 68 17 34 100 40 50 29 89 43 18 18
31 3 34 50 0.34701 11.00309 76 68 17 34 100 40 50 29 89 43 18 18
31 4 100 44 0.35933 10.37259 76 68 17 34 100 40 50 29 89 43 18 18
31 5 40 49 0.34755 10.84607 76 68 17 34 100 40 50 29 89 43 18 18
31 6 50 48 0.35000 10.73631 76 68 17 34 100 40 50 29 89 43 18 18
31 7 29 50 0.34485 10.95761 76 68 17 34 100 40 50 29 89 43 18 18
31 8 89 45 0.35728 10.94625 76 68 17 34 100 40 50 29 89 43 18 18
31 9 43 49 0.34853 10.94124 76 68 17 34 100 40 50 29 89 43 18 18
31 10 18 51 0.34216 10.89306 76 68 17 34 100 40 50 29 89 43 18 18
31 11 18 51 0.34216 10.81506 76 68 17 34 100 40 50 29 89 43 18 18
32 0 79 46 0.35508 11.55172 79 70 91 34 60 20 56 38 21 63 15 34
32 1 70 46 0.35560 11.34855 79 70 91 34 60 20 56 38 21 63 15 34
32 2 91 45 0.35670 11.22627 79 70 91 34 60 20 56 38 21 63 15 34
32 3 34 50 0.34701 11.35010 79 70 91 34 60 20 56 38 21 63 15 34
32 4 60 47 0.35268 10.72527 79 70 91 34 60 20 56 38 21 63 15 34
32 5 20 51 0.34335 11.18942 79 70 91 34 60 20 56 38 21 63 15 34
32 6 56 48 0.35112 11.08743 79 70 91 34 60 20 56 38 21 63 15 34
32 7 38 49 0.34678 11.30439 79 70 91 34 60 20 56 38 21 63 15 34
32 8 21 51 0.34391 11.29016 79 70 91 34 60 20 56 38 21 63 15 34
32 9 63 47 0.35303 11.29428 79 70 91 34 60 20 56 38 21 63 15 34
32 10 15 51 0.34020 11.23326 79 70 91 34 60 20 56 38 21 63 15 34
32 11 34 50 0.34701 11.16207 79 70 91 34 60 20 56 38 21 63 15 34
33 0 87 36 0.40051 11.95222 87 36 21 39 0 50 60 35 31 65 14 42
33 1 36 40 0.32975 11.67830 87 36 21 39 0 50 60 35 31 65 14 42
33 2 21 42 0.31041 11.53669 87 36 21 39 0 50 60 35 31 65 14 42
33 3 39 40 0.33447 11.68457 87 36 21 39 0 50 60 35 31 65 14 42
33 4 0 44 0.28233 11.00760 87 36 21 39 0 50 60 35 31 65 14 42
33 5 50 39 0.35000 11.53942 87 36 21 39 0 50 60 35 31 65 14 42
33 6 60 38 0.36423 11.45166 87 36 21 39 0 50 60 35 31 65 14 42
33 7 35 40 0.32812 11.63252 87 36 21 39 0 50 60 35 31 65 14 42
33 8 31 41 0.32384 11.61400 87 36 21 39 0 50 60 35 31 65 14 42
33 9 65 38 0.37048 11.66475 87 36 21 39 0 50 60 35 31 65 14 42
33 10 14 42 0.29792 11.53118 87 36 21 39 0 50 60 35 31 65 14 42
33 11 42 40 0.33899 11.50106 87 36 21 39 0 50 60 35 31 65 14 42
34 0 84 39 0.38451 12.33673 84 34 20 32 4 50 64 37 13 68 53 50
34 1 34 43 0.33264 12.01094 84 34 20 32 4 50 64 37 13 68 53 50
34 2 20 44 0.31640 11.85309 84 34 20 32 4 50 64 37 13 68 53 50
34 3 32 43 0.33005 12.01462 84 34 20 32 4 50 64 37 13 68 53 50
34 4 4 46 0.30170 11.30930 84 34 20 32 4 50 64 37 13 68 53 50
34 5 50 42 0.35000 11.88942 84 34 20 32 4 50 64 37 13 68 53 50
34 6 64 40 0.36568 11.81734 84 34 20 32 4 50 64 37 13 68 53 50
34 7 37 43 0.33635 11.96887 84 34 20 32 4 50 64 37 13 68 53 50
34 8 13 45 0.31029 11.92429 84 34 20 32 4 50 64 37 13 68 53 50
34 9 68 40 0.36932 12.03407 84 34 20 32 4 50 64 37 13 68 53 50
34 10 53 41 0.35336 11.88454 84 34 20 32 4 50 64 37 13 68 53 50
34 11 50 42 0.35000 11.85106 84 34 20 32 4 50 64 37 13 68 53 50
35 0 86 54 0.31640 12.65313 86 35 22 59 51 78 68 42 82 59 46 50
35 1 35 58 0.36278 12.37371 86 35 22 59 51 78 68 42 82 59 46 50
35 2 22 60 0.37679 12.22987 86 35 22 59 51 78 68 42 82 59 46 50
35 3 59 56 0.34212 12.35675 86 35 22 59 51 78 68 42 82 59 46 50
35 4 51 57 0.34909 11.65839 86 35 22 59 51 78 68 42 82 59 46 50
35 5 78 55 0.32289 12.21230 86 35 22 59 51 78 68 42 82 59 46 50
35 6 68 55 0.33467 12.15201 86 35 22 59 51 78 68 42 82 59 46 50
35 7 42 58 0.35747 12.32633 86 35 22 59 51 78 68 42 82 59 46 50
35 8 82 54 0.32163 12.24592 86 35 22 59 51 78 68 42 82 59 46 50
35 9 59 56 0.34212 12.37620 86 35 22 59 51 78 68 42 82 59 46 50
35 10 46 57 0.35341 12.23795 86 35 22 59 51 78 68 42 82 59 46 50
35 11 50 57 0.35000 12.20106 86 35 22 59 51 78 68 42 82 59 46 50
36 0 62 54 0.34216 12.99529 62 31 50 62 55 30 34 40 83 61 100 50
36 1 31 57 0.36286 12.73657 62 31 50 62 55 30 34 40 83 61 100 50
36 2 50 55 0.35000 12.57987 62 31 50 62 55 30 34 40 83 61 100 50
36 3 62 54 0.34216 12.69891 62 31 50 62 55 30 34 40 83 61 100 50
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Table XXXVII.: (continued)
Round Player OwnM MS Earn SubTot Pl0 Pl1 Pl2 Pl3 Pl4 Pl5 Pl6 Pl7 Pl8 Pl9 Pl10 Pl11
36 4 55 55 0.34650 12.00489 62 31 50 62 55 30 34 40 83 61 100 50
36 5 30 57 0.36330 12.57560 62 31 50 62 55 30 34 40 83 61 100 50
36 6 34 57 0.36139 12.51340 62 31 50 62 55 30 34 40 83 61 100 50
36 7 40 56 0.35653 12.68287 62 31 50 62 55 30 34 40 83 61 100 50
36 8 83 52 0.32882 12.57474 62 31 50 62 55 30 34 40 83 61 100 50
36 9 61 54 0.34294 12.71914 62 31 50 62 55 30 34 40 83 61 100 50
36 10 100 51 0.31442 12.55236 62 31 50 62 55 30 34 40 83 61 100 50
36 11 50 55 0.35000 12.55106 62 31 50 62 55 30 34 40 83 61 100 50
37 0 75 50 0.34271 13.33800 75 70 50 59 60 30 26 39 85 43 35 50
37 1 70 50 0.34533 13.08190 75 70 50 59 60 30 26 39 85 43 35 50
37 2 50 52 0.35000 12.92987 75 70 50 59 60 30 26 39 85 43 35 50
37 3 59 51 0.34790 13.04681 75 70 50 59 60 30 26 39 85 43 35 50
37 4 60 51 0.34755 12.35244 75 70 50 59 60 30 26 39 85 43 35 50
37 5 30 54 0.35560 12.93120 75 70 50 59 60 30 26 39 85 43 35 50
37 6 26 54 0.35560 12.86900 75 70 50 59 60 30 26 39 85 43 35 50
37 7 39 53 0.35282 13.03569 75 70 50 59 60 30 26 39 85 43 35 50
37 8 85 49 0.34020 12.91494 75 70 50 59 60 30 26 39 85 43 35 50
37 9 43 53 0.35212 13.07126 75 70 50 59 60 30 26 39 85 43 35 50
37 10 35 53 0.35315 12.90551 75 70 50 59 60 30 26 39 85 43 35 50
37 11 50 52 0.35000 12.90106 75 70 50 59 60 30 26 39 85 43 35 50
38 0 80 50 0.33950 13.67750 80 80 60 60 51 19 11 35 87 58 34 50
38 1 80 50 0.33950 13.42140 80 80 60 60 51 19 11 35 87 58 34 50
38 2 60 51 0.34755 13.27742 80 80 60 60 51 19 11 35 87 58 34 50
38 3 60 51 0.34755 13.39436 80 80 60 60 51 19 11 35 87 58 34 50
38 4 51 52 0.34973 12.70217 80 80 60 60 51 19 11 35 87 58 34 50
38 5 19 55 0.35868 13.28988 80 80 60 60 51 19 11 35 87 58 34 50
38 6 11 56 0.36229 13.23128 80 80 60 60 51 19 11 35 87 58 34 50
38 7 35 54 0.35508 13.39077 80 80 60 60 51 19 11 35 87 58 34 50
38 8 87 49 0.33878 13.25372 80 80 60 60 51 19 11 35 87 58 34 50
38 9 58 52 0.34720 13.41846 80 80 60 60 51 19 11 35 87 58 34 50
38 10 34 54 0.35523 13.26074 80 80 60 60 51 19 11 35 87 58 34 50
38 11 50 52 0.35000 13.25106 80 80 60 60 51 19 11 35 87 58 34 50
39 0 89 64 0.26218 13.93968 89 80 52 59 49 100 89 34 98 50 41 50
39 1 80 65 0.28175 13.70315 89 80 52 59 49 100 89 34 98 50 41 50
39 2 52 67 0.34559 13.62301 89 80 52 59 49 100 89 34 98 50 41 50
39 3 59 67 0.32942 13.72378 89 80 52 59 49 100 89 34 98 50 41 50
39 4 49 67 0.35217 13.05434 89 80 52 59 49 100 89 34 98 50 41 50
39 5 100 63 0.23742 13.52730 89 80 52 59 49 100 89 34 98 50 41 50
39 6 89 64 0.26218 13.49347 89 80 52 59 49 100 89 34 98 50 41 50
39 7 34 69 0.38603 13.77679 89 80 52 59 49 100 89 34 98 50 41 50
39 8 98 63 0.24304 13.49676 89 80 52 59 49 100 89 34 98 50 41 50
39 9 50 67 0.35000 13.76846 89 80 52 59 49 100 89 34 98 50 41 50
39 10 41 68 0.36985 13.63059 89 80 52 59 49 100 89 34 98 50 41 50
39 11 50 67 0.35000 13.60106 89 80 52 59 49 100 89 34 98 50 41 50
40 0 63 48 0.35137 14.29105 63 30 49 56 60 81 51 33 29 50 41 50
40 1 30 51 0.34790 14.05105 63 30 49 56 60 81 51 33 29 50 41 50
40 2 49 49 0.34986 13.97287 63 30 49 56 60 81 51 33 29 50 41 50
40 3 56 49 0.35035 14.07413 63 30 49 56 60 81 51 33 29 50 41 50
40 4 60 48 0.35140 13.40574 63 30 49 56 60 81 51 33 29 50 41 50
40 5 81 47 0.35072 13.87802 63 30 49 56 60 81 51 33 29 50 41 50
40 6 51 49 0.35012 13.84358 63 30 49 56 60 81 51 33 29 50 41 50
40 7 33 51 0.34881 14.12560 63 30 49 56 60 81 51 33 29 50 41 50
40 8 29 51 0.34755 13.84431 63 30 49 56 60 81 51 33 29 50 41 50
40 9 50 49 0.35000 14.11846 63 30 49 56 60 81 51 33 29 50 41 50
40 10 41 50 0.34905 13.97964 63 30 49 56 60 81 51 33 29 50 41 50
40 11 50 49 0.35000 13.95106 63 30 49 56 60 81 51 33 29 50 41 50
41 0 65 49 0.34930 14.64035 65 40 84 86 49 51 22 35 30 62 35 50
41 1 40 52 0.35140 14.40245 65 40 84 86 49 51 22 35 30 62 35 50
41 2 84 48 0.34524 14.31811 65 40 84 86 49 51 22 35 30 62 35 50
41 3 86 48 0.34412 14.41825 65 40 84 86 49 51 22 35 30 62 35 50
41 4 49 51 0.35012 13.75586 65 40 84 86 49 51 22 35 30 62 35 50
41 5 51 51 0.34986 14.22788 65 40 84 86 49 51 22 35 30 62 35 50
41 6 22 53 0.35163 14.19522 65 40 84 86 49 51 22 35 30 62 35 50
41 7 35 52 0.35123 14.47683 65 40 84 86 49 51 22 35 30 62 35 50
41 8 30 53 0.35303 14.19734 65 40 84 86 49 51 22 35 30 62 35 50
41 9 62 50 0.34832 14.46678 65 40 84 86 49 51 22 35 30 62 35 50
41 10 35 52 0.35123 14.33087 65 40 84 86 49 51 22 35 30 62 35 50
41 11 50 51 0.35000 14.30106 65 40 84 86 49 51 22 35 30 62 35 50
42 0 69 48 0.35067 14.99101 69 97 42 78 55 6 27 29 32 56 60 50
42 1 97 46 0.34835 14.75081 69 97 42 78 55 6 27 29 32 56 60 50
42 2 42 51 0.35028 14.66839 69 97 42 78 55 6 27 29 32 56 60 50
42 3 78 48 0.34804 14.76629 69 97 42 78 55 6 27 29 32 56 60 50
42 4 55 50 0.34971 14.10557 69 97 42 78 55 6 27 29 32 56 60 50
42 5 6 54 0.35000 14.57788 69 97 42 78 55 6 27 29 32 56 60 50
42 6 27 52 0.34973 14.54495 69 97 42 78 55 6 27 29 32 56 60 50
42 7 29 52 0.35025 14.82707 69 97 42 78 55 6 27 29 32 56 60 50
42 8 32 52 0.35084 14.54818 69 97 42 78 55 6 27 29 32 56 60 50
42 9 56 50 0.34958 14.81636 69 97 42 78 55 6 27 29 32 56 60 50
42 10 60 49 0.35012 14.68098 69 97 42 78 55 6 27 29 32 56 60 50
42 11 50 50 0.35000 14.65106 69 97 42 78 55 6 27 29 32 56 60 50
43 0 74 61 0.30940 15.30041 74 95 50 72 50 50 82 31 35 51 71 83
43 1 95 59 0.27440 15.02521 74 95 50 72 50 50 82 31 35 51 71 83
43 2 50 63 0.35000 15.01839 74 95 50 72 50 50 82 31 35 51 71 83
43 3 72 61 0.31330 15.07959 74 95 50 72 50 50 82 31 35 51 71 83
43 4 50 63 0.35000 14.45557 74 95 50 72 50 50 82 31 35 51 71 83
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Table XXXVII.: (continued)
Round Player OwnM MS Earn SubTot Pl0 Pl1 Pl2 Pl3 Pl4 Pl5 Pl6 Pl7 Pl8 Pl9 Pl10 Pl11
43 5 50 63 0.35000 14.92788 74 95 50 72 50 50 82 31 35 51 71 83
43 6 82 60 0.29699 14.84194 74 95 50 72 50 50 82 31 35 51 71 83
43 7 31 65 0.38236 15.20944 74 95 50 72 50 50 82 31 35 51 71 83
43 8 35 64 0.37433 14.92251 74 95 50 72 50 50 82 31 35 51 71 83
43 9 51 63 0.34832 15.16468 74 95 50 72 50 50 82 31 35 51 71 83
43 10 71 61 0.31521 14.99619 74 95 50 72 50 50 82 31 35 51 71 83
43 11 83 60 0.29494 14.94600 74 95 50 72 50 50 82 31 35 51 71 83
44 0 56 58 0.34342 15.64383 56 97 31 14 100 100 46 30 61 42 71 50
44 1 97 55 0.29407 15.31928 56 97 31 14 100 100 46 30 61 42 71 50
44 2 31 61 0.37261 15.39100 56 97 31 14 100 100 46 30 61 42 71 50
44 3 14 62 0.39032 15.46991 56 97 31 14 100 100 46 30 61 42 71 50
44 4 100 54 0.29517 14.75074 56 97 31 14 100 100 46 30 61 42 71 50
44 5 100 54 0.29517 15.22305 56 97 31 14 100 100 46 30 61 42 71 50
44 6 46 59 0.35443 15.19637 56 97 31 14 100 100 46 30 61 42 71 50
44 7 30 61 0.37357 15.58300 56 97 31 14 100 100 46 30 61 42 71 50
44 8 61 58 0.33729 15.25980 56 97 31 14 100 100 46 30 61 42 71 50
44 9 42 60 0.35952 15.52420 56 97 31 14 100 100 46 30 61 42 71 50
44 10 71 57 0.32599 15.32218 56 97 31 14 100 100 46 30 61 42 71 50
44 11 50 59 0.35000 15.29600 56 97 31 14 100 100 46 30 61 42 71 50
45 0 67 36 0.37717 16.02100 67 10 22 3 52 67 42 25 67 40 16 51
45 1 10 41 0.28513 15.60441 67 10 22 3 52 67 42 25 67 40 16 51
45 2 22 40 0.30492 15.69592 67 10 22 3 52 67 42 25 67 40 16 51
45 3 3 42 0.27597 15.74588 67 10 22 3 52 67 42 25 67 40 16 51
45 4 52 37 0.35329 15.10403 67 10 22 3 52 67 42 25 67 40 16 51
45 5 67 36 0.37717 15.60022 67 10 22 3 52 67 42 25 67 40 16 51
45 6 42 38 0.33693 15.53330 67 10 22 3 52 67 42 25 67 40 16 51
45 7 25 40 0.31062 15.89363 67 10 22 3 52 67 42 25 67 40 16 51
45 8 67 36 0.37717 15.63697 67 10 22 3 52 67 42 25 67 40 16 51
45 9 40 38 0.33343 15.85764 67 10 22 3 52 67 42 25 67 40 16 51
45 10 16 41 0.29724 15.61943 67 10 22 3 52 67 42 25 67 40 16 51
45 11 51 37 0.35166 15.64766 67 10 22 3 52 67 42 25 67 40 16 51
46 0 65 43 0.36085 16.38185 65 7 58 92 51 10 50 26 9 50 72 51
46 1 7 49 0.32291 15.92732 65 7 58 92 51 10 50 26 9 50 72 51
46 2 58 44 0.35541 16.05134 65 7 58 92 51 10 50 26 9 50 72 51
46 3 92 41 0.37793 16.12381 65 7 58 92 51 10 50 26 9 50 72 51
46 4 51 45 0.35063 15.45466 65 7 58 92 51 10 50 26 9 50 72 51
46 5 10 48 0.32107 15.92129 65 7 58 92 51 10 50 26 9 50 72 51
46 6 50 45 0.35000 15.88330 65 7 58 92 51 10 50 26 9 50 72 51
46 7 26 47 0.33404 16.22767 65 7 58 92 51 10 50 26 9 50 72 51
46 8 9 48 0.31986 15.95684 65 7 58 92 51 10 50 26 9 50 72 51
46 9 50 45 0.35000 16.20764 65 7 58 92 51 10 50 26 9 50 72 51
46 10 72 43 0.36412 15.98354 65 7 58 92 51 10 50 26 9 50 72 51
46 11 51 45 0.35063 15.99829 65 7 58 92 51 10 50 26 9 50 72 51
47 0 68 54 0.33698 16.71883 68 41 54 79 50 77 53 27 19 58 87 50
47 1 41 57 0.35714 16.28446 68 41 54 79 50 77 53 27 19 58 87 50
47 2 54 55 0.34725 16.39858 68 41 54 79 50 77 53 27 19 58 87 50
47 3 79 53 0.32902 16.45283 68 41 54 79 50 77 53 27 19 58 87 50
47 4 50 56 0.35000 15.80466 68 41 54 79 50 77 53 27 19 58 87 50
47 5 77 53 0.33110 16.25239 68 41 54 79 50 77 53 27 19 58 87 50
47 6 53 55 0.34797 16.23127 68 41 54 79 50 77 53 27 19 58 87 50
47 7 27 58 0.36744 16.59511 68 41 54 79 50 77 53 27 19 58 87 50
47 8 19 59 0.37459 16.33143 68 41 54 79 50 77 53 27 19 58 87 50
47 9 58 55 0.34412 16.55176 68 41 54 79 50 77 53 27 19 58 87 50
47 10 87 52 0.32453 16.30807 68 41 54 79 50 77 53 27 19 58 87 50
47 11 50 56 0.35000 16.34829 68 41 54 79 50 77 53 27 19 58 87 50
48 0 53 42 0.35298 17.07181 53 58 29 13 1 94 49 28 39 50 50 50
48 1 58 41 0.35849 16.64295 53 58 29 13 1 94 49 28 39 50 50 50
48 2 29 44 0.32868 16.72727 53 58 29 13 1 94 49 28 39 50 50 50
48 3 13 46 0.31503 16.76787 53 58 29 13 1 94 49 28 39 50 50 50
48 4 1 47 0.30312 16.10778 53 58 29 13 1 94 49 28 39 50 50 50
48 5 94 38 0.39517 16.64756 53 58 29 13 1 94 49 28 39 50 50 50
48 6 49 42 0.34896 16.58023 53 58 29 13 1 94 49 28 39 50 50 50
48 7 28 44 0.32741 16.92252 53 58 29 13 1 94 49 28 39 50 50 50
48 8 39 43 0.33871 16.67014 53 58 29 13 1 94 49 28 39 50 50 50
48 9 50 42 0.35000 16.90176 53 58 29 13 1 94 49 28 39 50 50 50
48 10 50 42 0.35000 16.65807 53 58 29 13 1 94 49 28 39 50 50 50
48 11 50 42 0.35000 16.69829 53 58 29 13 1 94 49 28 39 50 50 50
49 0 60 50 0.34883 17.42064 60 39 51 13 0 89 72 28 48 62 100 50
49 1 39 52 0.35141 16.99437 60 39 51 13 0 89 72 28 48 62 100 50
49 2 51 51 0.34986 17.07713 60 39 51 13 0 89 72 28 48 62 100 50
49 3 13 54 0.35302 17.12089 60 39 51 13 0 89 72 28 48 62 100 50
49 4 0 56 0.35933 16.46711 60 39 51 13 0 89 72 28 48 62 100 50
49 5 89 48 0.34226 16.98983 60 39 51 13 0 89 72 28 48 62 100 50
49 6 72 49 0.34718 16.92741 60 39 51 13 0 89 72 28 48 62 100 50
49 7 28 53 0.35282 17.27535 60 39 51 13 0 89 72 28 48 62 100 50
49 8 48 51 0.35021 17.02035 60 39 51 13 0 89 72 28 48 62 100 50
49 9 62 50 0.34832 17.25008 60 39 51 13 0 89 72 28 48 62 100 50
49 10 100 47 0.34008 16.99816 60 39 51 13 0 89 72 28 48 62 100 50
49 11 50 51 0.35000 17.04829 60 39 51 13 0 89 72 28 48 62 100 50
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Table XXXVIII.: Data from experiments: 12 small suppliers - no transport costs - Cohort 3
Round Player OwnM MS Earn SubTot Pl0 Pl1 Pl2 Pl3 Pl4 Pl5 Pl6 Pl7 Pl8 Pl9 Pl10 Pl11
0 0 50 52 0.35000 0.35000 50 90 10 60 50 38 66 50 99 50 50 10
0 1 90 48 0.34160 0.34160 50 90 10 60 50 38 66 50 99 50 50 10
0 2 10 56 0.36213 0.36213 50 90 10 60 50 38 66 50 99 50 50 10
0 3 60 51 0.34755 0.34755 50 90 10 60 50 38 66 50 99 50 50 10
0 4 50 52 0.35000 0.35000 50 90 10 60 50 38 66 50 99 50 50 10
0 5 38 53 0.35294 0.35294 50 90 10 60 50 38 66 50 99 50 50 10
0 6 66 51 0.34496 0.34496 50 90 10 60 50 38 66 50 99 50 50 10
0 7 50 52 0.35000 0.35000 50 90 10 60 50 38 66 50 99 50 50 10
0 8 99 48 0.33456 0.33456 50 90 10 60 50 38 66 50 99 50 50 10
0 9 50 52 0.35000 0.35000 50 90 10 60 50 38 66 50 99 50 50 10
0 10 50 52 0.35000 0.35000 50 90 10 60 50 38 66 50 99 50 50 10
0 11 10 56 0.36213 0.36213 50 90 10 60 50 38 66 50 99 50 50 10
1 0 50 57 0.35000 0.70000 50 95 98 47 50 30 50 50 90 50 50 22
1 1 95 53 0.30905 0.65065 50 95 98 47 50 30 50 50 90 50 50 22
1 2 98 53 0.30464 0.66677 50 95 98 47 50 30 50 50 90 50 50 22
1 3 47 58 0.35298 0.70053 50 95 98 47 50 30 50 50 90 50 50 22
1 4 50 57 0.35000 0.70000 50 95 98 47 50 30 50 50 90 50 50 22
1 5 30 59 0.36843 0.72137 50 95 98 47 50 30 50 50 90 50 50 22
1 6 50 57 0.35000 0.69496 50 95 98 47 50 30 50 50 90 50 50 22
1 7 50 57 0.35000 0.70000 50 95 98 47 50 30 50 50 90 50 50 22
1 8 90 54 0.31080 0.64536 50 95 98 47 50 30 50 50 90 50 50 22
1 9 50 57 0.35000 0.70000 50 95 98 47 50 30 50 50 90 50 50 22
1 10 50 57 0.35000 0.70000 50 95 98 47 50 30 50 50 90 50 50 22
1 11 22 60 0.37679 0.73892 50 95 98 47 50 30 50 50 90 50 50 22
2 0 47 43 0.34720 1.04720 47 25 100 24 39 20 50 50 0 50 50 65
2 1 25 45 0.32667 0.97732 47 25 100 24 39 20 50 50 0 50 50 65
2 2 100 38 0.39783 1.06461 47 25 100 24 39 20 50 50 0 50 50 65
2 3 24 45 0.32543 1.02595 47 25 100 24 39 20 50 50 0 50 50 65
2 4 39 44 0.34012 1.04012 47 25 100 24 39 20 50 50 0 50 50 65
2 5 20 45 0.32025 1.04162 47 25 100 24 39 20 50 50 0 50 50 65
2 6 50 43 0.35000 1.04496 47 25 100 24 39 20 50 50 0 50 50 65
2 7 50 43 0.35000 1.05000 47 25 100 24 39 20 50 50 0 50 50 65
2 8 0 47 0.30158 0.94695 47 25 100 24 39 20 50 50 0 50 50 65
2 9 50 43 0.35000 1.05000 47 25 100 24 39 20 50 50 0 50 50 65
2 10 50 43 0.35000 1.05000 47 25 100 24 39 20 50 50 0 50 50 65
2 11 65 41 0.36470 1.10362 47 25 100 24 39 20 50 50 0 50 50 65
3 0 40 49 0.34755 1.39475 40 47 0 40 40 60 100 50 100 50 50 2
3 1 47 48 0.34912 1.32644 40 47 0 40 40 60 100 50 100 50 50 2
3 2 0 53 0.34008 1.40469 40 47 0 40 40 60 100 50 100 50 50 2
3 3 40 49 0.34755 1.37350 40 47 0 40 40 60 100 50 100 50 50 2
3 4 40 49 0.34755 1.38767 40 47 0 40 40 60 100 50 100 50 50 2
3 5 60 47 0.35268 1.39431 40 47 0 40 40 60 100 50 100 50 50 2
3 6 100 44 0.35933 1.40429 40 47 0 40 40 60 100 50 100 50 50 2
3 7 50 48 0.35000 1.40000 40 47 0 40 40 60 100 50 100 50 50 2
3 8 100 44 0.35933 1.30628 40 47 0 40 40 60 100 50 100 50 50 2
3 9 50 48 0.35000 1.40000 40 47 0 40 40 60 100 50 100 50 50 2
3 10 50 48 0.35000 1.40000 40 47 0 40 40 60 100 50 100 50 50 2
3 11 2 52 0.33544 1.43906 40 47 0 40 40 60 100 50 100 50 50 2
4 0 55 58 0.34457 1.73932 55 94 0 48 50 60 100 50 90 50 50 49
4 1 94 55 0.29918 1.62562 55 94 0 48 50 60 100 50 90 50 50 49
4 2 0 63 0.40425 1.80894 55 94 0 48 50 60 100 50 90 50 50 49
4 3 48 59 0.35226 1.72577 55 94 0 48 50 60 100 50 90 50 50 49
4 4 50 59 0.35000 1.73767 55 94 0 48 50 60 100 50 90 50 50 49
4 5 60 58 0.33857 1.73287 55 94 0 48 50 60 100 50 90 50 50 49
4 6 100 54 0.29517 1.69946 55 94 0 48 50 60 100 50 90 50 50 49
4 7 50 59 0.35000 1.75000 55 94 0 48 50 60 100 50 90 50 50 49
4 8 90 55 0.30567 1.61195 55 94 0 48 50 60 100 50 90 50 50 49
4 9 50 59 0.35000 1.75000 55 94 0 48 50 60 100 50 90 50 50 49
4 10 50 59 0.35000 1.75000 55 94 0 48 50 60 100 50 90 50 50 49
4 11 49 59 0.35114 1.79020 55 94 0 48 50 60 100 50 90 50 50 49
5 0 53 51 0.34951 2.08883 53 29 100 22 50 20 0 50 100 50 50 87
5 1 29 53 0.35294 1.97856 53 29 100 22 50 20 0 50 100 50 50 87
5 2 100 46 0.34650 2.15544 53 29 100 22 50 20 0 50 100 50 50 87
5 3 22 54 0.35523 2.08099 53 29 100 22 50 20 0 50 100 50 50 87
5 4 50 51 0.35000 2.08767 53 29 100 22 50 20 0 50 100 50 50 87
5 5 20 54 0.35490 2.08777 53 29 100 22 50 20 0 50 100 50 50 87
5 6 0 56 0.35933 2.05879 53 29 100 22 50 20 0 50 100 50 50 87
5 7 50 51 0.35000 2.10000 53 29 100 22 50 20 0 50 100 50 50 87
5 8 100 46 0.34650 1.95845 53 29 100 22 50 20 0 50 100 50 50 87
5 9 50 51 0.35000 2.10000 53 29 100 22 50 20 0 50 100 50 50 87
5 10 50 51 0.35000 2.10000 53 29 100 22 50 20 0 50 100 50 50 87
5 11 87 48 0.34352 2.13373 53 29 100 22 50 20 0 50 100 50 50 87
6 0 50 41 0.35000 2.43883 50 51 100 10 42 30 20 50 50 50 50 0
6 1 51 41 0.35114 2.32970 50 51 100 10 42 30 20 50 50 50 50 0
6 2 100 37 0.40425 2.55969 50 51 100 10 42 30 20 50 50 50 50 0
6 3 10 45 0.30567 2.38666 50 51 100 10 42 30 20 50 50 50 50 0
6 4 42 42 0.34104 2.42871 50 51 100 10 42 30 20 50 50 50 50 0
6 5 30 43 0.32737 2.41514 50 51 100 10 42 30 20 50 50 50 50 0
6 6 20 44 0.31640 2.37519 50 51 100 10 42 30 20 50 50 50 50 0
6 7 50 41 0.35000 2.45000 50 51 100 10 42 30 20 50 50 50 50 0
6 8 50 41 0.35000 2.30845 50 51 100 10 42 30 20 50 50 50 50 0
6 9 50 41 0.35000 2.45000 50 51 100 10 42 30 20 50 50 50 50 0
6 10 50 41 0.35000 2.45000 50 51 100 10 42 30 20 50 50 50 50 0
6 11 0 46 0.29517 2.42889 50 51 100 10 42 30 20 50 50 50 50 0
7 0 50 57 0.35000 2.78883 50 20 0 55 42 90 50 50 100 50 100 71
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Table XXXVIII.: (continued)
Round Player OwnM MS Earn SubTot Pl0 Pl1 Pl2 Pl3 Pl4 Pl5 Pl6 Pl7 Pl8 Pl9 Pl10 Pl11
7 1 20 60 0.37800 2.70770 50 20 0 55 42 90 50 50 100 50 100 71
7 2 0 62 0.39783 2.95752 50 20 0 55 42 90 50 50 100 50 100 71
7 3 55 57 0.34522 2.73188 50 20 0 55 42 90 50 50 100 50 100 71
7 4 42 58 0.35747 2.78617 50 20 0 55 42 90 50 50 100 50 100 71
7 5 90 53 0.31593 2.73107 50 20 0 55 42 90 50 50 100 50 100 71
7 6 50 57 0.35000 2.72519 50 20 0 55 42 90 50 50 100 50 100 71
7 7 50 57 0.35000 2.80000 50 20 0 55 42 90 50 50 100 50 100 71
7 8 100 53 0.30158 2.61003 50 20 0 55 42 90 50 50 100 50 100 71
7 9 50 57 0.35000 2.80000 50 20 0 55 42 90 50 50 100 50 100 71
7 10 100 53 0.30158 2.75158 50 20 0 55 42 90 50 50 100 50 100 71
7 11 71 55 0.33138 2.76027 50 20 0 55 42 90 50 50 100 50 100 71
8 0 64 48 0.35131 3.14014 64 5 0 44 56 50 59 50 47 50 100 68
8 1 5 53 0.34370 3.05140 64 5 0 44 56 50 59 50 47 50 100 68
8 2 0 54 0.34650 3.30402 64 5 0 44 56 50 59 50 47 50 100 68
8 3 44 50 0.34958 3.08146 64 5 0 44 56 50 59 50 47 50 100 68
8 4 56 49 0.35035 3.13652 64 5 0 44 56 50 59 50 47 50 100 68
8 5 50 49 0.35000 3.08107 64 5 0 44 56 50 59 50 47 50 100 68
8 6 59 49 0.35021 3.07540 64 5 0 44 56 50 59 50 47 50 100 68
8 7 50 49 0.35000 3.15000 64 5 0 44 56 50 59 50 47 50 100 68
8 8 47 50 0.34989 2.95993 64 5 0 44 56 50 59 50 47 50 100 68
8 9 50 49 0.35000 3.15000 64 5 0 44 56 50 59 50 47 50 100 68
8 10 100 45 0.35292 3.10450 64 5 0 44 56 50 59 50 47 50 100 68
8 11 68 48 0.35084 3.11111 64 5 0 44 56 50 59 50 47 50 100 68
9 0 39 64 0.36835 3.50849 39 92 95 57 40 50 41 50 47 50 100 79
9 1 92 59 0.28091 3.33231 39 92 95 57 40 50 41 50 47 50 100 79
9 2 95 59 0.27440 3.57842 39 92 95 57 40 50 41 50 47 50 100 79
9 3 57 62 0.33865 3.42011 39 92 95 57 40 50 41 50 47 50 100 79
9 4 40 64 0.36680 3.50333 39 92 95 57 40 50 41 50 47 50 100 79
9 5 50 63 0.35000 3.43107 39 92 95 57 40 50 41 50 47 50 100 79
9 6 41 64 0.36523 3.44063 39 92 95 57 40 50 41 50 47 50 100 79
9 7 50 63 0.35000 3.50000 39 92 95 57 40 50 41 50 47 50 100 79
9 8 47 63 0.35490 3.31483 39 92 95 57 40 50 41 50 47 50 100 79
9 9 50 63 0.35000 3.50000 39 92 95 57 40 50 41 50 47 50 100 79
9 10 100 58 0.26950 3.37400 39 92 95 57 40 50 41 50 47 50 100 79
9 11 79 60 0.30297 3.41409 39 92 95 57 40 50 41 50 47 50 100 79
10 0 68 49 0.34853 3.85702 68 16 100 50 57 50 50 50 2 50 100 19
10 1 16 54 0.35397 3.68628 68 16 100 50 57 50 50 50 2 50 100 19
10 2 100 47 0.34008 3.91851 68 16 100 50 57 50 50 50 2 50 100 19
10 3 50 51 0.35000 3.77011 68 16 100 50 57 50 50 50 2 50 100 19
10 4 57 50 0.34943 3.85275 68 16 100 50 57 50 50 50 2 50 100 19
10 5 50 51 0.35000 3.78107 68 16 100 50 57 50 50 50 2 50 100 19
10 6 50 51 0.35000 3.79063 68 16 100 50 57 50 50 50 2 50 100 19
10 7 50 51 0.35000 3.85000 68 16 100 50 57 50 50 50 2 50 100 19
10 8 2 55 0.35392 3.66875 68 16 100 50 57 50 50 50 2 50 100 19
10 9 50 51 0.35000 3.85000 68 16 100 50 57 50 50 50 2 50 100 19
10 10 100 47 0.34008 3.71408 68 16 100 50 57 50 50 50 2 50 100 19
10 11 19 54 0.35470 3.76879 68 16 100 50 57 50 50 50 2 50 100 19
11 0 42 52 0.35131 4.20833 42 15 100 53 50 50 59 70 4 50 100 19
11 1 15 54 0.35368 4.03996 42 15 100 53 50 50 59 70 4 50 100 19
11 2 100 47 0.34008 4.25859 42 15 100 53 50 50 59 70 4 50 100 19
11 3 53 51 0.34951 4.11962 42 15 100 53 50 50 59 70 4 50 100 19
11 4 50 51 0.35000 4.20275 42 15 100 53 50 50 59 70 4 50 100 19
11 5 50 51 0.35000 4.13107 42 15 100 53 50 50 59 70 4 50 100 19
11 6 59 50 0.34905 4.13968 42 15 100 53 50 50 59 70 4 50 100 19
11 7 70 49 0.34790 4.19790 42 15 100 53 50 50 59 70 4 50 100 19
11 8 4 55 0.35483 4.02358 42 15 100 53 50 50 59 70 4 50 100 19
11 9 50 51 0.35000 4.20000 42 15 100 53 50 50 59 70 4 50 100 19
11 10 100 47 0.34008 4.05417 42 15 100 53 50 50 59 70 4 50 100 19
11 11 19 54 0.35470 4.12349 42 15 100 53 50 50 59 70 4 50 100 19
12 0 70 33 0.38897 4.59730 70 3 0 50 48 1 60 70 0 50 66 20
12 1 3 40 0.26391 4.30387 70 3 0 50 48 1 60 70 0 50 66 20
12 2 0 40 0.25667 4.51526 70 3 0 50 48 1 60 70 0 50 66 20
12 3 50 35 0.35000 4.46962 70 3 0 50 48 1 60 70 0 50 66 20
12 4 48 35 0.34610 4.54886 70 3 0 50 48 1 60 70 0 50 66 20
12 5 1 40 0.25910 4.39018 70 3 0 50 48 1 60 70 0 50 66 20
12 6 60 34 0.36937 4.50905 70 3 0 50 48 1 60 70 0 50 66 20
12 7 70 33 0.38897 4.58687 70 3 0 50 48 1 60 70 0 50 66 20
12 8 0 40 0.25667 4.28024 70 3 0 50 48 1 60 70 0 50 66 20
12 9 50 35 0.35000 4.55000 70 3 0 50 48 1 60 70 0 50 66 20
12 10 66 34 0.37987 4.43403 70 3 0 50 48 1 60 70 0 50 66 20
12 11 20 38 0.29330 4.41679 70 3 0 50 48 1 60 70 0 50 66 20
13 0 33 57 0.36190 4.95920 33 26 0 80 30 90 63 50 100 10 100 74
13 1 26 57 0.36484 4.66871 33 26 0 80 30 90 63 50 100 10 100 74
13 2 0 60 0.38500 4.90026 33 26 0 80 30 90 63 50 100 10 100 74
13 3 80 52 0.33180 4.80142 33 26 0 80 30 90 63 50 100 10 100 74
13 4 30 57 0.36330 4.91216 33 26 0 80 30 90 63 50 100 10 100 74
13 5 90 51 0.32620 4.71638 33 26 0 80 30 90 63 50 100 10 100 74
13 6 63 54 0.34135 4.85040 33 26 0 80 30 90 63 50 100 10 100 74
13 7 50 55 0.35000 4.93687 33 26 0 80 30 90 63 50 100 10 100 74
13 8 100 51 0.31442 4.59466 33 26 0 80 30 90 63 50 100 10 100 74
13 9 10 59 0.37753 4.92753 33 26 0 80 30 90 63 50 100 10 100 74
13 10 100 51 0.31442 4.74845 33 26 0 80 30 90 63 50 100 10 100 74
13 11 74 53 0.33404 4.75083 33 26 0 80 30 90 63 50 100 10 100 74
14 0 75 48 0.34912 5.30832 75 9 0 65 64 50 45 35 0 90 100 66
14 1 9 54 0.35144 5.02014 75 9 0 65 64 50 45 35 0 90 100 66
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14 2 0 54 0.34650 5.24676 75 9 0 65 64 50 45 35 0 90 100 66
14 3 65 49 0.34930 5.15072 75 9 0 65 64 50 45 35 0 90 100 66
14 4 64 49 0.34951 5.26167 75 9 0 65 64 50 45 35 0 90 100 66
14 5 50 50 0.35000 5.06638 75 9 0 65 64 50 45 35 0 90 100 66
14 6 45 50 0.34971 5.20011 75 9 0 65 64 50 45 35 0 90 100 66
14 7 35 51 0.34930 5.28617 75 9 0 65 64 50 45 35 0 90 100 66
14 8 0 54 0.34650 4.94116 75 9 0 65 64 50 45 35 0 90 100 66
14 9 90 46 0.35187 5.27940 75 9 0 65 64 50 45 35 0 90 100 66
14 10 100 45 0.35292 5.10137 75 9 0 65 64 50 45 35 0 90 100 66
14 11 66 48 0.35112 5.10195 75 9 0 65 64 50 45 35 0 90 100 66
15 0 33 48 0.34226 5.65059 33 6 100 50 38 50 50 50 30 20 77 61
15 1 6 51 0.33306 5.35320 33 6 100 50 38 50 50 50 30 20 77 61
15 2 100 42 0.37217 5.61892 33 6 100 50 38 50 50 50 30 20 77 61
15 3 50 47 0.35000 5.50072 33 6 100 50 38 50 50 50 30 20 77 61
15 4 38 48 0.34524 5.60691 33 6 100 50 38 50 50 50 30 20 77 61
15 5 50 47 0.35000 5.41638 33 6 100 50 38 50 50 50 30 20 77 61
15 6 50 47 0.35000 5.55011 33 6 100 50 38 50 50 50 30 20 77 61
15 7 50 47 0.35000 5.63617 33 6 100 50 38 50 50 50 30 20 77 61
15 8 30 49 0.34277 5.28393 33 6 100 50 38 50 50 50 30 20 77 61
15 9 20 50 0.33950 5.61890 33 6 100 50 38 50 50 50 30 20 77 61
15 10 77 44 0.36229 5.46365 33 6 100 50 38 50 50 50 30 20 77 61
15 11 61 46 0.35424 5.45618 33 6 100 50 38 50 50 50 30 20 77 61
16 0 50 54 0.35000 6.00059 50 78 100 35 50 50 40 50 44 0 83 67
16 1 78 52 0.33367 5.68687 50 78 100 35 50 50 40 50 44 0 83 67
16 2 100 50 0.32083 5.93976 50 78 100 35 50 50 40 50 44 0 83 67
16 3 35 56 0.35893 5.85964 50 78 100 35 50 50 40 50 44 0 83 67
16 4 50 54 0.35000 5.95691 50 78 100 35 50 50 40 50 44 0 83 67
16 5 50 54 0.35000 5.76638 50 78 100 35 50 50 40 50 44 0 83 67
16 6 40 55 0.35525 5.90536 50 78 100 35 50 50 40 50 44 0 83 67
16 7 50 54 0.35000 5.98617 50 78 100 35 50 50 40 50 44 0 83 67
16 8 44 55 0.35343 5.63736 50 78 100 35 50 50 40 50 44 0 83 67
16 9 0 59 0.37858 5.99748 50 78 100 35 50 50 40 50 44 0 83 67
16 10 83 51 0.33306 5.79671 50 78 100 35 50 50 40 50 44 0 83 67
16 11 67 53 0.34008 5.79627 50 78 100 35 50 50 40 50 44 0 83 67
17 0 60 47 0.35268 6.35327 60 4 100 39 45 50 38 40 25 90 44 38
17 1 4 52 0.33712 6.02399 60 4 100 39 45 50 38 40 25 90 44 38
17 2 100 43 0.36575 6.30551 60 4 100 39 45 50 38 40 25 90 44 38
17 3 39 49 0.34718 6.20682 60 4 100 39 45 50 38 40 25 90 44 38
17 4 45 48 0.34842 6.30533 60 4 100 39 45 50 38 40 25 90 44 38
17 5 50 48 0.35000 6.11638 60 4 100 39 45 50 38 40 25 90 44 38
17 6 38 49 0.34678 6.25214 60 4 100 39 45 50 38 40 25 90 44 38
17 7 40 48 0.34627 6.33243 60 4 100 39 45 50 38 40 25 90 44 38
17 8 25 50 0.34271 5.98006 60 4 100 39 45 50 38 40 25 90 44 38
17 9 90 44 0.36213 6.35962 60 4 100 39 45 50 38 40 25 90 44 38
17 10 44 48 0.34804 6.14475 60 4 100 39 45 50 38 40 25 90 44 38
17 11 38 49 0.34678 6.14305 60 4 100 39 45 50 38 40 25 90 44 38
18 0 60 44 0.35653 6.70980 60 37 0 57 48 50 50 70 98 0 61 13
18 1 37 46 0.34135 6.36534 60 37 0 57 48 50 50 70 98 0 61 13
18 2 0 49 0.31442 6.61992 60 37 0 57 48 50 50 70 98 0 61 13
18 3 57 44 0.35482 6.56164 60 37 0 57 48 50 50 70 98 0 61 13
18 4 48 45 0.34867 6.65400 60 37 0 57 48 50 50 70 98 0 61 13
18 5 50 45 0.35000 6.46638 60 37 0 57 48 50 50 70 98 0 61 13
18 6 50 45 0.35000 6.60214 60 37 0 57 48 50 50 70 98 0 61 13
18 7 70 43 0.36330 6.69573 60 37 0 57 48 50 50 70 98 0 61 13
18 8 98 41 0.37856 6.35862 60 37 0 57 48 50 50 70 98 0 61 13
18 9 0 49 0.31442 6.67403 60 37 0 57 48 50 50 70 98 0 61 13
18 10 61 44 0.35706 6.50181 60 37 0 57 48 50 50 70 98 0 61 13
18 11 13 48 0.32453 6.46758 60 37 0 57 48 50 50 70 98 0 61 13
19 0 33 53 0.35317 7.06298 33 45 0 71 50 50 46 50 58 50 83 80
19 1 45 52 0.35099 6.71634 33 45 0 71 50 50 46 50 58 50 83 80
19 2 0 56 0.35933 6.97926 33 45 0 71 50 50 46 50 58 50 83 80
19 3 71 50 0.34485 6.90649 33 45 0 71 50 50 46 50 58 50 83 80
19 4 50 51 0.35000 7.00400 33 45 0 71 50 50 46 50 58 50 83 80
19 5 50 51 0.35000 6.81638 33 45 0 71 50 50 46 50 58 50 83 80
19 6 46 52 0.35084 6.95298 33 45 0 71 50 50 46 50 58 50 83 80
19 7 50 51 0.35000 7.04573 33 45 0 71 50 50 46 50 58 50 83 80
19 8 58 51 0.34823 6.70685 33 45 0 71 50 50 46 50 58 50 83 80
19 9 50 51 0.35000 7.02403 33 45 0 71 50 50 46 50 58 50 83 80
19 10 83 48 0.34576 6.84757 33 45 0 71 50 50 46 50 58 50 83 80
19 11 80 49 0.34335 6.81093 33 45 0 71 50 50 46 50 58 50 83 80
20 0 65 58 0.33197 7.39495 65 87 99 63 47 50 41 30 45 50 61 60
20 1 87 56 0.30554 7.02187 65 87 99 63 47 50 41 30 45 50 61 60
20 2 99 54 0.29683 7.27609 65 87 99 63 47 50 41 30 45 50 61 60
20 3 63 58 0.33468 7.24117 65 87 99 63 47 50 41 30 45 50 61 60
20 4 47 59 0.35336 7.35736 65 87 99 63 47 50 41 30 45 50 61 60
20 5 50 59 0.35000 7.16638 65 87 99 63 47 50 41 30 45 50 61 60
20 6 41 60 0.36061 7.31359 65 87 99 63 47 50 41 30 45 50 61 60
20 7 30 61 0.37357 7.41930 65 87 99 63 47 50 41 30 45 50 61 60
20 8 45 59 0.35548 7.06233 65 87 99 63 47 50 41 30 45 50 61 60
20 9 50 59 0.35000 7.37403 65 87 99 63 47 50 41 30 45 50 61 60
20 10 61 58 0.33729 7.18487 65 87 99 63 47 50 41 30 45 50 61 60
20 11 60 58 0.33857 7.14950 65 87 99 63 47 50 41 30 45 50 61 60
21 0 65 52 0.34352 7.73848 65 13 50 52 50 50 48 50 1 100 100 60
21 1 13 57 0.36727 7.38914 65 13 50 52 50 50 48 50 1 100 100 60
21 2 50 54 0.35000 7.62609 65 13 50 52 50 50 48 50 1 100 100 60
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21 3 52 53 0.34918 7.59036 65 13 50 52 50 50 48 50 1 100 100 60
21 4 50 54 0.35000 7.70736 65 13 50 52 50 50 48 50 1 100 100 60
21 5 50 54 0.35000 7.51638 65 13 50 52 50 50 48 50 1 100 100 60
21 6 48 54 0.35098 7.66457 65 13 50 52 50 50 48 50 1 100 100 60
21 7 50 54 0.35000 7.76930 65 13 50 52 50 50 48 50 1 100 100 60
21 8 1 58 0.37230 7.43463 65 13 50 52 50 50 48 50 1 100 100 60
21 9 100 49 0.32725 7.70128 65 13 50 52 50 50 48 50 1 100 100 60
21 10 100 49 0.32725 7.51212 65 13 50 52 50 50 48 50 1 100 100 60
21 11 60 53 0.34498 7.49448 65 13 50 52 50 50 48 50 1 100 100 60
22 0 50 50 0.35000 8.08848 50 22 56 50 48 50 57 100 20 50 50 52
22 1 22 53 0.35163 7.74077 50 22 56 50 48 50 57 100 20 50 50 52
22 2 56 50 0.34958 7.97567 50 22 56 50 48 50 57 100 20 50 50 52
22 3 50 50 0.35000 7.94036 50 22 56 50 48 50 57 100 20 50 50 52
22 4 48 51 0.35021 8.05757 50 22 56 50 48 50 57 100 20 50 50 52
22 5 50 50 0.35000 7.86638 50 22 56 50 48 50 57 100 20 50 50 52
22 6 57 50 0.34943 8.01400 50 22 56 50 48 50 57 100 20 50 50 52
22 7 100 46 0.34650 8.11580 50 22 56 50 48 50 57 100 20 50 50 52
22 8 20 53 0.35105 7.78568 50 22 56 50 48 50 57 100 20 50 50 52
22 9 50 50 0.35000 8.05128 50 22 56 50 48 50 57 100 20 50 50 52
22 10 50 50 0.35000 7.86212 50 22 56 50 48 50 57 100 20 50 50 52
22 11 52 50 0.34995 7.84443 50 22 56 50 48 50 57 100 20 50 50 52
23 0 50 42 0.35000 8.43848 50 18 0 55 47 50 70 50 16 50 100 5
23 1 18 45 0.31752 8.05829 50 18 0 55 47 50 70 50 16 50 100 5
23 2 0 46 0.29517 8.27084 50 18 0 55 47 50 70 50 16 50 100 5
23 3 55 41 0.35548 8.29584 50 18 0 55 47 50 70 50 16 50 100 5
23 4 47 42 0.34681 8.40439 50 18 0 55 47 50 70 50 16 50 100 5
23 5 50 42 0.35000 8.21638 50 18 0 55 47 50 70 50 16 50 100 5
23 6 70 40 0.37100 8.38500 50 18 0 55 47 50 70 50 16 50 100 5
23 7 50 42 0.35000 8.46580 50 18 0 55 47 50 70 50 16 50 100 5
23 8 16 45 0.31470 8.10038 50 18 0 55 47 50 70 50 16 50 100 5
23 9 50 42 0.35000 8.40128 50 18 0 55 47 50 70 50 16 50 100 5
23 10 100 37 0.40425 8.26637 50 18 0 55 47 50 70 50 16 50 100 5
23 11 5 46 0.30327 8.14771 50 18 0 55 47 50 70 50 16 50 100 5
24 0 40 52 0.35140 8.78988 40 24 0 63 44 50 50 50 89 50 100 53
24 1 24 54 0.35546 8.41375 40 24 0 63 44 50 50 50 89 50 100 53
24 2 0 56 0.35933 8.63017 40 24 0 63 44 50 50 50 89 50 100 53
24 3 63 50 0.34803 8.64387 40 24 0 63 44 50 50 50 89 50 100 53
24 4 44 52 0.35112 8.75551 40 24 0 63 44 50 50 50 89 50 100 53
24 5 50 51 0.35000 8.56638 40 24 0 63 44 50 50 50 89 50 100 53
24 6 50 51 0.35000 8.73500 40 24 0 63 44 50 50 50 89 50 100 53
24 7 50 51 0.35000 8.81580 40 24 0 63 44 50 50 50 89 50 100 53
24 8 89 48 0.34226 8.44264 40 24 0 63 44 50 50 50 89 50 100 53
24 9 50 51 0.35000 8.75128 40 24 0 63 44 50 50 50 89 50 100 53
24 10 100 47 0.34008 8.60645 40 24 0 63 44 50 50 50 89 50 100 53
24 11 53 51 0.34951 8.49722 40 24 0 63 44 50 50 50 89 50 100 53
25 0 60 56 0.34113 9.13101 60 40 100 27 56 50 31 50 50 50 100 58
25 1 40 57 0.35782 8.77157 60 40 100 27 56 50 31 50 50 50 100 58
25 2 100 52 0.30800 8.93817 60 40 100 27 56 50 31 50 50 50 100 58
25 3 27 59 0.37039 9.01426 60 40 100 27 56 50 31 50 50 50 100 58
25 4 56 56 0.34496 9.10047 60 40 100 27 56 50 31 50 50 50 100 58
25 5 50 57 0.35000 8.91638 60 40 100 27 56 50 31 50 50 50 100 58
25 6 31 58 0.36530 9.10029 60 40 100 27 56 50 31 50 50 50 100 58
25 7 50 57 0.35000 9.16580 60 40 100 27 56 50 31 50 50 50 100 58
25 8 50 57 0.35000 8.79264 60 40 100 27 56 50 31 50 50 50 100 58
25 9 50 57 0.35000 9.10128 60 40 100 27 56 50 31 50 50 50 100 58
25 10 100 52 0.30800 8.91445 60 40 100 27 56 50 31 50 50 50 100 58
25 11 58 56 0.34309 8.84031 60 40 100 27 56 50 31 50 50 50 100 58
26 0 60 50 0.34883 9.47984 60 84 50 50 52 50 46 30 6 50 100 29
26 1 84 48 0.34524 9.11681 60 84 50 50 52 50 46 30 6 50 100 29
26 2 50 51 0.35000 9.28817 60 84 50 50 52 50 46 30 6 50 100 29
26 3 50 51 0.35000 9.36426 60 84 50 50 52 50 46 30 6 50 100 29
26 4 52 50 0.34995 9.45042 60 84 50 50 52 50 46 30 6 50 100 29
26 5 50 51 0.35000 9.26638 60 84 50 50 52 50 46 30 6 50 100 29
26 6 46 51 0.35033 9.45062 60 84 50 50 52 50 46 30 6 50 100 29
26 7 30 52 0.35047 9.51627 60 84 50 50 52 50 46 30 6 50 100 29
26 8 6 55 0.35565 9.14829 60 84 50 50 52 50 46 30 6 50 100 29
26 9 50 51 0.35000 9.45128 60 84 50 50 52 50 46 30 6 50 100 29
26 10 100 46 0.34650 9.26095 60 84 50 50 52 50 46 30 6 50 100 29
26 11 29 53 0.35294 9.19325 60 84 50 50 52 50 46 30 6 50 100 29
27 0 50 57 0.35000 9.82984 50 69 50 50 50 50 63 70 50 50 100 30
27 1 69 56 0.33116 9.44797 50 69 50 50 50 50 63 70 50 50 100 30
27 2 50 57 0.35000 9.63817 50 69 50 50 50 50 63 70 50 50 100 30
27 3 50 57 0.35000 9.71426 50 69 50 50 50 50 63 70 50 50 100 30
27 4 50 57 0.35000 9.80042 50 69 50 50 50 50 63 70 50 50 100 30
27 5 50 57 0.35000 9.61638 50 69 50 50 50 50 63 70 50 50 100 30
27 6 63 56 0.33802 9.78864 50 69 50 50 50 50 63 70 50 50 100 30
27 7 70 56 0.32993 9.84620 50 69 50 50 50 50 63 70 50 50 100 30
27 8 50 57 0.35000 9.49829 50 69 50 50 50 50 63 70 50 50 100 30
27 9 50 57 0.35000 9.80128 50 69 50 50 50 50 63 70 50 50 100 30
27 10 100 53 0.30158 9.56254 50 69 50 50 50 50 63 70 50 50 100 30
27 11 30 59 0.36843 9.56168 50 69 50 50 50 50 63 70 50 50 100 30
28 0 50 49 0.35000 10.17984 50 28 50 25 54 50 63 75 10 50 100 30
28 1 28 51 0.34718 9.79515 50 28 50 25 54 50 63 75 10 50 100 30
28 2 50 49 0.35000 9.98817 50 28 50 25 54 50 63 75 10 50 100 30
28 3 25 51 0.34592 10.06018 50 28 50 25 54 50 63 75 10 50 100 30
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28 4 54 48 0.35084 10.15126 50 28 50 25 54 50 63 75 10 50 100 30
28 5 50 49 0.35000 9.96638 50 28 50 25 54 50 63 75 10 50 100 30
28 6 63 47 0.35303 10.14167 50 28 50 25 54 50 63 75 10 50 100 30
28 7 75 46 0.35554 10.20174 50 28 50 25 54 50 63 75 10 50 100 30
28 8 10 52 0.34160 9.83989 50 28 50 25 54 50 63 75 10 50 100 30
28 9 50 49 0.35000 10.15128 50 28 50 25 54 50 63 75 10 50 100 30
28 10 100 44 0.35933 9.92187 50 28 50 25 54 50 63 75 10 50 100 30
28 11 30 50 0.34533 9.90702 50 28 50 25 54 50 63 75 10 50 100 30
29 0 50 53 0.35000 10.52984 50 33 50 69 52 50 51 50 70 50 100 9
29 1 33 55 0.35754 10.15268 50 33 50 69 52 50 51 50 70 50 100 9
29 2 50 53 0.35000 10.33817 50 33 50 69 52 50 51 50 70 50 100 9
29 3 69 51 0.34335 10.40353 50 33 50 69 52 50 51 50 70 50 100 9
29 4 52 53 0.34918 10.50044 50 33 50 69 52 50 51 50 70 50 100 9
29 5 50 53 0.35000 10.31638 50 33 50 69 52 50 51 50 70 50 100 9
29 6 51 53 0.34960 10.49127 50 33 50 69 52 50 51 50 70 50 100 9
29 7 50 53 0.35000 10.55174 50 33 50 69 52 50 51 50 70 50 100 9
29 8 70 51 0.34277 10.18265 50 33 50 69 52 50 51 50 70 50 100 9
29 9 50 53 0.35000 10.50128 50 33 50 69 52 50 51 50 70 50 100 9
29 10 100 49 0.32725 10.24912 50 33 50 69 52 50 51 50 70 50 100 9
29 11 9 57 0.36722 10.27424 50 33 50 69 52 50 51 50 70 50 100 9
30 0 50 50 0.35000 10.87984 50 28 50 50 51 50 50 35 50 50 100 31
30 1 28 52 0.35000 10.50268 50 28 50 50 51 50 50 35 50 50 100 31
30 2 50 50 0.35000 10.68817 50 28 50 50 51 50 50 35 50 50 100 31
30 3 50 50 0.35000 10.75353 50 28 50 50 51 50 50 35 50 50 100 31
30 4 51 49 0.35012 10.85056 50 28 50 50 51 50 50 35 50 50 100 31
30 5 50 50 0.35000 10.66638 50 28 50 50 51 50 50 35 50 50 100 31
30 6 50 50 0.35000 10.84127 50 28 50 50 51 50 50 35 50 50 100 31
30 7 35 51 0.34930 10.90104 50 28 50 50 51 50 50 35 50 50 100 31
30 8 50 50 0.35000 10.53265 50 28 50 50 51 50 50 35 50 50 100 31
30 9 50 50 0.35000 10.85128 50 28 50 50 51 50 50 35 50 50 100 31
30 10 100 45 0.35292 10.60204 50 28 50 50 51 50 50 35 50 50 100 31
30 11 31 51 0.34823 10.62246 50 28 50 50 51 50 50 35 50 50 100 31
31 0 50 54 0.35000 11.22984 50 23 50 50 48 50 50 35 73 50 100 62
31 1 23 56 0.36229 10.86497 50 23 50 50 48 50 50 35 73 50 100 62
31 2 50 54 0.35000 11.03817 50 23 50 50 48 50 50 35 73 50 100 62
31 3 50 54 0.35000 11.10353 50 23 50 50 48 50 50 35 73 50 100 62
31 4 48 54 0.35098 11.20154 50 23 50 50 48 50 50 35 73 50 100 62
31 5 50 54 0.35000 11.01638 50 23 50 50 48 50 50 35 73 50 100 62
31 6 50 54 0.35000 11.19127 50 23 50 50 48 50 50 35 73 50 100 62
31 7 35 55 0.35700 11.25804 50 23 50 50 48 50 50 35 73 50 100 62
31 8 73 52 0.33792 10.87058 50 23 50 50 48 50 50 35 73 50 100 62
31 9 50 54 0.35000 11.20128 50 23 50 50 48 50 50 35 73 50 100 62
31 10 100 49 0.32725 10.92929 50 23 50 50 48 50 50 35 73 50 100 62
31 11 62 53 0.34370 10.96616 50 23 50 50 48 50 50 35 73 50 100 62
32 0 50 51 0.35000 11.57984 50 22 50 44 52 50 30 50 50 50 100 58
32 1 22 53 0.35163 11.21660 50 22 50 44 52 50 30 50 50 50 100 58
32 2 50 51 0.35000 11.38817 50 22 50 44 52 50 30 50 50 50 100 58
32 3 44 51 0.35035 11.45388 50 22 50 44 52 50 30 50 50 50 100 58
32 4 52 50 0.34995 11.55149 50 22 50 44 52 50 30 50 50 50 100 58
32 5 50 51 0.35000 11.36638 50 22 50 44 52 50 30 50 50 50 100 58
32 6 30 52 0.35047 11.54174 50 22 50 44 52 50 30 50 50 50 100 58
32 7 50 51 0.35000 11.60804 50 22 50 44 52 50 30 50 50 50 100 58
32 8 50 51 0.35000 11.22058 50 22 50 44 52 50 30 50 50 50 100 58
32 9 50 51 0.35000 11.55128 50 22 50 44 52 50 30 50 50 50 100 58
32 10 100 46 0.34650 11.27579 50 22 50 44 52 50 30 50 50 50 100 58
32 11 58 50 0.34925 11.31542 50 22 50 44 52 50 30 50 50 50 100 58
33 0 50 55 0.35000 11.92984 50 13 50 70 46 50 50 50 40 50 100 87
33 1 13 58 0.37202 11.58862 50 13 50 70 46 50 50 50 40 50 100 87
33 2 50 55 0.35000 11.73817 50 13 50 70 46 50 50 50 40 50 100 87
33 3 70 53 0.33763 11.79151 50 13 50 70 46 50 50 50 40 50 100 87
33 4 46 55 0.35238 11.90387 50 13 50 70 46 50 50 50 40 50 100 87
33 5 50 55 0.35000 11.71638 50 13 50 70 46 50 50 50 40 50 100 87
33 6 50 55 0.35000 11.89174 50 13 50 70 46 50 50 50 40 50 100 87
33 7 50 55 0.35000 11.95804 50 13 50 70 46 50 50 50 40 50 100 87
33 8 40 56 0.35653 11.57711 50 13 50 70 46 50 50 50 40 50 100 87
33 9 50 55 0.35000 11.90128 50 13 50 70 46 50 50 50 40 50 100 87
33 10 100 51 0.31442 11.59020 50 13 50 70 46 50 50 50 40 50 100 87
33 11 87 52 0.32453 11.63995 50 13 50 70 46 50 50 50 40 50 100 87
34 0 50 51 0.35000 12.27984 50 6 50 60 50 50 47 60 8 50 100 77
34 1 6 55 0.35565 11.94426 50 6 50 60 50 50 47 60 8 50 100 77
34 2 50 51 0.35000 12.08817 50 6 50 60 50 50 47 60 8 50 100 77
34 3 60 50 0.34883 12.14034 50 6 50 60 50 50 47 60 8 50 100 77
34 4 50 51 0.35000 12.25387 50 6 50 60 50 50 47 60 8 50 100 77
34 5 50 51 0.35000 12.06638 50 6 50 60 50 50 47 60 8 50 100 77
34 6 47 51 0.35028 12.24202 50 6 50 60 50 50 47 60 8 50 100 77
34 7 60 50 0.34883 12.30688 50 6 50 60 50 50 47 60 8 50 100 77
34 8 8 55 0.35637 11.93348 50 6 50 60 50 50 47 60 8 50 100 77
34 9 50 51 0.35000 12.25128 50 6 50 60 50 50 47 60 8 50 100 77
34 10 100 46 0.34650 11.93670 50 6 50 60 50 50 47 60 8 50 100 77
34 11 77 48 0.34842 11.98837 50 6 50 60 50 50 47 60 8 50 100 77
35 0 50 43 0.35000 12.62984 50 12 50 50 53 50 43 50 4 50 100 15
35 1 12 47 0.31852 12.26279 50 12 50 50 53 50 43 50 4 50 100 15
35 2 50 43 0.35000 12.43817 50 12 50 50 53 50 43 50 4 50 100 15
35 3 50 43 0.35000 12.49034 50 12 50 50 53 50 43 50 4 50 100 15
35 4 53 43 0.35259 12.60646 50 12 50 50 53 50 43 50 4 50 100 15
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Table XXXVIII.: (continued)
Round Player OwnM MS Earn SubTot Pl0 Pl1 Pl2 Pl3 Pl4 Pl5 Pl6 Pl7 Pl8 Pl9 Pl10 Pl11
35 5 50 43 0.35000 12.41638 50 12 50 50 53 50 43 50 4 50 100 15
35 6 43 44 0.34404 12.58606 50 12 50 50 53 50 43 50 4 50 100 15
35 7 50 43 0.35000 12.65688 50 12 50 50 53 50 43 50 4 50 100 15
35 8 4 48 0.31351 12.24699 50 12 50 50 53 50 43 50 4 50 100 15
35 9 50 43 0.35000 12.60128 50 12 50 50 53 50 43 50 4 50 100 15
35 10 100 39 0.39142 12.32812 50 12 50 50 53 50 43 50 4 50 100 15
35 11 15 47 0.32223 12.31061 50 12 50 50 53 50 43 50 4 50 100 15
36 0 50 57 0.35000 12.97984 50 34 50 50 45 50 48 45 50 50 100 100
36 1 34 58 0.36344 12.62623 50 34 50 50 45 50 48 45 50 50 100 100
36 2 50 57 0.35000 12.78817 50 34 50 50 45 50 48 45 50 50 100 100
36 3 50 57 0.35000 12.84034 50 34 50 50 45 50 48 45 50 50 100 100
36 4 45 57 0.35420 12.96066 50 34 50 50 45 50 48 45 50 50 100 100
36 5 50 57 0.35000 12.76638 50 34 50 50 45 50 48 45 50 50 100 100
36 6 48 57 0.35175 12.93781 50 34 50 50 45 50 48 45 50 50 100 100
36 7 45 57 0.35420 13.01108 50 34 50 50 45 50 48 45 50 50 100 100
36 8 50 57 0.35000 12.59699 50 34 50 50 45 50 48 45 50 50 100 100
36 9 50 57 0.35000 12.95128 50 34 50 50 45 50 48 45 50 50 100 100
36 10 100 52 0.30800 12.63612 50 34 50 50 45 50 48 45 50 50 100 100
36 11 100 52 0.30800 12.61861 50 34 50 50 45 50 48 45 50 50 100 100
37 0 50 45 0.35000 13.32984 50 11 50 63 56 50 45 50 18 50 100 0
37 1 11 48 0.32224 12.94847 50 11 50 63 56 50 45 50 18 50 100 0
37 2 50 45 0.35000 13.13817 50 11 50 63 56 50 45 50 18 50 100 0
37 3 63 44 0.35804 13.19838 50 11 50 63 56 50 45 50 18 50 100 0
37 4 56 44 0.35420 13.31486 50 11 50 63 56 50 45 50 18 50 100 0
37 5 50 45 0.35000 13.11638 50 11 50 63 56 50 45 50 18 50 100 0
37 6 45 45 0.34650 13.28431 50 11 50 63 56 50 45 50 18 50 100 0
37 7 50 45 0.35000 13.36108 50 11 50 63 56 50 45 50 18 50 100 0
37 8 18 48 0.32984 12.92683 50 11 50 63 56 50 45 50 18 50 100 0
37 9 50 45 0.35000 13.30128 50 11 50 63 56 50 45 50 18 50 100 0
37 10 100 40 0.38500 13.02112 50 11 50 63 56 50 45 50 18 50 100 0
37 11 0 49 0.31442 12.93302 50 11 50 63 56 50 45 50 18 50 100 0
38 0 40 55 0.35525 13.68509 40 66 50 50 45 50 50 50 50 50 100 49
38 1 66 53 0.34085 13.28932 40 66 50 50 45 50 50 50 50 50 100 49
38 2 50 55 0.35000 13.48817 40 66 50 50 45 50 50 50 50 50 100 49
38 3 50 55 0.35000 13.54838 40 66 50 50 45 50 50 50 50 50 100 49
38 4 45 55 0.35292 13.66778 40 66 50 50 45 50 50 50 50 50 100 49
38 5 50 55 0.35000 13.46638 40 66 50 50 45 50 50 50 50 50 100 49
38 6 50 55 0.35000 13.63431 40 66 50 50 45 50 50 50 50 50 100 49
38 7 50 55 0.35000 13.71108 40 66 50 50 45 50 50 50 50 50 100 49
38 8 50 55 0.35000 13.27683 40 66 50 50 45 50 50 50 50 50 100 49
38 9 50 55 0.35000 13.65128 40 66 50 50 45 50 50 50 50 50 100 49
38 10 100 50 0.32083 13.34195 40 66 50 50 45 50 50 50 50 50 100 49
38 11 49 55 0.35063 13.28365 40 66 50 50 45 50 50 50 50 50 100 49
39 0 50 53 0.35000 14.03509 50 13 50 50 53 50 48 35 87 50 100 44
39 1 13 56 0.36252 13.65184 50 13 50 50 53 50 48 35 87 50 100 44
39 2 50 53 0.35000 13.83817 50 13 50 50 53 50 48 35 87 50 100 44
39 3 50 53 0.35000 13.89838 50 13 50 50 53 50 48 35 87 50 100 44
39 4 53 52 0.34912 14.01691 50 13 50 50 53 50 48 35 87 50 100 44
39 5 50 53 0.35000 13.81638 50 13 50 50 53 50 48 35 87 50 100 44
39 6 48 53 0.35072 13.98503 50 13 50 50 53 50 48 35 87 50 100 44
39 7 35 54 0.35508 14.06615 50 13 50 50 53 50 48 35 87 50 100 44
39 8 87 49 0.33878 13.61561 50 13 50 50 53 50 48 35 87 50 100 44
39 9 50 53 0.35000 14.00128 50 13 50 50 53 50 48 35 87 50 100 44
39 10 100 48 0.33367 13.67562 50 13 50 50 53 50 48 35 87 50 100 44
39 11 44 53 0.35189 13.63554 50 13 50 50 53 50 48 35 87 50 100 44
40 0 50 47 0.35000 14.38509 50 24 50 30 51 50 56 50 12 50 100 41
40 1 24 49 0.33878 13.99062 50 24 50 30 51 50 56 50 12 50 100 41
40 2 50 47 0.35000 14.18817 50 24 50 30 51 50 56 50 12 50 100 41
40 3 30 49 0.34277 14.24115 50 24 50 30 51 50 56 50 12 50 100 41
40 4 51 47 0.35037 14.36728 50 24 50 30 51 50 56 50 12 50 100 41
40 5 50 47 0.35000 14.16638 50 24 50 30 51 50 56 50 12 50 100 41
40 6 56 46 0.35266 14.33769 50 24 50 30 51 50 56 50 12 50 100 41
40 7 50 47 0.35000 14.41615 50 24 50 30 51 50 56 50 12 50 100 41
40 8 12 50 0.33315 13.94876 50 24 50 30 51 50 56 50 12 50 100 41
40 9 50 47 0.35000 14.35128 50 24 50 30 51 50 56 50 12 50 100 41
40 10 100 42 0.37217 14.04779 50 24 50 30 51 50 56 50 12 50 100 41
40 11 41 48 0.34674 13.98229 50 24 50 30 51 50 56 50 12 50 100 41
41 0 40 53 0.35268 14.73778 40 36 50 40 48 50 47 30 50 50 100 80
41 1 36 53 0.35310 14.34372 40 36 50 40 48 50 47 30 50 50 100 80
41 2 50 52 0.35000 14.53817 40 36 50 40 48 50 47 30 50 50 100 80
41 3 40 53 0.35268 14.59383 40 36 50 40 48 50 47 30 50 50 100 80
41 4 48 52 0.35047 14.71775 40 36 50 40 48 50 47 30 50 50 100 80
41 5 50 52 0.35000 14.51638 40 36 50 40 48 50 47 30 50 50 100 80
41 6 47 52 0.35067 14.68836 40 36 50 40 48 50 47 30 50 50 100 80
41 7 30 54 0.35560 14.77175 40 36 50 40 48 50 47 30 50 50 100 80
41 8 50 52 0.35000 14.29876 40 36 50 40 48 50 47 30 50 50 100 80
41 9 50 52 0.35000 14.70128 40 36 50 40 48 50 47 30 50 50 100 80
41 10 100 47 0.34008 14.38787 40 36 50 40 48 50 47 30 50 50 100 80
41 11 80 49 0.34335 14.32564 40 36 50 40 48 50 47 30 50 50 100 80
42 0 50 51 0.35000 15.08778 50 16 50 50 51 50 40 50 50 50 100 54
42 1 16 54 0.35397 14.69769 50 16 50 50 51 50 40 50 50 50 100 54
42 2 50 51 0.35000 14.88817 50 16 50 50 51 50 40 50 50 50 100 54
42 3 50 51 0.35000 14.94383 50 16 50 50 51 50 40 50 50 50 100 54
42 4 51 51 0.34986 15.06761 50 16 50 50 51 50 40 50 50 50 100 54
42 5 50 51 0.35000 14.86638 50 16 50 50 51 50 40 50 50 50 100 54
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Table XXXVIII.: (continued)
Round Player OwnM MS Earn SubTot Pl0 Pl1 Pl2 Pl3 Pl4 Pl5 Pl6 Pl7 Pl8 Pl9 Pl10 Pl11
42 6 40 52 0.35140 15.03976 50 16 50 50 51 50 40 50 50 50 100 54
42 7 50 51 0.35000 15.12175 50 16 50 50 51 50 40 50 50 50 100 54
42 8 50 51 0.35000 14.64876 50 16 50 50 51 50 40 50 50 50 100 54
42 9 50 51 0.35000 15.05128 50 16 50 50 51 50 40 50 50 50 100 54
42 10 100 46 0.34650 14.73437 50 16 50 50 51 50 40 50 50 50 100 54
42 11 54 51 0.34930 14.67494 50 16 50 50 51 50 40 50 50 50 100 54
43 0 50 50 0.35000 15.43778 50 11 50 57 50 50 38 50 50 50 100 44
43 1 11 54 0.35228 15.04996 50 11 50 57 50 50 38 50 50 50 100 44
43 2 50 50 0.35000 15.23817 50 11 50 57 50 50 38 50 50 50 100 44
43 3 57 49 0.35033 15.29416 50 11 50 57 50 50 38 50 50 50 100 44
43 4 50 50 0.35000 15.41761 50 11 50 57 50 50 38 50 50 50 100 44
43 5 50 50 0.35000 15.21638 50 11 50 57 50 50 38 50 50 50 100 44
43 6 38 51 0.34986 15.38962 50 11 50 57 50 50 38 50 50 50 100 44
43 7 50 50 0.35000 15.47175 50 11 50 57 50 50 38 50 50 50 100 44
43 8 50 50 0.35000 14.99876 50 11 50 57 50 50 38 50 50 50 100 44
43 9 50 50 0.35000 15.40128 50 11 50 57 50 50 38 50 50 50 100 44
43 10 100 45 0.35292 15.08729 50 11 50 57 50 50 38 50 50 50 100 44
43 11 44 51 0.35035 15.02529 50 11 50 57 50 50 38 50 50 50 100 44
44 0 50 52 0.35000 15.78778 50 24 50 64 47 50 40 50 50 49 100 48
44 1 24 54 0.35546 15.40542 50 24 50 64 47 50 40 50 50 49 100 48
44 2 50 52 0.35000 15.58817 50 24 50 64 47 50 40 50 50 49 100 48
44 3 64 51 0.34592 15.64008 50 24 50 64 47 50 40 50 50 49 100 48
44 4 47 52 0.35067 15.76827 50 24 50 64 47 50 40 50 50 49 100 48
44 5 50 52 0.35000 15.56638 50 24 50 64 47 50 40 50 50 49 100 48
44 6 40 53 0.35268 15.74230 50 24 50 64 47 50 40 50 50 49 100 48
44 7 50 52 0.35000 15.82175 50 24 50 64 47 50 40 50 50 49 100 48
44 8 50 52 0.35000 15.34876 50 24 50 64 47 50 40 50 50 49 100 48
44 9 49 52 0.35025 15.75153 50 24 50 64 47 50 40 50 50 49 100 48
44 10 100 47 0.34008 15.42737 50 24 50 64 47 50 40 50 50 49 100 48
44 11 48 52 0.35047 15.37576 50 24 50 64 47 50 40 50 50 49 100 48
45 0 50 52 0.35000 16.13778 50 21 50 60 51 50 40 50 49 50 100 50
45 1 21 55 0.35880 15.76422 50 21 50 60 51 50 40 50 49 50 100 50
45 2 50 52 0.35000 15.93817 50 21 50 60 51 50 40 50 49 50 100 50
45 3 60 51 0.34755 15.98763 50 21 50 60 51 50 40 50 49 50 100 50
45 4 51 52 0.34973 16.11800 50 21 50 60 51 50 40 50 49 50 100 50
45 5 50 52 0.35000 15.91638 50 21 50 60 51 50 40 50 49 50 100 50
45 6 40 53 0.35268 16.09498 50 21 50 60 51 50 40 50 49 50 100 50
45 7 50 52 0.35000 16.17175 50 21 50 60 51 50 40 50 49 50 100 50
45 8 49 52 0.35025 15.69900 50 21 50 60 51 50 40 50 49 50 100 50
45 9 50 52 0.35000 16.10153 50 21 50 60 51 50 40 50 49 50 100 50
45 10 100 47 0.34008 15.76745 50 21 50 60 51 50 40 50 49 50 100 50
45 11 50 52 0.35000 15.72576 50 21 50 60 51 50 40 50 49 50 100 50
46 0 50 51 0.35000 16.48778 50 21 50 50 51 50 41 55 45 50 100 52
46 1 21 54 0.35508 16.11930 50 21 50 50 51 50 41 55 45 50 100 52
46 2 50 51 0.35000 16.28817 50 21 50 50 51 50 41 55 45 50 100 52
46 3 50 51 0.35000 16.33763 50 21 50 50 51 50 41 55 45 50 100 52
46 4 51 51 0.34986 16.46786 50 21 50 50 51 50 41 55 45 50 100 52
46 5 50 51 0.35000 16.26638 50 21 50 50 51 50 41 55 45 50 100 52
46 6 41 52 0.35137 16.44635 50 21 50 50 51 50 41 55 45 50 100 52
46 7 55 51 0.34907 16.52082 50 21 50 50 51 50 41 55 45 50 100 52
46 8 45 52 0.35099 16.05000 50 21 50 50 51 50 41 55 45 50 100 52
46 9 50 51 0.35000 16.45153 50 21 50 50 51 50 41 55 45 50 100 52
46 10 100 47 0.34008 16.10754 50 21 50 50 51 50 41 55 45 50 100 52
46 11 52 51 0.34970 16.07545 50 21 50 50 51 50 41 55 45 50 100 52
47 0 50 50 0.35000 16.83778 50 10 50 50 50 50 46 50 39 50 100 50
47 1 10 53 0.34673 16.46603 50 10 50 50 50 50 46 50 39 50 100 50
47 2 50 50 0.35000 16.63817 50 10 50 50 50 50 46 50 39 50 100 50
47 3 50 50 0.35000 16.68763 50 10 50 50 50 50 46 50 39 50 100 50
47 4 50 50 0.35000 16.81786 50 10 50 50 50 50 46 50 39 50 100 50
47 5 50 50 0.35000 16.61638 50 10 50 50 50 50 46 50 39 50 100 50
47 6 46 50 0.34981 16.79616 50 10 50 50 50 50 46 50 39 50 100 50
47 7 50 50 0.35000 16.87082 50 10 50 50 50 50 46 50 39 50 100 50
47 8 39 51 0.35000 16.40000 50 10 50 50 50 50 46 50 39 50 100 50
47 9 50 50 0.35000 16.80153 50 10 50 50 50 50 46 50 39 50 100 50
47 10 100 45 0.35292 16.46045 50 10 50 50 50 50 46 50 39 50 100 50
47 11 50 50 0.35000 16.42545 50 10 50 50 50 50 46 50 39 50 100 50
48 0 50 52 0.35000 17.18778 50 23 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 100 50
48 1 23 55 0.35882 16.82485 50 23 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 100 50
48 2 50 52 0.35000 16.98817 50 23 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 100 50
48 3 50 52 0.35000 17.03763 50 23 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 100 50
48 4 50 52 0.35000 17.16786 50 23 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 100 50
48 5 50 52 0.35000 16.96638 50 23 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 100 50
48 6 50 52 0.35000 17.14616 50 23 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 100 50
48 7 50 52 0.35000 17.22082 50 23 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 100 50
48 8 50 52 0.35000 16.75000 50 23 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 100 50
48 9 50 52 0.35000 17.15153 50 23 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 100 50
48 10 100 48 0.33367 16.79412 50 23 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 100 50
48 11 50 52 0.35000 16.77545 50 23 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 100 50
49 0 80 51 0.33565 17.52343 80 23 50 43 51 50 50 49 45 50 100 50
49 1 23 56 0.36229 17.18713 80 23 50 43 51 50 50 49 45 50 100 50
49 2 50 54 0.35000 17.33817 80 23 50 43 51 50 50 49 45 50 100 50
49 3 43 54 0.35302 17.39065 80 23 50 43 51 50 50 49 45 50 100 50
49 4 51 54 0.34947 17.51734 80 23 50 43 51 50 50 49 45 50 100 50
49 5 50 54 0.35000 17.31638 80 23 50 43 51 50 50 49 45 50 100 50
49 6 50 54 0.35000 17.49616 80 23 50 43 51 50 50 49 45 50 100 50
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Table XXXVIII.: (continued)
Round Player OwnM MS Earn SubTot Pl0 Pl1 Pl2 Pl3 Pl4 Pl5 Pl6 Pl7 Pl8 Pl9 Pl10 Pl11
49 7 49 54 0.35050 17.57132 80 23 50 43 51 50 50 49 45 50 100 50
49 8 45 54 0.35228 17.10227 80 23 50 43 51 50 50 49 45 50 100 50
49 9 50 54 0.35000 17.50153 80 23 50 43 51 50 50 49 45 50 100 50
49 10 100 49 0.32725 17.12137 80 23 50 43 51 50 50 49 45 50 100 50
49 11 50 54 0.35000 17.12545 80 23 50 43 51 50 50 49 45 50 100 50
Table XXXIX.: Data from experiments: 12 small suppliers - no transport costs - Cohort 4
Round Player OwnM MS Earn SubTot Pl0 Pl1 Pl2 Pl3 Pl4 Pl5 Pl6 Pl7 Pl8 Pl9 Pl10 Pl11
0 0 26 39 0.30940 0.30940 26 49 5 50 1 50 5 50 87 50 9 70
0 1 49 37 0.34832 0.34832 26 49 5 50 1 50 5 50 87 50 9 70
0 2 5 41 0.27440 0.27440 26 49 5 50 1 50 5 50 87 50 9 70
0 3 50 37 0.35000 0.35000 26 49 5 50 1 50 5 50 87 50 9 70
0 4 1 41 0.26539 0.26539 26 49 5 50 1 50 5 50 87 50 9 70
0 5 50 37 0.35000 0.35000 26 49 5 50 1 50 5 50 87 50 9 70
0 6 5 41 0.27440 0.27440 26 49 5 50 1 50 5 50 87 50 9 70
0 7 50 37 0.35000 0.35000 26 49 5 50 1 50 5 50 87 50 9 70
0 8 87 33 0.41475 0.41475 26 49 5 50 1 50 5 50 87 50 9 70
0 9 50 37 0.35000 0.35000 26 49 5 50 1 50 5 50 87 50 9 70
0 10 9 40 0.27777 0.27777 26 49 5 50 1 50 5 50 87 50 9 70
0 11 70 35 0.38383 0.38383 26 49 5 50 1 50 5 50 87 50 9 70
1 0 98 58 0.27384 0.58324 98 54 92 50 0 100 0 50 61 55 75 100
1 1 54 62 0.34365 0.69197 98 54 92 50 0 100 0 50 61 55 75 100
1 2 92 58 0.28630 0.56070 98 54 92 50 0 100 0 50 61 55 75 100
1 3 50 62 0.35000 0.70000 98 54 92 50 0 100 0 50 61 55 75 100
1 4 0 67 0.42992 0.69531 98 54 92 50 0 100 0 50 61 55 75 100
1 5 100 58 0.26950 0.61950 98 54 92 50 0 100 0 50 61 55 75 100
1 6 0 67 0.42992 0.70432 98 54 92 50 0 100 0 50 61 55 75 100
1 7 50 62 0.35000 0.70000 98 54 92 50 0 100 0 50 61 55 75 100
1 8 61 61 0.33306 0.74781 98 54 92 50 0 100 0 50 61 55 75 100
1 9 55 62 0.34201 0.69201 98 54 92 50 0 100 0 50 61 55 75 100
1 10 75 60 0.31062 0.58840 98 54 92 50 0 100 0 50 61 55 75 100
1 11 100 58 0.26950 0.65333 98 54 92 50 0 100 0 50 61 55 75 100
2 0 3 59 0.37851 0.96175 3 40 59 35 100 100 0 17 43 58 100 100
2 1 40 56 0.35653 1.04851 3 40 59 35 100 100 0 17 43 58 100 100
2 2 59 54 0.34443 0.90513 3 40 59 35 100 100 0 17 43 58 100 100
2 3 35 56 0.35893 1.05893 3 40 59 35 100 100 0 17 43 58 100 100
2 4 100 50 0.32083 1.01614 3 40 59 35 100 100 0 17 43 58 100 100
2 5 100 50 0.32083 0.94033 3 40 59 35 100 100 0 17 43 58 100 100
2 6 0 60 0.38500 1.08932 3 40 59 35 100 100 0 17 43 58 100 100
2 7 17 58 0.37118 1.07118 3 40 59 35 100 100 0 17 43 58 100 100
2 8 43 56 0.35482 1.10263 3 40 59 35 100 100 0 17 43 58 100 100
2 9 58 54 0.34515 1.03715 3 40 59 35 100 100 0 17 43 58 100 100
2 10 100 50 0.32083 0.90923 3 40 59 35 100 100 0 17 43 58 100 100
2 11 100 50 0.32083 0.97417 3 40 59 35 100 100 0 17 43 58 100 100
3 0 4 57 0.36664 1.32839 4 32 29 57 50 100 0 72 83 60 100 45
3 1 32 55 0.35777 1.40628 4 32 29 57 50 100 0 72 83 60 100 45
3 2 29 55 0.35833 1.26346 4 32 29 57 50 100 0 72 83 60 100 45
3 3 57 52 0.34763 1.40656 4 32 29 57 50 100 0 72 83 60 100 45
3 4 50 53 0.35000 1.36614 4 32 29 57 50 100 0 72 83 60 100 45
3 5 100 48 0.33367 1.27400 4 32 29 57 50 100 0 72 83 60 100 45
3 6 0 57 0.36575 1.45507 4 32 29 57 50 100 0 72 83 60 100 45
3 7 72 51 0.34153 1.41271 4 32 29 57 50 100 0 72 83 60 100 45
3 8 83 50 0.33729 1.43992 4 32 29 57 50 100 0 72 83 60 100 45
3 9 60 52 0.34627 1.38342 4 32 29 57 50 100 0 72 83 60 100 45
3 10 100 48 0.33367 1.24290 4 32 29 57 50 100 0 72 83 60 100 45
3 11 45 53 0.35163 1.32580 4 32 29 57 50 100 0 72 83 60 100 45
4 0 100 42 0.37217 1.70056 100 28 44 60 0 100 39 66 1 60 50 11
4 1 28 48 0.33871 1.74498 100 28 44 60 0 100 39 66 1 60 50 11
4 2 44 47 0.34727 1.61073 100 28 44 60 0 100 39 66 1 60 50 11
4 3 60 45 0.35525 1.76181 100 28 44 60 0 100 39 66 1 60 50 11
4 4 0 51 0.32725 1.69339 100 28 44 60 0 100 39 66 1 60 50 11
4 5 100 42 0.37217 1.64617 100 28 44 60 0 100 39 66 1 60 50 11
4 6 39 47 0.34435 1.79942 100 28 44 60 0 100 39 66 1 60 50 11
4 7 66 45 0.35728 1.76999 100 28 44 60 0 100 39 66 1 60 50 11
4 8 1 51 0.32828 1.76820 100 28 44 60 0 100 39 66 1 60 50 11
4 9 60 45 0.35525 1.73867 100 28 44 60 0 100 39 66 1 60 50 11
4 10 50 46 0.35000 1.59290 100 28 44 60 0 100 39 66 1 60 50 11
4 11 11 50 0.33225 1.65805 100 28 44 60 0 100 39 66 1 60 50 11
5 0 100 61 0.25025 1.95081 100 47 20 14 100 100 100 51 78 55 1 100
5 1 47 65 0.35567 2.10065 100 47 20 14 100 100 100 51 78 55 1 100
5 2 20 68 0.40880 2.01953 100 47 20 14 100 100 100 51 78 55 1 100
5 3 14 68 0.41804 2.17985 100 47 20 14 100 100 100 51 78 55 1 100
5 4 100 61 0.25025 1.94364 100 47 20 14 100 100 100 51 78 55 1 100
5 5 100 61 0.25025 1.89642 100 47 20 14 100 100 100 51 78 55 1 100
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Table XXXIX.: (continued)
Round Player OwnM MS Earn SubTot Pl0 Pl1 Pl2 Pl3 Pl4 Pl5 Pl6 Pl7 Pl8 Pl9 Pl10 Pl11
5 6 100 61 0.25025 2.04967 100 47 20 14 100 100 100 51 78 55 1 100
5 7 51 65 0.34806 2.11805 100 47 20 14 100 100 100 51 78 55 1 100
5 8 78 63 0.29414 2.06234 100 47 20 14 100 100 100 51 78 55 1 100
5 9 55 65 0.34008 2.07875 100 47 20 14 100 100 100 51 78 55 1 100
5 10 1 70 0.44776 2.04065 100 47 20 14 100 100 100 51 78 55 1 100
5 11 100 61 0.25025 1.90830 100 47 20 14 100 100 100 51 78 55 1 100
6 0 0 22 0.14117 2.09197 0 28 19 72 0 0 0 35 28 50 0 10
6 1 28 19 0.25683 2.35748 0 28 19 72 0 0 0 35 28 50 0 10
6 2 19 20 0.21944 2.23897 0 28 19 72 0 0 0 35 28 50 0 10
6 3 72 15 0.44317 2.62302 0 28 19 72 0 0 0 35 28 50 0 10
6 4 0 22 0.14117 2.08481 0 28 19 72 0 0 0 35 28 50 0 10
6 5 0 22 0.14117 2.03758 0 28 19 72 0 0 0 35 28 50 0 10
6 6 0 22 0.14117 2.19084 0 28 19 72 0 0 0 35 28 50 0 10
6 7 35 19 0.28770 2.40575 0 28 19 72 0 0 0 35 28 50 0 10
6 8 28 19 0.25683 2.31917 0 28 19 72 0 0 0 35 28 50 0 10
6 9 50 17 0.35000 2.42875 0 28 19 72 0 0 0 35 28 50 0 10
6 10 0 22 0.14117 2.18182 0 28 19 72 0 0 0 35 28 50 0 10
6 11 10 21 0.18247 2.09077 0 28 19 72 0 0 0 35 28 50 0 10
7 0 79 47 0.35135 2.44333 79 42 97 20 0 0 100 50 28 80 3 100
7 1 42 51 0.35028 2.70776 79 42 97 20 0 0 100 50 28 80 3 100
7 2 97 46 0.34835 2.58733 79 42 97 20 0 0 100 50 28 80 3 100
7 3 20 53 0.35105 2.97407 79 42 97 20 0 0 100 50 28 80 3 100
7 4 0 54 0.34650 2.43131 79 42 97 20 0 0 100 50 28 80 3 100
7 5 0 54 0.34650 2.38408 79 42 97 20 0 0 100 50 28 80 3 100
7 6 100 45 0.35292 2.54375 79 42 97 20 0 0 100 50 28 80 3 100
7 7 50 50 0.35000 2.75575 79 42 97 20 0 0 100 50 28 80 3 100
7 8 28 52 0.35000 2.66917 79 42 97 20 0 0 100 50 28 80 3 100
7 9 80 47 0.35105 2.77980 79 42 97 20 0 0 100 50 28 80 3 100
7 10 3 54 0.34835 2.53017 79 42 97 20 0 0 100 50 28 80 3 100
7 11 100 45 0.35292 2.44369 79 42 97 20 0 0 100 50 28 80 3 100
8 0 93 38 0.39465 2.83797 93 51 13 50 0 100 0 75 11 90 32 0
8 1 51 42 0.35102 3.05878 93 51 13 50 0 100 0 75 11 90 32 0
8 2 13 46 0.31503 2.90236 93 51 13 50 0 100 0 75 11 90 32 0
8 3 50 42 0.35000 3.32407 93 51 13 50 0 100 0 75 11 90 32 0
8 4 0 47 0.30158 2.73289 93 51 13 50 0 100 0 75 11 90 32 0
8 5 100 38 0.39783 2.78192 93 51 13 50 0 100 0 75 11 90 32 0
8 6 0 47 0.30158 2.84534 93 51 13 50 0 100 0 75 11 90 32 0
8 7 75 40 0.37479 3.13054 93 51 13 50 0 100 0 75 11 90 32 0
8 8 11 46 0.31223 2.98140 93 51 13 50 0 100 0 75 11 90 32 0
8 9 90 39 0.38780 3.16761 93 51 13 50 0 100 0 75 11 90 32 0
8 10 32 44 0.33236 2.86253 93 51 13 50 0 100 0 75 11 90 32 0
8 11 0 47 0.30158 2.74527 93 51 13 50 0 100 0 75 11 90 32 0
9 0 98 45 0.35392 3.19189 98 39 58 42 50 0 83 27 33 94 69 0
9 1 39 50 0.34859 3.40737 98 39 58 42 50 0 83 27 33 94 69 0
9 2 58 49 0.35028 3.25264 98 39 58 42 50 0 83 27 33 94 69 0
9 3 42 50 0.34925 3.67332 98 39 58 42 50 0 83 27 33 94 69 0
9 4 50 49 0.35000 3.08289 98 39 58 42 50 0 83 27 33 94 69 0
9 5 0 54 0.34650 3.12842 98 39 58 42 50 0 83 27 33 94 69 0
9 6 83 46 0.35424 3.19957 98 39 58 42 50 0 83 27 33 94 69 0
9 7 27 51 0.34678 3.47732 98 39 58 42 50 0 83 27 33 94 69 0
9 8 33 51 0.34881 3.33021 98 39 58 42 50 0 83 27 33 94 69 0
9 9 94 45 0.35565 3.52325 98 39 58 42 50 0 83 27 33 94 69 0
9 10 69 48 0.35067 3.21320 98 39 58 42 50 0 83 27 33 94 69 0
9 11 0 54 0.34650 3.09177 98 39 58 42 50 0 83 27 33 94 69 0
10 0 100 58 0.26950 3.46139 100 50 80 50 100 50 51 38 71 71 77 0
10 1 50 63 0.35000 3.75737 100 50 80 50 100 50 51 38 71 71 77 0
10 2 80 60 0.30100 3.55364 100 50 80 50 100 50 51 38 71 71 77 0
10 3 50 63 0.35000 4.02332 100 50 80 50 100 50 51 38 71 71 77 0
10 4 100 58 0.26950 3.35239 100 50 80 50 100 50 51 38 71 71 77 0
10 5 50 63 0.35000 3.47842 100 50 80 50 100 50 51 38 71 71 77 0
10 6 51 62 0.34845 3.54802 100 50 80 50 100 50 51 38 71 71 77 0
10 7 38 64 0.36988 3.84720 100 50 80 50 100 50 51 38 71 71 77 0
10 8 71 61 0.31521 3.64542 100 50 80 50 100 50 51 38 71 71 77 0
10 9 71 61 0.31521 3.83846 100 50 80 50 100 50 51 38 71 71 77 0
10 10 77 60 0.30684 3.52004 100 50 80 50 100 50 51 38 71 71 77 0
10 11 0 67 0.42992 3.52169 100 50 80 50 100 50 51 38 71 71 77 0
11 0 8 39 0.27013 3.73152 8 34 0 50 100 100 0 67 42 36 0 0
11 1 34 37 0.32032 4.07769 8 34 0 50 100 100 0 67 42 36 0 0
11 2 0 40 0.25667 3.81031 8 34 0 50 100 100 0 67 42 36 0 0
11 3 50 35 0.35000 4.37332 8 34 0 50 100 100 0 67 42 36 0 0
11 4 100 31 0.44275 3.79514 8 34 0 50 100 100 0 67 42 36 0 0
11 5 100 31 0.44275 3.92117 8 34 0 50 100 100 0 67 42 36 0 0
11 6 0 40 0.25667 3.80469 8 34 0 50 100 100 0 67 42 36 0 0
11 7 67 34 0.38154 4.22874 8 34 0 50 100 100 0 67 42 36 0 0
11 8 42 36 0.33488 3.98030 8 34 0 50 100 100 0 67 42 36 0 0
11 9 36 36 0.32256 4.16102 8 34 0 50 100 100 0 67 42 36 0 0
11 10 0 40 0.25667 3.77671 8 34 0 50 100 100 0 67 42 36 0 0
11 11 0 40 0.25667 3.77835 8 34 0 50 100 100 0 67 42 36 0 0
12 0 80 38 0.38570 4.11722 80 58 74 21 0 0 0 79 0 39 50 100
12 1 58 40 0.35952 4.43721 80 58 74 21 0 0 0 79 0 39 50 100
12 2 74 39 0.37716 4.18747 80 58 74 21 0 0 0 79 0 39 50 100
12 3 21 44 0.31786 4.69118 80 58 74 21 0 0 0 79 0 39 50 100
12 4 0 46 0.29517 4.09031 80 58 74 21 0 0 0 79 0 39 50 100
12 5 0 46 0.29517 4.21633 80 58 74 21 0 0 0 79 0 39 50 100
12 6 0 46 0.29517 4.09985 80 58 74 21 0 0 0 79 0 39 50 100
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12 7 79 38 0.38485 4.61358 80 58 74 21 0 0 0 79 0 39 50 100
12 8 0 46 0.29517 4.27547 80 58 74 21 0 0 0 79 0 39 50 100
12 9 39 42 0.33729 4.49832 80 58 74 21 0 0 0 79 0 39 50 100
12 10 50 41 0.35000 4.12671 80 58 74 21 0 0 0 79 0 39 50 100
12 11 100 36 0.41067 4.18902 80 58 74 21 0 0 0 79 0 39 50 100
13 0 87 53 0.31978 4.43701 87 60 96 23 50 50 0 30 74 49 49 100
13 1 60 55 0.34242 4.77962 87 60 96 23 50 50 0 30 74 49 49 100
13 2 96 52 0.31351 4.50098 87 60 96 23 50 50 0 30 74 49 49 100
13 3 23 59 0.37268 5.06386 87 60 96 23 50 50 0 30 74 49 49 100
13 4 50 56 0.35000 4.44031 87 60 96 23 50 50 0 30 74 49 49 100
13 5 50 56 0.35000 4.56633 87 60 96 23 50 50 0 30 74 49 49 100
13 6 0 61 0.39142 4.49127 87 60 96 23 50 50 0 30 74 49 49 100
13 7 30 58 0.36587 4.97945 87 60 96 23 50 50 0 30 74 49 49 100
13 8 74 54 0.33096 4.60643 87 60 96 23 50 50 0 30 74 49 49 100
13 9 49 56 0.35076 4.84907 87 60 96 23 50 50 0 30 74 49 49 100
13 10 49 56 0.35076 4.47747 87 60 96 23 50 50 0 30 74 49 49 100
13 11 100 52 0.30800 4.49702 87 60 96 23 50 50 0 30 74 49 49 100
14 0 72 64 0.30483 4.74183 72 47 79 56 100 100 100 29 75 65 54 0
14 1 47 66 0.35606 5.13568 72 47 79 56 100 100 100 29 75 65 54 0
14 2 79 63 0.29181 4.79278 72 47 79 56 100 100 100 29 75 65 54 0
14 3 56 66 0.33726 5.40112 72 47 79 56 100 100 100 29 75 65 54 0
14 4 100 62 0.24383 4.68414 72 47 79 56 100 100 100 29 75 65 54 0
14 5 100 62 0.24383 4.81017 72 47 79 56 100 100 100 29 75 65 54 0
14 6 100 62 0.24383 4.73510 72 47 79 56 100 100 100 29 75 65 54 0
14 7 29 68 0.39337 5.37282 72 47 79 56 100 100 100 29 75 65 54 0
14 8 75 64 0.29779 4.90422 72 47 79 56 100 100 100 29 75 65 54 0
14 9 65 65 0.31850 5.16757 72 47 79 56 100 100 100 29 75 65 54 0
14 10 54 66 0.34160 4.81907 72 47 79 56 100 100 100 29 75 65 54 0
14 11 0 71 0.45558 4.95260 72 47 79 56 100 100 100 29 75 65 54 0
15 0 98 52 0.31080 5.05263 98 47 40 70 100 50 100 73 38 10 42 0
15 1 47 56 0.35221 5.48788 98 47 40 70 100 50 100 73 38 10 42 0
15 2 40 57 0.35782 5.15060 98 47 40 70 100 50 100 73 38 10 42 0
15 3 70 54 0.33507 5.73619 98 47 40 70 100 50 100 73 38 10 42 0
15 4 100 52 0.30800 4.99214 98 47 40 70 100 50 100 73 38 10 42 0
15 5 50 56 0.35000 5.16017 98 47 40 70 100 50 100 73 38 10 42 0
15 6 100 52 0.30800 5.04310 98 47 40 70 100 50 100 73 38 10 42 0
15 7 73 54 0.33202 5.70484 98 47 40 70 100 50 100 73 38 10 42 0
15 8 38 57 0.35910 5.26332 98 47 40 70 100 50 100 73 38 10 42 0
15 9 10 60 0.38267 5.55024 98 47 40 70 100 50 100 73 38 10 42 0
15 10 42 57 0.35644 5.17551 98 47 40 70 100 50 100 73 38 10 42 0
15 11 0 61 0.39142 5.34402 98 47 40 70 100 50 100 73 38 10 42 0
16 0 94 41 0.37823 5.43087 94 19 90 50 50 50 66 30 50 1 40 3
16 1 19 48 0.33083 5.81871 94 19 90 50 50 50 66 30 50 1 40 3
16 2 90 41 0.37753 5.52813 94 19 90 50 50 50 66 30 50 1 40 3
16 3 50 45 0.35000 6.08619 94 19 90 50 50 50 66 30 50 1 40 3
16 4 50 45 0.35000 5.34214 94 19 90 50 50 50 66 30 50 1 40 3
16 5 50 45 0.35000 5.51017 94 19 90 50 50 50 66 30 50 1 40 3
16 6 66 43 0.36139 5.40449 94 19 90 50 50 50 66 30 50 1 40 3
16 7 30 47 0.33763 6.04247 94 19 90 50 50 50 66 30 50 1 40 3
16 8 50 45 0.35000 5.61332 94 19 90 50 50 50 66 30 50 1 40 3
16 9 1 49 0.31570 5.86594 94 19 90 50 50 50 66 30 50 1 40 3
16 10 40 46 0.34370 5.51921 94 19 90 50 50 50 66 30 50 1 40 3
16 11 3 49 0.31820 5.66222 94 19 90 50 50 50 66 30 50 1 40 3
17 0 8 55 0.35637 5.78724 8 51 70 50 0 100 0 63 62 50 64 100
17 1 51 52 0.34973 6.16845 8 51 70 50 0 100 0 63 62 50 64 100
17 2 70 50 0.34533 5.87347 8 51 70 50 0 100 0 63 62 50 64 100
17 3 50 52 0.35000 6.43619 8 51 70 50 0 100 0 63 62 50 64 100
17 4 0 56 0.35933 5.70147 8 51 70 50 0 100 0 63 62 50 64 100
17 5 100 47 0.34008 5.85025 8 51 70 50 0 100 0 63 62 50 64 100
17 6 0 56 0.35933 5.76382 8 51 70 50 0 100 0 63 62 50 64 100
17 7 63 50 0.34803 6.39050 8 51 70 50 0 100 0 63 62 50 64 100
17 8 62 51 0.34678 5.96010 8 51 70 50 0 100 0 63 62 50 64 100
17 9 50 52 0.35000 6.21594 8 51 70 50 0 100 0 63 62 50 64 100
17 10 64 50 0.34771 5.86692 8 51 70 50 0 100 0 63 62 50 64 100
17 11 100 47 0.34008 6.00230 8 51 70 50 0 100 0 63 62 50 64 100
18 0 42 46 0.34515 6.13238 42 34 4 50 40 100 50 23 35 50 21 100
18 1 34 47 0.34085 6.50930 42 34 4 50 40 100 50 23 35 50 21 100
18 2 4 50 0.32531 6.19878 42 34 4 50 40 100 50 23 35 50 21 100
18 3 50 45 0.35000 6.78619 42 34 4 50 40 100 50 23 35 50 21 100
18 4 40 46 0.34370 6.04517 42 34 4 50 40 100 50 23 35 50 21 100
18 5 100 41 0.37858 6.22883 42 34 4 50 40 100 50 23 35 50 21 100
18 6 50 45 0.35000 6.11382 42 34 4 50 40 100 50 23 35 50 21 100
18 7 23 48 0.33456 6.72506 42 34 4 50 40 100 50 23 35 50 21 100
18 8 35 47 0.34160 6.30170 42 34 4 50 40 100 50 23 35 50 21 100
18 9 50 45 0.35000 6.56594 42 34 4 50 40 100 50 23 35 50 21 100
18 10 21 48 0.33274 6.19967 42 34 4 50 40 100 50 23 35 50 21 100
18 11 100 41 0.37858 6.38088 42 34 4 50 40 100 50 23 35 50 21 100
19 0 61 57 0.33871 6.47109 61 45 13 50 0 100 50 50 65 71 81 100
19 1 45 58 0.35484 6.86414 61 45 13 50 0 100 50 50 65 71 81 100
19 2 13 61 0.38626 6.58504 61 45 13 50 0 100 50 50 65 71 81 100
19 3 50 58 0.35000 7.13619 61 45 13 50 0 100 50 50 65 71 81 100
19 4 0 62 0.39783 6.44301 61 45 13 50 0 100 50 50 65 71 81 100
19 5 100 53 0.30158 6.53042 61 45 13 50 0 100 50 50 65 71 81 100
19 6 50 58 0.35000 6.46382 61 45 13 50 0 100 50 50 65 71 81 100
19 7 50 58 0.35000 7.07506 61 45 13 50 0 100 50 50 65 71 81 100
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19 8 65 56 0.33582 6.63753 61 45 13 50 0 100 50 50 65 71 81 100
19 9 71 56 0.32868 6.89463 61 45 13 50 0 100 50 50 65 71 81 100
19 10 81 55 0.31890 6.51856 61 45 13 50 0 100 50 50 65 71 81 100
19 11 100 53 0.30158 6.68247 61 45 13 50 0 100 50 50 65 71 81 100
20 0 29 56 0.36103 6.83212 29 58 100 50 100 50 33 66 52 61 50 0
20 1 58 54 0.34515 7.20929 29 58 100 50 100 50 33 66 52 61 50 0
20 2 100 50 0.32083 6.90587 29 58 100 50 100 50 33 66 52 61 50 0
20 3 50 54 0.35000 7.48619 29 58 100 50 100 50 33 66 52 61 50 0
20 4 100 50 0.32083 6.76384 29 58 100 50 100 50 33 66 52 61 50 0
20 5 50 54 0.35000 6.88042 29 58 100 50 100 50 33 66 52 61 50 0
20 6 33 56 0.35972 6.82354 29 58 100 50 100 50 33 66 52 61 50 0
20 7 66 53 0.34085 7.41592 29 58 100 50 100 50 33 66 52 61 50 0
20 8 52 54 0.34893 6.98645 29 58 100 50 100 50 33 66 52 61 50 0
20 9 61 53 0.34435 7.23898 29 58 100 50 100 50 33 66 52 61 50 0
20 10 50 54 0.35000 6.86856 29 58 100 50 100 50 33 66 52 61 50 0
20 11 0 59 0.37858 7.06105 29 58 100 50 100 50 33 66 52 61 50 0
21 0 100 44 0.35933 7.19145 100 45 50 45 50 50 39 62 63 50 34 0
21 1 45 49 0.34907 7.55835 100 45 50 45 50 50 39 62 63 50 34 0
21 2 50 49 0.35000 7.25587 100 45 50 45 50 50 39 62 63 50 34 0
21 3 45 49 0.34907 7.83525 100 45 50 45 50 50 39 62 63 50 34 0
21 4 50 49 0.35000 7.11384 100 45 50 45 50 50 39 62 63 50 34 0
21 5 50 49 0.35000 7.23042 100 45 50 45 50 50 39 62 63 50 34 0
21 6 39 50 0.34859 7.17213 100 45 50 45 50 50 39 62 63 50 34 0
21 7 62 48 0.35140 7.76732 100 45 50 45 50 50 39 62 63 50 34 0
21 8 63 48 0.35137 7.33782 100 45 50 45 50 50 39 62 63 50 34 0
21 9 50 49 0.35000 7.58898 100 45 50 45 50 50 39 62 63 50 34 0
21 10 34 50 0.34701 7.21558 100 45 50 45 50 50 39 62 63 50 34 0
21 11 0 53 0.34008 7.40113 100 45 50 45 50 50 39 62 63 50 34 0
22 0 50 49 0.35000 7.54145 50 44 14 50 50 50 50 37 59 35 50 100
22 1 44 50 0.34958 7.90793 50 44 14 50 50 50 50 37 59 35 50 100
22 2 14 52 0.34412 7.59999 50 44 14 50 50 50 50 37 59 35 50 100
22 3 50 49 0.35000 8.18525 50 44 14 50 50 50 50 37 59 35 50 100
22 4 50 49 0.35000 7.46384 50 44 14 50 50 50 50 37 59 35 50 100
22 5 50 49 0.35000 7.58042 50 44 14 50 50 50 50 37 59 35 50 100
22 6 50 49 0.35000 7.52213 50 44 14 50 50 50 50 37 59 35 50 100
22 7 37 50 0.34803 8.11535 50 44 14 50 50 50 50 37 59 35 50 100
22 8 59 48 0.35137 7.68918 50 44 14 50 50 50 50 37 59 35 50 100
22 9 35 50 0.34737 7.93635 50 44 14 50 50 50 50 37 59 35 50 100
22 10 50 49 0.35000 7.56558 50 44 14 50 50 50 50 37 59 35 50 100
22 11 100 44 0.35933 7.76047 50 44 14 50 50 50 50 37 59 35 50 100
23 0 2 56 0.36008 7.90153 2 47 73 50 40 50 61 40 57 50 50 100
23 1 47 52 0.35067 8.25860 2 47 73 50 40 50 61 40 57 50 50 100
23 2 73 50 0.34383 7.94382 2 47 73 50 40 50 61 40 57 50 50 100
23 3 50 52 0.35000 8.53525 2 47 73 50 40 50 61 40 57 50 50 100
23 4 40 53 0.35268 7.81652 2 47 73 50 40 50 61 40 57 50 50 100
23 5 50 52 0.35000 7.93042 2 47 73 50 40 50 61 40 57 50 50 100
23 6 61 51 0.34718 7.86931 2 47 73 50 40 50 61 40 57 50 50 100
23 7 40 53 0.35268 8.46803 2 47 73 50 40 50 61 40 57 50 50 100
23 8 57 51 0.34853 8.03771 2 47 73 50 40 50 61 40 57 50 50 100
23 9 50 52 0.35000 8.28635 2 47 73 50 40 50 61 40 57 50 50 100
23 10 50 52 0.35000 7.91558 2 47 73 50 40 50 61 40 57 50 50 100
23 11 100 47 0.34008 8.10055 2 47 73 50 40 50 61 40 57 50 50 100
24 0 100 49 0.32725 8.22878 100 49 36 50 61 100 28 67 49 50 50 0
24 1 49 54 0.35050 8.60910 100 49 36 50 61 100 28 67 49 50 50 0
24 2 36 55 0.35670 8.30052 100 49 36 50 61 100 28 67 49 50 50 0
24 3 50 54 0.35000 8.88525 100 49 36 50 61 100 28 67 49 50 50 0
24 4 61 53 0.34435 8.16088 100 49 36 50 61 100 28 67 49 50 50 0
24 5 100 49 0.32725 8.25767 100 49 36 50 61 100 28 67 49 50 50 0
24 6 28 56 0.36129 8.23060 100 49 36 50 61 100 28 67 49 50 50 0
24 7 67 52 0.34226 8.81029 100 49 36 50 61 100 28 67 49 50 50 0
24 8 49 54 0.35050 8.38822 100 49 36 50 61 100 28 67 49 50 50 0
24 9 50 54 0.35000 8.63635 100 49 36 50 61 100 28 67 49 50 50 0
24 10 50 54 0.35000 8.26558 100 49 36 50 61 100 28 67 49 50 50 0
24 11 0 58 0.37217 8.47272 100 49 36 50 61 100 28 67 49 50 50 0
25 0 29 50 0.34485 8.57363 29 47 58 50 100 50 34 44 53 55 55 0
25 1 47 48 0.34912 8.95823 29 47 58 50 100 50 34 44 53 55 55 0
25 2 58 47 0.35233 8.65285 29 47 58 50 100 50 34 44 53 55 55 0
25 3 50 48 0.35000 9.23525 29 47 58 50 100 50 34 44 53 55 55 0
25 4 100 43 0.36575 8.52663 29 47 58 50 100 50 34 44 53 55 55 0
25 5 50 48 0.35000 8.60767 29 47 58 50 100 50 34 44 53 55 55 0
25 6 34 49 0.34496 8.57556 29 47 58 50 100 50 34 44 53 55 55 0
25 7 44 48 0.34804 9.15833 29 47 58 50 100 50 34 44 53 55 55 0
25 8 53 47 0.35105 8.73927 29 47 58 50 100 50 34 44 53 55 55 0
25 9 55 47 0.35163 8.98799 29 47 58 50 100 50 34 44 53 55 55 0
25 10 55 47 0.35163 8.61721 29 47 58 50 100 50 34 44 53 55 55 0
25 11 0 52 0.33367 8.80638 29 47 58 50 100 50 34 44 53 55 55 0
26 0 0 51 0.32725 8.90088 0 50 35 50 0 50 50 28 87 59 50 100
26 1 50 46 0.35000 9.30823 0 50 35 50 0 50 50 28 87 59 50 100
26 2 35 48 0.34352 8.99638 0 50 35 50 0 50 50 28 87 59 50 100
26 3 50 46 0.35000 9.58525 0 50 35 50 0 50 50 28 87 59 50 100
26 4 0 51 0.32725 8.85388 0 50 35 50 0 50 50 28 87 59 50 100
26 5 50 46 0.35000 8.95767 0 50 35 50 0 50 50 28 87 59 50 100
26 6 50 46 0.35000 8.92556 0 50 35 50 0 50 50 28 87 59 50 100
26 7 28 48 0.33871 9.49704 0 50 35 50 0 50 50 28 87 59 50 100
26 8 87 43 0.36727 9.10653 0 50 35 50 0 50 50 28 87 59 50 100
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26 9 59 45 0.35483 9.34282 0 50 35 50 0 50 50 28 87 59 50 100
26 10 50 46 0.35000 8.96721 0 50 35 50 0 50 50 28 87 59 50 100
26 11 100 42 0.37217 9.17855 0 50 35 50 0 50 50 28 87 59 50 100
27 0 0 52 0.33367 9.23455 0 54 35 50 0 50 27 50 87 60 59 100
27 1 54 47 0.35135 9.65958 0 54 35 50 0 50 27 50 87 60 59 100
27 2 35 49 0.34545 9.34183 0 54 35 50 0 50 27 50 87 60 59 100
27 3 50 47 0.35000 9.93525 0 54 35 50 0 50 27 50 87 60 59 100
27 4 0 52 0.33367 9.18754 0 54 35 50 0 50 27 50 87 60 59 100
27 5 50 47 0.35000 9.30767 0 54 35 50 0 50 27 50 87 60 59 100
27 6 27 50 0.34383 9.26939 0 54 35 50 0 50 27 50 87 60 59 100
27 7 50 47 0.35000 9.84704 0 54 35 50 0 50 27 50 87 60 59 100
27 8 87 44 0.36252 9.46905 0 54 35 50 0 50 27 50 87 60 59 100
27 9 60 47 0.35268 9.69550 0 54 35 50 0 50 27 50 87 60 59 100
27 10 59 47 0.35252 9.31973 0 54 35 50 0 50 27 50 87 60 59 100
27 11 100 43 0.36575 9.54430 0 54 35 50 0 50 27 50 87 60 59 100
28 0 35 61 0.36855 9.60310 35 55 45 50 100 50 23 42 92 63 51 100
28 1 55 59 0.34393 10.00351 35 55 45 50 100 50 23 42 92 63 51 100
28 2 45 60 0.35613 9.69795 35 55 45 50 100 50 23 42 92 63 51 100
28 3 50 60 0.35000 10.28525 35 55 45 50 100 50 23 42 92 63 51 100
28 4 100 55 0.28875 9.47629 35 55 45 50 100 50 23 42 92 63 51 100
28 5 50 60 0.35000 9.65767 35 55 45 50 100 50 23 42 92 63 51 100
28 6 23 62 0.38308 9.65246 35 55 45 50 100 50 23 42 92 63 51 100
28 7 42 60 0.35952 10.20656 35 55 45 50 100 50 23 42 92 63 51 100
28 8 92 56 0.29708 9.76613 35 55 45 50 100 50 23 42 92 63 51 100
28 9 63 58 0.33468 10.03018 35 55 45 50 100 50 23 42 92 63 51 100
28 10 51 60 0.34870 9.66843 35 55 45 50 100 50 23 42 92 63 51 100
28 11 100 55 0.28875 9.83305 35 55 45 50 100 50 23 42 92 63 51 100
29 0 6 48 0.31612 9.91922 6 50 6 50 100 0 100 62 52 56 50 0
29 1 50 44 0.35000 10.35351 6 50 6 50 100 0 100 62 52 56 50 0
29 2 6 48 0.31612 10.01407 6 50 6 50 100 0 100 62 52 56 50 0
29 3 50 44 0.35000 10.63525 6 50 6 50 100 0 100 62 52 56 50 0
29 4 100 39 0.39142 9.86771 6 50 6 50 100 0 100 62 52 56 50 0
29 5 0 48 0.30800 9.96567 6 50 6 50 100 0 100 62 52 56 50 0
29 6 100 39 0.39142 10.04388 6 50 6 50 100 0 100 62 52 56 50 0
29 7 62 43 0.35910 10.56566 6 50 6 50 100 0 100 62 52 56 50 0
29 8 52 44 0.35149 10.11762 6 50 6 50 100 0 100 62 52 56 50 0
29 9 56 43 0.35497 10.38515 6 50 6 50 100 0 100 62 52 56 50 0
29 10 50 44 0.35000 10.01843 6 50 6 50 100 0 100 62 52 56 50 0
29 11 0 48 0.30800 10.14105 6 50 6 50 100 0 100 62 52 56 50 0
30 0 46 54 0.35187 10.27109 46 54 28 50 0 20 49 64 87 60 77 100
30 1 54 53 0.34827 10.70179 46 54 28 50 0 20 49 64 87 60 77 100
30 2 28 55 0.35847 10.37254 46 54 28 50 0 20 49 64 87 60 77 100
30 3 50 53 0.35000 10.98525 46 54 28 50 0 20 49 64 87 60 77 100
30 4 0 58 0.37217 10.23988 46 54 28 50 0 20 49 64 87 60 77 100
30 5 20 56 0.36260 10.32827 46 54 28 50 0 20 49 64 87 60 77 100
30 6 49 53 0.35037 10.39425 46 54 28 50 0 20 49 64 87 60 77 100
30 7 64 52 0.34412 10.90978 46 54 28 50 0 20 49 64 87 60 77 100
30 8 87 50 0.33403 10.45165 46 54 28 50 0 20 49 64 87 60 77 100
30 9 60 52 0.34627 10.73142 46 54 28 50 0 20 49 64 87 60 77 100
30 10 77 51 0.33803 10.35646 46 54 28 50 0 20 49 64 87 60 77 100
30 11 100 49 0.32725 10.46830 46 54 28 50 0 20 49 64 87 60 77 100
31 0 100 48 0.33367 10.60475 100 48 71 50 50 50 50 59 48 51 50 0
31 1 48 53 0.35072 11.05251 100 48 71 50 50 50 50 59 48 51 50 0
31 2 71 51 0.34216 10.71470 100 48 71 50 50 50 50 59 48 51 50 0
31 3 50 52 0.35000 11.33525 100 48 71 50 50 50 50 59 48 51 50 0
31 4 50 52 0.35000 10.58988 100 48 71 50 50 50 50 59 48 51 50 0
31 5 50 52 0.35000 10.67827 100 48 71 50 50 50 50 59 48 51 50 0
31 6 50 52 0.35000 10.74425 100 48 71 50 50 50 50 59 48 51 50 0
31 7 59 52 0.34674 11.25653 100 48 71 50 50 50 50 59 48 51 50 0
31 8 48 53 0.35072 10.80238 100 48 71 50 50 50 50 59 48 51 50 0
31 9 51 52 0.34973 11.08115 100 48 71 50 50 50 50 59 48 51 50 0
31 10 50 52 0.35000 10.70646 100 48 71 50 50 50 50 59 48 51 50 0
31 11 0 57 0.36575 10.83405 100 48 71 50 50 50 50 59 48 51 50 0
32 0 100 43 0.36575 10.97050 100 48 30 50 100 20 45 34 48 50 51 0
32 1 48 48 0.34944 11.40195 100 48 30 50 100 20 45 34 48 50 51 0
32 2 30 50 0.34533 11.06003 100 48 30 50 100 20 45 34 48 50 51 0
32 3 50 48 0.35000 11.68525 100 48 30 50 100 20 45 34 48 50 51 0
32 4 100 43 0.36575 10.95563 100 48 30 50 100 20 45 34 48 50 51 0
32 5 20 51 0.34335 11.02162 100 48 30 50 100 20 45 34 48 50 51 0
32 6 45 48 0.34842 11.09268 100 48 30 50 100 20 45 34 48 50 51 0
32 7 34 49 0.34496 11.60149 100 48 30 50 100 20 45 34 48 50 51 0
32 8 48 48 0.34944 11.15182 100 48 30 50 100 20 45 34 48 50 51 0
32 9 50 48 0.35000 11.43115 100 48 30 50 100 20 45 34 48 50 51 0
32 10 51 48 0.35025 11.05671 100 48 30 50 100 20 45 34 48 50 51 0
32 11 0 52 0.33367 11.16772 100 48 30 50 100 20 45 34 48 50 51 0
33 0 100 48 0.33367 11.30417 100 50 56 52 0 50 50 56 7 54 48 100
33 1 50 52 0.35000 11.75195 100 50 56 52 0 50 50 56 7 54 48 100
33 2 56 52 0.34804 11.40807 100 50 56 52 0 50 50 56 7 54 48 100
33 3 52 52 0.34944 12.03469 100 50 56 52 0 50 50 56 7 54 48 100
33 4 0 57 0.36575 11.32138 100 50 56 52 0 50 50 56 7 54 48 100
33 5 50 52 0.35000 11.37162 100 50 56 52 0 50 50 56 7 54 48 100
33 6 50 52 0.35000 11.44268 100 50 56 52 0 50 50 56 7 54 48 100
33 7 56 52 0.34804 11.94953 100 50 56 52 0 50 50 56 7 54 48 100
33 8 7 56 0.36154 11.51335 100 50 56 52 0 50 50 56 7 54 48 100
33 9 54 52 0.34879 11.77994 100 50 56 52 0 50 50 56 7 54 48 100
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33 10 48 52 0.35047 11.40718 100 50 56 52 0 50 50 56 7 54 48 100
33 11 100 48 0.33367 11.50138 100 50 56 52 0 50 50 56 7 54 48 100
34 0 31 62 0.37505 11.67922 31 49 50 50 82 50 61 45 88 50 52 100
34 1 49 60 0.35127 12.10322 31 49 50 50 82 50 61 45 88 50 52 100
34 2 50 60 0.35000 11.75807 31 49 50 50 82 50 61 45 88 50 52 100
34 3 50 60 0.35000 12.38469 31 49 50 50 82 50 61 45 88 50 52 100
34 4 82 57 0.30931 11.63068 31 49 50 50 82 50 61 45 88 50 52 100
34 5 50 60 0.35000 11.72162 31 49 50 50 82 50 61 45 88 50 52 100
34 6 61 59 0.33588 11.77856 31 49 50 50 82 50 61 45 88 50 52 100
34 7 45 60 0.35613 12.30565 31 49 50 50 82 50 61 45 88 50 52 100
34 8 88 56 0.30389 11.81725 31 49 50 50 82 50 61 45 88 50 52 100
34 9 50 60 0.35000 12.12994 31 49 50 50 82 50 61 45 88 50 52 100
34 10 52 60 0.34739 11.75456 31 49 50 50 82 50 61 45 88 50 52 100
34 11 100 55 0.28875 11.79013 31 49 50 50 82 50 61 45 88 50 52 100
35 0 15 39 0.28630 11.96552 15 44 17 52 80 50 0 38 50 40 55 0
35 1 44 36 0.33880 12.44202 15 44 17 52 80 50 0 38 50 40 55 0
35 2 17 39 0.29071 12.04878 15 44 17 52 80 50 0 38 50 40 55 0
35 3 52 35 0.35380 12.73850 15 44 17 52 80 50 0 38 50 40 55 0
35 4 80 33 0.40495 12.03564 15 44 17 52 80 50 0 38 50 40 55 0
35 5 50 36 0.35000 12.07162 15 44 17 52 80 50 0 38 50 40 55 0
35 6 0 40 0.25667 12.03523 15 44 17 52 80 50 0 38 50 40 55 0
35 7 38 37 0.32830 12.63395 15 44 17 52 80 50 0 38 50 40 55 0
35 8 50 36 0.35000 12.16725 15 44 17 52 80 50 0 38 50 40 55 0
35 9 40 36 0.33087 12.46080 15 44 17 52 80 50 0 38 50 40 55 0
35 10 55 35 0.35933 12.11390 15 44 17 52 80 50 0 38 50 40 55 0
35 11 0 40 0.25667 12.04680 15 44 17 52 80 50 0 38 50 40 55 0
36 0 100 48 0.33367 12.29918 100 52 95 27 100 0 50 59 48 55 38 0
36 1 52 52 0.34944 12.79146 100 52 95 27 100 0 50 59 48 55 38 0
36 2 95 48 0.33792 12.38671 100 52 95 27 100 0 50 59 48 55 38 0
36 3 27 54 0.35564 13.09413 100 52 95 27 100 0 50 59 48 55 38 0
36 4 100 48 0.33367 12.36930 100 52 95 27 100 0 50 59 48 55 38 0
36 5 0 57 0.36575 12.43737 100 52 95 27 100 0 50 59 48 55 38 0
36 6 50 52 0.35000 12.38523 100 52 95 27 100 0 50 59 48 55 38 0
36 7 59 51 0.34790 12.98185 100 52 95 27 100 0 50 59 48 55 38 0
36 8 48 52 0.35047 12.51771 100 52 95 27 100 0 50 59 48 55 38 0
36 9 55 52 0.34842 12.80923 100 52 95 27 100 0 50 59 48 55 38 0
36 10 38 53 0.35294 12.46684 100 52 95 27 100 0 50 59 48 55 38 0
36 11 0 57 0.36575 12.41255 100 52 95 27 100 0 50 59 48 55 38 0
37 0 50 55 0.35000 12.64918 50 50 42 50 50 100 50 58 54 45 53 50
37 1 50 55 0.35000 13.14146 50 50 42 50 50 100 50 58 54 45 53 50
37 2 42 55 0.35439 12.74110 50 50 42 50 50 100 50 58 54 45 53 50
37 3 50 55 0.35000 13.44413 50 50 42 50 50 100 50 58 54 45 53 50
37 4 50 55 0.35000 12.71930 50 50 42 50 50 100 50 58 54 45 53 50
37 5 100 50 0.32083 12.75820 50 50 42 50 50 100 50 58 54 45 53 50
37 6 50 55 0.35000 12.73523 50 50 42 50 50 100 50 58 54 45 53 50
37 7 58 54 0.34515 13.32700 50 50 42 50 50 100 50 58 54 45 53 50
37 8 54 54 0.34776 12.86547 50 50 42 50 50 100 50 58 54 45 53 50
37 9 45 55 0.35292 13.16215 50 50 42 50 50 100 50 58 54 45 53 50
37 10 53 54 0.34835 12.81519 50 50 42 50 50 100 50 58 54 45 53 50
37 11 50 55 0.35000 12.76255 50 50 42 50 50 100 50 58 54 45 53 50
38 0 100 49 0.32725 12.97643 100 45 3 50 100 50 61 50 48 40 36 56
38 1 45 54 0.35228 13.49374 100 45 3 50 100 50 61 50 48 40 36 56
38 2 3 58 0.37248 13.11358 100 45 3 50 100 50 61 50 48 40 36 56
38 3 50 54 0.35000 13.79413 100 45 3 50 100 50 61 50 48 40 36 56
38 4 100 49 0.32725 13.04655 100 45 3 50 100 50 61 50 48 40 36 56
38 5 50 54 0.35000 13.10820 100 45 3 50 100 50 61 50 48 40 36 56
38 6 61 53 0.34435 13.07958 100 45 3 50 100 50 61 50 48 40 36 56
38 7 50 54 0.35000 13.67700 100 45 3 50 100 50 61 50 48 40 36 56
38 8 48 54 0.35098 13.21645 100 45 3 50 100 50 61 50 48 40 36 56
38 9 40 54 0.35397 13.51611 100 45 3 50 100 50 61 50 48 40 36 56
38 10 36 55 0.35670 13.17189 100 45 3 50 100 50 61 50 48 40 36 56
38 11 56 53 0.34727 13.10982 100 45 3 50 100 50 61 50 48 40 36 56
39 0 100 60 0.25667 13.23310 100 49 86 50 50 50 50 50 87 40 50 96
39 1 49 64 0.35179 13.84552 100 49 86 50 50 50 50 50 87 40 50 96
39 2 86 61 0.28406 13.39764 100 49 86 50 50 50 50 50 87 40 50 96
39 3 50 64 0.35000 14.14413 100 49 86 50 50 50 50 50 87 40 50 96
39 4 50 64 0.35000 13.39655 100 49 86 50 50 50 50 50 87 40 50 96
39 5 50 64 0.35000 13.45820 100 49 86 50 50 50 50 50 87 40 50 96
39 6 50 64 0.35000 13.42958 100 49 86 50 50 50 50 50 87 40 50 96
39 7 50 64 0.35000 14.02700 100 49 86 50 50 50 50 50 87 40 50 96
39 8 87 61 0.28180 13.49825 100 49 86 50 50 50 50 50 87 40 50 96
39 9 40 65 0.36808 13.88420 100 49 86 50 50 50 50 50 87 40 50 96
39 10 50 64 0.35000 13.52189 100 49 86 50 50 50 50 50 87 40 50 96
39 11 96 60 0.26628 13.37610 100 49 86 50 50 50 50 50 87 40 50 96
40 0 100 64 0.23100 13.46410 100 55 9 71 100 100 100 6 50 33 85 100
40 1 55 69 0.33752 14.18304 100 55 9 71 100 100 100 6 50 33 85 100
40 2 9 73 0.45141 13.84904 100 55 9 71 100 100 100 6 50 33 85 100
40 3 71 67 0.29904 14.44317 100 55 9 71 100 100 100 6 50 33 85 100
40 4 100 64 0.23100 13.62755 100 55 9 71 100 100 100 6 50 33 85 100
40 5 100 64 0.23100 13.68920 100 55 9 71 100 100 100 6 50 33 85 100
40 6 100 64 0.23100 13.66058 100 55 9 71 100 100 100 6 50 33 85 100
40 7 6 73 0.45729 14.48428 100 55 9 71 100 100 100 6 50 33 85 100
40 8 50 69 0.35000 13.84825 100 55 9 71 100 100 100 6 50 33 85 100
40 9 33 71 0.39244 14.27664 100 55 9 71 100 100 100 6 50 33 85 100
40 10 85 66 0.26384 13.78573 100 55 9 71 100 100 100 6 50 33 85 100
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Table XXXIX.: (continued)
Round Player OwnM MS Earn SubTot Pl0 Pl1 Pl2 Pl3 Pl4 Pl5 Pl6 Pl7 Pl8 Pl9 Pl10 Pl11
40 11 100 64 0.23100 13.60710 100 55 9 71 100 100 100 6 50 33 85 100
41 0 100 45 0.35292 13.81702 100 44 2 50 100 0 50 9 61 27 51 100
41 1 44 50 0.34958 14.53262 100 44 2 50 100 0 50 9 61 27 51 100
41 2 2 54 0.34776 14.19680 100 44 2 50 100 0 50 9 61 27 51 100
41 3 50 49 0.35000 14.79317 100 44 2 50 100 0 50 9 61 27 51 100
41 4 100 45 0.35292 13.98047 100 44 2 50 100 0 50 9 61 27 51 100
41 5 0 54 0.34650 14.03570 100 44 2 50 100 0 50 9 61 27 51 100
41 6 50 49 0.35000 14.01058 100 44 2 50 100 0 50 9 61 27 51 100
41 7 9 53 0.34617 14.83046 100 44 2 50 100 0 50 9 61 27 51 100
41 8 61 48 0.35141 14.19966 100 44 2 50 100 0 50 9 61 27 51 100
41 9 27 52 0.34973 14.62637 100 44 2 50 100 0 50 9 61 27 51 100
41 10 51 49 0.35012 14.13585 100 44 2 50 100 0 50 9 61 27 51 100
41 11 100 45 0.35292 13.96002 100 44 2 50 100 0 50 9 61 27 51 100
42 0 100 41 0.37858 14.19560 100 51 88 50 26 50 0 10 55 50 72 0
42 1 51 46 0.35050 14.88312 100 51 88 50 26 50 0 10 55 50 72 0
42 2 88 42 0.37217 14.56897 100 51 88 50 26 50 0 10 55 50 72 0
42 3 50 46 0.35000 15.14317 100 51 88 50 26 50 0 10 55 50 72 0
42 4 26 48 0.33712 14.31759 100 51 88 50 26 50 0 10 55 50 72 0
42 5 50 46 0.35000 14.38570 100 51 88 50 26 50 0 10 55 50 72 0
42 6 0 50 0.32083 14.33141 100 51 88 50 26 50 0 10 55 50 72 0
42 7 10 49 0.32620 15.15666 100 51 88 50 26 50 0 10 55 50 72 0
42 8 55 45 0.35292 14.55258 100 51 88 50 26 50 0 10 55 50 72 0
42 9 50 46 0.35000 14.97637 100 51 88 50 26 50 0 10 55 50 72 0
42 10 72 44 0.36129 14.49714 100 51 88 50 26 50 0 10 55 50 72 0
42 11 0 50 0.32083 14.28085 100 51 88 50 26 50 0 10 55 50 72 0
43 0 100 38 0.39783 14.59343 100 50 25 50 20 0 100 10 55 55 50 0
43 1 50 42 0.35000 15.23312 100 50 25 50 20 0 100 10 55 55 50 0
43 2 25 45 0.32667 14.89564 100 50 25 50 20 0 100 10 55 55 50 0
43 3 50 42 0.35000 15.49317 100 50 25 50 20 0 100 10 55 55 50 0
43 4 20 45 0.32025 14.63784 100 50 25 50 20 0 100 10 55 55 50 0
43 5 0 47 0.30158 14.68728 100 50 25 50 20 0 100 10 55 55 50 0
43 6 100 38 0.39783 14.72925 100 50 25 50 20 0 100 10 55 55 50 0
43 7 10 46 0.31080 15.46746 100 50 25 50 20 0 100 10 55 55 50 0
43 8 55 42 0.35484 14.90742 100 50 25 50 20 0 100 10 55 55 50 0
43 9 55 42 0.35484 15.33121 100 50 25 50 20 0 100 10 55 55 50 0
43 10 50 42 0.35000 14.84714 100 50 25 50 20 0 100 10 55 55 50 0
43 11 0 47 0.30158 14.58243 100 50 25 50 20 0 100 10 55 55 50 0
44 0 100 45 0.35292 14.94635 100 50 67 50 20 50 0 89 49 60 65 0
44 1 50 50 0.35000 15.58312 100 50 67 50 20 50 0 89 49 60 65 0
44 2 67 48 0.35099 15.24663 100 50 67 50 20 50 0 89 49 60 65 0
44 3 50 50 0.35000 15.84317 100 50 67 50 20 50 0 89 49 60 65 0
44 4 20 53 0.35105 14.98889 100 50 67 50 20 50 0 89 49 60 65 0
44 5 50 50 0.35000 15.03728 100 50 67 50 20 50 0 89 49 60 65 0
44 6 0 55 0.35292 15.08216 100 50 67 50 20 50 0 89 49 60 65 0
44 7 89 46 0.35228 15.81973 100 50 67 50 20 50 0 89 49 60 65 0
44 8 49 50 0.34999 15.25741 100 50 67 50 20 50 0 89 49 60 65 0
44 9 60 49 0.35012 15.68133 100 50 67 50 20 50 0 89 49 60 65 0
44 10 65 49 0.34930 15.19644 100 50 67 50 20 50 0 89 49 60 65 0
44 11 0 55 0.35292 14.93535 100 50 67 50 20 50 0 89 49 60 65 0
45 0 72 49 0.34718 15.29353 72 48 50 50 50 50 50 82 57 55 50 0
45 1 48 51 0.35021 15.93333 72 48 50 50 50 50 50 82 57 55 50 0
45 2 50 51 0.35000 15.59663 72 48 50 50 50 50 50 82 57 55 50 0
45 3 50 51 0.35000 16.19317 72 48 50 50 50 50 50 82 57 55 50 0
45 4 50 51 0.35000 15.33889 72 48 50 50 50 50 50 82 57 55 50 0
45 5 50 51 0.35000 15.38728 72 48 50 50 50 50 50 82 57 55 50 0
45 6 50 51 0.35000 15.43216 72 48 50 50 50 50 50 82 57 55 50 0
45 7 82 48 0.34627 16.16600 72 48 50 50 50 50 50 82 57 55 50 0
45 8 57 51 0.34853 15.60594 72 48 50 50 50 50 50 82 57 55 50 0
45 9 55 51 0.34907 16.03040 72 48 50 50 50 50 50 82 57 55 50 0
45 10 50 51 0.35000 15.54644 72 48 50 50 50 50 50 82 57 55 50 0
45 11 0 56 0.35933 15.29468 72 48 50 50 50 50 50 82 57 55 50 0
46 0 0 48 0.30800 15.60153 0 47 13 50 50 50 61 76 41 50 50 35
46 1 47 43 0.34720 16.28053 0 47 13 50 50 50 61 76 41 50 50 35
46 2 13 46 0.31503 15.91166 0 47 13 50 50 50 61 76 41 50 50 35
46 3 50 43 0.35000 16.54317 0 47 13 50 50 50 61 76 41 50 50 35
46 4 50 43 0.35000 15.68889 0 47 13 50 50 50 61 76 41 50 50 35
46 5 50 43 0.35000 15.73728 0 47 13 50 50 50 61 76 41 50 50 35
46 6 61 42 0.35988 15.79204 0 47 13 50 50 50 61 76 41 50 50 35
46 7 76 41 0.37214 16.53814 0 47 13 50 50 50 61 76 41 50 50 35
46 8 41 44 0.34212 15.94806 0 47 13 50 50 50 61 76 41 50 50 35
46 9 50 43 0.35000 16.38040 0 47 13 50 50 50 61 76 41 50 50 35
46 10 50 43 0.35000 15.89644 0 47 13 50 50 50 61 76 41 50 50 35
46 11 35 44 0.33582 15.63051 0 47 13 50 50 50 61 76 41 50 50 35
47 0 100 49 0.32725 15.92878 100 50 78 50 0 50 50 93 50 45 50 24
47 1 50 54 0.35000 16.63053 100 50 78 50 0 50 50 93 50 45 50 24
47 2 78 51 0.33726 16.24892 100 50 78 50 0 50 50 93 50 45 50 24
47 3 50 54 0.35000 16.89317 100 50 78 50 0 50 50 93 50 45 50 24
47 4 0 58 0.37217 16.06105 100 50 78 50 0 50 50 93 50 45 50 24
47 5 50 54 0.35000 16.08728 100 50 78 50 0 50 50 93 50 45 50 24
47 6 50 54 0.35000 16.14204 100 50 78 50 0 50 50 93 50 45 50 24
47 7 93 50 0.32843 16.86657 100 50 78 50 0 50 50 93 50 45 50 24
47 8 50 54 0.35000 16.29806 100 50 78 50 0 50 50 93 50 45 50 24
47 9 45 54 0.35228 16.73267 100 50 78 50 0 50 50 93 50 45 50 24
47 10 50 54 0.35000 16.24644 100 50 78 50 0 50 50 93 50 45 50 24
47 11 24 56 0.36213 15.99264 100 50 78 50 0 50 50 93 50 45 50 24
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Table XXXIX.: (continued)
Round Player OwnM MS Earn SubTot Pl0 Pl1 Pl2 Pl3 Pl4 Pl5 Pl6 Pl7 Pl8 Pl9 Pl10 Pl11
48 0 100 35 0.41708 16.34586 100 49 3 50 81 0 0 64 49 39 50 0
48 1 49 40 0.34870 16.97923 100 49 3 50 81 0 0 64 49 39 50 0
48 2 3 44 0.28804 16.53696 100 49 3 50 81 0 0 64 49 39 50 0
48 3 50 40 0.35000 17.24317 100 49 3 50 81 0 0 64 49 39 50 0
48 4 81 37 0.39051 16.45156 100 49 3 50 81 0 0 64 49 39 50 0
48 5 0 44 0.28233 16.36961 100 49 3 50 81 0 0 64 49 39 50 0
48 6 0 44 0.28233 16.42438 100 49 3 50 81 0 0 64 49 39 50 0
48 7 64 38 0.36927 17.23584 100 49 3 50 81 0 0 64 49 39 50 0
48 8 49 40 0.34870 16.64677 100 49 3 50 81 0 0 64 49 39 50 0
48 9 39 41 0.33588 17.06855 100 49 3 50 81 0 0 64 49 39 50 0
48 10 50 40 0.35000 16.59644 100 49 3 50 81 0 0 64 49 39 50 0
48 11 0 44 0.28233 16.27497 100 49 3 50 81 0 0 64 49 39 50 0
49 0 100 45 0.35292 16.69878 100 50 3 50 22 50 50 92 49 50 78 0
49 1 50 49 0.35000 17.32923 100 50 3 50 22 50 50 92 49 50 78 0
49 2 3 54 0.34835 16.88532 100 50 3 50 22 50 50 92 49 50 78 0
49 3 50 49 0.35000 17.59317 100 50 3 50 22 50 50 92 49 50 78 0
49 4 22 52 0.34804 16.79960 100 50 3 50 22 50 50 92 49 50 78 0
49 5 50 49 0.35000 16.71961 100 50 3 50 22 50 50 92 49 50 78 0
49 6 50 49 0.35000 16.77438 100 50 3 50 22 50 50 92 49 50 78 0
49 7 92 46 0.35098 17.58682 100 50 3 50 22 50 50 92 49 50 78 0
49 8 49 50 0.34999 16.99676 100 50 3 50 22 50 50 92 49 50 78 0
49 9 50 49 0.35000 17.41855 100 50 3 50 22 50 50 92 49 50 78 0
49 10 78 47 0.35163 16.94807 100 50 3 50 22 50 50 92 49 50 78 0
49 11 0 54 0.34650 16.62147 100 50 3 50 22 50 50 92 49 50 78 0
Table XL.: Data from experiments: 12 small suppliers - no transport costs - Cohort 5
Round Player OwnM MS Earn SubTot Pl0 Pl1 Pl2 Pl3 Pl4 Pl5 Pl6 Pl7 Pl8 Pl9 Pl10 Pl11
0 0 76 36 0.38883 0.38883 76 38 0 52 10 50 100 50 2 76 17 0
0 1 38 39 0.33138 0.33138 76 38 0 52 10 50 100 50 2 76 17 0
0 2 0 43 0.27592 0.27592 76 38 0 52 10 50 100 50 2 76 17 0
0 3 52 38 0.35303 0.35303 76 38 0 52 10 50 100 50 2 76 17 0
0 4 10 42 0.29027 0.29027 76 38 0 52 10 50 100 50 2 76 17 0
0 5 50 38 0.35000 0.35000 76 38 0 52 10 50 100 50 2 76 17 0
0 6 100 34 0.42350 0.42350 76 38 0 52 10 50 100 50 2 76 17 0
0 7 50 38 0.35000 0.35000 76 38 0 52 10 50 100 50 2 76 17 0
0 8 2 43 0.28000 0.28000 76 38 0 52 10 50 100 50 2 76 17 0
0 9 76 36 0.38883 0.38883 76 38 0 52 10 50 100 50 2 76 17 0
0 10 17 41 0.29918 0.29918 76 38 0 52 10 50 100 50 2 76 17 0
0 11 0 43 0.27592 0.27592 76 38 0 52 10 50 100 50 2 76 17 0
1 0 86 36 0.39956 0.78839 86 24 50 53 13 70 36 5 43 79 19 0
1 1 24 41 0.31208 0.64346 86 24 50 53 13 70 36 5 43 79 19 0
1 2 50 39 0.35000 0.62592 86 24 50 53 13 70 36 5 43 79 19 0
1 3 53 39 0.35413 0.70716 86 24 50 53 13 70 36 5 43 79 19 0
1 4 13 42 0.29604 0.58631 86 24 50 53 13 70 36 5 43 79 19 0
1 5 70 37 0.37870 0.72870 86 24 50 53 13 70 36 5 43 79 19 0
1 6 36 40 0.32975 0.75325 86 24 50 53 13 70 36 5 43 79 19 0
1 7 5 43 0.28595 0.63595 86 24 50 53 13 70 36 5 43 79 19 0
1 8 43 40 0.34044 0.62044 86 24 50 53 13 70 36 5 43 79 19 0
1 9 79 36 0.39229 0.78112 86 24 50 53 13 70 36 5 43 79 19 0
1 10 19 42 0.30696 0.60614 86 24 50 53 13 70 36 5 43 79 19 0
1 11 0 43 0.27592 0.55183 86 24 50 53 13 70 36 5 43 79 19 0
2 0 100 76 0.15400 0.94239 100 85 100 61 100 80 43 60 97 100 88 20
2 1 85 77 0.21443 0.85790 100 85 100 61 100 80 43 60 97 100 88 20
2 2 100 76 0.15400 0.77992 100 85 100 61 100 80 43 60 97 100 88 20
2 3 61 79 0.30765 1.01481 100 85 100 61 100 80 43 60 97 100 88 20
2 4 100 76 0.15400 0.74031 100 85 100 61 100 80 43 60 97 100 88 20
2 5 80 78 0.23170 0.96040 100 85 100 61 100 80 43 60 97 100 88 20
2 6 43 81 0.37728 1.13052 100 85 100 61 100 80 43 60 97 100 88 20
2 7 60 79 0.31162 0.94757 100 85 100 61 100 80 43 60 97 100 88 20
2 8 97 76 0.16740 0.78785 100 85 100 61 100 80 43 60 97 100 88 20
2 9 100 76 0.15400 0.93512 100 85 100 61 100 80 43 60 97 100 88 20
2 10 88 77 0.20148 0.80762 100 85 100 61 100 80 43 60 97 100 88 20
2 11 20 83 0.46655 1.01838 100 85 100 61 100 80 43 60 97 100 88 20
3 0 0 33 0.21175 1.15414 0 50 0 11 10 60 100 30 35 23 16 24
3 1 50 28 0.35000 1.20790 0 50 0 11 10 60 100 30 35 23 16 24
3 2 0 33 0.21175 0.99167 0 50 0 11 10 60 100 30 35 23 16 24
3 3 11 32 0.24216 1.25698 0 50 0 11 10 60 100 30 35 23 16 24
3 4 10 32 0.23893 0.97924 0 50 0 11 10 60 100 30 35 23 16 24
3 5 60 27 0.37835 1.33875 0 50 0 11 10 60 100 30 35 23 16 24
3 6 100 24 0.48767 1.61819 0 50 0 11 10 60 100 30 35 23 16 24
3 7 30 30 0.29400 1.24157 0 50 0 11 10 60 100 30 35 23 16 24
3 8 35 29 0.30695 1.09480 0 50 0 11 10 60 100 30 35 23 16 24
3 9 23 31 0.27566 1.21078 0 50 0 11 10 60 100 30 35 23 16 24
3 10 16 31 0.25361 1.06123 0 50 0 11 10 60 100 30 35 23 16 24
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Table XL.: (continued)
Round Player OwnM MS Earn SubTot Pl0 Pl1 Pl2 Pl3 Pl4 Pl5 Pl6 Pl7 Pl8 Pl9 Pl10 Pl11
3 11 24 30 0.27538 1.29376 0 50 0 11 10 60 100 30 35 23 16 24
4 0 28 45 0.33024 1.48437 28 11 50 50 10 28 100 50 30 55 15 100
4 1 11 47 0.31724 1.52514 28 11 50 50 10 28 100 50 30 55 15 100
4 2 50 43 0.35000 1.34167 28 11 50 50 10 28 100 50 30 55 15 100
4 3 50 43 0.35000 1.60698 28 11 50 50 10 28 100 50 30 55 15 100
4 4 10 47 0.31593 1.29517 28 11 50 50 10 28 100 50 30 55 15 100
4 5 28 45 0.33024 1.66899 28 11 50 50 10 28 100 50 30 55 15 100
4 6 100 39 0.39142 2.00961 28 11 50 50 10 28 100 50 30 55 15 100
4 7 50 43 0.35000 1.59157 28 11 50 50 10 28 100 50 30 55 15 100
4 8 30 45 0.33250 1.42730 28 11 50 50 10 28 100 50 30 55 15 100
4 9 55 43 0.35420 1.56498 28 11 50 50 10 28 100 50 30 55 15 100
4 10 15 47 0.32223 1.38347 28 11 50 50 10 28 100 50 30 55 15 100
4 11 100 39 0.39142 1.68518 28 11 50 50 10 28 100 50 30 55 15 100
5 0 70 48 0.35047 1.83484 70 32 50 56 10 55 45 80 64 24 16 95
5 1 32 51 0.34853 1.87367 70 32 50 56 10 55 45 80 64 24 16 95
5 2 50 50 0.35000 1.69167 70 32 50 56 10 55 45 80 64 24 16 95
5 3 56 49 0.35035 1.95733 70 32 50 56 10 55 45 80 64 24 16 95
5 4 10 53 0.34673 1.64191 70 32 50 56 10 55 45 80 64 24 16 95
5 5 55 49 0.35035 2.01934 70 32 50 56 10 55 45 80 64 24 16 95
5 6 45 50 0.34971 2.35932 70 32 50 56 10 55 45 80 64 24 16 95
5 7 80 47 0.35105 1.94262 70 32 50 56 10 55 45 80 64 24 16 95
5 8 64 48 0.35131 1.77861 70 32 50 56 10 55 45 80 64 24 16 95
5 9 24 52 0.34879 1.91376 70 32 50 56 10 55 45 80 64 24 16 95
5 10 16 53 0.34960 1.73307 70 32 50 56 10 55 45 80 64 24 16 95
5 11 95 46 0.34947 2.03465 70 32 50 56 10 55 45 80 64 24 16 95
6 0 26 53 0.35252 2.18736 26 70 50 25 100 65 21 50 45 50 2 100
6 1 70 49 0.34790 2.22157 26 70 50 25 100 65 21 50 45 50 2 100
6 2 50 50 0.35000 2.04167 26 70 50 25 100 65 21 50 45 50 2 100
6 3 25 53 0.35233 2.30966 26 70 50 25 100 65 21 50 45 50 2 100
6 4 100 46 0.34650 1.98841 26 70 50 25 100 65 21 50 45 50 2 100
6 5 65 49 0.34930 2.36864 26 70 50 25 100 65 21 50 45 50 2 100
6 6 21 53 0.35135 2.71067 26 70 50 25 100 65 21 50 45 50 2 100
6 7 50 50 0.35000 2.29262 26 70 50 25 100 65 21 50 45 50 2 100
6 8 45 51 0.35035 2.12896 26 70 50 25 100 65 21 50 45 50 2 100
6 9 50 50 0.35000 2.26376 26 70 50 25 100 65 21 50 45 50 2 100
6 10 2 55 0.35392 2.08699 26 70 50 25 100 65 21 50 45 50 2 100
6 11 100 46 0.34650 2.38115 26 70 50 25 100 65 21 50 45 50 2 100
7 0 46 60 0.35495 2.54231 46 70 50 100 100 50 76 50 62 50 48 0
7 1 70 57 0.32737 2.54893 46 70 50 100 100 50 76 50 62 50 48 0
7 2 50 59 0.35000 2.39167 46 70 50 100 100 50 76 50 62 50 48 0
7 3 100 55 0.28875 2.59841 46 70 50 100 100 50 76 50 62 50 48 0
7 4 100 55 0.28875 2.27716 46 70 50 100 100 50 76 50 62 50 48 0
7 5 50 59 0.35000 2.71864 46 70 50 100 100 50 76 50 62 50 48 0
7 6 76 57 0.31876 3.02943 46 70 50 100 100 50 76 50 62 50 48 0
7 7 50 59 0.35000 2.64262 46 70 50 100 100 50 76 50 62 50 48 0
7 8 62 58 0.33600 2.46496 46 70 50 100 100 50 76 50 62 50 48 0
7 9 50 59 0.35000 2.61376 46 70 50 100 100 50 76 50 62 50 48 0
7 10 48 59 0.35226 2.43925 46 70 50 100 100 50 76 50 62 50 48 0
7 11 0 64 0.41067 2.79182 46 70 50 100 100 50 76 50 62 50 48 0
8 0 14 41 0.29330 2.83561 14 36 50 66 100 70 10 80 31 3 0 0
8 1 36 39 0.32795 2.87688 14 36 50 66 100 70 10 80 31 3 0 0
8 2 50 37 0.35000 2.74167 14 36 50 66 100 70 10 80 31 3 0 0
8 3 66 36 0.37576 2.97417 14 36 50 66 100 70 10 80 31 3 0 0
8 4 100 33 0.42992 2.70707 14 36 50 66 100 70 10 80 31 3 0 0
8 5 70 35 0.38383 3.10247 14 36 50 66 100 70 10 80 31 3 0 0
8 6 10 41 0.28513 3.31456 14 36 50 66 100 70 10 80 31 3 0 0
8 7 80 35 0.39725 3.03987 14 36 50 66 100 70 10 80 31 3 0 0
8 8 31 39 0.31897 2.78392 14 36 50 66 100 70 10 80 31 3 0 0
8 9 3 42 0.27597 2.88974 14 36 50 66 100 70 10 80 31 3 0 0
8 10 0 42 0.26950 2.70875 14 36 50 66 100 70 10 80 31 3 0 0
8 11 0 42 0.26950 3.06132 14 36 50 66 100 70 10 80 31 3 0 0
9 0 74 37 0.38332 3.21893 74 21 50 81 0 30 26 40 40 21 100 0
9 1 21 42 0.31041 3.18730 74 21 50 81 0 30 26 40 40 21 100 0
9 2 50 39 0.35000 3.09167 74 21 50 81 0 30 26 40 40 21 100 0
9 3 81 37 0.39051 3.36468 74 21 50 81 0 30 26 40 40 21 100 0
9 4 0 44 0.28233 2.98941 74 21 50 81 0 30 26 40 40 21 100 0
9 5 30 41 0.32223 3.42470 74 21 50 81 0 30 26 40 40 21 100 0
9 6 26 42 0.31864 3.63320 74 21 50 81 0 30 26 40 40 21 100 0
9 7 40 40 0.33600 3.37587 74 21 50 81 0 30 26 40 40 21 100 0
9 8 40 40 0.33600 3.11992 74 21 50 81 0 30 26 40 40 21 100 0
9 9 21 42 0.31041 3.20015 74 21 50 81 0 30 26 40 40 21 100 0
9 10 100 35 0.41708 3.12584 74 21 50 81 0 30 26 40 40 21 100 0
9 11 0 44 0.28233 3.34365 74 21 50 81 0 30 26 40 40 21 100 0
10 0 100 29 0.45558 3.67451 100 1 0 26 5 50 42 50 30 16 100 0
10 1 1 38 0.24653 3.43383 100 1 0 26 5 50 42 50 30 16 100 0
10 2 0 38 0.24383 3.33550 100 1 0 26 5 50 42 50 30 16 100 0
10 3 26 36 0.30016 3.66484 100 1 0 26 5 50 42 50 30 16 100 0
10 4 5 38 0.25707 3.24648 100 1 0 26 5 50 42 50 30 16 100 0
10 5 50 34 0.35000 3.77470 100 1 0 26 5 50 42 50 30 16 100 0
10 6 42 34 0.33283 3.96603 100 1 0 26 5 50 42 50 30 16 100 0
10 7 50 34 0.35000 3.72587 100 1 0 26 5 50 42 50 30 16 100 0
10 8 30 35 0.30683 3.42676 100 1 0 26 5 50 42 50 30 16 100 0
10 9 16 37 0.27979 3.47994 100 1 0 26 5 50 42 50 30 16 100 0
10 10 100 29 0.45558 3.58142 100 1 0 26 5 50 42 50 30 16 100 0
10 11 0 38 0.24383 3.58749 100 1 0 26 5 50 42 50 30 16 100 0
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Table XL.: (continued)
Round Player OwnM MS Earn SubTot Pl0 Pl1 Pl2 Pl3 Pl4 Pl5 Pl6 Pl7 Pl8 Pl9 Pl10 Pl11
11 0 75 67 0.28817 3.96268 75 99 0 100 50 1 60 50 93 90 100 99
11 1 99 65 0.22766 3.66149 75 99 0 100 50 1 60 50 93 90 100 99
11 2 0 74 0.47483 3.81033 75 99 0 100 50 1 60 50 93 90 100 99
11 3 100 65 0.22458 3.88942 75 99 0 100 50 1 60 50 93 90 100 99
11 4 50 70 0.35000 3.59648 75 99 0 100 50 1 60 50 93 90 100 99
11 5 1 74 0.47291 4.24761 75 99 0 100 50 1 60 50 93 90 100 99
11 6 60 69 0.32445 4.29048 75 99 0 100 50 1 60 50 93 90 100 99
11 7 50 70 0.35000 4.07587 75 99 0 100 50 1 60 50 93 90 100 99
11 8 93 66 0.24013 3.66689 75 99 0 100 50 1 60 50 93 90 100 99
11 9 90 66 0.24920 3.72914 75 99 0 100 50 1 60 50 93 90 100 99
11 10 100 65 0.22458 3.80600 75 99 0 100 50 1 60 50 93 90 100 99
11 11 99 65 0.22766 3.81515 75 99 0 100 50 1 60 50 93 90 100 99
12 0 0 53 0.34008 4.30276 0 62 100 50 100 50 19 100 75 23 1 4
12 1 62 47 0.35294 4.01443 0 62 100 50 100 50 19 100 75 23 1 4
12 2 100 44 0.35933 4.16967 0 62 100 50 100 50 19 100 75 23 1 4
12 3 50 49 0.35000 4.23942 0 62 100 50 100 50 19 100 75 23 1 4
12 4 100 44 0.35933 3.95581 0 62 100 50 100 50 19 100 75 23 1 4
12 5 50 49 0.35000 4.59761 0 62 100 50 100 50 19 100 75 23 1 4
12 6 19 51 0.34277 4.63324 0 62 100 50 100 50 19 100 75 23 1 4
12 7 100 44 0.35933 4.43520 0 62 100 50 100 50 19 100 75 23 1 4
12 8 75 46 0.35554 4.02243 0 62 100 50 100 50 19 100 75 23 1 4
12 9 23 51 0.34496 4.07410 0 62 100 50 100 50 19 100 75 23 1 4
12 10 1 53 0.34085 4.14686 0 62 100 50 100 50 19 100 75 23 1 4
12 11 4 53 0.34302 4.15817 0 62 100 50 100 50 19 100 75 23 1 4
13 0 0 44 0.28233 4.58509 0 62 50 50 0 80 29 90 69 45 11 2
13 1 62 39 0.36526 4.37969 0 62 50 50 0 80 29 90 69 45 11 2
13 2 50 40 0.35000 4.51967 0 62 50 50 0 80 29 90 69 45 11 2
13 3 50 40 0.35000 4.58942 0 62 50 50 0 80 29 90 69 45 11 2
13 4 0 44 0.28233 4.23815 0 62 50 50 0 80 29 90 69 45 11 2
13 5 80 37 0.38955 4.98716 0 62 50 50 0 80 29 90 69 45 11 2
13 6 29 42 0.32329 4.95654 0 62 50 50 0 80 29 90 69 45 11 2
13 7 90 36 0.40320 4.83840 0 62 50 50 0 80 29 90 69 45 11 2
13 8 69 38 0.37505 4.39748 0 62 50 50 0 80 29 90 69 45 11 2
13 9 45 40 0.34329 4.41740 0 62 50 50 0 80 29 90 69 45 11 2
13 10 11 43 0.29722 4.44408 0 62 50 50 0 80 29 90 69 45 11 2
13 11 2 44 0.28616 4.44433 0 62 50 50 0 80 29 90 69 45 11 2
14 0 86 62 0.27944 4.86453 86 62 100 100 20 45 64 50 81 40 100 19
14 1 62 64 0.32676 4.70645 86 62 100 100 20 45 64 50 81 40 100 19
14 2 100 61 0.25025 4.76992 86 62 100 100 20 45 64 50 81 40 100 19
14 3 100 61 0.25025 4.83967 86 62 100 100 20 45 64 50 81 40 100 19
14 4 20 68 0.40880 4.64695 86 62 100 100 20 45 64 50 81 40 100 19
14 5 45 66 0.35998 5.34714 86 62 100 100 20 45 64 50 81 40 100 19
14 6 64 64 0.32256 5.27910 86 62 100 100 20 45 64 50 81 40 100 19
14 7 50 65 0.35000 5.18840 86 62 100 100 20 45 64 50 81 40 100 19
14 8 81 62 0.29105 4.68853 86 62 100 100 20 45 64 50 81 40 100 19
14 9 40 66 0.36937 4.78676 86 62 100 100 20 45 64 50 81 40 100 19
14 10 100 61 0.25025 4.69433 86 62 100 100 20 45 64 50 81 40 100 19
14 11 19 68 0.41040 4.85473 86 62 100 100 20 45 64 50 81 40 100 19
15 0 34 63 0.37371 5.23824 34 62 100 50 80 55 50 92 95 90 0 19
15 1 62 60 0.33292 5.03937 34 62 100 50 80 55 50 92 95 90 0 19
15 2 100 57 0.27592 5.04583 34 62 100 50 80 55 50 92 95 90 0 19
15 3 50 62 0.35000 5.18967 34 62 100 50 80 55 50 92 95 90 0 19
15 4 80 59 0.30485 4.95180 34 62 100 50 80 55 50 92 95 90 0 19
15 5 55 61 0.34265 5.68979 34 62 100 50 80 55 50 92 95 90 0 19
15 6 50 62 0.35000 5.62910 34 62 100 50 80 55 50 92 95 90 0 19
15 7 92 58 0.28630 5.47470 34 62 100 50 80 55 50 92 95 90 0 19
15 8 95 57 0.28595 4.97448 34 62 100 50 80 55 50 92 95 90 0 19
15 9 90 58 0.29027 5.07703 34 62 100 50 80 55 50 92 95 90 0 19
15 10 0 66 0.42350 5.11783 34 62 100 50 80 55 50 92 95 90 0 19
15 11 19 64 0.39449 5.24922 34 62 100 50 80 55 50 92 95 90 0 19
16 0 0 65 0.41708 5.65532 0 42 100 100 85 90 50 90 51 84 0 20
16 1 42 61 0.36055 5.39992 0 42 100 100 85 90 50 90 51 84 0 20
16 2 100 56 0.28233 5.32816 0 42 100 100 85 90 50 90 51 84 0 20
16 3 100 56 0.28233 5.47200 0 42 100 100 85 90 50 90 51 84 0 20
16 4 85 57 0.30427 5.25606 0 42 100 100 85 90 50 90 51 84 0 20
16 5 90 57 0.29540 5.98519 0 42 100 100 85 90 50 90 51 84 0 20
16 6 50 60 0.35000 5.97910 0 42 100 100 85 90 50 90 51 84 0 20
16 7 90 57 0.29540 5.77010 0 42 100 100 85 90 50 90 51 84 0 20
16 8 51 60 0.34870 5.32318 0 42 100 100 85 90 50 90 51 84 0 20
16 9 84 57 0.30597 5.38300 0 42 100 100 85 90 50 90 51 84 0 20
16 10 0 65 0.41708 5.53491 0 42 100 100 85 90 50 90 51 84 0 20
16 11 20 63 0.38955 5.63877 0 42 100 100 85 90 50 90 51 84 0 20
17 0 36 50 0.34771 6.00304 36 32 100 55 89 50 50 50 20 90 0 17
17 1 32 51 0.34853 5.74845 36 32 100 55 89 50 50 50 20 90 0 17
17 2 100 44 0.35933 5.68750 36 32 100 55 89 50 50 50 20 90 0 17
17 3 55 49 0.35035 5.82235 36 32 100 55 89 50 50 50 20 90 0 17
17 4 89 45 0.35728 5.61334 36 32 100 55 89 50 50 50 20 90 0 17
17 5 50 49 0.35000 6.33519 36 32 100 55 89 50 50 50 20 90 0 17
17 6 50 49 0.35000 6.32910 36 32 100 55 89 50 50 50 20 90 0 17
17 7 50 49 0.35000 6.12010 36 32 100 55 89 50 50 50 20 90 0 17
17 8 20 52 0.34720 5.67038 36 32 100 55 89 50 50 50 20 90 0 17
17 9 90 45 0.35700 5.74000 36 32 100 55 89 50 50 50 20 90 0 17
17 10 0 54 0.34650 5.88141 36 32 100 55 89 50 50 50 20 90 0 17
17 11 17 52 0.34576 5.98453 36 32 100 55 89 50 50 50 20 90 0 17
18 0 100 48 0.33367 6.33670 100 70 100 36 18 63 60 30 50 75 0 23
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Table XL.: (continued)
Round Player OwnM MS Earn SubTot Pl0 Pl1 Pl2 Pl3 Pl4 Pl5 Pl6 Pl7 Pl8 Pl9 Pl10 Pl11
18 1 70 50 0.34533 6.09378 100 70 100 36 18 63 60 30 50 75 0 23
18 2 100 48 0.33367 6.02116 100 70 100 36 18 63 60 30 50 75 0 23
18 3 36 54 0.35490 6.17725 100 70 100 36 18 63 60 30 50 75 0 23
18 4 18 55 0.35859 5.97193 100 70 100 36 18 63 60 30 50 75 0 23
18 5 63 51 0.34636 6.68155 100 70 100 36 18 63 60 30 50 75 0 23
18 6 60 51 0.34755 6.67665 100 70 100 36 18 63 60 30 50 75 0 23
18 7 30 54 0.35560 6.47570 100 70 100 36 18 63 60 30 50 75 0 23
18 8 50 52 0.35000 6.02038 100 70 100 36 18 63 60 30 50 75 0 23
18 9 75 50 0.34271 6.08271 100 70 100 36 18 63 60 30 50 75 0 23
18 10 0 57 0.36575 6.24716 100 70 100 36 18 63 60 30 50 75 0 23
18 11 23 55 0.35882 6.34335 100 70 100 36 18 63 60 30 50 75 0 23
19 0 17 53 0.35000 6.68670 17 73 50 50 81 100 50 50 40 70 0 18
19 1 73 48 0.34973 6.44351 17 73 50 50 81 100 50 50 40 70 0 18
19 2 50 50 0.35000 6.37116 17 73 50 50 81 100 50 50 40 70 0 18
19 3 50 50 0.35000 6.52725 17 73 50 50 81 100 50 50 40 70 0 18
19 4 81 47 0.35072 6.32265 17 73 50 50 81 100 50 50 40 70 0 18
19 5 100 45 0.35292 7.03446 17 73 50 50 81 100 50 50 40 70 0 18
19 6 50 50 0.35000 7.02665 17 73 50 50 81 100 50 50 40 70 0 18
19 7 50 50 0.35000 6.82570 17 73 50 50 81 100 50 50 40 70 0 18
19 8 40 51 0.35012 6.37050 17 73 50 50 81 100 50 50 40 70 0 18
19 9 70 48 0.35047 6.43317 17 73 50 50 81 100 50 50 40 70 0 18
19 10 0 54 0.34650 6.59366 17 73 50 50 81 100 50 50 40 70 0 18
19 11 18 53 0.35037 6.69373 17 73 50 50 81 100 50 50 40 70 0 18
20 0 52 48 0.35047 7.03717 52 73 50 75 12 80 50 80 53 28 0 32
20 1 73 47 0.35268 6.79619 52 73 50 75 12 80 50 80 53 28 0 32
20 2 50 49 0.35000 6.72116 52 73 50 75 12 80 50 80 53 28 0 32
20 3 75 46 0.35554 6.88280 52 73 50 75 12 80 50 80 53 28 0 32
20 4 12 52 0.34291 6.66556 52 73 50 75 12 80 50 80 53 28 0 32
20 5 80 46 0.35490 7.38936 52 73 50 75 12 80 50 80 53 28 0 32
20 6 50 49 0.35000 7.37665 52 73 50 75 12 80 50 80 53 28 0 32
20 7 80 46 0.35490 7.18060 52 73 50 75 12 80 50 80 53 28 0 32
20 8 53 48 0.35067 6.72116 52 73 50 75 12 80 50 80 53 28 0 32
20 9 28 51 0.34718 6.78035 52 73 50 75 12 80 50 80 53 28 0 32
20 10 0 53 0.34008 6.93374 52 73 50 75 12 80 50 80 53 28 0 32
20 11 32 50 0.34622 7.03995 52 73 50 75 12 80 50 80 53 28 0 32
21 0 40 52 0.35140 7.38857 40 73 50 55 14 90 55 85 72 50 0 30
21 1 73 49 0.34678 7.14297 40 73 50 55 14 90 55 85 72 50 0 30
21 2 50 51 0.35000 7.07116 40 73 50 55 14 90 55 85 72 50 0 30
21 3 55 51 0.34907 7.23186 40 73 50 55 14 90 55 85 72 50 0 30
21 4 14 55 0.35798 7.02354 40 73 50 55 14 90 55 85 72 50 0 30
21 5 90 48 0.34160 7.73096 40 73 50 55 14 90 55 85 72 50 0 30
21 6 55 51 0.34907 7.72571 40 73 50 55 14 90 55 85 72 50 0 30
21 7 85 48 0.34469 7.52529 40 73 50 55 14 90 55 85 72 50 0 30
21 8 72 49 0.34718 7.06834 40 73 50 55 14 90 55 85 72 50 0 30
21 9 50 51 0.35000 7.13035 40 73 50 55 14 90 55 85 72 50 0 30
21 10 0 56 0.35933 7.29308 40 73 50 55 14 90 55 85 72 50 0 30
21 11 30 53 0.35303 7.39298 40 73 50 55 14 90 55 85 72 50 0 30
22 0 62 44 0.35756 7.74613 62 71 50 45 20 100 32 10 84 45 0 29
22 1 71 43 0.36372 7.50669 62 71 50 45 20 100 32 10 84 45 0 29
22 2 50 45 0.35000 7.42116 62 71 50 45 20 100 32 10 84 45 0 29
22 3 45 46 0.34714 7.57900 62 71 50 45 20 100 32 10 84 45 0 29
22 4 20 48 0.33180 7.35534 62 71 50 45 20 100 32 10 84 45 0 29
22 5 100 41 0.37858 8.10955 62 71 50 45 20 100 32 10 84 45 0 29
22 6 32 47 0.33929 8.06500 62 71 50 45 20 100 32 10 84 45 0 29
22 7 10 49 0.32620 7.85149 62 71 50 45 20 100 32 10 84 45 0 29
22 8 84 42 0.37142 7.43976 62 71 50 45 20 100 32 10 84 45 0 29
22 9 45 46 0.34714 7.47749 62 71 50 45 20 100 32 10 84 45 0 29
22 10 0 50 0.32083 7.61391 62 71 50 45 20 100 32 10 84 45 0 29
22 11 29 47 0.33677 7.72975 62 71 50 45 20 100 32 10 84 45 0 29
23 0 26 48 0.33712 8.08325 26 71 50 56 81 50 50 10 81 33 0 50
23 1 71 44 0.36103 7.86772 26 71 50 56 81 50 50 10 81 33 0 50
23 2 50 46 0.35000 7.77116 26 71 50 56 81 50 50 10 81 33 0 50
23 3 56 46 0.35266 7.93166 26 71 50 56 81 50 50 10 81 33 0 50
23 4 81 43 0.36664 7.72198 26 71 50 56 81 50 50 10 81 33 0 50
23 5 50 46 0.35000 8.45955 26 71 50 56 81 50 50 10 81 33 0 50
23 6 50 46 0.35000 8.41500 26 71 50 56 81 50 50 10 81 33 0 50
23 7 10 50 0.33133 8.18282 26 71 50 56 81 50 50 10 81 33 0 50
23 8 81 43 0.36664 7.80640 26 71 50 56 81 50 50 10 81 33 0 50
23 9 33 48 0.34226 7.81976 26 71 50 56 81 50 50 10 81 33 0 50
23 10 0 51 0.32725 7.94116 26 71 50 56 81 50 50 10 81 33 0 50
23 11 50 46 0.35000 8.07975 26 71 50 56 81 50 50 10 81 33 0 50
24 0 39 49 0.34718 8.43043 39 71 50 34 12 40 50 50 95 55 34 50
24 1 71 46 0.35564 8.22335 39 71 50 34 12 40 50 50 95 55 34 50
24 2 50 48 0.35000 8.12116 39 71 50 34 12 40 50 50 95 55 34 50
24 3 34 50 0.34701 8.27868 39 71 50 34 12 40 50 50 95 55 34 50
24 4 12 52 0.34291 8.06488 39 71 50 34 12 40 50 50 95 55 34 50
24 5 40 49 0.34755 8.80710 39 71 50 34 12 40 50 50 95 55 34 50
24 6 50 48 0.35000 8.76500 39 71 50 34 12 40 50 50 95 55 34 50
24 7 50 48 0.35000 8.53282 39 71 50 34 12 40 50 50 95 55 34 50
24 8 95 44 0.36103 8.16742 39 71 50 34 12 40 50 50 95 55 34 50
24 9 55 48 0.35099 8.17075 39 71 50 34 12 40 50 50 95 55 34 50
24 10 34 50 0.34701 8.28817 39 71 50 34 12 40 50 50 95 55 34 50
24 11 50 48 0.35000 8.42975 39 71 50 34 12 40 50 50 95 55 34 50
25 0 40 60 0.36167 8.79209 40 29 50 50 97 50 50 50 100 63 42 81
25 1 29 61 0.37450 8.59785 40 29 50 50 97 50 50 50 100 63 42 81
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Table XL.: (continued)
Round Player OwnM MS Earn SubTot Pl0 Pl1 Pl2 Pl3 Pl4 Pl5 Pl6 Pl7 Pl8 Pl9 Pl10 Pl11
25 2 50 59 0.35000 8.47116 40 29 50 50 97 50 50 50 100 63 42 81
25 3 50 59 0.35000 8.62868 40 29 50 50 97 50 50 50 100 63 42 81
25 4 97 55 0.29407 8.35895 40 29 50 50 97 50 50 50 100 63 42 81
25 5 50 59 0.35000 9.15710 40 29 50 50 97 50 50 50 100 63 42 81
25 6 50 59 0.35000 9.11500 40 29 50 50 97 50 50 50 100 63 42 81
25 7 50 59 0.35000 8.88282 40 29 50 50 97 50 50 50 100 63 42 81
25 8 100 55 0.28875 8.45617 40 29 50 50 97 50 50 50 100 63 42 81
25 9 63 58 0.33468 8.50543 40 29 50 50 97 50 50 50 100 63 42 81
25 10 42 60 0.35952 8.64769 40 29 50 50 97 50 50 50 100 63 42 81
25 11 81 56 0.31492 8.74467 40 29 50 50 97 50 50 50 100 63 42 81
26 0 0 37 0.23742 9.02951 0 27 50 0 73 1 50 60 65 33 0 50
26 1 27 35 0.29955 8.89741 0 27 50 0 73 1 50 60 65 33 0 50
26 2 50 33 0.35000 8.82116 0 27 50 0 73 1 50 60 65 33 0 50
26 3 0 37 0.23742 8.86609 0 27 50 0 73 1 50 60 65 33 0 50
26 4 73 31 0.39991 8.75886 0 27 50 0 73 1 50 60 65 33 0 50
26 5 1 37 0.24024 9.39734 0 27 50 0 73 1 50 60 65 33 0 50
26 6 50 33 0.35000 9.46500 0 27 50 0 73 1 50 60 65 33 0 50
26 7 60 32 0.37193 9.25476 0 27 50 0 73 1 50 60 65 33 0 50
26 8 65 31 0.38395 8.84012 0 27 50 0 73 1 50 60 65 33 0 50
26 9 33 34 0.31172 8.81715 0 27 50 0 73 1 50 60 65 33 0 50
26 10 0 37 0.23742 8.88511 0 27 50 0 73 1 50 60 65 33 0 50
26 11 50 33 0.35000 9.09467 0 27 50 0 73 1 50 60 65 33 0 50
27 0 30 67 0.38897 9.41848 30 29 50 50 96 59 50 90 100 25 100 92
27 1 29 67 0.39067 9.28808 30 29 50 50 96 59 50 90 100 25 100 92
27 2 50 66 0.35000 9.17116 30 29 50 50 96 59 50 90 100 25 100 92
27 3 50 66 0.35000 9.21609 30 29 50 50 96 59 50 90 100 25 100 92
27 4 96 61 0.26038 9.01924 30 29 50 50 96 59 50 90 100 25 100 92
27 5 59 65 0.33173 9.72907 30 29 50 50 96 59 50 90 100 25 100 92
27 6 50 66 0.35000 9.81500 30 29 50 50 96 59 50 90 100 25 100 92
27 7 90 62 0.26973 9.52449 30 29 50 50 96 59 50 90 100 25 100 92
27 8 100 61 0.25025 9.09037 30 29 50 50 96 59 50 90 100 25 100 92
27 9 25 68 0.40046 9.21761 30 29 50 50 96 59 50 90 100 25 100 92
27 10 100 61 0.25025 9.13536 30 29 50 50 96 59 50 90 100 25 100 92
27 11 92 62 0.26474 9.35941 30 29 50 50 96 59 50 90 100 25 100 92
28 0 0 52 0.33367 9.75214 0 29 50 66 84 65 50 50 100 23 0 50
28 1 29 49 0.34216 9.63024 0 29 50 66 84 65 50 50 100 23 0 50
28 2 50 47 0.35000 9.52116 0 29 50 66 84 65 50 50 100 23 0 50
28 3 66 46 0.35523 9.57132 0 29 50 66 84 65 50 50 100 23 0 50
28 4 84 44 0.36269 9.38193 0 29 50 66 84 65 50 50 100 23 0 50
28 5 65 46 0.35508 10.08414 0 29 50 66 84 65 50 50 100 23 0 50
28 6 50 47 0.35000 10.16500 0 29 50 66 84 65 50 50 100 23 0 50
28 7 50 47 0.35000 9.87449 0 29 50 66 84 65 50 50 100 23 0 50
28 8 100 42 0.37217 9.46254 0 29 50 66 84 65 50 50 100 23 0 50
28 9 23 49 0.33803 9.55564 0 29 50 66 84 65 50 50 100 23 0 50
28 10 0 52 0.33367 9.46903 0 29 50 66 84 65 50 50 100 23 0 50
28 11 50 47 0.35000 9.70941 0 29 50 66 84 65 50 50 100 23 0 50
29 0 0 46 0.29517 10.04731 0 25 50 46 16 50 50 50 100 72 0 50
29 1 25 44 0.32346 9.95370 0 25 50 46 16 50 50 50 100 72 0 50
29 2 50 42 0.35000 9.87116 0 25 50 46 16 50 50 50 100 72 0 50
29 3 46 42 0.34571 9.91703 0 25 50 46 16 50 50 50 100 72 0 50
29 4 16 45 0.31470 9.69663 0 25 50 46 16 50 50 50 100 72 0 50
29 5 50 42 0.35000 10.43414 0 25 50 46 16 50 50 50 100 72 0 50
29 6 50 42 0.35000 10.51500 0 25 50 46 16 50 50 50 100 72 0 50
29 7 50 42 0.35000 10.22449 0 25 50 46 16 50 50 50 100 72 0 50
29 8 100 37 0.40425 9.86679 0 25 50 46 16 50 50 50 100 72 0 50
29 9 72 40 0.37259 9.92823 0 25 50 46 16 50 50 50 100 72 0 50
29 10 0 46 0.29517 9.76419 0 25 50 46 16 50 50 50 100 72 0 50
29 11 50 42 0.35000 10.05941 0 25 50 46 16 50 50 50 100 72 0 50
30 0 28 53 0.35282 10.40013 28 50 50 0 50 60 50 50 100 69 100 0
30 1 50 51 0.35000 10.30370 28 50 50 0 50 60 50 50 100 69 100 0
30 2 50 51 0.35000 10.22116 28 50 50 0 50 60 50 50 100 69 100 0
30 3 0 55 0.35292 10.26994 28 50 50 0 50 60 50 50 100 69 100 0
30 4 50 51 0.35000 10.04663 28 50 50 0 50 60 50 50 100 69 100 0
30 5 60 50 0.34883 10.78297 28 50 50 0 50 60 50 50 100 69 100 0
30 6 50 51 0.35000 10.86500 28 50 50 0 50 60 50 50 100 69 100 0
30 7 50 51 0.35000 10.57449 28 50 50 0 50 60 50 50 100 69 100 0
30 8 100 46 0.34650 10.21329 28 50 50 0 50 60 50 50 100 69 100 0
30 9 69 49 0.34823 10.27645 28 50 50 0 50 60 50 50 100 69 100 0
30 10 100 46 0.34650 10.11069 28 50 50 0 50 60 50 50 100 69 100 0
30 11 0 55 0.35292 10.41232 28 50 50 0 50 60 50 50 100 69 100 0
31 0 67 53 0.34008 10.74022 67 29 50 60 25 80 50 50 100 40 100 0
31 1 29 57 0.36372 10.66742 67 29 50 60 25 80 50 50 100 40 100 0
31 2 50 55 0.35000 10.57116 67 29 50 60 25 80 50 50 100 40 100 0
31 3 60 54 0.34370 10.61364 67 29 50 60 25 80 50 50 100 40 100 0
31 4 25 57 0.36517 10.41180 67 29 50 60 25 80 50 50 100 40 100 0
31 5 80 52 0.33180 11.11477 67 29 50 60 25 80 50 50 100 40 100 0
31 6 50 55 0.35000 11.21500 67 29 50 60 25 80 50 50 100 40 100 0
31 7 50 55 0.35000 10.92449 67 29 50 60 25 80 50 50 100 40 100 0
31 8 100 50 0.32083 10.53412 67 29 50 60 25 80 50 50 100 40 100 0
31 9 40 56 0.35653 10.63299 67 29 50 60 25 80 50 50 100 40 100 0
31 10 100 50 0.32083 10.43153 67 29 50 60 25 80 50 50 100 40 100 0
31 11 0 59 0.37858 10.79091 67 29 50 60 25 80 50 50 100 40 100 0
32 0 100 42 0.37217 11.11238 100 71 50 50 0 80 50 50 100 12 0 0
32 1 71 45 0.35833 11.02575 100 71 50 50 0 80 50 50 100 12 0 0
32 2 50 47 0.35000 10.92116 100 71 50 50 0 80 50 50 100 12 0 0
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Table XL.: (continued)
Round Player OwnM MS Earn SubTot Pl0 Pl1 Pl2 Pl3 Pl4 Pl5 Pl6 Pl7 Pl8 Pl9 Pl10 Pl11
32 3 50 47 0.35000 10.96364 100 71 50 50 0 80 50 50 100 12 0 0
32 4 0 51 0.32725 10.73905 100 71 50 50 0 80 50 50 100 12 0 0
32 5 80 44 0.36260 11.47737 100 71 50 50 0 80 50 50 100 12 0 0
32 6 50 47 0.35000 11.56500 100 71 50 50 0 80 50 50 100 12 0 0
32 7 50 47 0.35000 11.27449 100 71 50 50 0 80 50 50 100 12 0 0
32 8 100 42 0.37217 10.90629 100 71 50 50 0 80 50 50 100 12 0 0
32 9 12 50 0.33315 10.96614 100 71 50 50 0 80 50 50 100 12 0 0
32 10 0 51 0.32725 10.75878 100 71 50 50 0 80 50 50 100 12 0 0
32 11 0 51 0.32725 11.11816 100 71 50 50 0 80 50 50 100 12 0 0
33 0 100 50 0.32083 11.43322 100 74 50 50 34 90 50 50 100 50 0 0
33 1 74 52 0.33712 11.36287 100 74 50 50 34 90 50 50 100 50 0 0
33 2 50 54 0.35000 11.27116 100 74 50 50 34 90 50 50 100 50 0 0
33 3 50 54 0.35000 11.31364 100 74 50 50 34 90 50 50 100 50 0 0
33 4 34 56 0.35933 11.09838 100 74 50 50 34 90 50 50 100 50 0 0
33 5 90 51 0.32620 11.80357 100 74 50 50 34 90 50 50 100 50 0 0
33 6 50 54 0.35000 11.91500 100 74 50 50 34 90 50 50 100 50 0 0
33 7 50 54 0.35000 11.62449 100 74 50 50 34 90 50 50 100 50 0 0
33 8 100 50 0.32083 11.22712 100 74 50 50 34 90 50 50 100 50 0 0
33 9 50 54 0.35000 11.31614 100 74 50 50 34 90 50 50 100 50 0 0
33 10 0 59 0.37858 11.13736 100 74 50 50 34 90 50 50 100 50 0 0
33 11 0 59 0.37858 11.49674 100 74 50 50 34 90 50 50 100 50 0 0
34 0 53 42 0.35298 11.78619 53 40 50 45 16 50 50 50 100 60 0 0
34 1 40 43 0.33985 11.70272 53 40 50 45 16 50 50 50 100 60 0 0
34 2 50 42 0.35000 11.62116 53 40 50 45 16 50 50 50 100 60 0 0
34 3 45 43 0.34522 11.65886 53 40 50 45 16 50 50 50 100 60 0 0
34 4 16 45 0.31470 11.41308 53 40 50 45 16 50 50 50 100 60 0 0
34 5 50 42 0.35000 12.15357 53 40 50 45 16 50 50 50 100 60 0 0
34 6 50 42 0.35000 12.26500 53 40 50 45 16 50 50 50 100 60 0 0
34 7 50 42 0.35000 11.97449 53 40 50 45 16 50 50 50 100 60 0 0
34 8 100 38 0.39783 11.62496 53 40 50 45 16 50 50 50 100 60 0 0
34 9 60 41 0.36038 11.67652 53 40 50 45 16 50 50 50 100 60 0 0
34 10 0 47 0.30158 11.43894 53 40 50 45 16 50 50 50 100 60 0 0
34 11 0 47 0.30158 11.79832 53 40 50 45 16 50 50 50 100 60 0 0
35 0 43 48 0.34763 12.13382 43 43 50 50 17 30 50 50 93 40 0 100
35 1 43 48 0.34763 12.05035 43 43 50 50 17 30 50 50 93 40 0 100
35 2 50 47 0.35000 11.97116 43 43 50 50 17 30 50 50 93 40 0 100
35 3 50 47 0.35000 12.00886 43 43 50 50 17 30 50 50 93 40 0 100
35 4 17 50 0.33729 11.75037 43 43 50 50 17 30 50 50 93 40 0 100
35 5 30 49 0.34277 12.49634 43 43 50 50 17 30 50 50 93 40 0 100
35 6 50 47 0.35000 12.61500 43 43 50 50 17 30 50 50 93 40 0 100
35 7 50 47 0.35000 12.32449 43 43 50 50 17 30 50 50 93 40 0 100
35 8 93 43 0.36706 11.99201 43 43 50 50 17 30 50 50 93 40 0 100
35 9 40 48 0.34627 12.02279 43 43 50 50 17 30 50 50 93 40 0 100
35 10 0 51 0.32725 11.76619 43 43 50 50 17 30 50 50 93 40 0 100
35 11 100 42 0.37217 12.17049 43 43 50 50 17 30 50 50 93 40 0 100
36 0 100 50 0.32083 12.45466 100 10 50 59 35 40 50 50 95 60 0 100
36 1 10 58 0.37240 12.42275 100 10 50 59 35 40 50 50 95 60 0 100
36 2 50 54 0.35000 12.32116 100 10 50 59 35 40 50 50 95 60 0 100
36 3 59 54 0.34443 12.35329 100 10 50 59 35 40 50 50 95 60 0 100
36 4 35 56 0.35893 12.10930 100 10 50 59 35 40 50 50 95 60 0 100
36 5 40 55 0.35525 12.85159 100 10 50 59 35 40 50 50 95 60 0 100
36 6 50 54 0.35000 12.96500 100 10 50 59 35 40 50 50 95 60 0 100
36 7 50 54 0.35000 12.67449 100 10 50 59 35 40 50 50 95 60 0 100
36 8 95 50 0.32637 12.31839 100 10 50 59 35 40 50 50 95 60 0 100
36 9 60 54 0.34370 12.36649 100 10 50 59 35 40 50 50 95 60 0 100
36 10 0 59 0.37858 12.14478 100 10 50 59 35 40 50 50 95 60 0 100
36 11 100 50 0.32083 12.49132 100 10 50 59 35 40 50 50 95 60 0 100
37 0 21 52 0.34763 12.80229 21 85 50 44 85 70 50 50 100 40 0 0
37 1 85 46 0.35368 12.77642 21 85 50 44 85 70 50 50 100 40 0 0
37 2 50 50 0.35000 12.67116 21 85 50 44 85 70 50 50 100 40 0 0
37 3 44 50 0.34958 12.70287 21 85 50 44 85 70 50 50 100 40 0 0
37 4 85 46 0.35368 12.46297 21 85 50 44 85 70 50 50 100 40 0 0
37 5 70 48 0.35047 13.20206 21 85 50 44 85 70 50 50 100 40 0 0
37 6 50 50 0.35000 13.31500 21 85 50 44 85 70 50 50 100 40 0 0
37 7 50 50 0.35000 13.02449 21 85 50 44 85 70 50 50 100 40 0 0
37 8 100 45 0.35292 12.67130 21 85 50 44 85 70 50 50 100 40 0 0
37 9 40 50 0.34883 12.71532 21 85 50 44 85 70 50 50 100 40 0 0
37 10 0 54 0.34650 12.49128 21 85 50 44 85 70 50 50 100 40 0 0
37 11 0 54 0.34650 12.83782 21 85 50 44 85 70 50 50 100 40 0 0
38 0 50 45 0.35000 13.15229 50 85 50 78 37 50 50 50 39 60 0 0
38 1 85 42 0.37164 13.14806 50 85 50 78 37 50 50 50 39 60 0 0
38 2 50 45 0.35000 13.02116 50 85 50 78 37 50 50 50 39 60 0 0
38 3 78 43 0.36601 13.06888 50 85 50 78 37 50 50 50 39 60 0 0
38 4 37 47 0.34302 12.80600 50 85 50 78 37 50 50 50 39 60 0 0
38 5 50 45 0.35000 13.55206 50 85 50 78 37 50 50 50 39 60 0 0
38 6 50 45 0.35000 13.66500 50 85 50 78 37 50 50 50 39 60 0 0
38 7 50 45 0.35000 13.37449 50 85 50 78 37 50 50 50 39 60 0 0
38 8 39 46 0.34294 13.01425 50 85 50 78 37 50 50 50 39 60 0 0
38 9 60 44 0.35653 13.07186 50 85 50 78 37 50 50 50 39 60 0 0
38 10 0 50 0.32083 12.81211 50 85 50 78 37 50 50 50 39 60 0 0
38 11 0 50 0.32083 13.15866 50 85 50 78 37 50 50 50 39 60 0 0
39 0 61 44 0.35706 13.50935 61 62 50 28 88 64 50 50 0 40 0 50
39 1 62 44 0.35756 13.50562 61 62 50 28 88 64 50 50 0 40 0 50
39 2 50 45 0.35000 13.37116 61 62 50 28 88 64 50 50 0 40 0 50
39 3 28 47 0.33588 13.40476 61 62 50 28 88 64 50 50 0 40 0 50
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Table XL.: (continued)
Round Player OwnM MS Earn SubTot Pl0 Pl1 Pl2 Pl3 Pl4 Pl5 Pl6 Pl7 Pl8 Pl9 Pl10 Pl11
39 4 88 41 0.37704 13.18304 61 62 50 28 88 64 50 50 0 40 0 50
39 5 64 44 0.35849 13.91055 61 62 50 28 88 64 50 50 0 40 0 50
39 6 50 45 0.35000 14.01500 61 62 50 28 88 64 50 50 0 40 0 50
39 7 50 45 0.35000 13.72449 61 62 50 28 88 64 50 50 0 40 0 50
39 8 0 49 0.31442 13.32866 61 62 50 28 88 64 50 50 0 40 0 50
39 9 40 46 0.34370 13.41556 61 62 50 28 88 64 50 50 0 40 0 50
39 10 0 49 0.31442 13.12653 61 62 50 28 88 64 50 50 0 40 0 50
39 11 50 45 0.35000 13.50866 61 62 50 28 88 64 50 50 0 40 0 50
40 0 91 52 0.31986 13.82921 91 8 50 64 83 80 50 50 0 60 32 100
40 1 8 60 0.38332 13.88894 91 8 50 64 83 80 50 50 0 60 32 100
40 2 50 56 0.35000 13.72116 91 8 50 64 83 80 50 50 0 60 32 100
40 3 64 55 0.33873 13.74349 91 8 50 64 83 80 50 50 0 60 32 100
40 4 83 53 0.32459 13.50763 91 8 50 64 83 80 50 50 0 60 32 100
40 5 80 53 0.32795 14.23850 91 8 50 64 83 80 50 50 0 60 32 100
40 6 50 56 0.35000 14.36500 91 8 50 64 83 80 50 50 0 60 32 100
40 7 50 56 0.35000 14.07449 91 8 50 64 83 80 50 50 0 60 32 100
40 8 0 61 0.39142 13.72008 91 8 50 64 83 80 50 50 0 60 32 100
40 9 60 55 0.34242 13.75797 91 8 50 64 83 80 50 50 0 60 32 100
40 10 32 58 0.36470 13.49123 91 8 50 64 83 80 50 50 0 60 32 100
40 11 100 52 0.30800 13.81666 91 8 50 64 83 80 50 50 0 60 32 100
41 0 50 34 0.35000 14.17921 50 29 50 61 38 40 50 50 0 9 0 50
41 1 29 36 0.30712 14.19607 50 29 50 61 38 40 50 50 0 9 0 50
41 2 50 34 0.35000 14.07116 50 29 50 61 38 40 50 50 0 9 0 50
41 3 61 33 0.37259 14.11608 50 29 50 61 38 40 50 50 0 9 0 50
41 4 38 35 0.32522 13.83285 50 29 50 61 38 40 50 50 0 9 0 50
41 5 40 35 0.32958 14.56808 50 29 50 61 38 40 50 50 0 9 0 50
41 6 50 34 0.35000 14.71500 50 29 50 61 38 40 50 50 0 9 0 50
41 7 50 34 0.35000 14.42449 50 29 50 61 38 40 50 50 0 9 0 50
41 8 0 39 0.25025 13.97033 50 29 50 61 38 40 50 50 0 9 0 50
41 9 9 38 0.26725 14.02522 50 29 50 61 38 40 50 50 0 9 0 50
41 10 0 39 0.25025 13.74148 50 29 50 61 38 40 50 50 0 9 0 50
41 11 50 34 0.35000 14.16666 50 29 50 61 38 40 50 50 0 9 0 50
42 0 100 41 0.37858 14.55779 100 25 50 33 23 10 50 50 0 15 100 100
42 1 25 48 0.33629 14.53236 100 25 50 33 23 10 50 50 0 15 100 100
42 2 50 46 0.35000 14.42116 100 25 50 33 23 10 50 50 0 15 100 100
42 3 33 48 0.34226 14.45835 100 25 50 33 23 10 50 50 0 15 100 100
42 4 23 48 0.33456 14.16741 100 25 50 33 23 10 50 50 0 15 100 100
42 5 10 50 0.33133 14.89942 100 25 50 33 23 10 50 50 0 15 100 100
42 6 50 46 0.35000 15.06500 100 25 50 33 23 10 50 50 0 15 100 100
42 7 50 46 0.35000 14.77449 100 25 50 33 23 10 50 50 0 15 100 100
42 8 0 51 0.32725 14.29758 100 25 50 33 23 10 50 50 0 15 100 100
42 9 15 49 0.33122 14.35644 100 25 50 33 23 10 50 50 0 15 100 100
42 10 100 41 0.37858 14.12006 100 25 50 33 23 10 50 50 0 15 100 100
42 11 100 41 0.37858 14.54524 100 25 50 33 23 10 50 50 0 15 100 100
43 0 0 51 0.32725 14.88504 0 28 50 13 72 50 50 50 0 50 100 100
43 1 28 49 0.34153 14.87389 0 28 50 13 72 50 50 50 0 50 100 100
43 2 50 47 0.35000 14.77116 0 28 50 13 72 50 50 50 0 50 100 100
43 3 13 50 0.33403 14.79237 0 28 50 13 72 50 50 50 0 50 100 100
43 4 72 45 0.35847 14.52588 0 28 50 13 72 50 50 50 0 50 100 100
43 5 50 47 0.35000 15.24942 0 28 50 13 72 50 50 50 0 50 100 100
43 6 50 47 0.35000 15.41500 0 28 50 13 72 50 50 50 0 50 100 100
43 7 50 47 0.35000 15.12449 0 28 50 13 72 50 50 50 0 50 100 100
43 8 0 51 0.32725 14.62483 0 28 50 13 72 50 50 50 0 50 100 100
43 9 50 47 0.35000 14.70644 0 28 50 13 72 50 50 50 0 50 100 100
43 10 100 42 0.37217 14.49223 0 28 50 13 72 50 50 50 0 50 100 100
43 11 100 42 0.37217 14.91741 0 28 50 13 72 50 50 50 0 50 100 100
44 0 100 60 0.25667 15.14171 100 29 50 78 92 70 50 50 0 45 100 100
44 1 29 67 0.39067 15.26456 100 29 50 78 92 70 50 50 0 45 100 100
44 2 50 65 0.35000 15.12116 100 29 50 78 92 70 50 50 0 45 100 100
44 3 78 62 0.29773 15.09011 100 29 50 78 92 70 50 50 0 45 100 100
44 4 92 61 0.27013 14.79601 100 29 50 78 92 70 50 50 0 45 100 100
44 5 70 63 0.31197 15.56138 100 29 50 78 92 70 50 50 0 45 100 100
44 6 50 65 0.35000 15.76500 100 29 50 78 92 70 50 50 0 45 100 100
44 7 50 65 0.35000 15.47449 100 29 50 78 92 70 50 50 0 45 100 100
44 8 0 69 0.44275 15.06758 100 29 50 78 92 70 50 50 0 45 100 100
44 9 45 65 0.35933 15.06577 100 29 50 78 92 70 50 50 0 45 100 100
44 10 100 60 0.25667 14.74889 100 29 50 78 92 70 50 50 0 45 100 100
44 11 100 60 0.25667 15.17407 100 29 50 78 92 70 50 50 0 45 100 100
45 0 0 47 0.30158 15.44329 0 68 50 100 17 80 50 50 20 80 0 0
45 1 68 41 0.36701 15.63157 0 68 50 100 17 80 50 50 20 80 0 0
45 2 50 42 0.35000 15.47116 0 68 50 100 17 80 50 50 20 80 0 0
45 3 100 38 0.39783 15.48794 0 68 50 100 17 80 50 50 20 80 0 0
45 4 17 45 0.31612 15.11213 0 68 50 100 17 80 50 50 20 80 0 0
45 5 80 40 0.37800 15.93938 0 68 50 100 17 80 50 50 20 80 0 0
45 6 50 42 0.35000 16.11500 0 68 50 100 17 80 50 50 20 80 0 0
45 7 50 42 0.35000 15.82449 0 68 50 100 17 80 50 50 20 80 0 0
45 8 20 45 0.32025 15.38783 0 68 50 100 17 80 50 50 20 80 0 0
45 9 80 40 0.37800 15.44377 0 68 50 100 17 80 50 50 20 80 0 0
45 10 0 47 0.30158 15.05048 0 68 50 100 17 80 50 50 20 80 0 0
45 11 0 47 0.30158 15.47566 0 68 50 100 17 80 50 50 20 80 0 0
46 0 0 55 0.35292 15.79621 0 68 50 0 42 49 100 50 0 100 100 50
46 1 68 49 0.34853 15.98010 0 68 50 0 42 49 100 50 0 100 100 50
46 2 50 51 0.35000 15.82116 0 68 50 0 42 49 100 50 0 100 100 50
46 3 0 55 0.35292 15.84086 0 68 50 0 42 49 100 50 0 100 100 50
46 4 42 52 0.35131 15.46344 0 68 50 0 42 49 100 50 0 100 100 50
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Table XL.: (continued)
Round Player OwnM MS Earn SubTot Pl0 Pl1 Pl2 Pl3 Pl4 Pl5 Pl6 Pl7 Pl8 Pl9 Pl10 Pl11
46 5 49 51 0.35012 16.28950 0 68 50 0 42 49 100 50 0 100 100 50
46 6 100 46 0.34650 16.46150 0 68 50 0 42 49 100 50 0 100 100 50
46 7 50 51 0.35000 16.17449 0 68 50 0 42 49 100 50 0 100 100 50
46 8 0 55 0.35292 15.74075 0 68 50 0 42 49 100 50 0 100 100 50
46 9 100 46 0.34650 15.79027 0 68 50 0 42 49 100 50 0 100 100 50
46 10 100 46 0.34650 15.39698 0 68 50 0 42 49 100 50 0 100 100 50
46 11 50 51 0.35000 15.82566 0 68 50 0 42 49 100 50 0 100 100 50
47 0 100 53 0.30158 16.09779 100 29 50 100 63 39 50 50 0 50 100 50
47 1 29 59 0.36911 16.34921 100 29 50 100 63 39 50 50 0 50 100 50
47 2 50 57 0.35000 16.17116 100 29 50 100 63 39 50 50 0 50 100 50
47 3 100 53 0.30158 16.14244 100 29 50 100 63 39 50 50 0 50 100 50
47 4 63 56 0.33802 15.80146 100 29 50 100 63 39 50 50 0 50 100 50
47 5 39 58 0.35988 16.64938 100 29 50 100 63 39 50 50 0 50 100 50
47 6 50 57 0.35000 16.81150 100 29 50 100 63 39 50 50 0 50 100 50
47 7 50 57 0.35000 16.52449 100 29 50 100 63 39 50 50 0 50 100 50
47 8 0 62 0.39783 16.13858 100 29 50 100 63 39 50 50 0 50 100 50
47 9 50 57 0.35000 16.14027 100 29 50 100 63 39 50 50 0 50 100 50
47 10 100 53 0.30158 15.69856 100 29 50 100 63 39 50 50 0 50 100 50
47 11 50 57 0.35000 16.17566 100 29 50 100 63 39 50 50 0 50 100 50
48 0 100 37 0.40425 16.50204 100 29 50 0 51 51 50 50 0 55 71 0
48 1 29 43 0.32599 16.67520 100 29 50 0 51 51 50 50 0 55 71 0
48 2 50 42 0.35000 16.52116 100 29 50 0 51 51 50 50 0 55 71 0
48 3 0 46 0.29517 16.43761 100 29 50 0 51 51 50 50 0 55 71 0
48 4 51 41 0.35114 16.15260 100 29 50 0 51 51 50 50 0 55 71 0
48 5 51 41 0.35114 17.00053 100 29 50 0 51 51 50 50 0 55 71 0
48 6 50 42 0.35000 17.16150 100 29 50 0 51 51 50 50 0 55 71 0
48 7 50 42 0.35000 16.87449 100 29 50 0 51 51 50 50 0 55 71 0
48 8 0 46 0.29517 16.43375 100 29 50 0 51 51 50 50 0 55 71 0
48 9 55 41 0.35548 16.49575 100 29 50 0 51 51 50 50 0 55 71 0
48 10 71 40 0.37181 16.07036 100 29 50 0 51 51 50 50 0 55 71 0
48 11 0 46 0.29517 16.47082 100 29 50 0 51 51 50 50 0 55 71 0
49 0 0 47 0.30158 16.80363 0 43 50 0 77 47 50 50 0 45 100 50
49 1 43 43 0.34314 17.01834 0 43 50 0 77 47 50 50 0 45 100 50
49 2 50 42 0.35000 16.87116 0 43 50 0 77 47 50 50 0 45 100 50
49 3 0 47 0.30158 16.73919 0 43 50 0 77 47 50 50 0 45 100 50
49 4 77 40 0.37615 16.52875 0 43 50 0 77 47 50 50 0 45 100 50
49 5 47 42 0.34681 17.34734 0 43 50 0 77 47 50 50 0 45 100 50
49 6 50 42 0.35000 17.51150 0 43 50 0 77 47 50 50 0 45 100 50
49 7 50 42 0.35000 17.22449 0 43 50 0 77 47 50 50 0 45 100 50
49 8 0 47 0.30158 16.73533 0 43 50 0 77 47 50 50 0 45 100 50
49 9 45 42 0.34457 16.84033 0 43 50 0 77 47 50 50 0 45 100 50
49 10 100 37 0.40425 16.47461 0 43 50 0 77 47 50 50 0 45 100 50
49 11 50 42 0.35000 16.82082 0 43 50 0 77 47 50 50 0 45 100 50
Table XLI.: Data from experiments: 2 large suppliers - no transport costs - Cohort 1
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1
0 0 51 54 1.04895 1.04895 51 54
0 1 54 51 1.04580 1.04580 51 54
1 0 50 78 1.05000 2.09895 50 78
1 1 78 50 0.88536 1.93116 50 78
2 0 55 70 1.02375 3.12270 55 70
2 1 70 55 0.94500 2.87616 55 70
3 0 60 66 0.99540 4.11810 60 66
3 1 66 60 0.96264 3.83880 60 66
4 0 100 50 0.52500 4.64310 100 50
4 1 50 100 1.05000 4.88880 100 50
5 0 49 54 1.05063 5.69373 49 54
5 1 54 49 1.04748 5.93628 49 54
6 0 68 54 0.96684 6.66057 68 54
6 1 54 68 1.03152 6.96780 68 54
7 0 45 54 1.04895 7.70952 45 54
7 1 54 45 1.05084 8.01864 45 54
8 0 52 54 1.04748 8.75700 52 54
8 1 54 52 1.04496 9.06360 52 54
9 0 51 58 1.04811 9.80511 51 58
9 1 58 51 1.03488 10.09848 51 58
10 0 53 50 1.04811 10.85322 53 50
10 1 50 53 1.05000 11.14848 53 50
11 0 45 50 1.04475 11.89797 45 50
11 1 50 45 1.05000 12.19848 45 50
12 0 56 50 1.04244 12.94041 56 50
12 1 50 56 1.05000 13.24848 56 50
13 0 50 50 1.05000 13.99041 50 50
13 1 50 50 1.05000 14.29848 50 50
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Table XLI.: (continued)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1
14 0 48 50 1.04916 15.03957 48 50
14 1 50 48 1.05000 15.34848 48 50
15 0 51 50 1.04979 16.08936 51 50
15 1 50 51 1.05000 16.39848 51 50
16 0 50 50 1.05000 17.13936 50 50
16 1 50 50 1.05000 17.44848 50 50
17 0 53 50 1.04811 18.18747 53 50
17 1 50 53 1.05000 18.49848 53 50
18 0 50 50 1.05000 19.23747 50 50
18 1 50 50 1.05000 19.54848 50 50
19 0 50 50 1.05000 20.28747 50 50
19 1 50 50 1.05000 20.59848 50 50
20 0 50 50 1.05000 21.33747 50 50
20 1 50 50 1.05000 21.64848 50 50
21 0 50 50 1.05000 22.38747 50 50
21 1 50 50 1.05000 22.69848 50 50
22 0 50 50 1.05000 23.43747 50 50
22 1 50 50 1.05000 23.74848 50 50
23 0 50 50 1.05000 24.48747 50 50
23 1 50 50 1.05000 24.79848 50 50
24 0 50 50 1.05000 25.53747 50 50
24 1 50 50 1.05000 25.84848 50 50
25 0 51 50 1.04979 26.58726 51 50
25 1 50 51 1.05000 26.89848 51 50
26 0 50 50 1.05000 27.63726 50 50
26 1 50 50 1.05000 27.94848 50 50
27 0 50 50 1.05000 28.68726 50 50
27 1 50 50 1.05000 28.99848 50 50
28 0 50 50 1.05000 29.73726 50 50
28 1 50 50 1.05000 30.04848 50 50
29 0 50 50 1.05000 30.78726 50 50
29 1 50 50 1.05000 31.09848 50 50
30 0 50 50 1.05000 31.83726 50 50
30 1 50 50 1.05000 32.14848 50 50
31 0 50 50 1.05000 32.88726 50 50
31 1 50 50 1.05000 33.19848 50 50
32 0 50 50 1.05000 33.93726 50 50
32 1 50 50 1.05000 34.24848 50 50
33 0 52 50 1.04916 34.98642 52 50
33 1 50 52 1.05000 35.29848 52 50
34 0 50 50 1.05000 36.03642 50 50
34 1 50 50 1.05000 36.34848 50 50
35 0 49 50 1.04979 37.08621 49 50
35 1 50 49 1.05000 37.39848 49 50
36 0 50 50 1.05000 38.13621 50 50
36 1 50 50 1.05000 38.44848 50 50
37 0 50 50 1.05000 39.18621 50 50
37 1 50 50 1.05000 39.49848 50 50
38 0 51 50 1.04979 40.23600 51 50
38 1 50 51 1.05000 40.54848 51 50
39 0 50 50 1.05000 41.28600 50 50
39 1 50 50 1.05000 41.59848 50 50
40 0 50 50 1.05000 42.33600 50 50
40 1 50 50 1.05000 42.64848 50 50
41 0 50 50 1.05000 43.38600 50 50
41 1 50 50 1.05000 43.69848 50 50
42 0 50 50 1.05000 44.43600 50 50
42 1 50 50 1.05000 44.74848 50 50
43 0 50 50 1.05000 45.48600 50 50
43 1 50 50 1.05000 45.79848 50 50
44 0 50 50 1.05000 46.53600 50 50
44 1 50 50 1.05000 46.84848 50 50
45 0 50 50 1.05000 47.58600 50 50
45 1 50 50 1.05000 47.89848 50 50
46 0 50 50 1.05000 48.63600 50 50
46 1 50 50 1.05000 48.94848 50 50
47 0 50 50 1.05000 49.68600 50 50
47 1 50 50 1.05000 49.99848 50 50
48 0 50 50 1.05000 50.73600 50 50
48 1 50 50 1.05000 51.04848 50 50
49 0 50 50 1.05000 51.78600 50 50
49 1 50 50 1.05000 52.09848 50 50
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Table XLII.: Data from experiments: 2 large suppliers - no transport costs - Cohort 2
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1
0 0 50 50 1.05000 1.05000 50 50
0 1 50 50 1.05000 1.05000 50 50
1 0 50 41 1.05000 2.10000 50 41
1 1 41 50 1.03299 2.08299 50 41
2 0 50 50 1.05000 3.15000 50 50
2 1 50 50 1.05000 3.13299 50 50
3 0 50 50 1.05000 4.20000 50 50
3 1 50 50 1.05000 4.18299 50 50
4 0 50 50 1.05000 5.25000 50 50
4 1 50 50 1.05000 5.23299 50 50
5 0 50 50 1.05000 6.30000 50 50
5 1 50 50 1.05000 6.28299 50 50
6 0 50 50 1.05000 7.35000 50 50
6 1 50 50 1.05000 7.33299 50 50
7 0 50 50 1.05000 8.40000 50 50
7 1 50 50 1.05000 8.38299 50 50
8 0 50 50 1.05000 9.45000 50 50
8 1 50 50 1.05000 9.43299 50 50
9 0 50 50 1.05000 10.50000 50 50
9 1 50 50 1.05000 10.48299 50 50
10 0 50 50 1.05000 11.55000 50 50
10 1 50 50 1.05000 11.53299 50 50
11 0 50 50 1.05000 12.60000 50 50
11 1 50 50 1.05000 12.58299 50 50
12 0 50 50 1.05000 13.65000 50 50
12 1 50 50 1.05000 13.63299 50 50
13 0 50 50 1.05000 14.70000 50 50
13 1 50 50 1.05000 14.68299 50 50
14 0 50 50 1.05000 15.75000 50 50
14 1 50 50 1.05000 15.73299 50 50
15 0 50 50 1.05000 16.80000 50 50
15 1 50 50 1.05000 16.78299 50 50
16 0 50 50 1.05000 17.85000 50 50
16 1 50 50 1.05000 17.83299 50 50
17 0 50 50 1.05000 18.90000 50 50
17 1 50 50 1.05000 18.88299 50 50
18 0 50 50 1.05000 19.95000 50 50
18 1 50 50 1.05000 19.93299 50 50
19 0 50 50 1.05000 21.00000 50 50
19 1 50 50 1.05000 20.98299 50 50
20 0 50 50 1.05000 22.05000 50 50
20 1 50 50 1.05000 22.03299 50 50
21 0 50 60 1.05000 23.10000 50 60
21 1 60 50 1.02900 23.06199 50 60
22 0 50 60 1.05000 24.15000 50 60
22 1 60 50 1.02900 24.09099 50 60
23 0 50 50 1.05000 25.20000 50 50
23 1 50 50 1.05000 25.14099 50 50
24 0 50 70 1.05000 26.25000 50 70
24 1 70 50 0.96600 26.10699 50 70
25 0 50 50 1.05000 27.30000 50 50
25 1 50 50 1.05000 27.15699 50 50
26 0 50 50 1.05000 28.35000 50 50
26 1 50 50 1.05000 28.20699 50 50
27 0 50 50 1.05000 29.40000 50 50
27 1 50 50 1.05000 29.25699 50 50
28 0 50 50 1.05000 30.45000 50 50
28 1 50 50 1.05000 30.30699 50 50
29 0 50 50 1.05000 31.50000 50 50
29 1 50 50 1.05000 31.35699 50 50
30 0 50 50 1.05000 32.55000 50 50
30 1 50 50 1.05000 32.40699 50 50
31 0 50 50 1.05000 33.60000 50 50
31 1 50 50 1.05000 33.45699 50 50
32 0 50 50 1.05000 34.65000 50 50
32 1 50 50 1.05000 34.50699 50 50
33 0 50 50 1.05000 35.70000 50 50
33 1 50 50 1.05000 35.55699 50 50
34 0 50 50 1.05000 36.75000 50 50
34 1 50 50 1.05000 36.60699 50 50
35 0 50 50 1.05000 37.80000 50 50
35 1 50 50 1.05000 37.65699 50 50
36 0 50 50 1.05000 38.85000 50 50
36 1 50 50 1.05000 38.70699 50 50
37 0 50 50 1.05000 39.90000 50 50
37 1 50 50 1.05000 39.75699 50 50
38 0 50 50 1.05000 40.95000 50 50
38 1 50 50 1.05000 40.80699 50 50
39 0 50 50 1.05000 42.00000 50 50
39 1 50 50 1.05000 41.85699 50 50
40 0 50 50 1.05000 43.05000 50 50
40 1 50 50 1.05000 42.90699 50 50
41 0 50 50 1.05000 44.10000 50 50
41 1 50 50 1.05000 43.95699 50 50
42 0 50 50 1.05000 45.15000 50 50
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Table XLII.: (continued)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1
42 1 50 50 1.05000 45.00699 50 50
43 0 50 50 1.05000 46.20000 50 50
43 1 50 50 1.05000 46.05699 50 50
44 0 50 60 1.05000 47.25000 50 60
44 1 60 50 1.02900 47.08599 50 60
45 0 50 70 1.05000 48.30000 50 70
45 1 70 50 0.96600 48.05199 50 70
46 0 50 40 1.05000 49.35000 50 40
46 1 40 50 1.02900 49.08099 50 40
47 0 50 30 1.05000 50.40000 50 30
47 1 30 50 0.96600 50.04699 50 30
48 0 50 50 1.05000 51.45000 50 50
48 1 50 50 1.05000 51.09699 50 50
49 0 50 50 1.05000 52.50000 50 50
49 1 50 50 1.05000 52.14699 50 50
Table XLIII.: Data from experiments: 2 large suppliers - no transport costs - Cohort 3
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1
0 0 55 50 1.04475 1.04475 55 50
0 1 50 55 1.05000 1.05000 55 50
1 0 60 50 1.02900 2.07375 60 50
1 1 50 60 1.05000 2.10000 60 50
2 0 50 50 1.05000 3.12375 50 50
2 1 50 50 1.05000 3.15000 50 50
3 0 50 50 1.05000 4.17375 50 50
3 1 50 50 1.05000 4.20000 50 50
4 0 50 50 1.05000 5.22375 50 50
4 1 50 50 1.05000 5.25000 50 50
5 0 50 50 1.05000 6.27375 50 50
5 1 50 50 1.05000 6.30000 50 50
6 0 50 50 1.05000 7.32375 50 50
6 1 50 50 1.05000 7.35000 50 50
7 0 50 50 1.05000 8.37375 50 50
7 1 50 50 1.05000 8.40000 50 50
8 0 50 50 1.05000 9.42375 50 50
8 1 50 50 1.05000 9.45000 50 50
9 0 50 50 1.05000 10.47375 50 50
9 1 50 50 1.05000 10.50000 50 50
10 0 50 50 1.05000 11.52375 50 50
10 1 50 50 1.05000 11.55000 50 50
11 0 50 50 1.05000 12.57375 50 50
11 1 50 50 1.05000 12.60000 50 50
12 0 50 50 1.05000 13.62375 50 50
12 1 50 50 1.05000 13.65000 50 50
13 0 50 50 1.05000 14.67375 50 50
13 1 50 50 1.05000 14.70000 50 50
14 0 50 50 1.05000 15.72375 50 50
14 1 50 50 1.05000 15.75000 50 50
15 0 50 50 1.05000 16.77375 50 50
15 1 50 50 1.05000 16.80000 50 50
16 0 50 50 1.05000 17.82375 50 50
16 1 50 50 1.05000 17.85000 50 50
17 0 50 50 1.05000 18.87375 50 50
17 1 50 50 1.05000 18.90000 50 50
18 0 50 50 1.05000 19.92375 50 50
18 1 50 50 1.05000 19.95000 50 50
19 0 50 50 1.05000 20.97375 50 50
19 1 50 50 1.05000 21.00000 50 50
20 0 50 50 1.05000 22.02375 50 50
20 1 50 50 1.05000 22.05000 50 50
21 0 50 50 1.05000 23.07375 50 50
21 1 50 50 1.05000 23.10000 50 50
22 0 50 50 1.05000 24.12375 50 50
22 1 50 50 1.05000 24.15000 50 50
23 0 50 50 1.05000 25.17375 50 50
23 1 50 50 1.05000 25.20000 50 50
24 0 50 50 1.05000 26.22375 50 50
24 1 50 50 1.05000 26.25000 50 50
25 0 50 50 1.05000 27.27375 50 50
25 1 50 50 1.05000 27.30000 50 50
26 0 50 50 1.05000 28.32375 50 50
26 1 50 50 1.05000 28.35000 50 50
27 0 50 50 1.05000 29.37375 50 50
27 1 50 50 1.05000 29.40000 50 50
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Table XLIII.: (continued)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1
28 0 50 50 1.05000 30.42375 50 50
28 1 50 50 1.05000 30.45000 50 50
29 0 50 50 1.05000 31.47375 50 50
29 1 50 50 1.05000 31.50000 50 50
30 0 50 50 1.05000 32.52375 50 50
30 1 50 50 1.05000 32.55000 50 50
31 0 50 50 1.05000 33.57375 50 50
31 1 50 50 1.05000 33.60000 50 50
32 0 50 50 1.05000 34.62375 50 50
32 1 50 50 1.05000 34.65000 50 50
33 0 50 50 1.05000 35.67375 50 50
33 1 50 50 1.05000 35.70000 50 50
34 0 50 50 1.05000 36.72375 50 50
34 1 50 50 1.05000 36.75000 50 50
35 0 50 50 1.05000 37.77375 50 50
35 1 50 50 1.05000 37.80000 50 50
36 0 50 50 1.05000 38.82375 50 50
36 1 50 50 1.05000 38.85000 50 50
37 0 50 50 1.05000 39.87375 50 50
37 1 50 50 1.05000 39.90000 50 50
38 0 50 50 1.05000 40.92375 50 50
38 1 50 50 1.05000 40.95000 50 50
39 0 50 50 1.05000 41.97375 50 50
39 1 50 50 1.05000 42.00000 50 50
40 0 50 50 1.05000 43.02375 50 50
40 1 50 50 1.05000 43.05000 50 50
41 0 50 50 1.05000 44.07375 50 50
41 1 50 50 1.05000 44.10000 50 50
42 0 50 50 1.05000 45.12375 50 50
42 1 50 50 1.05000 45.15000 50 50
43 0 50 50 1.05000 46.17375 50 50
43 1 50 50 1.05000 46.20000 50 50
44 0 50 50 1.05000 47.22375 50 50
44 1 50 50 1.05000 47.25000 50 50
45 0 50 50 1.05000 48.27375 50 50
45 1 50 50 1.05000 48.30000 50 50
46 0 50 50 1.05000 49.32375 50 50
46 1 50 50 1.05000 49.35000 50 50
47 0 50 50 1.05000 50.37375 50 50
47 1 50 50 1.05000 50.40000 50 50
48 0 50 50 1.05000 51.42375 50 50
48 1 50 50 1.05000 51.45000 50 50
49 0 50 50 1.05000 52.47375 50 50
49 1 50 50 1.05000 52.50000 50 50
Table XLIV.: Data from experiments: 2 large suppliers - no transport costs - Cohort 4
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1
0 0 50 49 1.05000 1.05000 50 49
0 1 49 50 1.04979 1.04979 50 49
1 0 50 49 1.05000 2.10000 50 49
1 1 49 50 1.04979 2.09958 50 49
2 0 50 68 1.05000 3.15000 50 68
2 1 68 50 0.98196 3.08154 50 68
3 0 50 52 1.05000 4.20000 50 52
3 1 52 50 1.04916 4.13070 50 52
4 0 50 50 1.05000 5.25000 50 50
4 1 50 50 1.05000 5.18070 50 50
5 0 50 65 1.05000 6.30000 50 65
5 1 65 50 1.00275 6.18345 50 65
6 0 50 65 1.05000 7.35000 50 65
6 1 65 50 1.00275 7.18620 50 65
7 0 50 60 1.05000 8.40000 50 60
7 1 60 50 1.02900 8.21520 50 60
8 0 50 51 1.05000 9.45000 50 51
8 1 51 50 1.04979 9.26499 50 51
9 0 50 60 1.05000 10.50000 50 60
9 1 60 50 1.02900 10.29399 50 60
10 0 50 50 1.05000 11.55000 50 50
10 1 50 50 1.05000 11.34399 50 50
11 0 50 50 1.05000 12.60000 50 50
11 1 50 50 1.05000 12.39399 50 50
12 0 50 50 1.05000 13.65000 50 50
12 1 50 50 1.05000 13.44399 50 50
13 0 50 50 1.05000 14.70000 50 50
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Table XLIV.: (continued)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1
13 1 50 50 1.05000 14.49399 50 50
14 0 50 50 1.05000 15.75000 50 50
14 1 50 50 1.05000 15.54399 50 50
15 0 50 50 1.05000 16.80000 50 50
15 1 50 50 1.05000 16.59399 50 50
16 0 50 50 1.05000 17.85000 50 50
16 1 50 50 1.05000 17.64399 50 50
17 0 50 50 1.05000 18.90000 50 50
17 1 50 50 1.05000 18.69399 50 50
18 0 50 50 1.05000 19.95000 50 50
18 1 50 50 1.05000 19.74399 50 50
19 0 50 50 1.05000 21.00000 50 50
19 1 50 50 1.05000 20.79399 50 50
20 0 50 50 1.05000 22.05000 50 50
20 1 50 50 1.05000 21.84399 50 50
21 0 50 50 1.05000 23.10000 50 50
21 1 50 50 1.05000 22.89399 50 50
22 0 50 60 1.05000 24.15000 50 60
22 1 60 50 1.02900 23.92299 50 60
23 0 50 50 1.05000 25.20000 50 50
23 1 50 50 1.05000 24.97299 50 50
24 0 50 50 1.05000 26.25000 50 50
24 1 50 50 1.05000 26.02299 50 50
25 0 50 50 1.05000 27.30000 50 50
25 1 50 50 1.05000 27.07299 50 50
26 0 50 50 1.05000 28.35000 50 50
26 1 50 50 1.05000 28.12299 50 50
27 0 50 50 1.05000 29.40000 50 50
27 1 50 50 1.05000 29.17299 50 50
28 0 50 50 1.05000 30.45000 50 50
28 1 50 50 1.05000 30.22299 50 50
29 0 50 50 1.05000 31.50000 50 50
29 1 50 50 1.05000 31.27299 50 50
30 0 50 50 1.05000 32.55000 50 50
30 1 50 50 1.05000 32.32299 50 50
31 0 50 50 1.05000 33.60000 50 50
31 1 50 50 1.05000 33.37299 50 50
32 0 50 50 1.05000 34.65000 50 50
32 1 50 50 1.05000 34.42299 50 50
33 0 50 50 1.05000 35.70000 50 50
33 1 50 50 1.05000 35.47299 50 50
34 0 50 50 1.05000 36.75000 50 50
34 1 50 50 1.05000 36.52299 50 50
35 0 50 50 1.05000 37.80000 50 50
35 1 50 50 1.05000 37.57299 50 50
36 0 50 50 1.05000 38.85000 50 50
36 1 50 50 1.05000 38.62299 50 50
37 0 50 50 1.05000 39.90000 50 50
37 1 50 50 1.05000 39.67299 50 50
38 0 50 50 1.05000 40.95000 50 50
38 1 50 50 1.05000 40.72299 50 50
39 0 50 50 1.05000 42.00000 50 50
39 1 50 50 1.05000 41.77299 50 50
40 0 50 50 1.05000 43.05000 50 50
40 1 50 50 1.05000 42.82299 50 50
41 0 50 50 1.05000 44.10000 50 50
41 1 50 50 1.05000 43.87299 50 50
42 0 50 50 1.05000 45.15000 50 50
42 1 50 50 1.05000 44.92299 50 50
43 0 50 50 1.05000 46.20000 50 50
43 1 50 50 1.05000 45.97299 50 50
44 0 50 50 1.05000 47.25000 50 50
44 1 50 50 1.05000 47.02299 50 50
45 0 50 50 1.05000 48.30000 50 50
45 1 50 50 1.05000 48.07299 50 50
46 0 50 50 1.05000 49.35000 50 50
46 1 50 50 1.05000 49.12299 50 50
47 0 50 50 1.05000 50.40000 50 50
47 1 50 50 1.05000 50.17299 50 50
48 0 50 50 1.05000 51.45000 50 50
48 1 50 50 1.05000 51.22299 50 50
49 0 50 50 1.05000 52.50000 50 50
49 1 50 50 1.05000 52.27299 50 50
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Table XLV.: Data from experiments: 2 large suppliers - no transport costs - Cohort 5
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1
0 0 50 50 1.05000 1.05000 50 50
0 1 50 50 1.05000 1.05000 50 50
1 0 50 50 1.05000 2.10000 50 50
1 1 50 50 1.05000 2.10000 50 50
2 0 50 50 1.05000 3.15000 50 50
2 1 50 50 1.05000 3.15000 50 50
3 0 50 50 1.05000 4.20000 50 50
3 1 50 50 1.05000 4.20000 50 50
4 0 50 50 1.05000 5.25000 50 50
4 1 50 50 1.05000 5.25000 50 50
5 0 50 50 1.05000 6.30000 50 50
5 1 50 50 1.05000 6.30000 50 50
6 0 50 50 1.05000 7.35000 50 50
6 1 50 50 1.05000 7.35000 50 50
7 0 50 50 1.05000 8.40000 50 50
7 1 50 50 1.05000 8.40000 50 50
8 0 50 50 1.05000 9.45000 50 50
8 1 50 50 1.05000 9.45000 50 50
9 0 50 50 1.05000 10.50000 50 50
9 1 50 50 1.05000 10.50000 50 50
10 0 50 50 1.05000 11.55000 50 50
10 1 50 50 1.05000 11.55000 50 50
11 0 50 50 1.05000 12.60000 50 50
11 1 50 50 1.05000 12.60000 50 50
12 0 50 50 1.05000 13.65000 50 50
12 1 50 50 1.05000 13.65000 50 50
13 0 50 70 1.05000 14.70000 50 70
13 1 70 50 0.96600 14.61600 50 70
14 0 40 70 1.07100 15.77100 40 70
14 1 70 40 1.00800 15.62400 40 70
15 0 40 70 1.07100 16.84200 40 70
15 1 70 40 1.00800 16.63200 40 70
16 0 40 100 1.13400 17.97600 40 100
16 1 100 40 0.63000 17.26200 40 100
17 0 25 50 0.91875 18.89475 25 50
17 1 50 25 1.05000 18.31200 25 50
18 0 50 50 1.05000 19.94475 50 50
18 1 50 50 1.05000 19.36200 50 50
19 0 50 50 1.05000 20.99475 50 50
19 1 50 50 1.05000 20.41200 50 50
20 0 50 50 1.05000 22.04475 50 50
20 1 50 50 1.05000 21.46200 50 50
21 0 50 50 1.05000 23.09475 50 50
21 1 50 50 1.05000 22.51200 50 50
22 0 50 50 1.05000 24.14475 50 50
22 1 50 50 1.05000 23.56200 50 50
23 0 50 50 1.05000 25.19475 50 50
23 1 50 50 1.05000 24.61200 50 50
24 0 50 50 1.05000 26.24475 50 50
24 1 50 50 1.05000 25.66200 50 50
25 0 50 50 1.05000 27.29475 50 50
25 1 50 50 1.05000 26.71200 50 50
26 0 50 50 1.05000 28.34475 50 50
26 1 50 50 1.05000 27.76200 50 50
27 0 50 50 1.05000 29.39475 50 50
27 1 50 50 1.05000 28.81200 50 50
28 0 50 50 1.05000 30.44475 50 50
28 1 50 50 1.05000 29.86200 50 50
29 0 50 50 1.05000 31.49475 50 50
29 1 50 50 1.05000 30.91200 50 50
30 0 50 50 1.05000 32.54475 50 50
30 1 50 50 1.05000 31.96200 50 50
31 0 50 50 1.05000 33.59475 50 50
31 1 50 50 1.05000 33.01200 50 50
32 0 50 50 1.05000 34.64475 50 50
32 1 50 50 1.05000 34.06200 50 50
33 0 50 50 1.05000 35.69475 50 50
33 1 50 50 1.05000 35.11200 50 50
34 0 50 50 1.05000 36.74475 50 50
34 1 50 50 1.05000 36.16200 50 50
35 0 50 50 1.05000 37.79475 50 50
35 1 50 50 1.05000 37.21200 50 50
36 0 50 50 1.05000 38.84475 50 50
36 1 50 50 1.05000 38.26200 50 50
37 0 50 50 1.05000 39.89475 50 50
37 1 50 50 1.05000 39.31200 50 50
38 0 50 50 1.05000 40.94475 50 50
38 1 50 50 1.05000 40.36200 50 50
39 0 50 50 1.05000 41.99475 50 50
39 1 50 50 1.05000 41.41200 50 50
40 0 50 50 1.05000 43.04475 50 50
40 1 50 50 1.05000 42.46200 50 50
41 0 50 50 1.05000 44.09475 50 50
41 1 50 50 1.05000 43.51200 50 50
42 0 50 50 1.05000 45.14475 50 50
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Table XLV.: (continued)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1
42 1 50 50 1.05000 44.56200 50 50
43 0 50 50 1.05000 46.19475 50 50
43 1 50 50 1.05000 45.61200 50 50
44 0 50 50 1.05000 47.24475 50 50
44 1 50 50 1.05000 46.66200 50 50
45 0 50 50 1.05000 48.29475 50 50
45 1 50 50 1.05000 47.71200 50 50
46 0 50 50 1.05000 49.34475 50 50
46 1 50 50 1.05000 48.76200 50 50
47 0 50 50 1.05000 50.39475 50 50
47 1 50 50 1.05000 49.81200 50 50
48 0 50 50 1.05000 51.44475 50 50
48 1 50 50 1.05000 50.86200 50 50
49 0 50 50 1.05000 52.49475 50 50
49 1 50 50 1.05000 51.91200 50 50
Table XLVI.: Data from experiments: 2 large suppliers with transport costs - Cohort 1 (Player 0 - Home to
Market A; Player 1 - Home to Market B)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1
0 0 52 50 0.94836 0.94836 52 50
0 1 50 52 0.94500 0.94500 52 50
1 0 56 70 0.92484 1.87320 56 70
1 1 70 56 0.79380 1.73880 56 70
2 0 73 34 0.95949 2.83269 73 34
2 1 34 73 1.00212 2.74092 73 34
3 0 78 26 0.98028 3.81297 78 26
3 1 26 78 1.01556 3.75648 78 26
4 0 86 68 0.61236 4.42533 86 68
4 1 68 86 0.70308 4.45956 86 68
5 0 57 21 0.99204 5.41737 57 21
5 1 21 57 0.87192 5.33148 57 21
6 0 64 54 0.92148 6.33885 64 54
6 1 54 64 0.92148 6.25296 64 54
7 0 41 67 0.94122 7.28007 41 67
7 1 67 41 0.88074 7.13370 41 67
8 0 70 63 0.84840 8.12847 70 63
8 1 63 70 0.82761 7.96131 70 63
9 0 47 74 0.95193 9.08040 47 74
9 1 74 47 0.78876 8.75007 47 74
10 0 45 26 0.90405 9.98445 45 26
10 1 26 45 0.84924 9.59931 45 26
11 0 51 99 0.93660 10.92105 51 99
11 1 99 51 0.32760 9.92691 51 99
12 0 33 68 0.91287 11.83392 33 68
12 1 68 33 0.90342 10.83033 33 68
13 0 87 68 0.59535 12.42927 87 68
13 1 68 87 0.69930 11.52963 87 68
14 0 40 49 0.90090 13.33017 40 49
14 1 49 40 0.94479 12.47442 40 49
15 0 73 57 0.84840 14.17857 73 57
15 1 57 73 0.88620 13.36062 73 57
16 0 50 53 0.94500 15.12357 50 53
16 1 53 50 0.93681 14.29743 50 53
17 0 57 29 0.98028 16.10385 57 29
17 1 29 57 0.92736 15.22479 57 29
18 0 55 28 0.97335 17.07720 55 28
18 1 28 55 0.91266 16.13745 55 28
19 0 87 24 0.93723 18.01443 87 24
19 1 24 87 1.05966 17.19711 87 24
20 0 69 20 1.02879 19.04322 69 20
20 1 20 69 0.93870 18.13581 69 20
21 0 69 18 1.03677 20.07999 69 18
21 1 18 69 0.92484 19.06065 69 18
22 0 72 20 1.02816 21.10815 72 20
22 1 20 72 0.95760 20.01825 72 20
23 0 70 23 1.01640 22.12455 70 23
23 1 23 70 0.96201 20.98026 70 23
24 0 67 21 1.02354 23.14809 67 21
24 1 21 67 0.93282 21.91308 67 21
25 0 69 21 1.02480 24.17289 69 21
25 1 21 69 0.94500 22.85808 69 21
26 0 70 21 1.02480 25.19769 70 21
26 1 21 70 0.95109 23.80917 70 21
27 0 71 21 1.02438 26.22207 71 21
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Table XLVI.: (continued)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1
27 1 21 71 0.95718 24.76635 71 21
28 0 70 30 0.98700 27.20907 70 30
28 1 30 70 0.98700 25.75335 70 30
29 0 34 19 0.75348 27.96255 34 19
29 1 19 34 0.70413 26.45748 34 19
30 0 45 19 0.89670 28.85925 45 19
30 1 19 45 0.77574 27.23322 45 19
31 0 74 21 1.02060 29.87985 74 21
31 1 21 74 0.97545 28.20867 74 21
32 0 69 23 1.01682 30.89667 69 23
32 1 23 69 0.95634 29.16501 69 23
33 0 69 18 1.03677 31.93344 69 18
33 1 18 69 0.92484 30.08985 69 18
34 0 69 23 1.01682 32.95026 69 23
34 1 23 69 0.95634 31.04619 69 23
35 0 70 18 1.03740 33.98766 70 18
35 1 18 70 0.93156 31.97775 70 18
36 0 70 22 1.02060 35.00826 70 22
36 1 22 70 0.95676 32.93451 70 22
37 0 69 29 0.99288 36.00114 69 29
37 1 29 69 0.98028 33.91479 69 29
38 0 64 30 0.99204 36.99318 64 30
38 1 30 64 0.96180 34.87659 64 30
39 0 60 29 0.98910 37.98228 60 29
39 1 29 60 0.94059 35.81718 60 29
40 0 68 34 0.97524 38.95752 68 34
40 1 34 68 0.98532 36.80250 68 34
41 0 67 29 0.99498 39.95250 67 29
41 1 29 67 0.97146 37.77396 67 29
42 0 66 21 1.02228 40.97478 66 21
42 1 21 66 0.92673 38.70069 66 21
43 0 70 18 1.03740 42.01218 70 18
43 1 18 70 0.93156 39.63225 70 18
44 0 70 18 1.03740 43.04958 70 18
44 1 18 70 0.93156 40.56381 70 18
45 0 70 16 1.04580 44.09538 70 16
45 1 16 70 0.91644 41.48025 70 16
46 0 72 20 1.02816 45.12354 72 20
46 1 20 72 0.95760 42.43785 72 20
47 0 74 20 1.02564 46.14918 74 20
47 1 20 74 0.97020 43.40805 74 20
48 0 70 20 1.02900 47.17818 70 20
48 1 20 70 0.94500 44.35305 70 20
49 0 69 33 0.97692 48.15510 69 33
49 1 33 69 0.98784 45.34089 69 33
Table XLVII.: Data from experiments: 2 large suppliers with transport costs - Cohort 2 (Player 0 - Home to
Market A; Player 1 - Home to Market B)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1
0 0 75 41 0.91350 0.91350 75 41
0 1 41 75 0.99414 0.99414 75 41
1 0 90 39 0.78540 1.69890 90 39
1 1 39 90 1.03509 2.02923 90 39
2 0 81 24 0.97755 2.67645 81 24
2 1 24 81 1.02690 3.05613 81 24
3 0 80 25 0.97650 3.65295 80 25
3 1 25 80 1.02375 4.07988 80 25
4 0 80 28 0.95760 4.61055 80 28
4 1 28 80 1.02816 5.10804 80 28
5 0 78 28 0.96852 5.57907 78 28
5 1 28 78 1.01892 6.12696 78 28
6 0 79 30 0.95109 6.53016 79 30
6 1 30 79 1.02480 7.15176 79 30
7 0 81 30 0.93849 7.46865 81 30
7 1 30 81 1.03320 8.18496 81 30
8 0 30 27 0.72240 8.19105 30 27
8 1 27 30 0.78561 8.97057 30 27
9 0 79 30 0.95109 9.14214 79 30
9 1 30 79 1.02480 9.99537 79 30
10 0 78 28 0.96852 10.11066 78 28
10 1 28 78 1.01892 11.01429 78 28
11 0 77 30 0.96201 11.07267 77 30
11 1 30 77 1.01640 12.03069 77 30
12 0 76 25 0.99414 12.06681 76 25
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Table XLVII.: (continued)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1
12 1 25 76 1.00275 13.03344 76 25
13 0 72 28 0.99120 13.05801 72 28
13 1 28 72 0.99120 14.02464 72 28
14 0 70 28 0.99540 14.05341 70 28
14 1 28 70 0.98196 15.00660 70 28
15 0 70 30 0.98700 15.04041 70 30
15 1 30 70 0.98700 15.99360 70 30
16 0 71 30 0.98469 16.02510 71 30
16 1 30 71 0.99120 16.98480 71 30
17 0 73 30 0.97881 17.00391 73 30
17 1 30 73 0.99960 17.98440 73 30
18 0 72 30 0.98196 17.98587 72 30
18 1 30 72 0.99540 18.97980 72 30
19 0 63 25 1.00506 18.99093 63 25
19 1 25 63 0.93450 19.91430 63 25
20 0 63 25 1.00506 19.99599 63 25
20 1 25 63 0.93450 20.84880 63 25
21 0 62 25 1.00296 20.99895 62 25
21 1 25 62 0.92925 21.77805 62 25
22 0 64 25 1.00674 22.00569 64 25
22 1 25 64 0.93975 22.71780 64 25
23 0 65 25 1.00800 23.01369 65 25
23 1 25 65 0.94500 23.66280 65 25
24 0 64 25 1.00674 24.02043 64 25
24 1 25 64 0.93975 24.60255 64 25
25 0 64 25 1.00674 25.02717 64 25
25 1 25 64 0.93975 25.54230 64 25
26 0 64 25 1.00674 26.03391 64 25
26 1 25 64 0.93975 26.48205 64 25
27 0 64 25 1.00674 27.04065 64 25
27 1 25 64 0.93975 27.42180 64 25
28 0 64 25 1.00674 28.04739 64 25
28 1 25 64 0.93975 28.36155 64 25
29 0 64 38 0.96852 29.01591 64 38
29 1 38 64 0.97524 29.33679 64 38
30 0 64 38 0.96852 29.98443 64 38
30 1 38 64 0.97524 30.31203 64 38
31 0 75 24 1.00275 30.98718 75 24
31 1 24 75 0.99414 31.30617 75 24
32 0 70 25 1.00800 31.99518 70 25
32 1 25 70 0.97125 32.27742 70 25
33 0 65 25 1.00800 33.00318 65 25
33 1 25 65 0.94500 33.22242 65 25
34 0 65 25 1.00800 34.01118 65 25
34 1 25 65 0.94500 34.16742 65 25
35 0 65 37 0.97020 34.98138 65 37
35 1 37 65 0.97776 35.14518 65 37
36 0 71 30 0.98469 35.96607 71 30
36 1 30 71 0.99120 36.13638 71 30
37 0 68 33 0.97902 36.94509 68 33
37 1 33 68 0.98427 37.12065 68 33
38 0 70 32 0.97860 37.92369 70 32
38 1 32 70 0.99036 38.11101 70 32
39 0 68 30 0.99036 38.91405 68 30
39 1 30 68 0.97860 39.08961 68 30
40 0 71 30 0.98469 39.89874 71 30
40 1 30 71 0.99120 40.08081 71 30
41 0 71 32 0.97587 40.87461 71 32
41 1 32 71 0.99414 41.07495 71 32
42 0 74 32 0.96516 41.83977 74 32
42 1 32 74 1.00548 42.08043 74 32
43 0 68 30 0.99036 42.83013 68 30
43 1 30 68 0.97860 43.05903 68 30
44 0 69 30 0.98889 43.81902 69 30
44 1 30 69 0.98280 44.04183 69 30
45 0 69 30 0.98889 44.80791 69 30
45 1 30 69 0.98280 45.02463 69 30
46 0 69 32 0.98091 45.78882 69 32
46 1 32 69 0.98658 46.01121 69 32
47 0 69 30 0.98889 46.77771 69 30
47 1 30 69 0.98280 46.99401 69 30
48 0 69 30 0.98889 47.76660 69 30
48 1 30 69 0.98280 47.97681 69 30
49 0 69 36 0.96495 48.73155 69 36
49 1 36 69 0.98910 48.96591 69 36
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Table XLVIII.: Data from experiments: 2 large suppliers with transport costs - Cohort 3 (Player 0 - Home to
Market A; Player 1 - Home to Market B)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1
0 0 60 50 0.94500 0.94500 60 50
0 1 50 60 0.94500 0.94500 60 50
1 0 65 60 0.89775 1.84275 65 60
1 1 60 65 0.87150 1.81650 65 60
2 0 49 26 0.93765 2.78040 49 26
2 1 26 49 0.86940 2.68590 49 26
3 0 80 70 0.69300 3.47340 80 70
3 1 70 80 0.69300 3.37890 80 70
4 0 50 29 0.94500 4.41840 50 29
4 1 29 50 0.89649 4.27539 50 29
5 0 50 35 0.94500 5.36340 50 35
5 1 35 50 0.92925 5.20464 50 35
6 0 52 59 0.94458 6.30798 52 59
6 1 59 52 0.90531 6.10995 52 59
7 0 50 31 0.94500 7.25298 50 31
7 1 31 50 0.90909 7.01904 50 31
8 0 50 60 0.94500 8.19798 50 60
8 1 60 50 0.90300 7.92204 50 60
9 0 50 42 0.94500 9.14298 50 42
9 1 42 50 0.94836 8.87040 50 42
10 0 50 41 0.94500 10.08798 50 41
10 1 41 50 0.94689 9.81729 50 41
11 0 50 43 0.94500 11.03298 50 43
11 1 43 50 0.94941 10.76670 50 43
12 0 50 45 0.94500 11.97798 50 45
12 1 45 50 0.95025 11.71695 50 45
13 0 50 45 0.94500 12.92298 50 45
13 1 45 50 0.95025 12.66720 50 45
14 0 60 24 0.99960 13.92258 60 24
14 1 24 60 0.91224 13.57944 60 24
15 0 60 22 1.00380 14.92638 60 22
15 1 22 60 0.89796 14.47740 60 22
16 0 79 22 0.99981 15.92619 79 22
16 1 22 79 1.00968 15.48708 79 22
17 0 73 23 1.01262 16.93881 73 23
17 1 23 73 0.97902 16.46610 73 23
18 0 64 23 1.01262 17.95143 64 23
18 1 23 64 0.92799 17.39409 64 23
19 0 76 24 0.99960 18.95103 76 24
19 1 24 76 0.99960 18.39369 76 24
20 0 75 26 0.99225 19.94328 75 26
20 1 26 75 1.00044 19.39413 75 26
21 0 70 29 0.99120 20.93448 70 29
21 1 29 70 0.98469 20.37882 70 29
22 0 70 26 1.00380 21.93828 70 26
22 1 26 70 0.97524 21.35406 70 26
23 0 70 37 0.95760 22.89588 70 37
23 1 37 70 0.99141 22.34547 70 37
24 0 71 26 1.00233 23.89821 71 26
24 1 26 71 0.98028 23.32575 71 26
25 0 70 32 0.97860 24.87681 70 32
25 1 32 70 0.99036 24.31611 70 32
26 0 70 34 0.97020 25.84701 70 34
26 1 34 70 0.99204 25.30815 70 34
27 0 70 22 1.02060 26.86761 70 22
27 1 22 70 0.95676 26.26491 70 22
28 0 70 22 1.02060 27.88821 70 22
28 1 22 70 0.95676 27.22167 70 22
29 0 90 22 0.92820 28.81641 90 22
29 1 22 90 1.07436 28.29603 90 22
30 0 84 22 0.97356 29.78997 84 22
30 1 22 84 1.03908 29.33511 84 22
31 0 70 23 1.01640 30.80637 70 23
31 1 23 70 0.96201 30.29712 70 23
32 0 70 25 1.00800 31.81437 70 25
32 1 25 70 0.97125 31.26837 70 25
33 0 70 34 0.97020 32.78457 70 34
33 1 34 70 0.99204 32.26041 70 34
34 0 70 35 0.96600 33.75057 70 35
34 1 35 70 0.99225 33.25266 70 35
35 0 70 35 0.96600 34.71657 70 35
35 1 35 70 0.99225 34.24491 70 35
36 0 67 25 1.00926 35.72583 67 25
36 1 25 67 0.95550 35.20041 67 25
37 0 70 26 1.00380 36.72963 70 26
37 1 26 70 0.97524 36.17565 70 26
38 0 70 28 0.99540 37.72503 70 28
38 1 28 70 0.98196 37.15761 70 28
39 0 70 35 0.96600 38.69103 70 35
39 1 35 70 0.99225 38.14986 70 35
40 0 70 35 0.96600 39.65703 70 35
40 1 35 70 0.99225 39.14211 70 35
41 0 70 35 0.96600 40.62303 70 35
41 1 35 70 0.99225 40.13436 70 35
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Table XLVIII.: (continued)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1
42 0 59 24 0.99603 41.61906 59 24
42 1 24 59 0.90678 41.04114 59 24
43 0 68 24 1.01304 42.63210 68 24
43 1 24 68 0.95592 41.99706 68 24
44 0 68 24 1.01304 43.64514 68 24
44 1 24 68 0.95592 42.95298 68 24
45 0 68 24 1.01304 44.65818 68 24
45 1 24 68 0.95592 43.90890 68 24
46 0 68 35 0.97146 45.62964 68 35
46 1 35 68 0.98595 44.89485 68 35
47 0 60 36 0.97440 46.60404 60 36
47 1 36 60 0.96264 45.85749 60 36
48 0 68 22 1.02060 47.62464 68 22
48 1 22 68 0.94500 46.80249 68 22
49 0 69 37 0.96096 48.58560 69 37
49 1 37 69 0.98868 47.79117 69 37
Table XLIX.: Data from experiments: 2 large suppliers with transport costs - Cohort 4 (Player 0 - Home to
Market A; Player 1 - Home to Market B)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1
0 0 82 18 1.01220 1.01220 82 18
0 1 18 82 1.01220 1.01220 82 18
1 0 88 70 0.56196 1.57416 88 70
1 1 70 88 0.65940 1.67160 88 70
2 0 50 68 0.94500 2.51916 50 68
2 1 68 50 0.83916 2.51076 50 68
3 0 82 24 0.97188 3.49104 82 24
3 1 24 82 1.03236 3.54312 82 24
4 0 100 33 0.70350 4.19454 100 33
4 1 33 100 1.09851 4.64163 100 33
5 0 56 19 0.98910 5.18364 56 19
5 1 19 56 0.84735 5.48898 56 19
6 0 55 22 0.97965 6.16329 55 22
6 1 22 55 0.86856 6.35754 55 22
7 0 49 46 0.94185 7.10514 49 46
7 1 46 49 0.94920 7.30674 49 46
8 0 61 47 0.94962 8.05476 61 47
8 1 47 61 0.95634 8.26308 61 47
9 0 60 21 1.00590 9.06066 60 21
9 1 21 60 0.89019 9.15327 60 21
10 0 78 70 0.72156 9.78222 78 70
10 1 70 78 0.70140 9.85467 78 70
11 0 62 40 0.96516 10.74738 62 40
11 1 40 62 0.97020 10.82487 62 40
12 0 73 29 0.98364 11.73102 73 29
12 1 29 73 0.99792 11.82279 73 29
13 0 72 22 1.01892 12.74994 72 22
13 1 22 72 0.96852 12.79131 72 22
14 0 78 24 0.99204 13.74198 78 24
14 1 24 78 1.01052 13.80183 78 24
15 0 74 24 1.00548 14.74746 74 24
15 1 24 74 0.98868 14.79051 74 24
16 0 72 24 1.00968 15.75714 72 24
16 1 24 72 0.97776 15.76827 72 24
17 0 73 24 1.00779 16.76493 73 24
17 1 24 73 0.98322 16.75149 73 24
18 0 72 28 0.99120 17.75613 72 28
18 1 28 72 0.99120 17.74269 72 28
19 0 74 28 0.98532 18.74145 74 28
19 1 28 74 1.00044 18.74313 74 28
20 0 66 28 0.99876 19.74021 66 28
20 1 28 66 0.96348 19.70661 66 28
21 0 62 26 1.00044 20.74065 62 26
21 1 26 62 0.93492 20.64153 62 26
22 0 61 25 1.00044 21.74109 61 25
22 1 25 61 0.92400 21.56553 61 25
23 0 62 27 0.99792 22.73901 62 27
23 1 27 62 0.94017 22.50570 62 27
24 0 69 40 0.94899 23.68800 69 40
24 1 40 69 0.98490 23.49060 69 40
25 0 81 37 0.89292 24.58092 81 37
25 1 37 81 1.02144 24.51204 81 37
26 0 56 37 0.96642 25.54734 56 37
26 1 37 56 0.95319 25.46523 56 37
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Table XLIX.: (continued)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1
27 0 60 67 0.90930 26.45664 60 67
27 1 67 60 0.81291 26.27814 60 67
28 0 39 27 0.84336 27.30000 39 27
28 1 27 39 0.82908 27.10722 39 27
29 0 74 26 0.99540 28.29540 74 26
29 1 26 74 0.99540 28.10262 74 26
30 0 74 23 1.01052 29.30592 74 23
30 1 23 74 0.98469 29.08731 74 23
31 0 75 26 0.99225 30.29817 75 26
31 1 26 75 1.00044 30.08775 75 26
32 0 72 24 1.00968 31.30785 72 24
32 1 24 72 0.97776 31.06551 72 24
33 0 74 24 1.00548 32.31333 74 24
33 1 24 74 0.98868 32.05419 74 24
34 0 75 20 1.02375 33.33708 75 20
34 1 20 75 0.97650 33.03069 75 20
35 0 70 32 0.97860 34.31568 70 32
35 1 32 70 0.99036 34.02105 70 32
36 0 70 34 0.97020 35.28588 70 34
36 1 34 70 0.99204 35.01309 70 34
37 0 72 34 0.96348 36.24936 72 34
37 1 34 72 0.99876 36.01185 72 34
38 0 69 34 0.97293 37.22229 69 34
38 1 34 69 0.98868 37.00053 69 34
39 0 68 42 0.94500 38.16729 68 42
39 1 42 68 0.97860 37.97913 68 42
40 0 69 41 0.94500 39.11229 69 41
40 1 41 69 0.98280 38.96193 69 41
41 0 60 36 0.97440 40.08669 60 36
41 1 36 60 0.96264 39.92457 60 36
42 0 73 40 0.93051 41.01720 73 40
42 1 40 73 0.99330 40.91787 73 40
43 0 77 41 0.89964 41.91684 77 41
43 1 41 77 0.99792 41.91579 77 41
44 0 100 30 0.73500 42.65184 100 30
44 1 30 100 1.11300 43.02879 100 30
45 0 75 23 1.00800 43.65984 75 23
45 1 23 75 0.99036 44.01915 75 23
46 0 75 21 1.01850 44.67834 75 21
46 1 21 75 0.98154 45.00069 75 21
47 0 75 34 0.95025 45.62859 75 34
47 1 34 75 1.00884 46.00953 75 34
48 0 68 32 0.98280 46.61139 68 32
48 1 32 68 0.98280 46.99233 68 32
49 0 78 23 0.99792 47.60931 78 23
49 1 23 78 1.00737 47.99970 78 23
Table L.: Data from experiments: 2 large suppliers with transport costs - Cohort 5 (Player 0 - Home to Market
A; Player 1 - Home to Market B)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1
0 0 47 50 0.93681 0.93681 47 50
0 1 50 47 0.94500 0.94500 47 50
1 0 57 43 0.95970 1.89651 57 43
1 1 43 57 0.95970 1.90470 57 43
2 0 78 47 0.85680 2.75331 78 47
2 1 47 78 0.96705 2.87175 78 47
3 0 50 15 0.94500 3.69831 50 15
3 1 15 50 0.76125 3.63300 50 15
4 0 53 43 0.95382 4.65213 53 43
4 1 43 53 0.95382 4.58682 53 43
5 0 53 43 0.95382 5.60595 53 43
5 1 43 53 0.95382 5.54064 53 43
6 0 53 42 0.95445 6.56040 53 42
6 1 42 53 0.95340 6.49404 53 42
7 0 60 33 0.98070 7.54110 60 33
7 1 33 60 0.95571 7.44975 60 33
8 0 73 33 0.96432 8.50542 73 33
8 1 33 73 1.00212 8.45187 73 33
9 0 73 33 0.96432 9.46974 73 33
9 1 33 73 1.00212 9.45399 73 33
10 0 64 33 0.98322 10.45296 64 33
10 1 33 64 0.96999 10.42398 64 33
11 0 64 33 0.98322 11.43618 64 33
11 1 33 64 0.96999 11.39397 64 33
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Table L.: (continued)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1
12 0 71 33 0.97146 12.40764 71 33
12 1 33 71 0.99498 12.38895 71 33
13 0 71 33 0.97146 13.37910 71 33
13 1 33 71 0.99498 13.38393 71 33
14 0 71 33 0.97146 14.35056 71 33
14 1 33 71 0.99498 14.37891 71 33
15 0 71 33 0.97146 15.32202 71 33
15 1 33 71 0.99498 15.37389 71 33
16 0 71 33 0.97146 16.29348 71 33
16 1 33 71 0.99498 16.36887 71 33
17 0 71 33 0.97146 17.26494 71 33
17 1 33 71 0.99498 17.36385 71 33
18 0 71 33 0.97146 18.23640 71 33
18 1 33 71 0.99498 18.35883 71 33
19 0 71 34 0.96705 19.20345 71 34
19 1 34 71 0.99540 19.35423 71 34
20 0 71 34 0.96705 20.17050 71 34
20 1 34 71 0.99540 20.34963 71 34
21 0 71 34 0.96705 21.13755 71 34
21 1 34 71 0.99540 21.34503 71 34
22 0 71 32 0.97587 22.11342 71 32
22 1 32 71 0.99414 22.33917 71 32
23 0 71 34 0.96705 23.08047 71 34
23 1 34 71 0.99540 23.33457 71 34
24 0 71 34 0.96705 24.04752 71 34
24 1 34 71 0.99540 24.32997 71 34
25 0 63 34 0.98049 25.02801 63 34
25 1 34 63 0.96852 25.29849 63 34
26 0 63 34 0.98049 26.00850 63 34
26 1 34 63 0.96852 26.26701 63 34
27 0 63 32 0.98595 26.99445 63 32
27 1 32 63 0.96390 27.23091 63 32
28 0 63 32 0.98595 27.98040 63 32
28 1 32 63 0.96390 28.19481 63 32
29 0 64 26 1.00380 28.98420 64 26
29 1 26 64 0.94500 29.13981 64 26
30 0 67 33 0.98070 29.96490 67 33
30 1 33 67 0.98070 30.12051 67 33
31 0 67 33 0.98070 30.94560 67 33
31 1 33 67 0.98070 31.10121 67 33
32 0 67 33 0.98070 31.92630 67 33
32 1 33 67 0.98070 32.08191 67 33
33 0 67 33 0.98070 32.90700 67 33
33 1 33 67 0.98070 33.06261 67 33
34 0 63 33 0.98322 33.89022 63 33
34 1 33 63 0.96642 34.02903 63 33
35 0 67 33 0.98070 34.87092 67 33
35 1 33 67 0.98070 35.00973 67 33
36 0 63 33 0.98322 35.85414 63 33
36 1 33 63 0.96642 35.97615 63 33
37 0 67 50 0.92001 36.77415 67 50
37 1 50 67 0.94500 36.92115 67 50
38 0 63 33 0.98322 37.75737 63 33
38 1 33 63 0.96642 37.88757 63 33
39 0 63 33 0.98322 38.74059 63 33
39 1 33 63 0.96642 38.85399 63 33
40 0 63 33 0.98322 39.72381 63 33
40 1 33 63 0.96642 39.82041 63 33
41 0 63 30 0.99141 40.71522 63 30
41 1 30 63 0.95760 40.77801 63 30
42 0 63 33 0.98322 41.69844 63 33
42 1 33 63 0.96642 41.74443 63 33
43 0 63 33 0.98322 42.68166 63 33
43 1 33 63 0.96642 42.71085 63 33
44 0 63 33 0.98322 43.66488 63 33
44 1 33 63 0.96642 43.67727 63 33
45 0 63 33 0.98322 44.64810 63 33
45 1 33 63 0.96642 44.64369 63 33
46 0 63 33 0.98322 45.63132 63 33
46 1 33 63 0.96642 45.61011 63 33
47 0 63 33 0.98322 46.61454 63 33
47 1 33 63 0.96642 46.57653 63 33
48 0 63 33 0.98322 47.59776 63 33
48 1 33 63 0.96642 47.54295 63 33
49 0 63 33 0.98322 48.58098 63 33
49 1 33 63 0.96642 48.50937 63 33
211
Table LI.: Data from experiments: 6 small suppliers - no transport costs - Cohort 1
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
0 0 69 70 0.29724 0.29724 69 75 50 50 96 79
0 1 75 69 0.28000 0.28000 69 75 50 50 96 79
0 2 50 74 0.35000 0.35000 69 75 50 50 96 79
0 3 50 74 0.35000 0.35000 69 75 50 50 96 79
0 4 96 65 0.22013 0.22013 69 75 50 50 96 79
0 5 79 68 0.26948 0.26948 69 75 50 50 96 79
1 0 90 63 0.25200 0.54924 90 68 50 74 52 72
1 1 68 68 0.30464 0.58464 90 68 50 74 52 72
1 2 50 71 0.35000 0.70000 90 68 50 74 52 72
1 3 74 66 0.29176 0.64176 90 68 50 74 52 72
1 4 52 71 0.34501 0.56513 90 68 50 74 52 72
1 5 72 67 0.29507 0.56455 90 68 50 74 52 72
2 0 5 37 0.23450 0.78374 5 58 50 0 50 29
2 1 58 27 0.36997 0.95461 5 58 50 0 50 29
2 2 50 28 0.35000 1.05000 5 58 50 0 50 29
2 3 0 38 0.22167 0.86343 5 58 50 0 50 29
2 4 50 28 0.35000 0.91513 5 58 50 0 50 29
2 5 29 33 0.29806 0.86261 5 58 50 0 50 29
3 0 98 54 0.27384 1.05758 98 77 50 56 60 27
3 1 77 58 0.30779 1.26240 98 77 50 56 60 27
3 2 50 64 0.35000 1.40000 98 77 50 56 60 27
3 3 56 62 0.34076 1.20419 98 77 50 56 60 27
3 4 60 62 0.33367 1.24880 98 77 50 56 60 27
3 5 27 68 0.38596 1.24857 98 77 50 56 60 27
4 0 50 49 0.35000 1.40758 50 73 50 56 57 11
4 1 73 45 0.35107 1.61348 50 73 50 56 57 11
4 2 50 49 0.35000 1.75000 50 73 50 56 57 11
4 3 56 48 0.35056 1.55475 50 73 50 56 57 11
4 4 57 48 0.35049 1.59929 50 73 50 56 57 11
4 5 11 57 0.34636 1.59493 50 73 50 56 57 11
5 0 45 47 0.34767 1.75525 45 77 50 45 48 17
5 1 77 41 0.36134 1.97482 45 77 50 45 48 17
5 2 50 46 0.35000 2.10000 45 77 50 45 48 17
5 3 45 47 0.34767 1.90241 45 77 50 45 48 17
5 4 48 47 0.34921 1.94850 45 77 50 45 48 17
5 5 17 53 0.33614 1.93107 45 77 50 45 48 17
6 0 71 58 0.32011 2.07536 71 75 50 37 50 79
6 1 75 57 0.31500 2.28982 71 75 50 37 50 79
6 2 50 62 0.35000 2.45000 71 75 50 37 50 79
6 3 37 65 0.36881 2.27122 71 75 50 37 50 79
6 4 50 62 0.35000 2.29850 71 75 50 37 50 79
6 5 79 57 0.30669 2.23776 71 75 50 37 50 79
7 0 50 51 0.35000 2.42536 50 69 50 36 50 50
7 1 69 47 0.34823 2.63804 50 69 50 36 50 50
7 2 50 51 0.35000 2.80000 50 69 50 36 50 50
7 3 36 54 0.35196 2.62318 50 69 50 36 50 50
7 4 50 51 0.35000 2.64850 50 69 50 36 50 50
7 5 50 51 0.35000 2.58776 50 69 50 36 50 50
8 0 36 46 0.33889 2.76425 36 54 50 61 61 2
8 1 54 42 0.35336 2.99140 36 54 50 61 61 2
8 2 50 43 0.35000 3.15000 36 54 50 61 61 2
8 3 61 41 0.35873 2.98191 36 54 50 61 61 2
8 4 61 41 0.35873 3.00722 36 54 50 61 61 2
8 5 2 52 0.30744 2.89520 36 54 50 61 61 2
9 0 41 54 0.35231 3.11656 41 63 50 65 40 52
9 1 63 50 0.34606 3.33746 41 63 50 65 40 52
9 2 50 52 0.35000 3.50000 41 63 50 65 40 52
9 3 65 49 0.34650 3.32841 41 63 50 65 40 52
9 4 40 54 0.35233 3.35956 41 63 50 65 40 52
9 5 52 52 0.34944 3.24464 41 63 50 65 40 52
10 0 62 56 0.33824 3.45480 62 53 50 40 42 97
10 1 53 58 0.34699 3.68445 62 53 50 40 42 97
10 2 50 59 0.35000 3.85000 62 53 50 40 42 97
10 3 40 61 0.36050 3.68891 62 53 50 40 42 97
10 4 42 60 0.35784 3.71740 62 53 50 40 42 97
10 5 97 49 0.30394 3.54858 62 53 50 40 42 97
11 0 50 52 0.35000 3.80480 50 40 50 68 49 53
11 1 40 54 0.35233 4.03678 50 40 50 68 49 53
11 2 50 52 0.35000 4.20000 50 40 50 68 49 53
11 3 68 48 0.34664 4.03555 50 40 50 68 49 53
11 4 49 52 0.35021 4.06761 50 40 50 68 49 53
11 5 53 51 0.34944 3.89802 50 40 50 68 49 53
12 0 48 49 0.34967 4.15448 48 45 50 50 50 51
12 1 45 50 0.34942 4.38620 48 45 50 50 50 51
12 2 50 49 0.35000 4.55000 48 45 50 50 50 51
12 3 50 49 0.35000 4.38555 48 45 50 50 50 51
12 4 50 49 0.35000 4.41761 48 45 50 50 50 51
12 5 51 49 0.35009 4.24811 48 45 50 50 50 51
13 0 48 49 0.34967 4.50415 48 38 50 50 56 51
13 1 38 51 0.34804 4.73424 48 38 50 50 56 51
13 2 50 49 0.35000 4.90000 48 38 50 50 56 51
13 3 50 49 0.35000 4.73555 48 38 50 50 56 51
13 4 56 47 0.35126 4.76887 48 38 50 50 56 51
13 5 51 48 0.35021 4.59832 48 38 50 50 56 51
14 0 56 48 0.35056 4.85471 56 45 50 50 46 51
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Table LI.: (continued)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
14 1 45 51 0.35000 5.08424 56 45 50 50 46 51
14 2 50 50 0.35000 5.25000 56 45 50 50 46 51
14 3 50 50 0.35000 5.08555 56 45 50 50 46 51
14 4 46 50 0.34963 5.11849 56 45 50 50 46 51
14 5 51 49 0.35009 4.94842 56 45 50 50 46 51
15 0 49 51 0.35009 5.20480 49 60 50 50 41 55
15 1 60 49 0.34883 5.43307 49 60 50 50 41 55
15 2 50 51 0.35000 5.60000 49 60 50 50 41 55
15 3 50 51 0.35000 5.43555 49 60 50 50 41 55
15 4 41 53 0.35126 5.46975 49 60 50 50 41 55
15 5 55 50 0.34942 5.29783 49 60 50 50 41 55
16 0 61 50 0.34718 5.55198 61 50 50 50 50 52
16 1 50 53 0.35000 5.78307 61 50 50 50 50 52
16 2 50 53 0.35000 5.95000 61 50 50 50 50 52
16 3 50 53 0.35000 5.78555 61 50 50 50 50 52
16 4 50 53 0.35000 5.81975 61 50 50 50 50 52
16 5 52 52 0.34944 5.64727 61 50 50 50 50 52
17 0 28 55 0.35154 5.90352 28 72 50 50 52 51
17 1 72 46 0.34897 6.13205 28 72 50 50 52 51
17 2 50 51 0.35000 6.30000 28 72 50 50 52 51
17 3 50 51 0.35000 6.13555 28 72 50 50 52 51
17 4 52 50 0.34991 6.16966 28 72 50 50 52 51
17 5 51 50 0.34998 5.99725 28 72 50 50 52 51
18 0 46 58 0.35336 6.25688 46 83 50 50 56 50
18 1 83 50 0.32459 6.45664 46 83 50 50 56 50
18 2 50 57 0.35000 6.65000 46 83 50 50 56 50
18 3 50 57 0.35000 6.48555 46 83 50 50 56 50
18 4 56 56 0.34496 6.51462 46 83 50 50 56 50
18 5 50 57 0.35000 6.34725 46 83 50 50 56 50
19 0 55 41 0.35467 6.61155 55 35 49 43 45 34
19 1 35 45 0.33600 6.79264 55 35 49 43 45 34
19 2 49 42 0.34904 6.99904 55 35 49 43 45 34
19 3 43 44 0.34396 6.82950 55 35 49 43 45 34
19 4 45 43 0.34533 6.85995 55 35 49 43 45 34
19 5 34 45 0.33469 6.68194 55 35 49 43 45 34
20 0 68 53 0.33614 6.94769 68 74 49 57 53 32
20 1 74 52 0.33096 7.12360 68 74 49 57 53 32
20 2 49 57 0.35079 7.34984 68 74 49 57 53 32
20 3 57 55 0.34477 7.17428 68 74 49 57 53 32
20 4 53 56 0.34769 7.20764 68 74 49 57 53 32
20 5 32 60 0.36344 7.04538 68 74 49 57 53 32
21 0 72 47 0.34641 7.29409 72 50 51 65 43 25
21 1 50 51 0.35000 7.47360 72 50 51 65 43 25
21 2 51 51 0.34986 7.69970 72 50 51 65 43 25
21 3 65 48 0.34825 7.52253 72 50 51 65 43 25
21 4 43 53 0.35131 7.55895 72 50 51 65 43 25
21 5 25 56 0.35292 7.39830 72 50 51 65 43 25
22 0 29 48 0.33481 7.62890 29 54 50 70 52 15
22 1 54 43 0.35289 7.82649 29 54 50 70 52 15
22 2 50 44 0.35000 8.04970 29 54 50 70 52 15
22 3 70 40 0.36400 7.88653 29 54 50 70 52 15
22 4 52 44 0.35131 7.91026 29 54 50 70 52 15
22 5 15 51 0.32550 7.72380 29 54 50 70 52 15
23 0 32 61 0.36554 7.99444 32 55 48 75 50 78
23 1 55 57 0.34533 8.17182 32 55 48 75 50 78
23 2 48 58 0.35177 8.40147 32 55 48 75 50 78
23 3 75 53 0.32667 8.21319 32 55 48 75 50 78
23 4 50 58 0.35000 8.26026 32 55 48 75 50 78
23 5 78 52 0.32517 8.04897 32 55 48 75 50 78
24 0 29 57 0.35686 8.35130 29 74 52 60 48 50
24 1 74 48 0.34216 8.51398 29 74 52 60 48 50
24 2 52 52 0.34944 8.75091 29 74 52 60 48 50
24 3 60 51 0.34650 8.55969 29 74 52 60 48 50
24 4 48 53 0.35061 8.61086 29 74 52 60 48 50
24 5 50 53 0.35000 8.39897 29 74 52 60 48 50
25 0 20 58 0.35700 8.70830 20 75 52 51 54 56
25 1 75 47 0.34417 8.85815 20 75 52 51 54 56
25 2 52 51 0.34967 9.10058 20 75 52 51 54 56
25 3 51 51 0.34986 8.90955 20 75 52 51 54 56
25 4 54 51 0.34916 8.96002 20 75 52 51 54 56
25 5 56 50 0.34916 8.74813 20 75 52 51 54 56
26 0 24 55 0.34939 9.05770 24 71 52 49 56 49
26 1 71 46 0.34951 9.20766 24 71 52 49 56 49
26 2 52 50 0.34991 9.45049 24 71 52 49 56 49
26 3 49 50 0.34998 9.25953 24 71 52 49 56 49
26 4 56 49 0.34986 9.30988 24 71 52 49 56 49
26 5 49 50 0.34998 9.09811 24 71 52 49 56 49
27 0 69 52 0.33714 9.39484 69 70 50 49 54 36
27 1 70 52 0.33600 9.54366 69 70 50 49 54 36
27 2 50 56 0.35000 9.80049 69 70 50 49 54 36
27 3 49 56 0.35068 9.61021 69 70 50 49 54 36
27 4 54 55 0.34729 9.65718 69 70 50 49 54 36
27 5 36 58 0.35849 9.45660 69 70 50 49 54 36
28 0 81 50 0.32758 9.72242 81 50 48 40 48 62
28 1 50 56 0.35000 9.89366 81 50 48 40 48 62
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Table LI.: (continued)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
28 2 48 56 0.35131 10.15180 81 50 48 40 48 62
28 3 40 58 0.35700 9.96721 81 50 48 40 48 62
28 4 48 56 0.35131 10.00848 81 50 48 40 48 62
28 5 62 53 0.34244 9.79904 81 50 48 40 48 62
29 0 73 38 0.36986 10.09227 73 16 50 37 52 35
29 1 16 49 0.31906 10.21272 73 16 50 37 52 35
29 2 50 43 0.35000 10.50180 73 16 50 37 52 35
29 3 37 45 0.33847 10.30568 73 16 50 37 52 35
29 4 52 42 0.35177 10.36026 73 16 50 37 52 35
29 5 35 46 0.33775 10.13679 73 16 50 37 52 35
30 0 53 47 0.35084 10.44311 53 57 50 50 47 31
30 1 57 46 0.35212 10.56484 53 57 50 50 47 31
30 2 50 48 0.35000 10.85180 53 57 50 50 47 31
30 3 50 48 0.35000 10.65568 53 57 50 50 47 31
30 4 47 48 0.34909 10.70935 53 57 50 50 47 31
30 5 31 51 0.34379 10.48059 53 57 50 50 47 31
31 0 36 52 0.34869 10.79181 36 68 50 50 56 34
31 1 68 45 0.35294 10.91778 36 68 50 50 56 34
31 2 50 49 0.35000 11.20180 36 68 50 50 56 34
31 3 50 49 0.35000 11.00568 36 68 50 50 56 34
31 4 56 48 0.35056 11.05991 36 68 50 50 56 34
31 5 34 52 0.34776 10.82835 36 68 50 50 56 34
32 0 35 55 0.35350 11.14531 35 65 50 50 60 50
32 1 65 49 0.34650 11.26428 35 65 50 50 60 50
32 2 50 52 0.35000 11.55180 35 65 50 50 60 50
32 3 50 52 0.35000 11.35568 35 65 50 50 60 50
32 4 60 50 0.34767 11.40757 35 65 50 50 60 50
32 5 50 52 0.35000 11.17835 35 65 50 50 60 50
33 0 25 51 0.33833 11.48364 25 62 50 45 51 49
33 1 62 44 0.35504 11.61932 25 62 50 45 51 49
33 2 50 46 0.35000 11.90180 25 62 50 45 51 49
33 3 45 47 0.34767 11.70335 25 62 50 45 51 49
33 4 51 46 0.35044 11.75802 25 62 50 45 51 49
33 5 49 47 0.34963 11.52797 25 62 50 45 51 49
34 0 50 56 0.35000 11.83364 50 49 50 50 50 79
34 1 49 56 0.35068 11.97000 50 49 50 50 50 79
34 2 50 56 0.35000 12.25180 50 49 50 50 50 79
34 3 50 56 0.35000 12.05335 50 49 50 50 50 79
34 4 50 56 0.35000 12.10802 50 49 50 50 50 79
34 5 79 50 0.33038 11.85835 50 49 50 50 50 79
35 0 49 50 0.34998 12.18362 49 45 50 50 52 51
35 1 45 50 0.34942 12.31942 49 45 50 50 52 51
35 2 50 49 0.35000 12.60180 49 45 50 50 52 51
35 3 50 49 0.35000 12.40335 49 45 50 50 52 51
35 4 52 49 0.35014 12.45816 49 45 50 50 52 51
35 5 51 49 0.35009 12.20844 49 45 50 50 52 51
36 0 50 55 0.35000 12.53362 50 68 50 50 56 52
36 1 68 52 0.33824 12.65766 50 68 50 50 56 52
36 2 50 55 0.35000 12.95180 50 68 50 50 56 52
36 3 50 55 0.35000 12.75335 50 68 50 50 56 52
36 4 56 54 0.34636 12.80452 50 68 50 50 56 52
36 5 52 55 0.34874 12.55718 50 68 50 50 56 52
37 0 50 50 0.35000 12.88362 50 50 53 50 59 36
37 1 50 50 0.35000 13.00766 50 50 53 50 59 36
37 2 53 49 0.35014 13.30194 50 50 53 50 59 36
37 3 50 50 0.35000 13.10335 50 50 53 50 59 36
37 4 59 48 0.35021 13.15473 50 50 53 50 59 36
37 5 36 52 0.34869 12.90588 50 50 53 50 59 36
38 0 60 49 0.34883 13.23245 60 50 50 50 52 42
38 1 50 51 0.35000 13.35766 60 50 50 50 52 42
38 2 50 51 0.35000 13.65194 60 50 50 50 52 42
38 3 50 51 0.35000 13.45335 60 50 50 50 52 42
38 4 52 50 0.34991 13.50463 60 50 50 50 52 42
38 5 42 52 0.35037 13.25625 60 50 50 50 52 42
39 0 51 48 0.35021 13.58266 51 50 50 50 44 47
39 1 50 48 0.35000 13.70766 51 50 50 50 44 47
39 2 50 48 0.35000 14.00194 51 50 50 50 44 47
39 3 50 48 0.35000 13.80335 51 50 50 50 44 47
39 4 44 50 0.34916 13.85379 51 50 50 50 44 47
39 5 47 49 0.34944 13.60569 51 50 50 50 44 47
40 0 52 52 0.34944 13.93210 52 60 50 50 50 50
40 1 60 50 0.34767 14.05532 52 60 50 50 50 50
40 2 50 52 0.35000 14.35194 52 60 50 50 50 50
40 3 50 52 0.35000 14.15335 52 60 50 50 50 50
40 4 50 52 0.35000 14.20379 52 60 50 50 50 50
40 5 50 52 0.35000 13.95569 52 60 50 50 50 50
41 0 50 47 0.35000 14.28210 50 50 50 50 47 38
41 1 50 47 0.35000 14.40532 50 50 50 50 47 38
41 2 50 47 0.35000 14.70194 50 50 50 50 47 38
41 3 50 47 0.35000 14.50335 50 50 50 50 47 38
41 4 47 48 0.34909 14.55288 50 50 50 50 47 38
41 5 38 49 0.34524 14.30093 50 50 50 50 47 38
42 0 46 49 0.34916 14.63126 46 55 50 50 55 35
42 1 55 47 0.35117 14.75649 46 55 50 50 55 35
42 2 50 48 0.35000 15.05194 46 55 50 50 55 35
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Table LI.: (continued)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
42 3 50 48 0.35000 14.85335 46 55 50 50 55 35
42 4 55 47 0.35117 14.90405 46 55 50 50 55 35
42 5 35 51 0.34650 14.64743 46 55 50 50 55 35
43 0 46 50 0.34963 14.98089 46 54 50 50 50 47
43 1 54 49 0.35009 15.10658 46 54 50 50 50 47
43 2 50 49 0.35000 15.40194 46 54 50 50 50 47
43 3 50 49 0.35000 15.20335 46 54 50 50 50 47
43 4 50 49 0.35000 15.25405 46 54 50 50 50 47
43 5 47 50 0.34979 14.99722 46 54 50 50 50 47
44 0 50 52 0.35000 15.33089 50 58 50 50 51 53
44 1 58 51 0.34757 15.45416 50 58 50 50 51 53
44 2 50 52 0.35000 15.75194 50 58 50 50 51 53
44 3 50 52 0.35000 15.55335 50 58 50 50 51 53
44 4 51 52 0.34974 15.60379 50 58 50 50 51 53
44 5 53 52 0.34909 15.34631 50 58 50 50 51 53
45 0 50 52 0.35000 15.68089 50 63 50 50 50 47
45 1 63 49 0.34757 15.80173 50 63 50 50 50 47
45 2 50 52 0.35000 16.10194 50 63 50 50 50 47
45 3 50 52 0.35000 15.90335 50 63 50 50 50 47
45 4 50 52 0.35000 15.95379 50 63 50 50 50 47
45 5 47 53 0.35084 15.69715 50 63 50 50 50 47
46 0 43 49 0.34804 16.02893 43 50 50 50 50 45
46 1 50 48 0.35000 16.15173 43 50 50 50 50 45
46 2 50 48 0.35000 16.45194 43 50 50 50 50 45
46 3 50 48 0.35000 16.25335 43 50 50 50 50 45
46 4 50 48 0.35000 16.30379 43 50 50 50 50 45
46 5 45 49 0.34883 16.04598 43 50 50 50 50 45
47 0 62 51 0.34524 16.37417 62 57 50 50 52 47
47 1 57 52 0.34722 16.49895 62 57 50 50 52 47
47 2 50 54 0.35000 16.80194 62 57 50 50 52 47
47 3 50 54 0.35000 16.60335 62 57 50 50 52 47
47 4 52 53 0.34921 16.65300 62 57 50 50 52 47
47 5 47 54 0.35119 16.39717 62 57 50 50 52 47
48 0 41 53 0.35126 16.72543 41 55 50 50 50 60
48 1 55 50 0.34942 16.84837 41 55 50 50 50 60
48 2 50 51 0.35000 17.15194 41 55 50 50 50 60
48 3 50 51 0.35000 16.95335 41 55 50 50 50 60
48 4 50 51 0.35000 17.00300 41 55 50 50 50 60
48 5 60 49 0.34883 16.74601 41 55 50 50 50 60
49 0 37 49 0.34454 17.06997 37 50 50 50 50 44
49 1 50 46 0.35000 17.19837 37 50 50 50 50 44
49 2 50 46 0.35000 17.50194 37 50 50 50 50 44
49 3 50 46 0.35000 17.30335 37 50 50 50 50 44
49 4 50 46 0.35000 17.35300 37 50 50 50 50 44
49 5 44 47 0.34706 17.09307 37 50 50 50 50 44
Table LII.: Data from experiments: 6 small suppliers - no transport costs - Cohort 2
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
0 0 46 51 0.35009 0.35009 46 75 80 50 50 0
0 1 75 45 0.35000 0.35000 46 75 80 50 50 0
0 2 80 44 0.35000 0.35000 46 75 80 50 50 0
0 3 50 50 0.35000 0.35000 46 75 80 50 50 0
0 4 50 50 0.35000 0.35000 46 75 80 50 50 0
0 5 0 60 0.35000 0.35000 46 75 80 50 50 0
1 0 54 48 0.35056 0.70065 54 58 83 50 50 0
1 1 58 47 0.35131 0.70131 54 58 83 50 50 0
1 2 83 42 0.35539 0.70539 54 58 83 50 50 0
1 3 50 49 0.35000 0.70000 54 58 83 50 50 0
1 4 50 49 0.35000 0.70000 54 58 83 50 50 0
1 5 0 59 0.34417 0.69417 54 58 83 50 50 0
2 0 52 62 0.34711 1.04776 52 79 50 30 50 100
2 1 79 56 0.31008 1.01138 52 79 50 30 50 100
2 2 50 62 0.35000 1.05539 52 79 50 30 50 100
2 3 30 66 0.37800 1.07800 52 79 50 30 50 100
2 4 50 62 0.35000 1.05000 52 79 50 30 50 100
2 5 100 52 0.28000 0.97417 52 79 50 30 50 100
3 0 50 60 0.35000 1.39776 50 50 100 100 52 0
3 1 50 60 0.35000 1.36138 50 50 100 100 52 0
3 2 100 50 0.29167 1.34706 50 50 100 100 52 0
3 3 100 50 0.29167 1.36967 50 50 100 100 52 0
3 4 52 60 0.34757 1.39757 50 50 100 100 52 0
3 5 0 70 0.40833 1.38250 50 50 100 100 52 0
4 0 50 40 0.35000 1.74776 50 19 50 80 50 0
4 1 19 46 0.31311 1.67449 50 19 50 80 50 0
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Table LII.: (continued)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
4 2 50 40 0.35000 1.69706 50 19 50 80 50 0
4 3 80 34 0.38500 1.75467 50 19 50 80 50 0
4 4 50 40 0.35000 1.74757 50 19 50 80 50 0
4 5 0 50 0.29167 1.67417 50 19 50 80 50 0
5 0 48 33 0.34594 2.09370 48 40 69 10 45 0
5 1 40 34 0.32900 2.00349 48 40 69 10 45 0
5 2 69 29 0.38813 2.08518 48 40 69 10 45 0
5 3 10 40 0.26600 2.02067 48 40 69 10 45 0
5 4 45 33 0.33950 2.08707 48 40 69 10 45 0
5 5 0 42 0.24500 1.91917 48 40 69 10 45 0
6 0 50 61 0.35000 2.44370 50 76 69 10 50 100
6 1 76 56 0.31603 2.31952 50 76 69 10 50 100
6 2 69 57 0.32606 2.41124 50 76 69 10 50 100
6 3 10 69 0.40133 2.42200 50 76 69 10 50 100
6 4 50 61 0.35000 2.43707 50 76 69 10 50 100
6 5 100 51 0.28583 2.20500 50 76 69 10 50 100
7 0 50 52 0.35000 2.79370 50 50 23 90 45 52
7 1 50 52 0.35000 2.66952 50 50 23 90 45 52
7 2 23 57 0.35504 2.76628 50 50 23 90 45 52
7 3 90 44 0.34067 2.76267 50 50 23 90 45 52
7 4 45 53 0.35117 2.78824 50 50 23 90 45 52
7 5 52 52 0.34944 2.55444 50 50 23 90 45 52
8 0 50 47 0.35000 3.14370 50 57 44 30 55 51
8 1 57 46 0.35212 3.02164 50 57 44 30 55 51
8 2 44 49 0.34846 3.11474 50 57 44 30 55 51
8 3 30 51 0.34300 3.10567 50 57 44 30 55 51
8 4 55 46 0.35175 3.13999 50 57 44 30 55 51
8 5 51 47 0.35033 2.90477 50 57 44 30 55 51
9 0 60 32 0.36867 3.51237 60 55 3 0 50 50
9 1 55 33 0.35933 3.38098 60 55 3 0 50 50
9 2 3 43 0.26007 3.37482 60 55 3 0 50 50
9 3 0 44 0.25667 3.36233 60 55 3 0 50 50
9 4 50 34 0.35000 3.48999 60 55 3 0 50 50
9 5 50 34 0.35000 3.25477 60 55 3 0 50 50
10 0 60 56 0.34067 3.85303 60 80 99 5 46 51
10 1 80 52 0.32200 3.70298 60 80 99 5 46 51
10 2 99 48 0.30541 3.68023 60 80 99 5 46 51
10 3 5 67 0.39200 3.75433 60 80 99 5 46 51
10 4 46 59 0.35383 3.84382 60 80 99 5 46 51
10 5 51 58 0.34904 3.60381 60 80 99 5 46 51
11 0 60 60 0.33600 4.18903 60 74 47 80 50 49
11 1 74 57 0.31696 4.01994 60 74 47 80 50 49
11 2 47 63 0.35434 4.03457 60 74 47 80 50 49
11 3 80 56 0.30800 4.06233 60 74 47 80 50 49
11 4 50 62 0.35000 4.19382 60 74 47 80 50 49
11 5 49 62 0.35138 3.95519 60 74 47 80 50 49
12 0 50 53 0.35000 4.53903 50 56 29 90 60 32
12 1 56 52 0.34776 4.36770 50 56 29 90 60 32
12 2 29 58 0.35931 4.39388 50 56 29 90 60 32
12 3 90 45 0.33600 4.39833 50 56 29 90 60 32
12 4 60 51 0.34650 4.54032 50 56 29 90 60 32
12 5 32 57 0.35714 4.31233 50 56 29 90 60 32
13 0 50 51 0.35000 4.88903 50 51 36 90 50 28
13 1 51 51 0.34986 4.71756 50 51 36 90 50 28
13 2 36 54 0.35196 4.74584 50 51 36 90 50 28
13 3 90 43 0.34533 4.74367 50 51 36 90 50 28
13 4 50 51 0.35000 4.89032 50 51 36 90 50 28
13 5 28 55 0.35154 4.66387 50 51 36 90 50 28
14 0 50 41 0.35000 5.23903 50 50 27 80 50 0
14 1 50 41 0.35000 5.06756 50 50 27 80 50 0
14 2 27 46 0.32692 5.07276 50 50 27 80 50 0
14 3 80 35 0.38150 5.12517 50 50 27 80 50 0
14 4 50 41 0.35000 5.24032 50 50 27 80 50 0
14 5 0 51 0.29750 4.96137 50 50 27 80 50 0
15 0 50 47 0.35000 5.58903 50 80 53 20 50 32
15 1 80 41 0.36050 5.42806 50 80 53 20 50 32
15 2 53 46 0.35119 5.42395 50 80 53 20 50 32
15 3 20 53 0.33950 5.46467 50 80 53 20 50 32
15 4 50 47 0.35000 5.59032 50 80 53 20 50 32
15 5 32 51 0.34454 5.30591 50 80 53 20 50 32
16 0 50 32 0.35000 5.93903 50 72 0 15 48 27
16 1 72 28 0.39517 5.82323 50 72 0 15 48 27
16 2 0 42 0.24500 5.66895 50 72 0 15 48 27
16 3 15 39 0.27650 5.74117 50 72 0 15 48 27
16 4 48 33 0.34594 5.93626 50 72 0 15 48 27
16 5 27 37 0.30277 5.60868 50 72 0 15 48 27
17 0 50 50 0.35000 6.28903 50 81 70 0 46 52
17 1 81 44 0.34928 6.17251 50 81 70 0 46 52
17 2 70 46 0.35000 6.01895 50 81 70 0 46 52
17 3 0 60 0.35000 6.09117 50 81 70 0 46 52
17 4 46 51 0.35009 6.28635 50 81 70 0 46 52
17 5 52 49 0.35014 5.95882 50 81 70 0 46 52
18 0 50 48 0.35000 6.63903 50 69 70 0 50 50
18 1 69 44 0.35488 6.52738 50 69 70 0 50 50
18 2 70 44 0.35467 6.37362 50 69 70 0 50 50
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Table LII.: (continued)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
18 3 0 58 0.33833 6.42950 50 69 70 0 50 50
18 4 50 48 0.35000 6.63635 50 69 70 0 50 50
18 5 50 48 0.35000 6.30882 50 69 70 0 50 50
19 0 50 48 0.35000 6.98903 50 82 0 50 50 56
19 1 82 41 0.35971 6.88709 50 82 0 50 50 56
19 2 0 58 0.33833 6.71195 50 82 0 50 50 56
19 3 50 48 0.35000 6.77950 50 82 0 50 50 56
19 4 50 48 0.35000 6.98635 50 82 0 50 50 56
19 5 56 46 0.35196 6.66078 50 82 0 50 50 56
20 0 50 47 0.35000 7.33903 50 87 18 20 50 58
20 1 87 39 0.36554 7.25263 50 87 18 20 50 58
20 2 18 53 0.33731 7.04926 50 87 18 20 50 58
20 3 20 53 0.33950 7.11900 50 87 18 20 50 58
20 4 50 47 0.35000 7.33635 50 87 18 20 50 58
20 5 58 45 0.35317 7.01395 50 87 18 20 50 58
21 0 50 65 0.35000 7.68903 50 100 18 100 50 58
21 1 100 55 0.26250 7.51513 50 100 18 100 50 58
21 2 18 72 0.40824 7.45750 50 100 18 100 50 58
21 3 100 55 0.26250 7.38150 50 100 18 100 50 58
21 4 50 65 0.35000 7.68635 50 100 18 100 50 58
21 5 58 64 0.33544 7.34939 50 100 18 100 50 58
22 0 50 62 0.35000 8.03903 50 94 20 100 47 50
22 1 94 53 0.28943 7.80456 50 94 20 100 47 50
22 2 20 68 0.39200 7.84950 50 94 20 100 47 50
22 3 100 52 0.28000 7.66150 50 94 20 100 47 50
22 4 47 63 0.35434 8.04069 50 94 20 100 47 50
22 5 50 62 0.35000 7.69939 50 94 20 100 47 50
23 0 44 56 0.35336 8.39239 44 57 23 100 51 48
23 1 57 53 0.34641 8.15096 44 57 23 100 51 48
23 2 23 60 0.36449 8.21399 44 57 23 100 51 48
23 3 100 45 0.32083 7.98233 44 57 23 100 51 48
23 4 51 54 0.34951 8.39020 44 57 23 100 51 48
23 5 48 55 0.35107 8.05047 44 57 23 100 51 48
24 0 45 55 0.35233 8.74473 45 53 25 100 49 47
24 1 53 53 0.34874 8.49970 45 53 25 100 49 47
24 2 25 59 0.36167 8.57565 45 53 25 100 49 47
24 3 100 44 0.32667 8.30900 45 53 25 100 49 47
24 4 49 54 0.35044 8.74064 45 53 25 100 49 47
24 5 47 54 0.35119 8.40166 45 53 25 100 49 47
25 0 45 59 0.35467 9.09939 45 94 5 100 50 47
25 1 94 49 0.30996 8.80966 45 94 5 100 50 47
25 2 5 67 0.39200 8.96765 45 94 5 100 50 47
25 3 100 48 0.30333 8.61233 45 94 5 100 50 47
25 4 50 58 0.35000 9.09064 45 94 5 100 50 47
25 5 47 59 0.35294 8.75460 45 94 5 100 50 47
26 0 45 51 0.35000 9.44939 45 50 7 100 50 46
26 1 50 50 0.35000 9.15966 45 50 7 100 50 46
26 2 7 58 0.34699 9.31464 45 50 7 100 50 46
26 3 100 40 0.35000 8.96233 45 50 7 100 50 46
26 4 50 50 0.35000 9.44064 45 50 7 100 50 46
26 5 46 50 0.34963 9.10422 45 50 7 100 50 46
27 0 44 34 0.33796 9.78735 44 51 23 0 50 47
27 1 51 33 0.35196 9.51162 44 51 23 0 50 47
27 2 23 38 0.29519 9.60983 44 51 23 0 50 47
27 3 0 43 0.25083 9.21317 44 51 23 0 50 47
27 4 50 33 0.35000 9.79064 44 51 23 0 50 47
27 5 47 34 0.34419 9.44841 44 51 23 0 50 47
28 0 50 58 0.35000 10.13735 50 70 90 0 54 74
28 1 70 54 0.33133 9.84296 50 70 90 0 54 74
28 2 90 50 0.31267 9.92250 50 70 90 0 54 74
28 3 0 68 0.39667 9.60983 50 70 90 0 54 74
28 4 54 57 0.34636 10.13700 50 70 90 0 54 74
28 5 74 53 0.32816 9.77657 50 70 90 0 54 74
29 0 43 36 0.33742 10.47478 43 51 20 0 50 60
29 1 51 35 0.35173 10.19468 43 51 20 0 50 60
29 2 20 41 0.29750 10.22000 43 51 20 0 50 60
29 3 0 45 0.26250 9.87233 43 51 20 0 50 60
29 4 50 35 0.35000 10.48700 43 51 20 0 50 60
29 5 60 33 0.36750 10.14407 43 51 20 0 50 60
30 0 50 51 0.35000 10.82478 50 50 68 0 55 84
30 1 50 51 0.35000 10.54468 50 50 68 0 55 84
30 2 68 48 0.34664 10.56664 50 50 68 0 55 84
30 3 0 61 0.35583 10.22817 50 50 68 0 55 84
30 4 55 50 0.34942 10.83642 50 50 68 0 55 84
30 5 84 45 0.34286 10.48693 50 50 68 0 55 84
31 0 50 65 0.35000 11.17478 50 89 20 100 50 67
31 1 89 57 0.28266 10.82734 50 89 20 100 50 67
31 2 20 71 0.40250 10.96914 50 89 20 100 50 67
31 3 100 55 0.26250 10.49067 50 89 20 100 50 67
31 4 50 65 0.35000 11.18642 50 89 20 100 50 67
31 5 67 62 0.31946 10.80639 50 89 20 100 50 67
32 0 47 52 0.35049 11.52527 47 51 20 90 50 50
32 1 51 51 0.34986 11.17720 47 51 20 90 50 50
32 2 20 58 0.35700 11.32614 47 51 20 90 50 50
32 3 90 44 0.34067 10.83133 47 51 20 90 50 50
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Table LII.: (continued)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
32 4 50 52 0.35000 11.53642 47 51 20 90 50 50
32 5 50 52 0.35000 11.15639 47 51 20 90 50 50
33 0 50 50 0.35000 11.87527 50 50 20 80 50 48
33 1 50 50 0.35000 11.52720 50 50 20 80 50 48
33 2 20 56 0.35000 11.67614 50 50 20 80 50 48
33 3 80 44 0.35000 11.18133 50 50 20 80 50 48
33 4 50 50 0.35000 11.88642 50 50 20 80 50 48
33 5 48 50 0.34991 11.50630 50 50 20 80 50 48
34 0 50 46 0.35000 12.22527 50 49 21 60 50 50
34 1 49 46 0.34951 11.87671 50 49 21 60 50 50
34 2 21 52 0.33714 12.01328 50 49 21 60 50 50
34 3 60 44 0.35467 11.53600 50 49 21 60 50 50
34 4 50 46 0.35000 12.23642 50 49 21 60 50 50
34 5 50 46 0.35000 11.85630 50 49 21 60 50 50
35 0 50 43 0.35000 12.57527 50 49 22 40 50 56
35 1 49 44 0.34928 12.22599 50 49 22 40 50 56
35 2 22 49 0.32844 12.34172 50 49 22 40 50 56
35 3 40 45 0.34183 11.87783 50 49 22 40 50 56
35 4 50 43 0.35000 12.58642 50 49 22 40 50 56
35 5 56 42 0.35476 12.21106 50 49 22 40 50 56
36 0 50 56 0.35000 12.92527 50 50 62 20 50 100
36 1 50 56 0.35000 12.57599 50 50 62 20 50 100
36 2 62 54 0.34104 12.68276 50 50 62 20 50 100
36 3 20 62 0.37100 12.24883 50 50 62 20 50 100
36 4 50 56 0.35000 12.93642 50 50 62 20 50 100
36 5 100 46 0.31500 12.52606 50 50 62 20 50 100
37 0 50 38 0.35000 13.27527 50 58 26 0 50 54
37 1 58 36 0.36157 12.93756 50 58 26 0 50 54
37 2 26 42 0.31416 12.99692 50 58 26 0 50 54
37 3 0 48 0.28000 12.52883 50 58 26 0 50 54
37 4 50 38 0.35000 13.28642 50 58 26 0 50 54
37 5 54 37 0.35569 12.88175 50 58 26 0 50 54
38 0 50 43 0.35000 13.62527 50 58 29 20 50 56
38 1 58 41 0.35691 13.29447 50 58 29 20 50 56
38 2 29 47 0.33236 13.32928 50 58 29 20 50 56
38 3 20 49 0.32550 12.85433 50 58 29 20 50 56
38 4 50 43 0.35000 13.63642 50 58 29 20 50 56
38 5 56 41 0.35546 13.23721 50 58 29 20 50 56
39 0 50 49 0.35000 13.97527 50 59 22 60 50 55
39 1 59 47 0.35126 13.64573 50 59 22 60 50 55
39 2 22 55 0.34804 13.67732 50 59 22 60 50 55
39 3 60 47 0.35117 13.20550 50 59 22 60 50 55
39 4 50 49 0.35000 13.98642 50 59 22 60 50 55
39 5 55 48 0.35058 13.58779 50 59 22 60 50 55
40 0 50 54 0.35000 14.32527 50 61 28 80 50 50
40 1 61 52 0.34461 13.99034 50 61 28 80 50 50
40 2 28 58 0.35924 14.03656 50 61 28 80 50 50
40 3 80 48 0.33600 13.54150 50 61 28 80 50 50
40 4 50 54 0.35000 14.33642 50 61 28 80 50 50
40 5 50 54 0.35000 13.93779 50 61 28 80 50 50
41 0 50 47 0.35000 14.67527 50 58 21 60 50 47
41 1 58 46 0.35224 14.34258 50 58 21 60 50 47
41 2 21 53 0.34053 14.37709 50 58 21 60 50 47
41 3 60 45 0.35350 13.89500 50 58 21 60 50 47
41 4 50 47 0.35000 14.68642 50 58 21 60 50 47
41 5 47 48 0.34909 14.28688 50 58 21 60 50 47
42 0 50 43 0.35000 15.02527 50 57 12 40 51 53
42 1 57 41 0.35621 14.69879 50 57 12 40 51 53
42 2 12 50 0.31631 14.69340 50 57 12 40 51 53
42 3 40 45 0.34183 14.23683 50 57 12 40 51 53
42 4 51 42 0.35091 15.03733 50 57 12 40 51 53
42 5 53 42 0.35259 14.63947 50 57 12 40 51 53
43 0 50 48 0.35000 15.37527 50 58 54 20 50 57
43 1 58 46 0.35224 15.05103 50 58 54 20 50 57
43 2 54 47 0.35103 15.04442 50 58 54 20 50 57
43 3 20 54 0.34300 14.57983 50 58 54 20 50 57
43 4 50 48 0.35000 15.38733 50 58 54 20 50 57
43 5 57 46 0.35212 14.99160 50 58 54 20 50 57
44 0 50 45 0.35000 15.72527 50 57 25 40 50 54
44 1 57 44 0.35376 15.40478 50 57 25 40 50 54
44 2 25 50 0.33542 15.37984 50 57 25 40 50 54
44 3 40 47 0.34417 14.92400 50 57 25 40 50 54
44 4 50 45 0.35000 15.73733 50 57 25 40 50 54
44 5 54 44 0.35243 15.34402 50 57 25 40 50 54
45 0 50 46 0.35000 16.07527 50 50 14 60 50 56
45 1 50 46 0.35000 15.75478 50 50 14 60 50 56
45 2 14 53 0.33236 15.71220 50 50 14 60 50 56
45 3 60 44 0.35467 15.27867 50 50 14 60 50 56
45 4 50 46 0.35000 16.08733 50 50 14 60 50 56
45 5 56 45 0.35266 15.69668 50 50 14 60 50 56
46 0 51 54 0.34951 16.42478 51 62 21 80 50 57
46 1 62 52 0.34384 16.09862 51 62 21 80 50 57
46 2 21 60 0.36421 16.07641 51 62 21 80 50 57
46 3 80 48 0.33600 15.61467 51 62 21 80 50 57
46 4 50 54 0.35000 16.43733 51 62 21 80 50 57
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Table LII.: (continued)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
46 5 57 53 0.34641 16.04309 51 62 21 80 50 57
47 0 50 47 0.35000 16.77478 50 57 15 60 50 52
47 1 57 45 0.35294 16.45156 50 57 15 60 50 52
47 2 15 54 0.33775 16.41416 50 57 15 60 50 52
47 3 60 45 0.35350 15.96817 50 57 15 60 50 52
47 4 50 47 0.35000 16.78733 50 57 15 60 50 52
47 5 52 46 0.35084 16.39393 50 57 15 60 50 52
48 0 50 46 0.35000 17.12478 50 58 26 40 50 55
48 1 58 44 0.35411 16.80567 50 58 26 40 50 55
48 2 26 51 0.33936 16.75352 50 58 26 40 50 55
48 3 40 48 0.34533 16.31350 50 58 26 40 50 55
48 4 50 46 0.35000 17.13733 50 58 26 40 50 55
48 5 55 45 0.35233 16.74626 50 58 26 40 50 55
49 0 50 47 0.35000 17.47478 50 60 53 0 50 70
49 1 60 45 0.35350 17.15917 50 60 53 0 50 70
49 2 53 46 0.35119 17.10471 50 60 53 0 50 70
49 3 0 57 0.33250 16.64600 50 60 53 0 50 70
49 4 50 47 0.35000 17.48733 50 60 53 0 50 70
49 5 70 43 0.35700 17.10326 50 60 53 0 50 70
Table LIII.: Data from experiments: 6 small suppliers - no transport costs - Cohort 3
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
0 0 10 62 0.36867 0.36867 10 82 47 60 62 60
0 1 82 48 0.33357 0.33357 10 82 47 60 62 60
0 2 47 55 0.35154 0.35154 10 82 47 60 62 60
0 3 60 52 0.34533 0.34533 10 82 47 60 62 60
0 4 62 52 0.34384 0.34384 10 82 47 60 62 60
0 5 60 52 0.34533 0.34533 10 82 47 60 62 60
1 0 0 59 0.34417 0.71283 0 98 35 92 17 55
1 1 98 40 0.35224 0.68581 0 98 35 92 17 55
1 2 35 52 0.34825 0.69979 0 98 35 92 17 55
1 3 92 41 0.35294 0.69827 0 98 35 92 17 55
1 4 17 56 0.34769 0.69153 0 98 35 92 17 55
1 5 55 48 0.35058 0.69592 0 98 35 92 17 55
2 0 30 64 0.37333 1.08617 30 99 58 13 94 56
2 1 99 50 0.29398 0.97979 30 99 58 13 94 56
2 2 58 58 0.34104 1.04083 30 99 58 13 94 56
2 3 13 67 0.39144 1.08971 30 99 58 13 94 56
2 4 94 51 0.29969 0.99122 30 99 58 13 94 56
2 5 56 59 0.34286 1.03878 30 99 58 13 94 56
3 0 29 32 0.29561 1.38178 29 0 53 12 42 55
3 1 0 38 0.22167 1.20146 29 0 53 12 42 55
3 2 53 28 0.35749 1.39832 29 0 53 12 42 55
3 3 12 36 0.25424 1.34395 29 0 53 12 42 55
3 4 42 30 0.32984 1.32106 29 0 53 12 42 55
3 5 55 27 0.36283 1.40161 29 0 53 12 42 55
4 0 100 62 0.22167 1.60344 100 100 33 89 77 10
4 1 100 62 0.22167 1.42312 100 100 33 89 77 10
4 2 33 75 0.39284 1.79116 100 100 33 89 77 10
4 3 89 64 0.25081 1.59476 100 100 33 89 77 10
4 4 77 66 0.28259 1.60365 100 100 33 89 77 10
4 5 10 80 0.45267 1.85428 100 100 33 89 77 10
5 0 30 39 0.31500 1.91844 30 51 79 14 50 0
5 1 51 35 0.35173 1.77485 30 51 79 14 50 0
5 2 79 29 0.40143 2.19259 30 51 79 14 50 0
5 3 14 42 0.28616 1.88092 30 51 79 14 50 0
5 4 50 35 0.35000 1.95365 30 51 79 14 50 0
5 5 0 45 0.26250 2.11678 30 51 79 14 50 0
6 0 30 54 0.35000 2.26844 30 99 37 75 50 10
6 1 99 40 0.35114 2.12599 30 99 37 75 50 10
6 2 37 53 0.35061 2.54319 30 99 37 75 50 10
6 3 75 45 0.35000 2.23092 30 99 37 75 50 10
6 4 50 50 0.35000 2.30365 30 99 37 75 50 10
6 5 10 58 0.35000 2.46678 30 99 37 75 50 10
7 0 50 87 0.35000 2.61844 50 100 64 85 95 90
7 1 100 77 0.13417 2.26016 50 100 64 85 95 90
7 2 64 84 0.28989 2.83309 50 100 64 85 95 90
7 3 85 80 0.19892 2.42984 50 100 64 85 95 90
7 4 95 78 0.15575 2.45940 50 100 64 85 95 90
7 5 90 79 0.17733 2.64411 50 100 64 85 95 90
8 0 30 16 0.26133 2.87978 30 0 15 26 30 10
8 1 0 22 0.12833 2.38849 30 0 15 26 30 10
8 2 15 19 0.19483 3.02792 30 0 15 26 30 10
8 3 26 17 0.24416 2.67400 30 0 15 26 30 10
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Table LIII.: (continued)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
8 4 30 16 0.26133 2.72074 30 0 15 26 30 10
8 5 10 20 0.17267 2.81678 30 0 15 26 30 10
9 0 0 43 0.25083 3.13061 0 51 35 24 51 55
9 1 51 33 0.35196 2.74045 0 51 35 24 51 55
9 2 35 36 0.32025 3.34817 0 51 35 24 51 55
9 3 24 38 0.29783 2.97183 0 51 35 24 51 55
9 4 51 33 0.35196 3.07270 0 51 35 24 51 55
9 5 55 32 0.35992 3.17669 0 51 35 24 51 55
10 0 60 62 0.33367 3.46428 60 100 42 39 72 55
10 1 100 54 0.26833 3.00879 60 100 42 39 72 55
10 2 42 65 0.36251 3.71068 60 100 42 39 72 55
10 3 39 66 0.36771 3.33954 60 100 42 39 72 55
10 4 72 59 0.31561 3.38830 60 100 42 39 72 55
10 5 55 63 0.34183 3.51853 60 100 42 39 72 55
11 0 40 45 0.34183 3.80611 40 67 61 50 0 45
11 1 67 39 0.36507 3.37386 40 67 61 50 0 45
11 2 61 40 0.36001 4.07069 40 67 61 50 0 45
11 3 50 43 0.35000 3.68954 40 67 61 50 0 45
11 4 0 53 0.30917 3.69747 40 67 61 50 0 45
11 5 45 44 0.34592 3.86444 40 67 61 50 0 45
12 0 40 49 0.34650 4.15261 40 75 54 21 3 90
12 1 75 42 0.35875 3.73261 40 75 54 21 3 90
12 2 54 46 0.35149 4.42218 40 75 54 21 3 90
12 3 21 52 0.33714 4.02668 40 75 54 21 3 90
12 4 3 56 0.33136 4.02883 40 75 54 21 3 90
12 5 90 39 0.36400 4.22844 40 75 54 21 3 90
13 0 50 48 0.35000 4.50261 50 77 63 18 74 10
13 1 77 43 0.35504 4.08765 50 77 63 18 74 10
13 2 63 46 0.35212 4.77430 50 77 63 18 74 10
13 3 18 55 0.34477 4.37145 50 77 63 18 74 10
13 4 74 44 0.35336 4.38219 50 77 63 18 74 10
13 5 10 56 0.34067 4.56911 50 77 63 18 74 10
14 0 50 65 0.35000 4.85261 50 98 56 66 13 90
14 1 98 55 0.26824 4.35589 50 98 56 66 13 90
14 2 56 63 0.34006 5.11436 50 98 56 66 13 90
14 3 66 61 0.32349 4.69495 50 98 56 66 13 90
14 4 13 72 0.41302 4.79521 50 98 56 66 13 90
14 5 90 57 0.28000 4.84911 50 98 56 66 13 90
15 0 40 64 0.36400 5.21661 40 82 61 87 37 55
15 1 82 56 0.30371 4.65960 40 82 61 87 37 55
15 2 61 60 0.33434 5.44871 40 82 61 87 37 55
15 3 87 55 0.29647 4.99142 40 82 61 87 37 55
15 4 37 65 0.36881 5.16402 40 82 61 87 37 55
15 5 55 61 0.34300 5.19211 40 82 61 87 37 55
16 0 40 50 0.34767 5.56428 40 26 59 29 75 60
16 1 26 53 0.34496 5.00456 40 26 59 29 75 60
16 2 59 46 0.35231 5.80102 40 26 59 29 75 60
16 3 29 52 0.34461 5.33603 40 26 59 29 75 60
16 4 75 43 0.35583 5.51985 40 26 59 29 75 60
16 5 60 46 0.35233 5.54444 40 26 59 29 75 60
17 0 41 42 0.33971 5.90399 41 1 90 54 10 53
17 1 1 50 0.29398 5.29853 41 1 90 54 10 53
17 2 90 32 0.39667 6.19768 41 1 90 54 10 53
17 3 54 39 0.35476 5.69079 41 1 90 54 10 53
17 4 10 48 0.30333 5.82318 41 1 90 54 10 53
17 5 53 39 0.35364 5.89808 41 1 90 54 10 53
18 0 70 49 0.34300 6.24699 70 43 86 55 0 60
18 1 43 54 0.35212 5.65066 70 43 86 55 0 60
18 2 86 46 0.33656 6.53424 70 43 86 55 0 60
18 3 55 52 0.34825 6.03904 70 43 86 55 0 60
18 4 0 63 0.36750 6.19068 70 43 86 55 0 60
18 5 60 51 0.34650 6.24458 70 43 86 55 0 60
19 0 60 62 0.33367 6.58065 60 60 81 47 32 90
19 1 60 62 0.33367 5.98432 60 60 81 47 32 90
19 2 81 58 0.29864 6.83289 60 60 81 47 32 90
19 3 47 65 0.35504 6.39408 60 60 81 47 32 90
19 4 32 68 0.38024 6.57092 60 60 81 47 32 90
19 5 90 56 0.28467 6.52925 60 60 81 47 32 90
20 0 58 58 0.34104 6.92169 58 58 73 60 52 48
20 1 58 58 0.34104 6.32536 58 58 73 60 52 48
20 2 73 55 0.32424 7.15713 58 58 73 60 52 48
20 3 60 58 0.33833 6.73241 58 58 73 60 52 48
20 4 52 59 0.34781 6.91873 58 58 73 60 52 48
20 5 48 60 0.35224 6.88149 58 58 73 60 52 48
21 0 30 43 0.32433 7.24603 30 41 64 36 26 50
21 1 41 41 0.33866 6.66402 30 41 64 36 26 50
21 2 64 37 0.36666 7.52379 30 41 64 36 26 50
21 3 36 42 0.33236 7.06477 30 41 64 36 26 50
21 4 26 44 0.31976 7.23849 30 41 64 36 26 50
21 5 50 39 0.35000 7.23149 30 41 64 36 26 50
22 0 60 52 0.34533 7.59136 60 76 57 42 73 10
22 1 76 48 0.34029 7.00432 60 76 57 42 73 10
22 2 57 52 0.34722 7.87101 60 76 57 42 73 10
22 3 42 55 0.35317 7.41795 60 76 57 42 73 10
22 4 73 49 0.34034 7.57883 60 76 57 42 73 10
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Table LIII.: (continued)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
22 5 10 62 0.36867 7.60016 60 76 57 42 73 10
23 0 50 44 0.35000 7.94136 50 77 62 36 18 28
23 1 77 39 0.36764 7.37196 50 77 62 36 18 28
23 2 62 42 0.35784 8.22885 50 77 62 36 18 28
23 3 36 47 0.34053 7.75847 50 77 62 36 18 28
23 4 18 51 0.32984 7.90867 50 77 62 36 18 28
23 5 28 49 0.33614 7.93630 50 77 62 36 18 28
24 0 70 47 0.34767 8.28903 70 78 52 50 43 10
24 1 78 45 0.34804 7.72000 70 78 52 50 43 10
24 2 52 50 0.34991 8.57876 70 78 52 50 43 10
24 3 50 51 0.35000 8.10847 70 78 52 50 43 10
24 4 43 52 0.35049 8.25916 70 78 52 50 43 10
24 5 10 59 0.35467 8.29096 70 78 52 50 43 10
25 0 50 40 0.35000 8.63903 50 77 50 41 32 0
25 1 77 35 0.38024 8.10024 50 77 50 41 32 0
25 2 50 40 0.35000 8.92876 50 77 50 41 32 0
25 3 41 42 0.33971 8.44818 50 77 50 41 32 0
25 4 32 44 0.32984 8.58900 50 77 50 41 32 0
25 5 0 50 0.29167 8.58263 50 77 50 41 32 0
26 0 60 72 0.32200 8.96103 60 77 59 61 75 90
26 1 77 69 0.27314 8.37338 60 77 59 61 75 90
26 2 59 73 0.32396 9.25272 60 77 59 61 75 90
26 3 61 72 0.31894 8.76713 60 77 59 61 75 90
26 4 75 69 0.28000 8.86900 60 77 59 61 75 90
26 5 90 66 0.23800 8.82063 60 77 59 61 75 90
27 0 58 39 0.35877 9.31980 58 45 47 30 17 55
27 1 45 41 0.34417 8.71754 58 45 47 30 17 55
27 2 47 41 0.34664 9.59936 58 45 47 30 17 55
27 3 30 44 0.32667 9.09379 58 45 47 30 17 55
27 4 17 47 0.31304 9.18204 58 45 47 30 17 55
27 5 55 39 0.35583 9.17646 58 45 47 30 17 55
28 0 30 50 0.34067 9.66047 30 41 69 52 29 59
28 1 41 48 0.34601 9.06355 30 41 69 52 29 59
28 2 69 42 0.35931 9.95867 30 41 69 52 29 59
28 3 52 46 0.35084 9.44463 30 41 69 52 29 59
28 4 29 50 0.33971 9.52175 30 41 69 52 29 59
28 5 59 44 0.35441 9.53087 30 41 69 52 29 59
29 0 50 54 0.35000 10.01047 50 67 64 44 31 63
29 1 67 50 0.34326 9.40681 50 67 64 44 31 63
29 2 64 51 0.34379 10.30246 50 67 64 44 31 63
29 3 44 55 0.35266 9.79729 50 67 64 44 31 63
29 4 31 58 0.35931 9.88106 50 67 64 44 31 63
29 5 63 51 0.34454 9.87541 50 67 64 44 31 63
30 0 50 51 0.35000 10.36047 50 68 63 59 8 55
30 1 68 47 0.34874 9.75555 50 68 63 59 8 55
30 2 63 48 0.34909 10.65155 50 68 63 59 8 55
30 3 59 49 0.34916 10.14645 50 68 63 59 8 55
30 4 8 59 0.35294 10.23400 50 68 63 59 8 55
30 5 55 50 0.34942 10.22483 50 68 63 59 8 55
31 0 50 52 0.35000 10.71047 50 67 51 50 41 50
31 1 67 48 0.34722 10.10277 50 67 51 50 41 50
31 2 51 52 0.34974 11.00129 50 67 51 50 41 50
31 3 50 52 0.35000 10.49645 50 67 51 50 41 50
31 4 41 54 0.35231 10.58631 50 67 51 50 41 50
31 5 50 52 0.35000 10.57483 50 67 51 50 41 50
32 0 50 47 0.35000 11.06047 50 54 59 50 22 50
32 1 54 46 0.35149 10.45427 50 54 59 50 22 50
32 2 59 45 0.35336 11.35465 50 54 59 50 22 50
32 3 50 47 0.35000 10.84645 50 54 59 50 22 50
32 4 22 53 0.34151 10.92782 50 54 59 50 22 50
32 5 50 47 0.35000 10.92483 50 54 59 50 22 50
33 0 50 58 0.35000 11.41047 50 96 59 25 60 50
33 1 96 49 0.30599 10.76026 50 96 59 25 60 50
33 2 59 56 0.34181 11.69646 50 96 59 25 60 50
33 3 25 63 0.37333 11.21979 50 96 59 25 60 50
33 4 60 56 0.34067 11.26848 50 96 59 25 60 50
33 5 50 58 0.35000 11.27483 50 96 59 25 60 50
34 0 70 50 0.34067 11.75113 70 78 63 15 38 55
34 1 78 48 0.33824 11.09850 70 78 63 15 38 55
34 2 63 51 0.34454 12.04100 70 78 63 15 38 55
34 3 15 61 0.36633 11.58612 70 78 63 15 38 55
34 4 38 56 0.35504 11.62352 70 78 63 15 38 55
34 5 55 53 0.34767 11.62250 70 78 63 15 38 55
35 0 50 40 0.35000 12.10113 50 51 47 21 38 45
35 1 51 40 0.35114 11.44964 50 51 47 21 38 45
35 2 47 41 0.34664 12.38764 50 51 47 21 38 45
35 3 21 46 0.31684 11.90296 50 51 47 21 38 45
35 4 38 43 0.33684 11.96036 50 51 47 21 38 45
35 5 45 41 0.34417 11.96666 50 51 47 21 38 45
36 0 51 53 0.34963 12.45076 51 53 49 50 60 55
36 1 53 53 0.34874 11.79838 51 53 49 50 60 55
36 2 49 54 0.35044 12.73809 51 53 49 50 60 55
36 3 50 54 0.35000 12.25296 51 53 49 50 60 55
36 4 60 52 0.34533 12.30570 51 53 49 50 60 55
36 5 55 53 0.34767 12.31433 51 53 49 50 60 55
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Table LIII.: (continued)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
37 0 50 51 0.35000 12.80076 50 72 48 50 32 55
37 1 72 47 0.34641 12.14479 50 72 48 50 32 55
37 2 48 52 0.35037 13.08846 50 72 48 50 32 55
37 3 50 51 0.35000 12.60296 50 72 48 50 32 55
37 4 32 55 0.35294 12.65864 50 72 48 50 32 55
37 5 55 50 0.34942 12.66375 50 72 48 50 32 55
38 0 50 50 0.35000 13.15076 50 52 42 64 40 50
38 1 52 49 0.35014 12.49493 50 52 42 64 40 50
38 2 42 51 0.34944 13.43790 50 52 42 64 40 50
38 3 64 47 0.35033 12.95329 50 52 42 64 40 50
38 4 40 52 0.35000 13.00864 50 52 42 64 40 50
38 5 50 50 0.35000 13.01375 50 52 42 64 40 50
39 0 50 52 0.35000 13.50076 50 70 65 30 45 50
39 1 70 48 0.34533 12.84026 50 70 65 30 45 50
39 2 65 49 0.34650 13.78440 50 70 65 30 45 50
39 3 30 56 0.35467 13.30796 50 70 65 30 45 50
39 4 45 53 0.35117 13.35980 50 70 65 30 45 50
39 5 50 52 0.35000 13.36375 50 70 65 30 45 50
40 0 50 38 0.35000 13.85076 50 70 11 24 37 50
40 1 70 34 0.37800 13.21826 50 70 11 24 37 50
40 2 11 46 0.29631 14.08071 50 70 11 24 37 50
40 3 24 44 0.31603 13.62398 50 70 11 24 37 50
40 4 37 41 0.33241 13.69221 50 70 11 24 37 50
40 5 50 38 0.35000 13.71375 50 70 11 24 37 50
41 0 0 65 0.37917 14.22993 0 85 46 91 53 50
41 1 85 48 0.32958 13.54785 0 85 46 91 53 50
41 2 46 56 0.35243 14.43314 0 85 46 91 53 50
41 3 91 47 0.32513 13.94911 0 85 46 91 53 50
41 4 53 54 0.34839 14.04060 0 85 46 91 53 50
41 5 50 55 0.35000 14.06375 0 85 46 91 53 50
42 0 80 59 0.29750 14.52743 80 86 56 66 38 50
42 1 86 58 0.28616 13.83401 80 86 56 66 38 50
42 2 56 64 0.33936 14.77250 80 86 56 66 38 50
42 3 66 62 0.32163 14.27074 80 86 56 66 38 50
42 4 38 68 0.37184 14.41244 80 86 56 66 38 50
42 5 50 65 0.35000 14.41375 80 86 56 66 38 50
43 0 50 53 0.35000 14.87743 50 94 60 27 34 50
43 1 94 44 0.33563 14.16963 50 94 60 27 34 50
43 2 60 51 0.34650 15.11900 50 94 60 27 34 50
43 3 27 58 0.35912 14.62986 50 94 60 27 34 50
43 4 34 56 0.35523 14.76767 50 94 60 27 34 50
43 5 50 53 0.35000 14.76375 50 94 60 27 34 50
44 0 50 56 0.35000 15.22743 50 100 53 25 50 50
44 1 100 46 0.31500 14.48463 50 100 53 25 50 50
44 2 53 55 0.34804 15.46704 50 100 53 25 50 50
44 3 25 61 0.36750 14.99736 50 100 53 25 50 50
44 4 50 56 0.35000 15.11767 50 100 53 25 50 50
44 5 50 56 0.35000 15.11375 50 100 53 25 50 50
45 0 48 45 0.34874 15.57617 48 71 62 10 44 40
45 1 71 41 0.36176 14.84639 48 71 62 10 44 40
45 2 62 43 0.35644 15.82348 48 71 62 10 44 40
45 3 10 53 0.32667 15.32403 48 71 62 10 44 40
45 4 44 46 0.34636 15.46403 48 71 62 10 44 40
45 5 40 47 0.34417 15.45791 48 71 62 10 44 40
46 0 50 54 0.35000 15.92617 50 75 58 46 41 50
46 1 75 49 0.33833 15.18473 50 75 58 46 41 50
46 2 58 52 0.34664 16.17012 50 75 58 46 41 50
46 3 46 55 0.35196 15.67599 50 75 58 46 41 50
46 4 41 56 0.35441 15.81844 50 75 58 46 41 50
46 5 50 54 0.35000 15.80791 50 75 58 46 41 50
47 0 50 58 0.35000 16.27617 50 79 55 68 37 50
47 1 79 52 0.32361 15.50834 50 79 55 68 37 50
47 2 55 57 0.34533 16.51545 50 79 55 68 37 50
47 3 68 54 0.33404 16.01003 50 79 55 68 37 50
47 4 37 60 0.36122 16.17966 50 79 55 68 37 50
47 5 50 58 0.35000 16.15791 50 79 55 68 37 50
48 0 50 47 0.35000 16.62617 50 78 57 22 30 50
48 1 78 42 0.35784 15.86618 50 78 57 22 30 50
48 2 57 46 0.35212 16.86757 50 78 57 22 30 50
48 3 22 53 0.34151 16.35153 50 78 57 22 30 50
48 4 30 51 0.34300 16.52266 50 78 57 22 30 50
48 5 50 47 0.35000 16.50791 50 78 57 22 30 50
49 0 50 64 0.35000 16.97617 50 81 52 94 41 50
49 1 81 57 0.30226 16.16844 50 81 52 94 41 50
49 2 52 63 0.34687 17.21445 50 81 52 94 41 50
49 3 94 55 0.27916 16.63069 50 81 52 94 41 50
49 4 41 65 0.36386 16.88652 50 81 52 94 41 50
49 5 50 64 0.35000 16.85791 50 81 52 94 41 50
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Table LIV.: Data from experiments: 6 small suppliers - no transport costs - Cohort 4
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
0 0 100 45 0.32083 0.32083 100 50 78 24 40 35
0 1 50 55 0.35000 0.35000 100 50 78 24 40 35
0 2 78 50 0.33171 0.33171 100 50 78 24 40 35
0 3 24 61 0.36759 0.36759 100 50 78 24 40 35
0 4 40 57 0.35583 0.35583 100 50 78 24 40 35
0 5 35 58 0.35875 0.35875 100 50 78 24 40 35
1 0 97 46 0.32039 0.64122 97 50 6 90 48 38
1 1 50 56 0.35000 0.70000 97 50 6 90 48 38
1 2 6 65 0.38183 0.71353 97 50 6 90 48 38
1 3 90 48 0.32200 0.68959 97 50 6 90 48 38
1 4 48 56 0.35131 0.70714 97 50 6 90 48 38
1 5 38 58 0.35784 0.71659 97 50 6 90 48 38
2 0 76 30 0.39489 1.03612 76 50 6 50 3 40
2 1 50 35 0.35000 1.05000 76 50 6 50 3 40
2 2 6 44 0.27403 0.98756 76 50 6 50 3 40
2 3 50 35 0.35000 1.03959 76 50 6 50 3 40
2 4 3 44 0.26556 0.97270 76 50 6 50 3 40
2 5 40 37 0.33250 1.04909 76 50 6 50 3 40
3 0 85 76 0.21525 1.25137 85 93 50 92 50 94
3 1 93 74 0.18646 1.23646 85 93 50 92 50 94
3 2 50 83 0.35000 1.33756 85 93 50 92 50 94
3 3 92 74 0.19124 1.23083 85 93 50 92 50 94
3 4 50 83 0.35000 1.32270 85 93 50 92 50 94
3 5 94 74 0.18163 1.23072 85 93 50 92 50 94
4 0 50 69 0.35000 1.60137 50 50 83 95 39 78
4 1 50 69 0.35000 1.58646 50 50 83 95 39 78
4 2 83 62 0.27839 1.61595 50 50 83 95 39 78
4 3 95 60 0.25025 1.48108 50 50 83 95 39 78
4 4 39 71 0.37413 1.69682 50 50 83 95 39 78
4 5 78 63 0.28924 1.51996 50 50 83 95 39 78
5 0 30 52 0.34533 1.94670 30 50 83 69 26 33
5 1 50 48 0.35000 1.93646 30 50 83 69 26 33
5 2 83 42 0.35539 1.97134 30 50 83 69 26 33
5 3 69 44 0.35488 1.83596 30 50 83 69 26 33
5 4 26 53 0.34496 2.04178 30 50 83 69 26 33
5 5 33 52 0.34722 1.86718 30 50 83 69 26 33
6 0 65 40 0.36225 2.30895 65 50 48 33 31 40
6 1 50 43 0.35000 2.28646 65 50 48 33 31 40
6 2 48 44 0.34851 2.31985 65 50 48 33 31 40
6 3 33 47 0.33731 2.17327 65 50 48 33 31 40
6 4 31 47 0.33493 2.37671 65 50 48 33 31 40
6 5 40 45 0.34183 2.20901 65 50 48 33 31 40
7 0 80 61 0.29050 2.59945 80 50 60 97 37 60
7 1 50 67 0.35000 2.63646 80 50 60 97 37 60
7 2 60 65 0.33017 2.65001 80 50 60 97 37 60
7 3 97 57 0.26007 2.43334 80 50 60 97 37 60
7 4 37 69 0.37487 2.75158 80 50 60 97 37 60
7 5 60 65 0.33017 2.53918 80 50 60 97 37 60
8 0 46 55 0.35196 2.95141 46 50 82 42 32 70
8 1 50 54 0.35000 2.98646 46 50 82 42 32 70
8 2 82 48 0.33357 2.98359 46 50 82 42 32 70
8 3 42 56 0.35411 2.78745 46 50 82 42 32 70
8 4 32 58 0.35924 3.11082 46 50 82 42 32 70
8 5 70 50 0.34067 2.87985 46 50 82 42 32 70
9 0 40 38 0.33367 3.28508 40 50 0 64 27 50
9 1 50 36 0.35000 3.33646 40 50 0 64 27 50
9 2 0 46 0.26833 3.25192 40 50 0 64 27 50
9 3 64 33 0.37319 3.16064 40 50 0 64 27 50
9 4 27 41 0.31351 3.42433 40 50 0 64 27 50
9 5 50 36 0.35000 3.22985 40 50 0 64 27 50
10 0 60 54 0.34300 3.62808 60 50 84 29 50 55
10 1 50 56 0.35000 3.68646 60 50 84 29 50 55
10 2 84 49 0.32699 3.57891 60 50 84 29 50 55
10 3 29 60 0.36421 3.52485 60 50 84 29 50 55
10 4 50 56 0.35000 3.77433 60 50 84 29 50 55
10 5 55 55 0.34650 3.57635 60 50 84 29 50 55
11 0 41 50 0.34811 3.97619 41 43 48 97 31 30
11 1 43 49 0.34804 4.03450 41 43 48 97 31 30
11 2 48 48 0.34944 3.92835 41 43 48 97 31 30
11 3 97 39 0.35877 3.88362 41 43 48 97 31 30
11 4 31 52 0.34601 4.12034 41 43 48 97 31 30
11 5 30 52 0.34533 3.92168 41 43 48 97 31 30
12 0 54 40 0.35429 4.33048 54 64 49 2 46 37
12 1 64 38 0.36503 4.39952 54 64 49 2 46 37
12 2 49 41 0.34893 4.27728 54 64 49 2 46 37
12 3 2 50 0.29624 4.17986 54 64 49 2 46 37
12 4 46 41 0.34543 4.46577 54 64 49 2 46 37
12 5 37 43 0.33544 4.25712 54 64 49 2 46 37
13 0 70 47 0.34767 4.67815 70 73 45 3 50 66
13 1 73 47 0.34571 4.74523 70 73 45 3 50 66
13 2 45 52 0.35058 4.62786 70 73 45 3 50 66
13 3 3 61 0.35877 4.53864 70 73 45 3 50 66
13 4 50 51 0.35000 4.81577 70 73 45 3 50 66
13 5 66 48 0.34776 4.60488 70 73 45 3 50 66
14 0 29 69 0.38626 5.06441 29 58 50 100 60 75
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Table LIV.: (continued)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
14 1 58 63 0.33637 5.08160 29 58 50 100 60 75
14 2 50 64 0.35000 4.97786 29 58 50 100 60 75
14 3 100 54 0.26833 4.80697 29 58 50 100 60 75
14 4 60 62 0.33367 5.14943 29 58 50 100 60 75
14 5 75 59 0.30917 4.91405 29 58 50 100 60 75
15 0 44 66 0.36036 5.42477 44 50 65 94 34 85
15 1 50 64 0.35000 5.43160 44 50 65 94 34 85
15 2 65 61 0.32550 5.30336 44 50 65 94 34 85
15 3 94 56 0.27403 5.08100 44 50 65 94 34 85
15 4 34 68 0.37763 5.52706 44 50 65 94 34 85
15 5 85 57 0.29283 5.20688 44 50 65 94 34 85
16 0 37 48 0.34302 5.76779 37 50 62 4 34 90
16 1 50 45 0.35000 5.78160 37 50 62 4 34 90
16 2 62 43 0.35644 5.65980 37 50 62 4 34 90
16 3 4 55 0.32746 5.40846 37 50 62 4 34 90
16 4 34 49 0.34216 5.86922 37 50 62 4 34 90
16 5 90 37 0.37333 5.58021 37 50 62 4 34 90
17 0 54 66 0.34216 6.10995 54 50 98 51 42 90
17 1 50 67 0.35000 6.13160 54 50 98 51 42 90
17 2 98 57 0.25704 5.91684 54 50 98 51 42 90
17 3 51 67 0.34799 5.75645 54 50 98 51 42 90
17 4 42 69 0.36624 6.23546 54 50 98 51 42 90
17 5 90 59 0.27067 5.85088 54 50 98 51 42 90
18 0 32 37 0.31514 6.42509 32 0 52 0 41 90
18 1 0 43 0.25083 6.38244 32 0 52 0 41 90
18 2 52 33 0.35387 6.27072 32 0 52 0 41 90
18 3 0 43 0.25083 6.00728 32 0 52 0 41 90
18 4 41 35 0.33236 6.56782 32 0 52 0 41 90
18 5 90 25 0.42933 6.28021 32 0 52 0 41 90
19 0 47 51 0.35014 6.77523 47 72 50 3 36 92
19 1 72 46 0.34897 6.73141 47 72 50 3 36 92
19 2 50 50 0.35000 6.62072 47 72 50 3 36 92
19 3 3 59 0.34781 6.35509 47 72 50 3 36 92
19 4 36 53 0.35033 6.91815 47 72 50 3 36 92
19 5 92 42 0.34804 6.62825 47 72 50 3 36 92
20 0 51 66 0.34811 7.12334 51 50 50 97 38 97
20 1 50 67 0.35000 7.08141 51 50 50 97 38 97
20 2 50 67 0.35000 6.97072 51 50 50 97 38 97
20 3 97 57 0.26007 6.61516 51 50 50 97 38 97
20 4 38 69 0.37324 7.29139 51 50 50 97 38 97
20 5 97 57 0.26007 6.88833 51 50 50 97 38 97
21 0 5 51 0.30800 7.43134 5 8 65 50 37 97
21 1 8 51 0.31374 7.39515 5 8 65 50 37 97
21 2 65 39 0.36400 7.33472 5 8 65 50 37 97
21 3 50 42 0.35000 6.96516 5 8 65 50 37 97
21 4 37 45 0.33847 7.62986 5 8 65 50 37 97
21 5 97 33 0.39167 7.28000 5 8 65 50 37 97
22 0 55 53 0.34767 7.77901 55 50 54 25 37 97
22 1 50 54 0.35000 7.74515 55 50 54 25 37 97
22 2 54 53 0.34823 7.68294 55 50 54 25 37 97
22 3 25 59 0.36167 7.32683 55 50 54 25 37 97
22 4 37 56 0.35516 7.98502 55 50 54 25 37 97
22 5 97 44 0.33136 7.61136 55 50 54 25 37 97
23 0 41 63 0.36176 8.14077 41 50 62 39 65 98
23 1 50 61 0.35000 8.09515 41 50 62 39 65 98
23 2 62 59 0.33404 8.01698 41 50 62 39 65 98
23 3 39 63 0.36386 7.69069 41 50 62 39 65 98
23 4 65 58 0.33075 8.31577 41 50 62 39 65 98
23 5 98 51 0.29064 7.90200 41 50 62 39 65 98
24 0 12 64 0.37837 8.51914 12 50 50 60 66 95
24 1 50 57 0.35000 8.44515 12 50 50 60 66 95
24 2 50 57 0.35000 8.36698 12 50 50 60 66 95
24 3 60 55 0.34183 8.03252 12 50 50 60 66 95
24 4 66 53 0.33843 8.65419 12 50 50 60 66 95
24 5 95 48 0.31325 8.21525 12 50 50 60 66 95
25 0 21 56 0.35068 8.86982 21 50 50 51 40 90
25 1 50 50 0.35000 8.79515 21 50 50 51 40 90
25 2 50 50 0.35000 8.71698 21 50 50 51 40 90
25 3 51 50 0.34998 8.38250 21 50 50 51 40 90
25 4 40 52 0.35000 9.00419 21 50 50 51 40 90
25 5 90 42 0.35000 8.56525 21 50 50 51 40 90
26 0 30 56 0.35467 9.22448 30 50 60 45 38 85
26 1 50 52 0.35000 9.14515 30 50 60 45 38 85
26 2 60 50 0.34767 9.06465 30 50 60 45 38 85
26 3 45 53 0.35117 8.73367 30 50 60 45 38 85
26 4 38 54 0.35224 9.35643 30 50 60 45 38 85
26 5 85 45 0.34183 8.90708 30 50 60 45 38 85
27 0 19 55 0.34566 9.57014 19 50 41 63 58 64
27 1 50 49 0.35000 9.49515 19 50 41 63 58 64
27 2 41 51 0.34916 9.41381 19 50 41 63 58 64
27 3 63 46 0.35212 9.08579 19 50 41 63 58 64
27 4 58 47 0.35131 9.70774 19 50 41 63 58 64
27 5 64 46 0.35196 9.25904 19 50 41 63 58 64
28 0 37 54 0.35212 9.92227 37 50 50 46 61 65
28 1 50 52 0.35000 9.84515 37 50 50 46 61 65
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Table LIV.: (continued)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
28 2 50 52 0.35000 9.76381 37 50 50 46 61 65
28 3 46 53 0.35103 9.43682 37 50 50 46 61 65
28 4 61 50 0.34718 10.05492 37 50 50 46 61 65
28 5 65 49 0.34650 9.60554 37 50 50 46 61 65
29 0 40 62 0.36167 10.28393 40 50 50 98 57 55
29 1 50 60 0.35000 10.19515 40 50 50 98 57 55
29 2 50 60 0.35000 10.11381 40 50 50 98 57 55
29 3 98 50 0.29624 9.73306 40 50 50 98 57 55
29 4 57 59 0.34151 10.39642 40 50 50 98 57 55
29 5 55 59 0.34417 9.94971 40 50 50 98 57 55
30 0 35 35 0.31850 10.60243 35 50 57 1 34 32
30 1 50 32 0.35000 10.54515 35 50 57 1 34 32
30 2 57 30 0.36519 10.47900 35 50 57 1 34 32
30 3 1 42 0.24824 9.98130 35 50 57 1 34 32
30 4 34 35 0.31603 10.71245 35 50 57 1 34 32
30 5 32 35 0.31094 10.26065 35 50 57 1 34 32
31 0 65 61 0.32550 10.92793 65 50 74 52 40 89
31 1 50 64 0.35000 10.89515 65 50 74 52 40 89
31 2 74 59 0.31136 10.79036 65 50 74 52 40 89
31 3 52 64 0.34664 10.32794 65 50 74 52 40 89
31 4 40 66 0.36633 11.07878 65 50 74 52 40 89
31 5 89 56 0.28721 10.54786 65 50 74 52 40 89
32 0 41 60 0.35861 11.28654 41 50 59 50 47 92
32 1 50 58 0.35000 11.24515 41 50 59 50 47 92
32 2 59 56 0.34181 11.13217 41 50 59 50 47 92
32 3 50 58 0.35000 10.67794 41 50 59 50 47 92
32 4 47 58 0.35259 11.43137 41 50 59 50 47 92
32 5 92 49 0.31374 10.86160 41 50 59 50 47 92
33 0 29 52 0.34461 11.63115 29 50 50 48 41 71
33 1 50 48 0.35000 11.59515 29 50 50 48 41 71
33 2 50 48 0.35000 11.48217 29 50 50 48 41 71
33 3 48 48 0.34944 11.02738 29 50 50 48 41 71
33 4 41 50 0.34811 11.77948 29 50 50 48 41 71
33 5 71 44 0.35441 11.21601 29 50 50 48 41 71
34 0 41 45 0.34286 11.97401 41 50 53 50 37 34
34 1 50 43 0.35000 11.94515 41 50 53 50 37 34
34 2 53 42 0.35259 11.83476 41 50 53 50 37 34
34 3 50 43 0.35000 11.37738 41 50 53 50 37 34
34 4 37 46 0.33999 12.11947 41 50 53 50 37 34
34 5 34 46 0.33656 11.55257 41 50 53 50 37 34
35 0 50 46 0.35000 12.32401 50 50 56 50 55 18
35 1 50 46 0.35000 12.29515 50 50 56 50 55 18
35 2 56 45 0.35266 12.18742 50 50 56 50 55 18
35 3 50 46 0.35000 11.72738 50 50 56 50 55 18
35 4 55 45 0.35233 12.47181 50 50 56 50 55 18
35 5 18 52 0.33357 11.88614 50 50 56 50 55 18
36 0 40 47 0.34417 12.66818 40 50 64 50 53 16
36 1 50 45 0.35000 12.64515 40 50 64 50 53 16
36 2 64 42 0.35849 12.54591 40 50 64 50 53 16
36 3 50 45 0.35000 12.07738 40 50 64 50 53 16
36 4 53 44 0.35189 12.82370 40 50 64 50 53 16
36 5 16 51 0.32699 12.21313 40 50 64 50 53 16
37 0 53 61 0.34594 13.01412 53 50 67 50 55 85
37 1 50 62 0.35000 12.99515 53 50 67 50 55 85
37 2 67 59 0.32541 12.87132 53 50 67 50 55 85
37 3 50 62 0.35000 12.42738 53 50 67 50 55 85
37 4 55 61 0.34300 13.16670 53 50 67 50 55 85
37 5 85 55 0.30100 12.51413 53 50 67 50 55 85
38 0 44 60 0.35616 13.37028 44 50 66 50 51 84
38 1 50 59 0.35000 13.34515 44 50 66 50 51 84
38 2 66 56 0.33283 13.20415 44 50 66 50 51 84
38 3 50 59 0.35000 12.77738 44 50 66 50 51 84
38 4 51 59 0.34893 13.51562 44 50 66 50 51 84
38 5 84 52 0.31509 12.82923 44 50 66 50 51 84
39 0 46 50 0.34963 13.71991 46 50 55 50 47 50
39 1 50 50 0.35000 13.69515 46 50 55 50 47 50
39 2 55 49 0.35000 13.55415 46 50 55 50 47 50
39 3 50 50 0.35000 13.12738 46 50 55 50 47 50
39 4 47 50 0.34979 13.86541 46 50 55 50 47 50
39 5 50 50 0.35000 13.17923 46 50 55 50 47 50
40 0 46 50 0.34963 14.06953 46 50 50 50 52 48
40 1 50 49 0.35000 14.04515 46 50 50 50 52 48
40 2 50 49 0.35000 13.90415 46 50 50 50 52 48
40 3 50 49 0.35000 13.47738 46 50 50 50 52 48
40 4 52 49 0.35014 14.21555 46 50 50 50 52 48
40 5 48 50 0.34991 13.52913 46 50 50 50 52 48
41 0 48 51 0.35014 14.41967 48 50 50 50 53 50
41 1 50 50 0.35000 14.39515 48 50 50 50 53 50
41 2 50 50 0.35000 14.25415 48 50 50 50 53 50
41 3 50 50 0.35000 13.82738 48 50 50 50 53 50
41 4 53 50 0.34979 14.56534 48 50 50 50 53 50
41 5 50 50 0.35000 13.87913 48 50 50 50 53 50
42 0 49 50 0.34998 14.76965 49 50 50 50 52 50
42 1 50 50 0.35000 14.74515 49 50 50 50 52 50
42 2 50 50 0.35000 14.60415 49 50 50 50 52 50
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Table LIV.: (continued)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
42 3 50 50 0.35000 14.17738 49 50 50 50 52 50
42 4 52 50 0.34991 14.91525 49 50 50 50 52 50
42 5 50 50 0.35000 14.22913 49 50 50 50 52 50
43 0 50 51 0.35000 15.11965 50 50 50 50 53 50
43 1 50 51 0.35000 15.09515 50 50 50 50 53 50
43 2 50 51 0.35000 14.95415 50 50 50 50 53 50
43 3 50 51 0.35000 14.52738 50 50 50 50 53 50
43 4 53 50 0.34979 15.26504 50 50 50 50 53 50
43 5 50 51 0.35000 14.57913 50 50 50 50 53 50
44 0 52 50 0.34991 15.46956 52 50 50 50 53 48
44 1 50 51 0.35000 15.44515 52 50 50 50 53 48
44 2 50 51 0.35000 15.30415 52 50 50 50 53 48
44 3 50 51 0.35000 14.87738 52 50 50 50 53 48
44 4 53 50 0.34979 15.61483 52 50 50 50 53 48
44 5 48 51 0.35014 14.92927 52 50 50 50 53 48
45 0 50 49 0.35000 15.81956 50 50 50 50 50 45
45 1 50 49 0.35000 15.79515 50 50 50 50 50 45
45 2 50 49 0.35000 15.65415 50 50 50 50 50 45
45 3 50 49 0.35000 15.22738 50 50 50 50 50 45
45 4 50 49 0.35000 15.96483 50 50 50 50 50 45
45 5 45 50 0.34942 15.27869 50 50 50 50 50 45
46 0 48 58 0.35177 16.17133 48 50 50 50 50 92
46 1 50 58 0.35000 16.14515 48 50 50 50 50 92
46 2 50 58 0.35000 16.00415 48 50 50 50 50 92
46 3 50 58 0.35000 15.57738 48 50 50 50 50 92
46 4 50 58 0.35000 16.31483 48 50 50 50 50 92
46 5 92 50 0.30884 15.58753 48 50 50 50 50 92
47 0 46 58 0.35336 16.52469 46 50 50 50 50 91
47 1 50 57 0.35000 16.49515 46 50 50 50 50 91
47 2 50 57 0.35000 16.35415 46 50 50 50 50 91
47 3 50 57 0.35000 15.92738 46 50 50 50 50 91
47 4 50 57 0.35000 16.66483 46 50 50 50 50 91
47 5 91 49 0.31556 15.90309 46 50 50 50 50 91
48 0 47 58 0.35259 16.87728 47 50 49 50 47 94
48 1 50 57 0.35000 16.84515 47 50 49 50 47 94
48 2 49 58 0.35091 16.70506 47 50 49 50 47 94
48 3 50 57 0.35000 16.27738 47 50 49 50 47 94
48 4 47 58 0.35259 17.01742 47 50 49 50 47 94
48 5 94 49 0.30996 16.21305 47 50 49 50 47 94
49 0 43 55 0.35294 17.23022 43 50 34 50 50 92
49 1 50 54 0.35000 17.19515 43 50 34 50 50 92
49 2 34 57 0.35709 17.06215 43 50 34 50 50 92
49 3 50 54 0.35000 16.62738 43 50 34 50 50 92
49 4 50 54 0.35000 17.36742 43 50 34 50 50 92
49 5 92 45 0.33334 16.54639 43 50 34 50 50 92
Table LV.: Data from experiments: 6 small suppliers - no transport costs - Cohort 5
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
0 0 3 46 0.27652 0.27652 3 48 40 53 89 0
0 1 48 37 0.34687 0.34687 3 48 40 53 89 0
0 2 40 39 0.33483 0.33483 3 48 40 53 89 0
0 3 53 36 0.35469 0.35469 3 48 40 53 89 0
0 4 89 29 0.41006 0.41006 3 48 40 53 89 0
0 5 0 47 0.27417 0.27417 3 48 40 53 89 0
1 0 68 51 0.34034 0.61686 68 50 20 47 100 40
1 1 50 55 0.35000 0.69687 68 50 20 47 100 40
1 2 20 61 0.36750 0.70233 68 50 20 47 100 40
1 3 47 56 0.35189 0.70658 68 50 20 47 100 40
1 4 100 45 0.32083 0.73089 68 50 20 47 100 40
1 5 40 57 0.35583 0.63000 68 50 20 47 100 40
2 0 45 60 0.35525 0.97211 45 50 70 23 98 60
2 1 50 59 0.35000 1.04687 45 50 70 23 98 60
2 2 70 55 0.32900 1.03133 45 50 70 23 98 60
2 3 23 65 0.38024 1.08682 45 50 70 23 98 60
2 4 98 50 0.29624 1.02713 45 50 70 23 98 60
2 5 60 57 0.33950 0.96950 45 50 70 23 98 60
3 0 37 52 0.34909 1.32120 37 50 10 25 95 80
3 1 50 49 0.35000 1.39687 37 50 10 25 95 80
3 2 10 57 0.34533 1.37667 37 50 10 25 95 80
3 3 25 54 0.34708 1.43390 37 50 10 25 95 80
3 4 95 40 0.35525 1.38238 37 50 10 25 95 80
3 5 80 43 0.35350 1.32300 37 50 10 25 95 80
4 0 40 57 0.35583 1.67704 40 50 21 30 85 100
4 1 50 55 0.35000 1.74687 40 50 21 30 85 100
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Table LV.: (continued)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
4 2 21 61 0.36759 1.74426 40 50 21 30 85 100
4 3 30 59 0.36167 1.79557 40 50 21 30 85 100
4 4 85 48 0.32958 1.71197 40 50 21 30 85 100
4 5 100 45 0.32083 1.64383 40 50 21 30 85 100
5 0 38 48 0.34384 2.02088 38 50 50 40 71 28
5 1 50 45 0.35000 2.09687 38 50 50 40 71 28
5 2 50 45 0.35000 2.09426 38 50 50 40 71 28
5 3 40 47 0.34417 2.13974 38 50 50 40 71 28
5 4 71 41 0.36176 2.07373 38 50 50 40 71 28
5 5 28 50 0.33871 1.98254 38 50 50 40 71 28
6 0 38 57 0.35644 2.37732 38 38 50 62 71 65
6 1 38 57 0.35644 2.45331 38 38 50 62 71 65
6 2 50 55 0.35000 2.44426 38 38 50 62 71 65
6 3 62 52 0.34384 2.48358 38 38 50 62 71 65
6 4 71 51 0.33726 2.41099 38 38 50 62 71 65
6 5 65 52 0.34125 2.32379 38 38 50 62 71 65
7 0 38 30 0.31864 2.69596 38 50 1 40 4 55
7 1 50 28 0.35000 2.80331 38 50 1 40 4 55
7 2 1 37 0.21966 2.66392 38 50 1 40 4 55
7 3 40 30 0.32433 2.80791 38 50 1 40 4 55
7 4 4 37 0.23086 2.64185 38 50 1 40 4 55
7 5 55 27 0.36283 2.68662 38 50 1 40 4 55
8 0 38 44 0.33824 3.03420 38 13 1 73 97 35
8 1 13 49 0.31374 3.11705 38 13 1 73 97 35
8 2 1 51 0.29969 2.96361 38 13 1 73 97 35
8 3 73 37 0.37254 3.18045 38 13 1 73 97 35
8 4 97 32 0.39716 3.03900 38 13 1 73 97 35
8 5 35 44 0.33425 3.02087 38 13 1 73 97 35
9 0 50 54 0.35000 3.38420 50 16 27 64 87 75
9 1 16 61 0.36666 3.48371 50 16 27 64 87 75
9 2 27 58 0.35912 3.32274 50 16 27 64 87 75
9 3 64 51 0.34379 3.52424 50 16 27 64 87 75
9 4 87 46 0.33532 3.37433 50 16 27 64 87 75
9 5 75 49 0.33833 3.35921 50 16 27 64 87 75
10 0 50 50 0.35000 3.73420 50 16 73 33 97 30
10 1 16 57 0.35079 3.83451 50 16 73 33 97 30
10 2 73 45 0.35107 3.67381 50 16 73 33 97 30
10 3 33 53 0.34921 3.87345 50 16 73 33 97 30
10 4 97 40 0.35329 3.72762 50 16 73 33 97 30
10 5 30 54 0.35000 3.70921 50 16 73 33 97 30
11 0 50 45 0.35000 4.08420 50 25 64 37 78 20
11 1 25 50 0.33542 4.16992 50 25 64 37 78 20
11 2 64 42 0.35849 4.03230 50 25 64 37 78 20
11 3 37 47 0.34151 4.21496 50 25 64 37 78 20
11 4 78 39 0.36764 4.09526 50 25 64 37 78 20
11 5 20 51 0.33250 4.04171 50 25 64 37 78 20
12 0 50 61 0.35000 4.43420 50 50 36 48 97 75
12 1 50 61 0.35000 4.51992 50 50 36 48 97 75
12 2 36 64 0.36829 4.40060 50 50 36 48 97 75
12 3 48 62 0.35271 4.56766 50 50 36 48 97 75
12 4 97 52 0.28749 4.38275 50 50 36 48 97 75
12 5 75 56 0.31792 4.35962 50 50 36 48 97 75
13 0 50 60 0.35000 4.78420 50 67 48 78 78 30
13 1 67 57 0.32937 4.84930 50 67 48 78 78 30
13 2 48 61 0.35247 4.75307 50 67 48 78 78 30
13 3 78 55 0.31537 4.88304 50 67 48 78 78 30
13 4 78 55 0.31537 4.69812 50 67 48 78 78 30
13 5 30 64 0.37333 4.73296 50 67 48 78 78 30
14 0 50 49 0.35000 5.13420 50 50 39 48 56 50
14 1 50 49 0.35000 5.19930 50 50 39 48 56 50
14 2 39 51 0.34846 5.10153 50 50 39 48 56 50
14 3 48 49 0.34967 5.23271 50 50 39 48 56 50
14 4 56 47 0.35126 5.04938 50 50 39 48 56 50
14 5 50 49 0.35000 5.08296 50 50 39 48 56 50
15 0 50 59 0.35000 5.48420 50 50 54 48 67 75
15 1 50 59 0.35000 5.54930 50 50 54 48 67 75
15 2 54 58 0.34589 5.44742 50 50 54 48 67 75
15 3 48 59 0.35201 5.58472 50 50 54 48 67 75
15 4 67 55 0.33334 5.38272 50 50 54 48 67 75
15 5 75 54 0.32375 5.40671 50 50 54 48 67 75
16 0 50 35 0.35000 5.83420 50 30 55 20 60 8
16 1 30 39 0.31500 5.86430 50 30 55 20 60 8
16 2 55 34 0.35875 5.80617 50 30 55 20 60 8
16 3 20 41 0.29750 5.88222 50 30 55 20 60 8
16 4 60 33 0.36750 5.75022 50 30 55 20 60 8
16 5 8 43 0.27454 5.68125 50 30 55 20 60 8
17 0 50 47 0.35000 6.18420 50 28 27 20 60 100
17 1 28 51 0.34127 6.20557 50 28 27 20 60 100
17 2 27 52 0.34302 6.14920 50 28 27 20 60 100
17 3 20 53 0.33950 6.22172 50 28 27 20 60 100
17 4 60 45 0.35350 6.10372 50 28 27 20 60 100
17 5 100 37 0.36750 6.04875 50 28 27 20 60 100
18 0 50 51 0.35000 6.53420 50 35 22 37 85 75
18 1 35 54 0.35175 6.55732 50 35 22 37 85 75
18 2 22 56 0.35131 6.50050 50 35 22 37 85 75
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Table LV.: (continued)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
18 3 37 53 0.35061 6.57232 50 35 22 37 85 75
18 4 85 44 0.34592 6.44964 50 35 22 37 85 75
18 5 75 46 0.34708 6.39583 50 35 22 37 85 75
19 0 50 51 0.35000 6.88420 50 63 41 38 87 25
19 1 63 48 0.34909 6.90641 50 63 41 38 87 25
19 2 41 53 0.35126 6.85176 50 63 41 38 87 25
19 3 38 53 0.35084 6.92316 50 63 41 38 87 25
19 4 87 43 0.34827 6.79791 50 63 41 38 87 25
19 5 25 56 0.35292 6.74875 50 63 41 38 87 25
20 0 50 64 0.35000 7.23420 50 38 76 35 69 100
20 1 38 66 0.36904 7.27545 50 38 76 35 69 100
20 2 76 58 0.30996 7.16172 50 38 76 35 69 100
20 3 35 67 0.37450 7.29766 50 38 76 35 69 100
20 4 69 60 0.31941 7.11732 50 38 76 35 69 100
20 5 100 54 0.26833 7.01708 50 38 76 35 69 100
21 0 50 57 0.35000 7.58420 50 60 50 50 100 25
21 1 60 55 0.34183 7.61728 50 60 50 50 100 25
21 2 50 57 0.35000 7.51172 50 60 50 50 100 25
21 3 50 57 0.35000 7.64766 50 60 50 50 100 25
21 4 100 47 0.30917 7.42649 50 60 50 50 100 25
21 5 25 62 0.37042 7.38750 50 60 50 50 100 25
22 0 50 67 0.35000 7.93420 50 62 83 43 81 65
22 1 62 64 0.32704 7.94432 50 62 83 43 81 65
22 2 83 60 0.28609 7.79781 50 62 83 43 81 65
22 3 43 68 0.36356 8.01122 50 62 83 43 81 65
22 4 81 61 0.28779 7.71428 50 62 83 43 81 65
22 5 65 64 0.32025 7.70775 50 62 83 43 81 65
23 0 50 46 0.35000 8.28420 50 25 81 20 85 20
23 1 25 51 0.33833 8.28266 50 25 81 20 85 20
23 2 81 40 0.36374 8.16156 50 25 81 20 85 20
23 3 20 52 0.33600 8.34722 50 25 81 20 85 20
23 4 85 39 0.36633 8.08061 50 25 81 20 85 20
23 5 20 52 0.33600 8.04375 50 25 81 20 85 20
24 0 50 58 0.35000 8.63420 50 28 67 25 88 80
24 1 28 62 0.36951 8.65216 50 28 67 25 88 80
24 2 67 54 0.33532 8.49688 50 28 67 25 88 80
24 3 25 63 0.37333 8.72055 50 28 67 25 88 80
24 4 88 50 0.31631 8.39692 50 28 67 25 88 80
24 5 80 52 0.32200 8.36575 50 28 67 25 88 80
25 0 50 59 0.35000 8.98420 50 30 78 25 83 81
25 1 30 63 0.37100 9.02316 50 30 78 25 83 81
25 2 78 54 0.31864 8.81552 50 30 78 25 83 81
25 3 25 64 0.37625 9.09680 50 30 78 25 83 81
25 4 83 53 0.31304 8.70996 50 30 78 25 83 81
25 5 81 53 0.31673 8.68247 50 30 78 25 83 81
26 0 50 45 0.35000 9.33420 50 30 50 32 85 30
26 1 30 49 0.33833 9.36150 50 30 50 32 85 30
26 2 50 45 0.35000 9.16552 50 30 50 32 85 30
26 3 32 49 0.34034 9.43714 50 30 50 32 85 30
26 4 85 38 0.37042 9.08038 50 30 50 32 85 30
26 5 30 49 0.33833 9.02081 50 30 50 32 85 30
27 0 50 48 0.35000 9.68420 50 30 50 58 79 25
27 1 30 52 0.34533 9.70683 50 30 50 58 79 25
27 2 50 48 0.35000 9.51552 50 30 50 58 79 25
27 3 58 47 0.35131 9.78845 50 30 50 58 79 25
27 4 79 43 0.35406 9.43444 50 30 50 58 79 25
27 5 25 53 0.34417 9.36497 50 30 50 58 79 25
28 0 50 43 0.35000 10.03420 50 31 25 50 80 28
28 1 31 47 0.33493 10.04176 50 31 25 50 80 28
28 2 25 48 0.32958 9.84510 50 31 25 50 80 28
28 3 50 43 0.35000 10.13845 50 31 25 50 80 28
28 4 80 37 0.37450 9.80894 50 31 25 50 80 28
28 5 28 47 0.33101 9.69598 50 31 25 50 80 28
29 0 50 52 0.35000 10.38420 50 34 25 75 100 25
29 1 34 55 0.35336 10.39512 50 34 25 75 100 25
29 2 25 57 0.35583 10.20094 50 34 25 75 100 25
29 3 75 47 0.34417 10.48262 50 34 25 75 100 25
29 4 100 42 0.33833 10.14727 50 34 25 75 100 25
29 5 25 57 0.35583 10.05181 50 34 25 75 100 25
30 0 50 51 0.35000 10.73420 50 50 50 32 78 43
30 1 50 51 0.35000 10.74512 50 50 50 32 78 43
30 2 50 51 0.35000 10.55094 50 50 50 32 78 43
30 3 32 54 0.35084 10.83346 50 50 50 32 78 43
30 4 78 45 0.34804 10.49531 50 50 50 32 78 43
30 5 43 52 0.35049 10.40230 50 50 50 32 78 43
31 0 50 52 0.35000 11.08420 50 50 37 25 76 70
31 1 50 52 0.35000 11.09512 50 50 37 25 76 70
31 2 37 54 0.35212 10.90306 50 50 37 25 76 70
31 3 25 57 0.35583 11.18929 50 50 37 25 76 70
31 4 76 46 0.34636 10.84167 50 50 37 25 76 70
31 5 70 48 0.34533 10.74764 50 50 37 25 76 70
32 0 50 43 0.35000 11.43420 50 50 50 14 75 25
32 1 50 43 0.35000 11.44512 50 50 50 14 75 25
32 2 50 43 0.35000 11.25306 50 50 50 14 75 25
32 3 14 50 0.31976 11.50905 50 50 50 14 75 25
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Table LV.: (continued)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
32 4 75 38 0.37042 11.21209 50 50 50 14 75 25
32 5 25 48 0.32958 11.07722 50 50 50 14 75 25
33 0 50 50 0.35000 11.78420 50 13 75 12 83 65
33 1 13 57 0.34827 11.79339 50 13 75 12 83 65
33 2 75 45 0.35000 11.60306 50 13 75 12 83 65
33 3 12 57 0.34734 11.85639 50 13 75 12 83 65
33 4 83 43 0.35154 11.56363 50 13 75 12 83 65
33 5 65 47 0.35000 11.42722 50 13 75 12 83 65
34 0 50 45 0.35000 12.13420 50 26 25 50 83 41
34 1 26 50 0.33656 12.12995 50 26 25 50 83 41
34 2 25 50 0.33542 11.93848 50 26 25 50 83 41
34 3 50 45 0.35000 12.20639 50 26 25 50 83 41
34 4 83 38 0.37079 11.93442 50 26 25 50 83 41
34 5 41 47 0.34496 11.77218 50 26 25 50 83 41
35 0 50 46 0.35000 12.48420 50 26 20 45 88 52
35 1 26 51 0.33936 12.46931 50 26 20 45 88 52
35 2 20 52 0.33600 12.27448 50 26 20 45 88 52
35 3 45 47 0.34767 12.55406 50 26 20 45 88 52
35 4 88 39 0.36507 12.29949 50 26 20 45 88 52
35 5 52 46 0.35084 12.12302 50 26 20 45 88 52
36 0 50 47 0.35000 12.83420 50 30 9 58 91 46
36 1 30 51 0.34300 12.81231 50 30 9 58 91 46
36 2 9 55 0.33469 12.60917 50 30 9 58 91 46
36 3 58 45 0.35317 12.90723 50 30 9 58 91 46
36 4 91 39 0.36339 12.66288 50 30 9 58 91 46
36 5 46 48 0.34869 12.47171 50 30 9 58 91 46
37 0 50 44 0.35000 13.18420 50 34 10 40 78 56
37 1 34 47 0.33843 13.15074 50 34 10 40 78 56
37 2 10 52 0.32200 12.93117 50 34 10 40 78 56
37 3 40 46 0.34300 13.25023 50 34 10 40 78 56
37 4 78 38 0.37091 13.03379 50 34 10 40 78 56
37 5 56 42 0.35476 12.82647 50 34 10 40 78 56
38 0 50 44 0.35000 13.53420 50 39 10 45 80 46
38 1 39 46 0.34204 13.49278 50 39 10 45 80 46
38 2 10 52 0.32200 13.25317 50 39 10 45 80 46
38 3 45 45 0.34650 13.59673 50 39 10 45 80 46
38 4 80 38 0.37100 13.40479 50 39 10 45 80 46
38 5 46 45 0.34729 13.17377 50 39 10 45 80 46
39 0 50 63 0.35000 13.88420 50 50 50 57 80 77
39 1 50 63 0.35000 13.84278 50 50 50 57 80 77
39 2 50 63 0.35000 13.60317 50 50 50 57 80 77
39 3 57 61 0.33987 13.93660 50 50 50 57 80 77
39 4 80 57 0.30450 13.70929 50 50 50 57 80 77
39 5 77 57 0.31094 13.48471 50 50 50 57 80 77
40 0 50 57 0.35000 14.23420 50 50 90 33 80 33
40 1 50 57 0.35000 14.19278 50 50 90 33 80 33
40 2 90 49 0.31733 13.92050 50 50 90 33 80 33
40 3 33 61 0.36507 14.30168 50 50 90 33 80 33
40 4 80 51 0.32550 14.03479 50 50 90 33 80 33
40 5 33 61 0.36507 13.84978 50 50 90 33 80 33
41 0 50 56 0.35000 14.58420 50 63 90 25 66 37
41 1 63 54 0.33999 14.53277 50 63 90 25 66 37
41 2 90 48 0.32200 14.24250 50 63 90 25 66 37
41 3 25 61 0.36750 14.66918 50 63 90 25 66 37
41 4 66 53 0.33843 14.37322 50 63 90 25 66 37
41 5 37 59 0.35971 14.20949 50 63 90 25 66 37
42 0 50 37 0.35000 14.93420 50 51 25 18 58 32
42 1 51 37 0.35149 14.88426 50 51 25 18 58 32
42 2 25 42 0.31208 14.55459 50 51 25 18 58 32
42 3 18 43 0.29997 14.96915 50 51 25 18 58 32
42 4 58 35 0.36251 14.73572 50 51 25 18 58 32
42 5 32 40 0.32144 14.53093 50 51 25 18 58 32
43 0 50 55 0.35000 15.28420 50 50 5 62 99 59
43 1 50 55 0.35000 15.23426 50 50 5 62 99 59
43 2 5 64 0.37625 14.93084 50 50 5 62 99 59
43 3 62 53 0.34244 15.31159 50 50 5 62 99 59
43 4 99 45 0.32256 15.05828 50 50 5 62 99 59
43 5 59 53 0.34496 14.87589 50 50 5 62 99 59
44 0 50 51 0.35000 15.63420 50 50 5 38 84 78
44 1 50 51 0.35000 15.58426 50 50 5 38 84 78
44 2 5 60 0.35525 15.28609 50 50 5 38 84 78
44 3 38 53 0.35084 15.66243 50 50 5 38 84 78
44 4 84 44 0.34683 15.40511 50 50 5 38 84 78
44 5 78 45 0.34804 15.22393 50 50 5 38 84 78
45 0 50 49 0.35000 15.98420 50 50 15 39 89 50
45 1 50 49 0.35000 15.93426 50 50 15 39 89 50
45 2 15 56 0.34592 15.63200 50 50 15 39 89 50
45 3 39 51 0.34846 16.01089 50 50 15 39 89 50
45 4 89 41 0.35546 15.76057 50 50 15 39 89 50
45 5 50 49 0.35000 15.57393 50 50 15 39 89 50
46 0 50 39 0.35000 16.33420 50 0 10 55 90 40
46 1 0 49 0.28583 16.22010 50 0 10 55 90 40
46 2 10 47 0.29867 15.93067 50 0 10 55 90 40
46 3 55 38 0.35642 16.36731 50 0 10 55 90 40
46 4 90 31 0.40133 16.16190 50 0 10 55 90 40
229
Table LV.: (continued)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
46 5 40 41 0.33717 15.91109 50 0 10 55 90 40
47 0 50 40 0.35000 16.68420 50 0 0 18 90 90
47 1 0 50 0.29167 16.51176 50 0 0 18 90 90
47 2 0 50 0.29167 16.22234 50 0 0 18 90 90
47 3 18 46 0.31117 16.67848 50 0 0 18 90 90
47 4 90 32 0.39667 16.55857 50 0 0 18 90 90
47 5 90 32 0.39667 16.30776 50 0 0 18 90 90
48 0 50 39 0.35000 17.03420 50 0 0 38 91 68
48 1 0 49 0.28583 16.79760 50 0 0 38 91 68
48 2 0 49 0.28583 16.50817 50 0 0 38 91 68
48 3 38 42 0.33544 17.01392 50 0 0 38 91 68
48 4 91 31 0.40166 16.96023 50 0 0 38 91 68
48 5 68 36 0.37184 16.67960 50 0 0 38 91 68
49 0 50 59 0.35000 17.38420 50 0 100 74 91 31
49 1 0 69 0.40250 17.20010 50 0 100 74 91 31
49 2 100 49 0.29750 16.80567 50 0 100 74 91 31
49 3 74 54 0.32536 17.33928 50 0 100 74 91 31
49 4 91 51 0.30599 17.26622 50 0 100 74 91 31
49 5 31 63 0.37039 17.04999 50 0 100 74 91 31
Table LVI.: Data from experiments: 6 small suppliers - with transport costs - Cohort 1 (Players 0-2 - Home to
Market A; Players 3-5 - Home to Market B)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
0 0 22 51 0.28037 0.28037 22 68 50 31 47 60
0 1 68 42 0.33684 0.33684 22 68 50 31 47 60
0 2 50 46 0.31500 0.31500 22 68 50 31 47 60
0 3 31 49 0.31766 0.31766 22 68 50 31 47 60
0 4 47 46 0.31549 0.31549 22 68 50 31 47 60
0 5 60 44 0.31267 0.31267 22 68 50 31 47 60
1 0 72 61 0.29087 0.57125 72 92 85 30 45 55
1 1 92 57 0.26894 0.60578 72 92 85 30 45 55
1 2 85 59 0.27417 0.58917 72 92 85 30 45 55
1 3 30 70 0.36633 0.68399 72 92 85 30 45 55
1 4 45 67 0.32783 0.64332 72 92 85 30 45 55
1 5 55 65 0.30217 0.61483 72 92 85 30 45 55
2 0 45 48 0.30975 0.88100 45 64 50 25 55 45
2 1 64 44 0.33003 0.93581 45 64 50 25 55 45
2 2 50 47 0.31500 0.90417 45 64 50 25 55 45
2 3 25 52 0.32375 1.00774 45 64 50 25 55 45
2 4 55 46 0.31325 0.95657 45 64 50 25 55 45
2 5 45 48 0.31675 0.93158 45 64 50 25 55 45
3 0 57 47 0.32121 1.20220 57 30 55 29 54 69
3 1 30 53 0.29867 1.23447 57 30 55 29 54 69
3 2 55 48 0.31908 1.22325 57 30 55 29 54 69
3 3 29 53 0.32676 1.33450 57 30 55 29 54 69
3 4 54 48 0.31276 1.26933 57 30 55 29 54 69
3 5 69 45 0.30436 1.23594 57 30 55 29 54 69
4 0 48 53 0.31421 1.51641 48 79 60 27 50 48
4 1 79 47 0.32583 1.56030 48 79 60 27 50 48
4 2 60 50 0.31967 1.54292 48 79 60 27 50 48
4 3 27 57 0.33754 1.67204 48 79 60 27 50 48
4 4 50 52 0.31500 1.58433 48 79 60 27 50 48
4 5 48 53 0.31701 1.55295 48 79 60 27 50 48
5 0 65 57 0.30800 1.82441 65 97 80 20 48 40
5 1 97 51 0.29087 1.85117 65 97 80 20 48 40
5 2 80 54 0.30100 1.84392 65 97 80 20 48 40
5 3 20 66 0.37100 2.04304 65 97 80 20 48 40
5 4 48 60 0.31864 1.90297 65 97 80 20 48 40
5 5 40 62 0.33367 1.88662 65 97 80 20 48 40
6 0 97 46 0.31829 2.14270 97 39 80 19 50 43
6 1 39 58 0.31474 2.16592 97 39 80 19 50 43
6 2 80 50 0.31500 2.15892 97 39 80 19 50 43
6 3 19 62 0.35768 2.40072 97 39 80 19 50 43
6 4 50 56 0.31500 2.21797 97 39 80 19 50 43
6 5 43 57 0.32447 2.21109 97 39 80 19 50 43
7 0 98 46 0.31724 2.45994 98 59 65 24 40 42
7 1 59 54 0.31521 2.48113 98 59 65 24 40 42
7 2 65 53 0.31500 2.47392 98 59 65 24 40 42
7 3 24 61 0.35079 2.75151 98 59 65 24 40 42
7 4 40 58 0.32900 2.54697 98 59 65 24 40 42
7 5 42 57 0.32564 2.53673 98 59 65 24 40 42
8 0 72 45 0.33194 2.79188 72 60 52 20 50 41
8 1 60 47 0.32317 2.80429 72 60 52 20 50 41
8 2 52 49 0.31654 2.79046 72 60 52 20 50 41
230
Table LVI.: (continued)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
8 3 20 55 0.33250 3.08401 72 60 52 20 50 41
8 4 50 49 0.31500 2.86197 72 60 52 20 50 41
8 5 41 51 0.32046 2.85719 72 60 52 20 50 41
9 0 99 47 0.31043 3.10231 99 66 65 19 49 37
9 1 66 54 0.31276 3.11705 99 66 65 19 49 37
9 2 65 54 0.31325 3.10371 99 66 65 19 49 37
9 3 19 63 0.36129 3.44531 99 66 65 19 49 37
9 4 49 57 0.31649 3.17847 99 66 65 19 49 37
9 5 37 60 0.33532 3.19251 99 66 65 19 49 37
10 0 99 43 0.33329 3.43560 99 54 55 15 54 35
10 1 54 52 0.31649 3.43355 99 54 55 15 54 35
10 2 55 51 0.31733 3.42104 99 54 55 15 54 35
10 3 15 59 0.34767 3.79297 99 54 55 15 54 35
10 4 54 52 0.31089 3.48936 99 54 55 15 54 35
10 5 35 55 0.32900 3.52151 99 54 55 15 54 35
11 0 1 52 0.23611 3.67171 1 70 90 13 50 39
11 1 70 39 0.34533 3.77888 1 70 90 13 50 39
11 2 90 35 0.37567 3.79671 1 70 90 13 50 39
11 3 13 50 0.30896 4.10193 1 70 90 13 50 39
11 4 50 43 0.31500 3.80436 1 70 90 13 50 39
11 5 39 45 0.31346 3.83497 1 70 90 13 50 39
12 0 1 50 0.22468 3.89639 1 87 55 22 50 38
12 1 87 33 0.38234 4.16122 1 87 55 22 50 38
12 2 55 40 0.32375 4.12046 1 87 55 22 50 38
12 3 22 46 0.30324 4.40517 1 87 55 22 50 38
12 4 50 41 0.31500 4.11936 1 87 55 22 50 38
12 5 38 43 0.31024 4.14521 1 87 55 22 50 38
13 0 100 70 0.17500 4.07139 100 97 78 57 59 61
13 1 97 71 0.18121 4.34243 100 97 78 57 59 61
13 2 78 75 0.23464 4.35510 100 97 78 57 59 61
13 3 57 79 0.28527 4.69044 100 97 78 57 59 61
13 4 59 79 0.27636 4.39572 100 97 78 57 59 61
13 5 61 78 0.26854 4.41376 100 97 78 57 59 61
14 0 0 43 0.18083 4.25222 0 5 65 25 48 70
14 1 5 42 0.19425 4.53668 0 5 65 25 48 70
14 2 65 30 0.35525 4.71035 0 5 65 25 48 70
14 3 25 38 0.28292 4.97336 0 5 65 25 48 70
14 4 48 33 0.31234 4.70806 0 5 65 25 48 70
14 5 70 29 0.34067 4.75442 0 5 65 25 48 70
15 0 0 37 0.14583 4.39805 0 3 72 25 20 65
15 1 3 36 0.15379 4.69047 0 3 72 25 20 65
15 2 72 23 0.38841 5.09875 0 3 72 25 20 65
15 3 25 32 0.26542 5.23878 0 3 72 25 20 65
15 4 20 33 0.25550 4.96356 0 3 72 25 20 65
15 5 65 24 0.34475 5.09917 0 3 72 25 20 65
16 0 0 42 0.17500 4.57305 0 24 50 50 20 68
16 1 24 38 0.24463 4.93509 0 24 50 50 20 68
16 2 50 32 0.31500 5.41375 0 24 50 50 20 68
16 3 50 32 0.31500 5.55378 0 24 50 50 20 68
16 4 20 38 0.27300 5.23656 0 24 50 50 20 68
16 5 68 29 0.33894 5.43811 0 24 50 50 20 68
17 0 0 74 0.36167 4.93472 0 89 80 65 55 81
17 1 89 56 0.27951 5.21460 0 89 80 65 55 81
17 2 80 58 0.28700 5.70075 0 89 80 65 55 81
17 3 65 61 0.28000 5.83378 0 89 80 65 55 81
17 4 55 63 0.30333 5.53989 0 89 80 65 55 81
17 5 81 58 0.24194 5.68006 0 89 80 65 55 81
18 0 100 50 0.29167 5.22639 100 32 63 50 50 53
18 1 32 63 0.32214 5.53674 100 32 63 50 50 53
18 2 63 57 0.30954 6.01029 100 32 63 50 50 53
18 3 50 60 0.31500 6.14878 100 32 63 50 50 53
18 4 50 60 0.31500 5.85489 100 32 63 50 50 53
18 5 53 59 0.30954 5.98960 100 32 63 50 50 53
19 0 55 36 0.32608 5.55247 55 24 30 34 50 44
19 1 24 43 0.25979 5.79654 55 24 30 34 50 44
19 2 30 41 0.27067 6.28096 55 24 30 34 50 44
19 3 34 41 0.30343 6.45220 55 24 30 34 50 44
19 4 50 37 0.31500 6.16989 55 24 30 34 50 44
19 5 44 39 0.31066 6.30026 55 24 30 34 50 44
20 0 100 59 0.23917 5.79164 100 60 90 50 51 46
20 1 60 67 0.29983 6.09637 100 60 90 50 51 46
20 2 90 61 0.25433 6.53529 100 60 90 50 51 46
20 3 50 69 0.31500 6.76720 100 60 90 50 51 46
20 4 51 69 0.31206 6.48195 100 60 90 50 51 46
20 5 46 70 0.32676 6.62702 100 60 90 50 51 46
21 0 87 63 0.25284 6.04448 87 40 90 60 47 78
21 1 40 72 0.33133 6.42770 87 40 90 60 47 78
21 2 90 62 0.24967 6.78496 87 40 90 60 47 78
21 3 60 68 0.28467 7.05187 87 40 90 60 47 78
21 4 47 71 0.32424 6.80619 87 40 90 60 47 78
21 5 78 65 0.22811 6.85512 87 40 90 60 47 78
22 0 100 48 0.30333 6.34781 100 21 90 60 0 71
22 1 21 64 0.32244 6.75015 100 21 90 60 0 71
22 2 90 50 0.30567 7.09063 100 21 90 60 0 71
22 3 60 56 0.29867 7.35054 100 21 90 60 0 71
231
Table LVI.: (continued)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
22 4 0 68 0.39667 7.20286 100 21 90 60 0 71
22 5 71 54 0.28021 7.13533 100 21 90 60 0 71
23 0 0 63 0.29750 6.64531 0 64 85 36 72 59
23 1 64 50 0.32023 7.07037 0 64 85 36 72 59
23 2 85 46 0.32725 7.41788 0 64 85 36 72 59
23 3 36 56 0.33003 7.68056 0 64 85 36 72 59
23 4 72 49 0.29087 7.49373 0 64 85 36 72 59
23 5 59 51 0.30576 7.44109 0 64 85 36 72 59
24 0 100 60 0.23333 6.87864 100 86 85 35 49 46
24 1 86 63 0.25536 7.32573 100 86 85 35 49 46
24 2 85 63 0.25783 7.67571 100 86 85 35 49 46
24 3 35 73 0.36050 8.04106 100 86 85 35 49 46
24 4 49 70 0.31801 7.81174 100 86 85 35 49 46
24 5 46 71 0.32723 7.76832 100 86 85 35 49 46
25 0 49 40 0.31311 7.19175 49 22 85 20 40 33
25 1 22 45 0.26077 7.58651 49 22 85 20 40 33
25 2 85 33 0.38033 8.05604 49 22 85 20 40 33
25 3 20 46 0.30100 8.34206 49 22 85 20 40 33
25 4 40 42 0.31033 8.12208 49 22 85 20 40 33
25 5 33 43 0.30627 8.07459 49 22 85 20 40 33
26 0 0 51 0.22750 7.41925 0 33 90 50 52 32
26 1 33 45 0.28644 7.87295 0 33 90 50 52 32
26 2 90 33 0.38500 8.44104 0 33 90 50 52 32
26 3 50 41 0.31500 8.65706 0 33 90 50 52 32
26 4 52 41 0.31561 8.43768 0 33 90 50 52 32
26 5 32 45 0.30954 8.38413 0 33 90 50 52 32
27 0 37 58 0.31409 7.73334 37 65 90 50 50 34
27 1 65 52 0.31675 8.18970 37 65 90 50 50 34
27 2 90 47 0.31967 8.76071 37 65 90 50 50 34
27 3 50 55 0.31500 8.97206 37 65 90 50 50 34
27 4 50 55 0.31500 8.75268 37 65 90 50 50 34
27 5 34 58 0.33516 8.71929 37 65 90 50 50 34
28 0 63 55 0.31257 8.04592 63 65 90 40 50 31
28 1 65 55 0.31150 8.50120 63 65 90 40 50 31
28 2 90 50 0.30567 9.06638 63 65 90 40 50 31
28 3 40 60 0.33133 9.30340 63 65 90 40 50 31
28 4 50 58 0.31500 9.06768 63 65 90 40 50 31
28 5 31 62 0.34648 9.06577 63 65 90 40 50 31
29 0 68 49 0.32214 8.36806 68 35 90 40 42 36
29 1 35 55 0.30800 8.80920 68 35 90 40 42 36
29 2 90 44 0.33367 9.40004 68 35 90 40 42 36
29 3 40 54 0.32433 9.62773 68 35 90 40 42 36
29 4 42 54 0.32284 9.39052 68 35 90 40 42 36
29 5 36 55 0.32839 9.39416 68 35 90 40 42 36
30 0 78 51 0.31304 8.68110 78 40 78 38 50 47
30 1 40 58 0.31500 9.12420 78 40 78 38 50 47
30 2 78 51 0.31304 9.71308 78 40 78 38 50 47
30 3 38 59 0.33264 9.96037 78 40 78 38 50 47
30 4 50 56 0.31500 9.70552 78 40 78 38 50 47
30 5 47 57 0.31934 9.71350 78 40 78 38 50 47
31 0 76 46 0.32956 9.01066 76 22 80 30 50 49
31 1 22 57 0.29997 9.42417 76 22 80 30 50 49
31 2 80 45 0.33250 10.04558 76 22 80 30 50 49
31 3 30 55 0.33133 10.29170 76 22 80 30 50 49
31 4 50 51 0.31500 10.02052 76 22 80 30 50 49
31 5 49 52 0.31591 10.02941 76 22 80 30 50 49
32 0 36 58 0.31369 9.32435 36 69 80 40 50 50
32 1 69 51 0.31766 9.74183 36 69 80 40 50 50
32 2 80 49 0.31850 10.36408 36 69 80 40 50 50
32 3 40 57 0.32783 10.61954 36 69 80 40 50 50
32 4 50 55 0.31500 10.33552 36 69 80 40 50 50
32 5 50 55 0.31500 10.34441 36 69 80 40 50 50
33 0 68 53 0.31374 9.63809 68 76 80 33 23 51
33 1 76 51 0.31439 10.05622 68 76 80 33 23 51
33 2 80 50 0.31500 10.67908 68 76 80 33 23 51
33 3 33 60 0.33999 10.95953 68 76 80 33 23 51
33 4 23 62 0.35469 10.69021 68 76 80 33 23 51
33 5 51 56 0.31358 10.65799 68 76 80 33 23 51
34 0 100 56 0.25667 9.89476 100 74 80 30 46 52
34 1 74 62 0.28476 10.34098 100 74 80 30 46 52
34 2 80 60 0.28000 10.95908 100 74 80 30 46 52
34 3 30 70 0.36633 11.32586 100 74 80 30 46 52
34 4 46 67 0.32536 11.01557 100 74 80 30 46 52
34 5 52 66 0.30977 10.96776 100 74 80 30 46 52
35 0 77 44 0.33579 10.23055 77 38 85 0 45 54
35 1 38 52 0.30604 10.64702 77 38 85 0 45 54
35 2 85 43 0.33950 11.29858 77 38 85 0 45 54
35 3 0 60 0.35000 11.67586 77 38 85 0 45 54
35 4 45 51 0.31850 11.33407 77 38 85 0 45 54
35 5 54 49 0.31229 11.28006 77 38 85 0 45 54
36 0 20 69 0.33950 10.57005 20 64 100 100 50 30
36 1 64 60 0.30389 10.95092 20 64 100 100 50 30
36 2 100 53 0.27417 11.57275 20 64 100 100 50 30
36 3 100 53 0.20417 11.88003 20 64 100 100 50 30
36 4 50 63 0.31500 11.64907 20 64 100 100 50 30
232
Table LVI.: (continued)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
36 5 30 67 0.35933 11.63939 20 64 100 100 50 30
37 0 72 44 0.33451 10.90455 72 63 97 30 3 29
37 1 63 46 0.32622 11.27714 72 63 97 30 3 29
37 2 97 39 0.35667 11.92942 72 63 97 30 3 29
37 3 30 53 0.32667 12.20669 72 63 97 30 3 29
37 4 3 58 0.34022 11.98930 72 63 97 30 3 29
37 5 29 53 0.32676 11.96615 72 63 97 30 3 29
38 0 36 54 0.30716 11.21171 36 66 95 25 56 28
38 1 66 48 0.32396 11.60110 36 66 95 25 56 28
38 2 95 42 0.34125 12.27067 36 66 95 25 56 28
38 3 25 56 0.33542 12.54211 36 66 95 25 56 28
38 4 56 50 0.30996 12.29926 36 66 95 25 56 28
38 5 28 56 0.33451 12.30066 36 66 95 25 56 28
39 0 0 53 0.23917 11.45088 0 76 90 26 48 26
39 1 76 38 0.35383 11.95493 0 76 90 26 48 26
39 2 90 35 0.37567 12.64634 0 76 90 26 48 26
39 3 26 48 0.31276 12.85487 0 76 90 26 48 26
39 4 48 44 0.31491 12.61416 0 76 90 26 48 26
39 5 26 48 0.31276 12.61342 0 76 90 26 48 26
40 0 0 52 0.23333 11.68421 0 71 60 50 50 27
40 1 71 37 0.35126 12.30619 0 71 60 50 50 27
40 2 60 40 0.33133 12.97767 0 71 60 50 50 27
40 3 50 42 0.31500 13.16987 0 71 60 50 50 27
40 4 50 42 0.31500 12.92916 0 71 60 50 50 27
40 5 27 46 0.30802 12.92144 0 71 60 50 50 27
41 0 90 63 0.24500 11.92921 90 72 65 50 60 66
41 1 72 66 0.27804 12.58423 90 72 65 50 60 66
41 2 65 68 0.28875 13.26642 90 72 65 50 60 66
41 3 50 71 0.31500 13.48487 90 72 65 50 60 66
41 4 60 69 0.28350 13.21266 90 72 65 50 60 66
41 5 66 67 0.26609 13.18753 90 72 65 50 60 66
42 0 60 46 0.32433 12.25355 60 37 75 38 53 25
42 1 37 50 0.30196 12.88618 60 37 75 38 53 25
42 2 75 43 0.33833 13.60476 60 37 75 38 53 25
42 3 38 50 0.32004 13.80491 60 37 75 38 53 25
42 4 53 47 0.31374 13.52640 60 37 75 38 53 25
42 5 25 53 0.32667 13.51420 60 37 75 38 53 25
43 0 81 45 0.33236 12.58591 81 40 75 40 51 19
43 1 40 53 0.30917 13.19535 81 40 75 40 51 19
43 2 75 46 0.32958 13.93434 81 40 75 40 51 19
43 3 40 53 0.32317 14.12808 81 40 75 40 51 19
43 4 51 51 0.31416 13.84056 81 40 75 40 51 19
43 5 19 57 0.33959 13.85379 81 40 75 40 51 19
44 0 75 49 0.32083 12.90674 75 40 80 35 50 39
44 1 40 56 0.31267 13.50802 75 40 80 35 50 39
44 2 80 48 0.32200 14.25634 75 40 80 35 50 39
44 3 35 57 0.33250 14.46058 75 40 80 35 50 39
44 4 50 54 0.31500 14.15556 75 40 80 35 50 39
44 5 39 56 0.32758 14.18137 75 40 80 35 50 39
45 0 19 56 0.29258 13.19932 19 70 80 30 50 51
45 1 70 46 0.32900 13.83702 19 70 80 30 50 51
45 2 80 44 0.33600 14.59234 19 70 80 30 50 51
45 3 30 54 0.32900 14.78958 19 70 80 30 50 51
45 4 50 50 0.31500 14.47056 19 70 80 30 50 51
45 5 51 50 0.31428 14.49565 19 70 80 30 50 51
46 0 96 55 0.27099 13.47031 96 77 80 35 50 32
46 1 77 59 0.28854 14.12556 96 77 80 35 50 32
46 2 80 58 0.28700 14.87934 96 77 80 35 50 32
46 3 35 67 0.35000 15.13958 96 77 80 35 50 32
46 4 50 64 0.31500 14.78556 96 77 80 35 50 32
46 5 32 68 0.35784 14.85349 96 77 80 35 50 32
47 0 81 53 0.30343 13.77374 81 71 85 40 45 24
47 1 71 55 0.30716 14.43272 81 71 85 40 45 24
47 2 85 52 0.30275 15.18209 81 71 85 40 45 24
47 3 40 61 0.33250 15.47208 81 71 85 40 45 24
47 4 45 60 0.32375 15.10931 81 71 85 40 45 24
47 5 24 64 0.35989 15.21338 81 71 85 40 45 24
48 0 49 46 0.31381 14.08755 49 35 85 36 50 24
48 1 35 49 0.29750 14.73022 49 35 85 36 50 24
48 2 85 39 0.35583 15.53792 49 35 85 36 50 24
48 3 36 49 0.31859 15.79067 49 35 85 36 50 24
48 4 50 46 0.31500 15.42431 49 35 85 36 50 24
48 5 24 51 0.32046 15.53384 49 35 85 36 50 24
49 0 0 60 0.28000 14.36755 0 87 86 40 55 32
49 1 87 43 0.33917 15.06939 0 87 86 40 55 32
49 2 86 43 0.33936 15.87728 0 87 86 40 55 32
49 3 40 52 0.32200 16.11267 0 87 86 40 55 32
49 4 55 49 0.31150 15.73581 0 87 86 40 55 32
49 5 32 54 0.32844 15.86228 0 87 86 40 55 32
233
Table LVII.: Data from experiments: 6 small suppliers - with transport costs - Cohort 2 (Players 0-2 - Home to
Market A; Players 3-5 - Home to Market B)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
0 0 81 49 0.31789 0.31789 81 42 94 1 45 64
0 1 42 57 0.31444 0.31444 81 42 94 1 45 64
0 2 94 47 0.31603 0.31603 81 42 94 1 45 64
0 3 1 65 0.37903 0.37903 81 42 94 1 45 64
0 4 45 56 0.32142 0.32142 81 42 94 1 45 64
0 5 64 53 0.29573 0.29573 81 42 94 1 45 64
1 0 91 64 0.23751 0.55540 91 58 96 100 20 44
1 1 58 70 0.30044 0.61488 91 58 96 100 20 44
1 2 96 63 0.22806 0.54409 91 58 96 100 20 44
1 3 100 62 0.15167 0.53069 91 58 96 100 20 44
1 4 20 78 0.41300 0.73442 91 58 96 100 20 44
1 5 44 73 0.33446 0.63019 91 58 96 100 20 44
2 0 48 55 0.31467 0.87008 48 70 100 30 0 73
2 1 70 50 0.31967 0.93455 48 70 100 30 0 73
2 2 100 44 0.32667 0.87075 48 70 100 30 0 73
2 3 30 58 0.33833 0.86903 48 70 100 30 0 73
2 4 0 64 0.37333 1.10775 48 70 100 30 0 73
2 5 73 50 0.28656 0.91674 48 70 100 30 0 73
3 0 31 45 0.28219 1.15227 31 38 100 1 0 86
3 1 38 44 0.29484 1.22939 31 38 100 1 0 86
3 2 100 31 0.40250 1.27325 31 38 100 1 0 86
3 3 1 51 0.29899 1.16802 31 38 100 1 0 86
3 4 0 51 0.29750 1.40525 31 38 100 1 0 86
3 5 86 34 0.32676 1.24350 31 38 100 1 0 86
4 0 84 43 0.33959 1.49186 84 32 73 100 0 12
4 1 32 54 0.30324 1.53263 84 32 73 100 0 12
4 2 73 46 0.32949 1.60274 84 32 73 100 0 12
4 3 100 40 0.28000 1.44802 84 32 73 100 0 12
4 4 0 60 0.35000 1.75525 84 32 73 100 0 12
4 5 12 58 0.34337 1.58688 84 32 73 100 0 12
5 0 100 32 0.39667 1.88853 100 37 79 19 5 21
5 1 37 45 0.29437 1.82700 100 37 79 19 5 21
5 2 79 36 0.36304 1.96579 100 37 79 19 5 21
5 3 19 48 0.30704 1.75506 100 37 79 19 5 21
5 4 5 51 0.30450 2.05975 100 37 79 19 5 21
5 5 21 48 0.30891 1.89579 100 37 79 19 5 21
6 0 88 44 0.33451 2.22304 88 65 100 0 30 26
6 1 65 49 0.32200 2.14900 88 65 100 0 30 26
6 2 100 42 0.33833 2.30412 88 65 100 0 30 26
6 3 0 62 0.36167 2.11673 88 65 100 0 30 26
6 4 30 56 0.33367 2.39342 88 65 100 0 30 26
6 5 26 57 0.33796 2.23375 88 65 100 0 30 26
7 0 0 35 0.13417 2.35720 0 53 99 0 20 5
7 1 53 25 0.32564 2.47464 0 53 99 0 20 5
7 2 99 16 0.48764 2.79176 0 53 99 0 20 5
7 3 0 35 0.20417 2.32090 0 53 99 0 20 5
7 4 20 31 0.24850 2.64192 0 53 99 0 20 5
7 5 5 34 0.21525 2.44900 0 53 99 0 20 5
8 0 58 66 0.30417 2.66138 58 74 94 64 40 58
8 1 74 63 0.28196 2.75660 58 74 94 64 40 58
8 2 94 59 0.25443 3.04619 58 74 94 64 40 58
8 3 64 65 0.27613 2.59702 58 74 94 64 40 58
8 4 40 70 0.34300 2.98492 58 74 94 64 40 58
8 5 58 66 0.29297 2.74197 58 74 94 64 40 58
9 0 100 54 0.26833 2.92971 100 65 97 0 25 84
9 1 65 61 0.30100 3.05760 100 65 97 0 25 84
9 2 97 55 0.26894 3.31513 100 65 97 0 25 84
9 3 0 74 0.43167 3.02869 100 65 97 0 25 84
9 4 25 69 0.37333 3.35825 100 65 97 0 25 84
9 5 84 57 0.23646 2.97843 100 65 97 0 25 84
10 0 96 44 0.33003 3.25974 96 41 100 0 10 70
10 1 41 55 0.31206 3.36966 96 41 100 0 10 70
10 2 100 43 0.33250 3.64763 96 41 100 0 10 70
10 3 0 63 0.36750 3.39619 96 41 100 0 10 70
10 4 10 61 0.35700 3.71525 96 41 100 0 10 70
10 5 70 49 0.29400 3.27243 96 41 100 0 10 70
11 0 90 38 0.36167 3.62140 90 57 97 0 5 32
11 1 57 45 0.32284 3.69250 90 57 97 0 5 32
11 2 97 37 0.36764 4.01527 90 57 97 0 5 32
11 3 0 56 0.32667 3.72286 90 57 97 0 5 32
11 4 5 55 0.32550 4.04075 90 57 97 0 5 32
11 5 32 50 0.32004 3.59247 90 57 97 0 5 32
12 0 97 37 0.36764 3.98904 97 73 95 10 0 7
12 1 73 42 0.34022 4.03272 97 73 95 10 0 7
12 2 95 37 0.36750 4.38277 97 73 95 10 0 7
12 3 10 54 0.32433 4.04719 97 73 95 10 0 7
12 4 0 56 0.32667 4.36742 97 73 95 10 0 7
12 5 7 55 0.32704 3.91951 97 73 95 10 0 7
13 0 92 29 0.40614 4.39518 92 77 7 20 30 9
13 1 77 32 0.37359 4.40631 92 77 7 20 30 9
13 2 7 46 0.22169 4.60446 92 77 7 20 30 9
13 3 20 43 0.29050 4.33769 92 77 7 20 30 9
13 4 30 41 0.29867 4.66608 92 77 7 20 30 9
13 5 9 45 0.28056 4.20007 92 77 7 20 30 9
234
Table LVII.: (continued)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
14 0 94 49 0.30576 4.70094 94 76 96 50 0 25
14 1 76 53 0.30833 4.71464 94 76 96 50 0 25
14 2 96 49 0.30319 4.90765 94 76 96 50 0 25
14 3 50 58 0.31500 4.65269 94 76 96 50 0 25
14 4 0 68 0.39667 5.06275 94 76 96 50 0 25
14 5 25 63 0.35583 4.55590 94 76 96 50 0 25
15 0 62 38 0.33684 5.03778 62 60 94 0 15 23
15 1 60 39 0.33250 5.04714 62 60 94 0 15 23
15 2 94 32 0.39303 5.30068 62 60 94 0 15 23
15 3 0 51 0.29750 4.95019 62 60 94 0 15 23
15 4 15 48 0.30275 5.36550 62 60 94 0 15 23
15 5 23 46 0.30429 4.86019 62 60 94 0 15 23
16 0 11 42 0.21581 5.25359 11 80 100 19 0 13
16 1 80 29 0.38850 5.43564 11 80 100 19 0 13
16 2 100 25 0.43750 5.73818 11 80 100 19 0 13
16 3 19 41 0.28173 5.23192 11 80 100 19 0 13
16 4 0 45 0.26250 5.62800 11 80 100 19 0 13
16 5 13 42 0.27442 5.13462 11 80 100 19 0 13
17 0 8 47 0.22974 5.48333 8 74 50 41 0 69
17 1 74 34 0.36316 5.79880 8 74 50 41 0 69
17 2 50 38 0.31500 6.05318 8 74 50 41 0 69
17 3 41 40 0.30891 5.54083 8 74 50 41 0 69
17 4 0 48 0.28000 5.90800 8 74 50 41 0 69
17 5 69 35 0.32653 5.46114 8 74 50 41 0 69
18 0 83 57 0.28574 5.76907 83 84 90 43 36 34
18 1 84 57 0.28406 6.08286 83 84 90 43 36 34
18 2 90 56 0.27767 6.33085 83 84 90 43 36 34
18 3 43 65 0.33101 5.87183 83 84 90 43 36 34
18 4 36 67 0.34799 6.25599 83 84 90 43 36 34
18 5 34 67 0.35196 5.81310 83 84 90 43 36 34
19 0 63 40 0.33532 6.10440 63 74 96 0 0 32
19 1 74 38 0.35196 6.43482 63 74 96 0 0 32
19 2 96 34 0.38369 6.71454 63 74 96 0 0 32
19 3 0 53 0.30917 6.18100 63 74 96 0 0 32
19 4 0 53 0.30917 6.56516 63 74 96 0 0 32
19 5 32 47 0.31374 6.12684 63 74 96 0 0 32
20 0 49 68 0.31638 6.42077 49 77 96 60 22 84
20 1 77 62 0.27909 6.71391 49 77 96 60 22 84
20 2 96 58 0.25489 6.96943 49 77 96 60 22 84
20 3 60 66 0.28700 6.46800 49 77 96 60 22 84
20 4 22 73 0.39144 6.95660 49 77 96 60 22 84
20 5 84 61 0.22059 6.34744 49 77 96 60 22 84
21 0 79 53 0.30553 6.72630 79 69 95 30 0 71
21 1 69 55 0.30879 7.02270 79 69 95 30 0 71
21 2 95 50 0.29925 7.26868 79 69 95 30 0 71
21 3 30 63 0.35000 6.81800 79 69 95 30 0 71
21 4 0 69 0.40250 7.35910 79 69 95 30 0 71
21 5 71 55 0.27776 6.62520 79 69 95 30 0 71
22 0 100 51 0.28583 7.01213 100 60 100 40 36 18
22 1 60 59 0.30917 7.33187 100 60 100 40 36 18
22 2 100 51 0.28583 7.55452 100 60 100 40 36 18
22 3 40 63 0.33483 7.15283 100 60 100 40 36 18
22 4 36 64 0.34309 7.70219 100 60 100 40 36 18
22 5 18 67 0.37697 7.00217 100 60 100 40 36 18
23 0 98 38 0.36204 7.37417 98 35 97 0 40 20
23 1 35 51 0.30100 7.63287 98 35 97 0 40 20
23 2 97 39 0.35667 7.91119 98 35 97 0 40 20
23 3 0 58 0.33833 7.49117 98 35 97 0 40 20
23 4 40 50 0.31967 8.02186 98 35 97 0 40 20
23 5 20 54 0.32900 7.33117 98 35 97 0 40 20
24 0 90 49 0.31033 7.68451 90 64 97 30 40 15
24 1 64 54 0.31369 7.94656 90 64 97 30 40 15
24 2 97 48 0.30732 8.21851 90 64 97 30 40 15
24 3 30 61 0.34533 7.83650 90 64 97 30 40 15
24 4 40 59 0.33017 8.35203 90 64 97 30 40 15
24 5 15 64 0.36808 7.69925 90 64 97 30 40 15
25 0 92 35 0.37674 8.06125 92 53 96 0 0 26
25 1 53 43 0.31934 8.26590 92 53 96 0 0 26
25 2 96 34 0.38369 8.60221 92 53 96 0 0 26
25 3 0 53 0.30917 8.14567 92 53 96 0 0 26
25 4 0 53 0.30917 8.66119 92 53 96 0 0 26
25 5 26 48 0.31276 8.01201 92 53 96 0 0 26
26 0 86 57 0.28056 8.34181 86 72 95 45 0 75
26 1 72 60 0.29344 8.55934 86 72 95 45 0 75
26 2 95 56 0.26775 8.86996 86 72 95 45 0 75
26 3 45 66 0.32725 8.47292 86 72 95 45 0 75
26 4 0 75 0.43750 9.09869 86 72 95 45 0 75
26 5 75 60 0.25375 8.26576 86 72 95 45 0 75
27 0 71 32 0.36351 8.70532 71 54 95 0 0 13
27 1 54 36 0.32396 8.88330 71 54 95 0 0 13
27 2 95 28 0.41475 9.28471 71 54 95 0 0 13
27 3 0 47 0.27417 8.74708 71 54 95 0 0 13
27 4 0 47 0.27417 9.37286 71 54 95 0 0 13
27 5 13 44 0.28306 8.54882 71 54 95 0 0 13
28 0 86 46 0.32676 9.03208 86 53 98 45 15 19
235
Table LVII.: (continued)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
28 1 53 53 0.31584 9.19914 86 53 98 45 15 19
28 2 98 44 0.32844 9.61315 86 53 98 45 15 19
28 3 45 54 0.32025 9.06733 86 53 98 45 15 19
28 4 15 60 0.35175 9.72461 86 53 98 45 15 19
28 5 19 59 0.34683 8.89565 86 53 98 45 15 19
29 0 95 47 0.31500 9.34708 95 70 96 36 10 24
29 1 70 52 0.31500 9.51414 95 70 96 36 10 24
29 2 96 47 0.31393 9.92707 95 70 96 36 10 24
29 3 36 59 0.33493 9.40226 95 70 96 36 10 24
29 4 10 64 0.37100 10.09561 95 70 96 36 10 24
29 5 24 61 0.35079 9.24644 95 70 96 36 10 24
30 0 5 42 0.19425 9.54133 5 70 97 0 20 22
30 1 70 29 0.36867 9.88281 5 70 97 0 20 22
30 2 97 23 0.44441 10.37148 5 70 97 0 20 22
30 3 0 43 0.25083 9.65309 5 70 97 0 20 22
30 4 20 39 0.27650 10.37211 5 70 97 0 20 22
30 5 22 38 0.27711 9.52355 5 70 97 0 20 22
31 0 12 52 0.26357 9.80490 12 74 98 33 20 36
31 1 74 40 0.34636 10.22917 12 74 98 33 20 36
31 2 98 35 0.37884 10.75032 12 74 98 33 20 36
31 3 33 48 0.31619 9.96928 12 74 98 33 20 36
31 4 20 51 0.31850 10.69061 12 74 98 33 20 36
31 5 36 47 0.31533 9.83887 12 74 98 33 20 36
32 0 89 46 0.32501 10.12991 89 59 99 34 15 23
32 1 59 52 0.31731 10.54648 89 59 99 34 15 23
32 2 99 44 0.32758 11.07790 89 59 99 34 15 23
32 3 34 57 0.33329 10.30258 89 59 99 34 15 23
32 4 15 61 0.35583 11.04644 89 59 99 34 15 23
32 5 23 59 0.34524 10.18411 89 59 99 34 15 23
33 0 94 37 0.36736 10.49727 94 43 97 23 0 21
33 1 43 47 0.30651 10.85299 94 43 97 23 0 21
33 2 97 36 0.37312 11.45102 94 43 97 23 0 21
33 3 23 51 0.32004 10.62262 94 43 97 23 0 21
33 4 0 56 0.32667 11.37311 94 43 97 23 0 21
33 5 21 51 0.31906 10.50317 94 43 97 23 0 21
34 0 94 43 0.33656 10.83383 94 73 98 31 0 15
34 1 73 48 0.32412 11.17711 94 73 98 31 0 15
34 2 98 43 0.33404 11.78506 94 73 98 31 0 15
34 3 31 56 0.33318 10.95579 94 73 98 31 0 15
34 4 0 62 0.36167 11.73478 94 73 98 31 0 15
34 5 15 59 0.34767 10.85084 94 73 98 31 0 15
35 0 94 39 0.35709 11.19092 94 63 97 0 18 16
35 1 63 45 0.32774 11.50485 94 63 97 0 18 16
35 2 97 38 0.36216 12.14722 94 63 97 0 18 16
35 3 0 58 0.33833 11.29413 94 63 97 0 18 16
35 4 18 54 0.32844 12.06322 94 63 97 0 18 16
35 5 16 54 0.32769 11.17853 94 63 97 0 18 16
36 0 79 47 0.32583 11.51675 79 73 97 6 45 13
36 1 73 48 0.32412 11.82897 79 73 97 6 45 13
36 2 97 43 0.33474 12.48196 79 73 97 6 45 13
36 3 6 61 0.35709 11.65122 79 73 97 6 45 13
36 4 45 54 0.32025 12.38347 79 73 97 6 45 13
36 5 13 60 0.35212 11.53066 79 73 97 6 45 13
37 0 92 53 0.28854 11.80529 92 68 96 41 45 16
37 1 68 58 0.30324 12.13221 92 68 96 41 45 16
37 2 96 52 0.28709 12.76905 92 68 96 41 45 16
37 3 41 63 0.33306 11.98428 92 68 96 41 45 16
37 4 45 63 0.32550 12.70897 92 68 96 41 45 16
37 5 16 68 0.38323 11.91388 92 68 96 41 45 16
38 0 94 47 0.31603 12.12132 94 74 98 0 47 18
38 1 74 51 0.31556 12.44777 94 74 98 0 47 18
38 2 98 47 0.31164 13.08069 94 74 98 0 47 18
38 3 0 66 0.38500 12.36928 94 74 98 0 47 18
38 4 47 57 0.31934 13.02831 94 74 98 0 47 18
38 5 18 63 0.36204 12.27592 94 74 98 0 47 18
39 0 100 46 0.31500 12.43632 100 69 97 0 45 20
39 1 69 52 0.31544 12.76322 100 69 97 0 45 20
39 2 97 47 0.31281 13.39350 100 69 97 0 45 20
39 3 0 66 0.38500 12.75428 100 69 97 0 45 20
39 4 45 57 0.32200 13.35031 100 69 97 0 45 20
39 5 20 62 0.35700 12.63292 100 69 97 0 45 20
40 0 53 38 0.32109 12.75741 53 76 97 0 0 19
40 1 76 34 0.36596 13.12918 53 76 97 0 0 19
40 2 97 30 0.40602 13.79952 53 76 97 0 0 19
40 3 0 49 0.28583 13.04011 53 76 97 0 0 19
40 4 0 49 0.28583 13.63614 53 76 97 0 0 19
40 5 19 45 0.29619 12.92912 53 76 97 0 0 19
41 0 78 59 0.28691 13.04431 78 76 96 33 15 75
41 1 76 59 0.29013 13.41930 78 76 96 33 15 75
41 2 96 55 0.27099 14.07051 78 76 96 33 15 75
41 3 33 68 0.35586 13.39597 78 76 96 33 15 75
41 4 15 72 0.40075 14.03689 78 76 96 33 15 75
41 5 75 60 0.25375 13.18287 78 76 96 33 15 75
42 0 36 46 0.29409 13.33841 36 60 99 12 20 40
42 1 60 41 0.33017 13.74947 36 60 99 12 20 40
236
Table LVII.: (continued)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
42 2 99 34 0.38474 14.45526 36 60 99 12 20 40
42 3 12 51 0.31234 13.70831 36 60 99 12 20 40
42 4 20 49 0.31150 14.34839 36 60 99 12 20 40
42 5 40 45 0.31383 13.49670 36 60 99 12 20 40
43 0 38 49 0.30184 13.64025 38 72 97 21 15 38
43 1 72 42 0.33964 14.08911 38 72 97 21 15 38
43 2 97 37 0.36764 14.82290 38 72 97 21 15 38
43 3 21 52 0.32244 14.03075 38 72 97 21 15 38
43 4 15 53 0.32317 14.67156 38 72 97 21 15 38
43 5 38 49 0.31864 13.81534 38 72 97 21 15 38
44 0 40 48 0.30333 13.94358 40 72 97 22 15 32
44 1 72 41 0.34221 14.43132 40 72 97 22 15 32
44 2 97 36 0.37312 15.19602 40 72 97 22 15 32
44 3 22 51 0.31957 14.35033 40 72 97 22 15 32
44 4 15 53 0.32317 14.99472 40 72 97 22 15 32
44 5 32 49 0.31794 14.13328 40 72 97 22 15 32
45 0 7 43 0.20664 14.15022 7 71 95 5 10 34
45 1 71 30 0.36841 14.79973 7 71 95 5 10 34
45 2 95 25 0.43050 15.62652 7 71 95 5 10 34
45 3 5 43 0.26250 14.61283 7 71 95 5 10 34
45 4 10 42 0.26833 15.26306 7 71 95 5 10 34
45 5 34 38 0.29783 14.43111 7 71 95 5 10 34
46 0 95 44 0.33075 14.48097 95 74 95 13 10 28
46 1 74 48 0.32396 15.12369 95 74 95 13 10 28
46 2 95 44 0.33075 15.95727 95 74 95 13 10 28
46 3 13 60 0.35212 14.96495 95 74 95 13 10 28
46 4 10 61 0.35700 15.62006 95 74 95 13 10 28
46 5 28 57 0.33707 14.76818 95 74 95 13 10 28
47 0 72 43 0.33707 14.81804 72 72 97 4 17 24
47 1 72 43 0.33707 15.46076 72 72 97 4 17 24
47 2 97 38 0.36216 16.31943 72 72 97 4 17 24
47 3 4 56 0.33003 15.29498 72 72 97 4 17 24
47 4 17 54 0.32809 15.94815 72 72 97 4 17 24
47 5 24 52 0.32349 15.09167 72 72 97 4 17 24
48 0 33 42 0.28049 15.09853 33 83 97 9 0 19
48 1 83 32 0.38199 15.84275 33 83 97 9 0 19
48 2 97 29 0.41151 16.73093 33 83 97 9 0 19
48 3 9 46 0.28534 15.58032 33 83 97 9 0 19
48 4 0 48 0.28000 16.22815 33 83 97 9 0 19
48 5 19 44 0.29258 15.38425 33 83 97 9 0 19
49 0 91 40 0.35231 15.45084 91 75 97 0 9 20
49 1 75 43 0.33833 16.18108 91 75 97 0 9 20
49 2 97 39 0.35667 17.08761 91 75 97 0 9 20
49 3 0 58 0.33833 15.91865 91 75 97 0 9 20
49 4 9 57 0.33796 16.56611 91 75 97 0 9 20
49 5 20 54 0.32900 15.71325 91 75 97 0 9 20
Table LVIII.: Data from experiments: 6 small suppliers - with transport costs - Cohort 3 (Players 0-2 - Home to
Market A; Players 3-5 - Home to Market B)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
0 0 55 41 0.32317 0.32317 55 37 60 49 10 50
0 1 37 45 0.29437 0.29437 55 37 60 49 10 50
0 2 60 40 0.33133 0.33133 55 37 60 49 10 50
0 3 49 42 0.31474 0.31474 55 37 60 49 10 50
0 4 10 50 0.30567 0.30567 55 37 60 49 10 50
0 5 50 42 0.31500 0.31500 55 37 60 49 10 50
1 0 58 52 0.31724 0.64041 58 90 70 4 35 60
1 1 90 45 0.32900 0.62337 58 90 70 4 35 60
1 2 70 49 0.32200 0.65333 58 90 70 4 35 60
1 3 4 63 0.36759 0.68234 58 90 70 4 35 60
1 4 35 56 0.33075 0.63642 58 90 70 4 35 60
1 5 60 51 0.30450 0.61950 58 90 70 4 35 60
2 0 58 51 0.31817 0.95858 58 52 65 26 60 50
2 1 52 52 0.31584 0.93921 58 52 65 26 60 50
2 2 65 49 0.32200 0.97533 58 52 65 26 60 50
2 3 26 57 0.33796 1.02030 58 52 65 26 60 50
2 4 60 50 0.30567 0.94208 58 52 65 26 60 50
2 5 50 52 0.31500 0.93450 58 52 65 26 60 50
3 0 60 59 0.30917 1.26775 60 95 70 13 60 55
3 1 95 52 0.28875 1.22796 60 95 70 13 60 55
3 2 70 57 0.30333 1.27867 60 95 70 13 60 55
3 3 13 68 0.38666 1.40695 60 95 70 13 60 55
3 4 60 59 0.29517 1.23725 60 95 70 13 60 55
3 5 55 60 0.30508 1.23958 60 95 70 13 60 55
237
Table LVIII.: (continued)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
4 0 55 43 0.32200 1.58975 55 98 40 28 6 45
4 1 98 35 0.37884 1.60680 55 98 40 28 6 45
4 2 40 46 0.30100 1.57967 55 98 40 28 6 45
4 3 28 49 0.31654 1.72349 55 98 40 28 6 45
4 4 6 53 0.31603 1.55328 55 98 40 28 6 45
4 5 45 45 0.31500 1.55458 55 98 40 28 6 45
5 0 80 58 0.28700 1.87675 80 50 60 40 96 45
5 1 50 64 0.31500 1.92180 80 50 60 40 96 45
5 2 60 62 0.30567 1.88533 80 50 60 40 96 45
5 3 40 66 0.33833 2.06183 80 50 60 40 96 45
5 4 96 55 0.20659 1.75987 80 50 60 40 96 45
5 5 45 65 0.32667 1.88125 80 50 60 40 96 45
6 0 60 36 0.33600 2.21275 60 7 70 9 50 45
6 1 7 47 0.22671 2.14851 60 7 70 9 50 45
6 2 70 34 0.35700 2.24233 60 7 70 9 50 45
6 3 9 46 0.28534 2.34717 60 7 70 9 50 45
6 4 50 38 0.31500 2.07487 60 7 70 9 50 45
6 5 45 39 0.31150 2.19275 60 7 70 9 50 45
7 0 78 49 0.31957 2.53232 78 82 36 40 40 47
7 1 82 48 0.32097 2.46948 78 82 36 40 40 47
7 2 36 57 0.31206 2.55439 78 82 36 40 40 47
7 3 40 57 0.32783 2.67500 78 82 36 40 40 47
7 4 40 57 0.32783 2.40270 78 82 36 40 40 47
7 5 47 55 0.31864 2.51139 78 82 36 40 40 47
8 0 78 67 0.26077 2.79309 78 100 70 40 90 35
8 1 100 63 0.21583 2.68532 78 100 70 40 90 35
8 2 70 69 0.27533 2.82973 78 100 70 40 90 35
8 3 40 75 0.34883 3.02384 78 100 70 40 90 35
8 4 90 65 0.17967 2.58237 78 100 70 40 90 35
8 5 35 76 0.36575 2.87714 78 100 70 40 90 35
9 0 37 21 0.25797 3.05107 37 18 20 40 5 24
9 1 18 25 0.17537 2.86069 37 18 20 40 5 24
9 2 20 25 0.18550 3.01523 37 18 20 40 5 24
9 3 40 21 0.28583 3.30967 37 18 20 40 5 24
9 4 5 28 0.18375 2.76612 37 18 20 40 5 24
9 5 24 24 0.23856 3.11570 37 18 20 40 5 24
10 0 70 20 0.38967 3.44073 70 16 31 15 10 27
10 1 16 31 0.18886 3.04955 70 16 31 15 10 27
10 2 31 28 0.24451 3.25974 70 16 31 15 10 27
10 3 15 31 0.23333 3.54300 70 16 31 15 10 27
10 4 10 32 0.22167 2.98779 70 16 31 15 10 27
10 5 27 28 0.25972 3.37542 70 16 31 15 10 27
11 0 55 34 0.32725 3.76798 55 0 60 36 50 24
11 1 0 45 0.19250 3.24205 55 0 60 36 50 24
11 2 60 33 0.33950 3.59924 55 0 60 36 50 24
11 3 36 38 0.30063 3.84363 55 0 60 36 50 24
11 4 50 35 0.31500 3.30279 55 0 60 36 50 24
11 5 24 40 0.28709 3.66252 55 0 60 36 50 24
12 0 61 52 0.31731 4.08529 61 49 74 49 60 27
12 1 49 54 0.31474 3.55679 61 49 74 49 60 27
12 2 74 49 0.32116 3.92040 61 49 74 49 60 27
12 3 49 54 0.31614 4.15977 61 49 74 49 60 27
12 4 60 52 0.30333 3.60612 61 49 74 49 60 27
12 5 27 59 0.34291 4.00542 61 49 74 49 60 27
13 0 59 37 0.33306 4.41835 59 50 50 49 15 21
13 1 50 39 0.31500 3.87179 59 50 50 49 15 21
13 2 50 39 0.31500 4.23540 59 50 50 49 15 21
13 3 49 39 0.31439 4.47417 59 50 50 49 15 21
13 4 15 46 0.29458 3.90070 59 50 50 49 15 21
13 5 21 45 0.29876 4.30418 59 50 50 49 15 21
14 0 96 59 0.24953 4.66788 96 93 90 59 20 32
14 1 93 59 0.25681 4.12860 96 93 90 59 20 32
14 2 90 60 0.25900 4.49440 96 93 90 59 20 32
14 3 59 66 0.29001 4.76418 96 93 90 59 20 32
14 4 20 74 0.39900 4.29970 96 93 90 59 20 32
14 5 32 72 0.36624 4.67042 96 93 90 59 20 32
15 0 52 53 0.31561 4.98349 52 50 68 42 80 24
15 1 50 53 0.31500 4.44360 52 50 68 42 80 24
15 2 68 50 0.32004 4.81444 52 50 68 42 80 24
15 3 42 55 0.32377 5.08795 52 50 68 42 80 24
15 4 80 47 0.28350 4.58320 52 50 68 42 80 24
15 5 24 58 0.34169 5.01212 52 50 68 42 80 24
16 0 50 62 0.31500 5.29849 50 82 82 19 50 78
16 1 82 56 0.29111 4.73471 50 82 82 19 50 78
16 2 82 56 0.29111 5.10554 50 82 82 19 50 78
16 3 19 68 0.37938 5.46733 50 82 82 19 50 78
16 4 50 62 0.31500 4.89820 50 82 82 19 50 78
16 5 78 57 0.25424 5.26636 50 82 82 19 50 78
17 0 40 41 0.29517 5.59365 40 55 37 41 50 24
17 1 55 38 0.32492 5.05962 40 55 37 41 50 24
17 2 37 42 0.28982 5.39537 40 55 37 41 50 24
17 3 41 41 0.30996 5.77729 40 55 37 41 50 24
17 4 50 39 0.31500 5.21320 40 55 37 41 50 24
17 5 24 45 0.30226 5.56862 40 55 37 41 50 24
18 0 55 26 0.33192 5.92557 55 31 41 37 0 23
238
Table LVIII.: (continued)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
18 1 31 31 0.25116 5.31078 55 31 41 37 0 23
18 2 41 29 0.28476 5.68013 55 31 41 37 0 23
18 3 37 30 0.28982 6.06711 55 31 41 37 0 23
18 4 0 37 0.21583 5.42904 55 31 41 37 0 23
18 5 23 33 0.26334 5.83196 55 31 41 37 0 23
19 0 60 71 0.29517 6.22074 60 89 87 46 100 35
19 1 89 66 0.23401 5.54479 60 89 87 46 100 35
19 2 87 66 0.23989 5.92002 60 89 87 46 100 35
19 3 46 74 0.32863 6.39574 60 89 87 46 100 35
19 4 100 63 0.14583 5.57487 60 89 87 46 100 35
19 5 35 76 0.36575 6.19771 60 89 87 46 100 35
20 0 40 46 0.30100 6.52174 40 55 60 40 50 24
20 1 55 43 0.32200 5.86679 40 55 60 40 50 24
20 2 60 42 0.32900 6.24902 40 55 60 40 50 24
20 3 40 46 0.31500 6.71074 40 55 60 40 50 24
20 4 50 44 0.31500 5.88987 40 55 60 40 50 24
20 5 24 49 0.31439 6.51210 40 55 60 40 50 24
21 0 36 38 0.28103 6.80276 36 15 70 48 25 30
21 1 15 42 0.22925 6.09604 36 15 70 48 25 30
21 2 70 31 0.36400 6.61302 36 15 70 48 25 30
21 3 48 35 0.31281 7.02354 36 15 70 48 25 30
21 4 25 40 0.28875 6.17862 36 15 70 48 25 30
21 5 30 39 0.29400 6.80610 36 15 70 48 25 30
22 0 44 57 0.31486 7.11762 44 82 80 51 45 26
22 1 82 49 0.31724 6.41328 44 82 80 51 45 26
22 2 80 50 0.31500 6.92802 44 82 80 51 45 26
22 3 51 55 0.31369 7.33724 44 82 80 51 45 26
22 4 45 57 0.32200 6.50062 44 82 80 51 45 26
22 5 26 60 0.34636 7.15246 44 82 80 51 45 26
23 0 28 45 0.27547 7.39310 28 63 70 22 45 23
23 1 63 38 0.33836 6.75164 28 63 70 22 45 23
23 2 70 36 0.35233 7.28035 28 63 70 22 45 23
23 3 22 46 0.30324 7.64048 28 63 70 22 45 23
23 4 45 41 0.31267 6.81329 28 63 70 22 45 23
23 5 23 46 0.30429 7.45675 28 63 70 22 45 23
24 0 51 52 0.31544 7.70854 51 38 90 50 48 32
24 1 38 54 0.30884 7.06048 51 38 90 50 48 32
24 2 90 44 0.33367 7.61402 51 38 90 50 48 32
24 3 50 52 0.31500 7.95548 51 38 90 50 48 32
24 4 48 52 0.31677 7.13006 51 38 90 50 48 32
24 5 32 55 0.33054 7.78729 51 38 90 50 48 32
25 0 55 67 0.30800 8.01654 55 85 70 50 81 50
25 1 85 61 0.26600 7.32648 55 85 70 50 81 50
25 2 70 64 0.28700 7.90102 55 85 70 50 81 50
25 3 50 68 0.31500 8.27048 55 85 70 50 81 50
25 4 81 62 0.22748 7.35754 55 85 70 50 81 50
25 5 50 68 0.31500 8.10229 55 85 70 50 81 50
26 0 43 46 0.30569 8.32223 43 52 87 11 50 28
26 1 52 44 0.31771 7.64419 43 52 87 11 50 28
26 2 87 37 0.36507 8.26609 43 52 87 11 50 28
26 3 11 52 0.31591 8.58639 43 52 87 11 50 28
26 4 50 44 0.31500 7.67254 43 52 87 11 50 28
26 5 28 49 0.31654 8.41883 43 52 87 11 50 28
27 0 89 56 0.27951 8.60174 89 55 100 59 50 15
27 1 55 63 0.31033 7.95452 89 55 100 59 50 15
27 2 100 54 0.26833 8.53442 89 55 100 59 50 15
27 3 59 62 0.29421 8.88060 89 55 100 59 50 15
27 4 50 64 0.31500 7.98754 89 55 100 59 50 15
27 5 15 71 0.39667 8.81550 89 55 100 59 50 15
28 0 45 41 0.30567 8.90741 45 59 80 50 5 11
28 1 59 38 0.33201 8.28653 45 59 80 50 5 11
28 2 80 34 0.37100 8.90542 45 59 80 50 5 11
28 3 50 40 0.31500 9.19560 45 59 80 50 5 11
28 4 5 49 0.29400 8.28154 45 59 80 50 5 11
28 5 11 48 0.29771 9.11321 45 59 80 50 5 11
29 0 45 40 0.30508 9.21249 45 40 70 65 6 17
29 1 40 41 0.29517 8.58170 45 40 70 65 6 17
29 2 70 35 0.35467 9.26009 45 40 70 65 6 17
29 3 65 36 0.32375 9.51935 45 40 70 65 6 17
29 4 6 47 0.28523 8.56676 45 40 70 65 6 17
29 5 17 45 0.29344 9.40665 45 40 70 65 6 17
30 0 45 58 0.31558 9.52807 45 95 70 40 60 27
30 1 95 48 0.30975 8.89145 45 95 70 40 60 27
30 2 70 53 0.31267 9.57276 45 95 70 40 60 27
30 3 40 59 0.33017 9.84951 45 95 70 40 60 27
30 4 60 55 0.29983 8.86660 45 95 70 40 60 27
30 5 27 62 0.35096 9.75760 45 95 70 40 60 27
31 0 49 26 0.31148 9.83955 49 1 40 18 50 23
31 1 1 36 0.14464 9.03609 49 1 40 18 50 23
31 2 40 28 0.28000 9.85276 49 1 40 18 50 23
31 3 18 33 0.25004 10.09955 49 1 40 18 50 23
31 4 50 26 0.31500 9.18160 49 1 40 18 50 23
31 5 23 32 0.26019 10.01779 49 1 40 18 50 23
32 0 51 40 0.31684 10.15639 51 42 40 46 50 24
32 1 42 42 0.30044 9.33653 51 42 40 46 50 24
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Table LVIII.: (continued)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
32 2 40 43 0.29750 10.15026 51 42 40 46 50 24
32 3 46 41 0.31323 10.41278 51 42 40 46 50 24
32 4 50 41 0.31500 9.49660 51 42 40 46 50 24
32 5 24 46 0.30529 10.32309 51 42 40 46 50 24
33 0 52 66 0.31257 10.46897 52 96 90 70 45 28
33 1 96 57 0.26026 9.59679 52 96 90 70 45 28
33 2 90 58 0.26833 10.41859 52 96 90 70 45 28
33 3 70 62 0.26367 10.67645 52 96 90 70 45 28
33 4 45 67 0.32783 9.82443 52 96 90 70 45 28
33 5 28 71 0.37301 10.69609 52 96 90 70 45 28
34 0 43 60 0.31712 10.78609 43 65 80 25 57 71
34 1 65 55 0.31150 9.90829 43 65 80 25 57 71
34 2 80 52 0.30800 10.72659 43 65 80 25 57 71
34 3 25 63 0.35583 11.03228 43 65 80 25 57 71
34 4 57 57 0.30324 10.12767 43 65 80 25 57 71
34 5 71 54 0.28021 10.97630 43 65 80 25 57 71
35 0 50 53 0.31500 11.10109 50 8 100 40 90 28
35 1 8 62 0.30324 10.21153 50 8 100 40 90 28
35 2 100 43 0.33250 11.05909 50 8 100 40 90 28
35 3 40 55 0.32550 11.35778 50 8 100 40 90 28
35 4 90 45 0.27300 10.40067 50 8 100 40 90 28
35 5 28 58 0.33964 11.31594 50 8 100 40 90 28
36 0 60 55 0.31383 11.41492 60 63 100 48 45 18
36 1 63 54 0.31409 10.52562 60 63 100 48 45 18
36 2 100 47 0.30917 11.36826 60 63 100 48 45 18
36 3 48 57 0.31794 11.67572 60 63 100 48 45 18
36 4 45 58 0.32258 10.72325 60 63 100 48 45 18
36 5 18 63 0.36204 11.67798 60 63 100 48 45 18
37 0 55 64 0.30975 11.72467 55 92 100 3 40 85
37 1 92 57 0.26894 10.79456 55 92 100 3 40 85
37 2 100 55 0.26250 11.63076 55 92 100 3 40 85
37 3 3 74 0.42796 12.10368 55 92 100 3 40 85
37 4 40 67 0.33950 11.06275 55 92 100 3 40 85
37 5 85 58 0.22925 11.90723 55 92 100 3 40 85
38 0 43 58 0.31549 12.04016 43 67 70 70 45 39
38 1 67 53 0.31421 11.10877 43 67 70 70 45 39
38 2 70 53 0.31267 11.94342 43 67 70 70 45 39
38 3 70 53 0.28467 12.38834 43 67 70 70 45 39
38 4 45 58 0.32258 11.38534 43 67 70 70 45 39
38 5 39 59 0.33143 12.23866 43 67 70 70 45 39
39 0 49 41 0.31323 12.35339 49 54 60 20 40 29
39 1 54 40 0.32209 11.43086 49 54 60 20 40 29
39 2 60 38 0.33367 12.27709 49 54 60 20 40 29
39 3 20 46 0.30100 12.68934 49 54 60 20 40 29
39 4 40 42 0.31033 11.69567 49 54 60 20 40 29
39 5 29 45 0.30716 12.54582 49 54 60 20 40 29
40 0 48 45 0.31234 12.66573 48 16 87 30 45 47
40 1 16 51 0.26819 11.69905 48 16 87 30 45 47
40 2 87 37 0.36507 12.64216 48 16 87 30 45 47
40 3 30 49 0.31733 13.00668 48 16 87 30 45 47
40 4 45 46 0.31558 12.01125 48 16 87 30 45 47
40 5 47 45 0.31514 12.86096 48 16 87 30 45 47
41 0 50 53 0.31500 12.98073 50 34 90 40 45 55
41 1 34 56 0.30903 12.00808 50 34 90 40 45 55
41 2 90 45 0.32900 12.97116 50 34 90 40 45 55
41 3 40 55 0.32550 13.33218 50 34 90 40 45 55
41 4 45 54 0.32025 12.33150 50 34 90 40 45 55
41 5 55 52 0.30975 13.17071 50 34 90 40 45 55
42 0 50 54 0.31500 13.29573 50 56 70 54 40 48
42 1 56 52 0.31696 12.32504 50 56 70 54 40 48
42 2 70 50 0.31967 13.29083 50 56 70 54 40 48
42 3 54 53 0.31043 13.64260 50 56 70 54 40 48
42 4 40 56 0.32667 12.65817 50 56 70 54 40 48
42 5 48 54 0.31724 13.48795 50 56 70 54 40 48
43 0 50 41 0.31500 13.61073 50 65 40 31 43 25
43 1 65 38 0.34125 12.66629 50 65 40 31 43 25
43 2 40 43 0.29750 13.58833 50 65 40 31 43 25
43 3 31 45 0.30879 13.95140 50 65 40 31 43 25
43 4 43 42 0.31222 12.97039 50 65 40 31 43 25
43 5 25 46 0.30625 13.79420 50 65 40 31 43 25
44 0 50 54 0.31500 13.92573 50 70 89 50 35 28
44 1 70 50 0.31967 12.98596 50 70 89 50 35 28
44 2 89 47 0.32046 13.90879 50 70 89 50 35 28
44 3 50 54 0.31500 14.26640 50 70 89 50 35 28
44 4 35 57 0.33250 13.30289 50 70 89 50 35 28
44 5 28 59 0.34221 14.13641 50 70 89 50 35 28
45 0 50 34 0.31500 14.24073 50 52 81 4 30 4
45 1 52 34 0.32004 13.30600 50 52 81 4 30 4
45 2 81 28 0.39384 14.30263 50 52 81 4 30 4
45 3 4 43 0.26026 14.52666 50 52 81 4 30 4
45 4 30 38 0.29167 13.59456 50 52 81 4 30 4
45 5 4 43 0.26026 14.39667 50 52 81 4 30 4
46 0 50 55 0.31500 14.55573 50 58 100 58 50 11
46 1 58 54 0.31537 13.62137 50 58 100 58 50 11
46 2 100 45 0.32083 14.62347 50 58 100 58 50 11
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Table LVIII.: (continued)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
46 3 58 54 0.30417 14.83083 50 58 100 58 50 11
46 4 50 55 0.31500 13.90956 50 58 100 58 50 11
46 5 11 63 0.36596 14.76263 50 58 100 58 50 11
47 0 50 55 0.31500 14.87073 50 43 90 40 40 60
47 1 43 56 0.31386 13.93523 50 43 90 40 40 60
47 2 90 47 0.31967 14.94313 50 43 90 40 40 60
47 3 40 57 0.32783 15.15866 50 43 90 40 40 60
47 4 40 57 0.32783 14.23739 50 43 90 40 40 60
47 5 60 53 0.30217 15.06479 50 43 90 40 40 60
48 0 50 49 0.31500 15.18573 50 51 70 36 40 48
48 1 51 49 0.31579 14.25102 50 51 70 36 40 48
48 2 70 45 0.33133 15.27447 50 51 70 36 40 48
48 3 36 52 0.32349 15.48216 50 51 70 36 40 48
48 4 40 51 0.32083 14.55823 50 51 70 36 40 48
48 5 48 49 0.31607 15.38087 50 51 70 36 40 48
49 0 50 43 0.31500 15.50073 50 36 80 47 35 16
49 1 36 46 0.29409 14.54511 50 36 80 47 35 16
49 2 80 37 0.36050 15.63497 50 36 80 47 35 16
49 3 47 43 0.31444 15.79660 50 36 80 47 35 16
49 4 35 46 0.31325 14.87148 50 36 80 47 35 16
49 5 16 50 0.31183 15.69269 50 36 80 47 35 16
Table LIX.: Data from experiments: 6 small suppliers - with transport costs - Cohort 4 (Players 0-2 - Home to
Market A; Players 3-5 - Home to Market B)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
0 0 83 60 0.27419 0.27419 83 67 39 45 48 100
0 1 67 63 0.29437 0.29437 83 67 39 45 48 100
0 2 39 69 0.32886 0.32886 83 67 39 45 48 100
0 3 45 67 0.32783 0.32783 83 67 39 45 48 100
0 4 48 67 0.32027 0.32027 83 67 39 45 48 100
0 5 100 56 0.18667 0.18667 83 67 39 45 48 100
1 0 75 36 0.35875 0.63294 75 70 52 40 9 9
1 1 70 37 0.35000 0.64437 75 70 52 40 9 9
1 2 52 41 0.31841 0.64727 75 70 52 40 9 9
1 3 40 43 0.31150 0.63933 75 70 52 40 9 9
1 4 9 49 0.29969 0.61997 75 70 52 40 9 9
1 5 9 49 0.29969 0.48636 75 70 52 40 9 9
2 0 77 49 0.32004 0.95298 77 40 74 43 50 40
2 1 40 57 0.31383 0.95821 77 40 74 43 50 40
2 2 74 50 0.31836 0.96563 77 40 74 43 50 40
2 3 43 56 0.32366 0.96299 77 40 74 43 50 40
2 4 50 55 0.31500 0.93497 77 40 74 43 50 40
2 5 40 57 0.32783 0.81419 77 40 74 43 50 40
3 0 80 50 0.31500 1.26798 80 69 75 40 31 35
3 1 69 52 0.31544 1.27365 80 69 75 40 31 35
3 2 75 51 0.31500 1.28063 80 69 75 40 31 35
3 3 40 58 0.32900 1.29199 80 69 75 40 31 35
3 4 31 60 0.34204 1.27701 80 69 75 40 31 35
3 5 35 59 0.33600 1.15019 80 69 75 40 31 35
4 0 94 49 0.30576 1.57374 94 60 62 45 32 47
4 1 60 56 0.31267 1.58632 94 60 62 45 32 47
4 2 62 56 0.31164 1.59227 94 60 62 45 32 47
4 3 45 59 0.32317 1.61516 94 60 62 45 32 47
4 4 32 62 0.34524 1.62225 94 60 62 45 32 47
4 5 47 59 0.32004 1.47023 94 60 62 45 32 47
5 0 47 46 0.31129 1.88503 47 56 62 35 30 46
5 1 56 44 0.32256 1.90888 47 56 62 35 30 46
5 2 62 43 0.32984 1.92211 47 56 62 35 30 46
5 3 35 48 0.31675 1.93191 47 56 62 35 30 46
5 4 30 49 0.31733 1.93958 47 56 62 35 30 46
5 5 46 46 0.31556 1.78579 47 56 62 35 30 46
6 0 80 54 0.30100 2.18603 80 79 70 35 35 51
6 1 79 54 0.30214 2.21102 80 79 70 35 35 51
6 2 70 56 0.30567 2.22777 80 79 70 35 35 51
6 3 35 63 0.34300 2.27491 80 79 70 35 35 51
6 4 35 63 0.34300 2.28258 80 79 70 35 35 51
6 5 51 60 0.31311 2.09890 80 79 70 35 35 51
7 0 35 43 0.28700 2.47303 35 68 57 30 10 50
7 1 68 36 0.34944 2.56046 35 68 57 30 10 50
7 2 57 39 0.32774 2.55551 35 68 57 30 10 50
7 3 30 44 0.30567 2.58057 35 68 57 30 10 50
7 4 10 48 0.29633 2.57892 35 68 57 30 10 50
7 5 50 40 0.31500 2.41390 35 68 57 30 10 50
8 0 66 44 0.33143 2.80446 66 96 37 25 9 51
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Table LIX.: (continued)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
8 1 96 38 0.36223 2.92269 66 96 37 25 9 51
8 2 37 49 0.30044 2.85595 66 96 37 25 9 51
8 3 25 52 0.32375 2.90432 66 96 37 25 9 51
8 4 9 55 0.32839 2.90731 66 96 37 25 9 51
8 5 51 47 0.31463 2.72853 66 96 37 25 9 51
9 0 63 50 0.32016 3.12461 63 88 62 20 32 50
9 1 88 45 0.33007 3.25276 63 88 62 20 32 50
9 2 62 51 0.31864 3.17459 63 88 62 20 32 50
9 3 20 59 0.34650 3.25082 63 88 62 20 32 50
9 4 32 57 0.33474 3.24205 63 88 62 20 32 50
9 5 50 53 0.31500 3.04353 63 88 62 20 32 50
10 0 67 42 0.33602 3.46064 67 82 40 20 24 46
10 1 82 39 0.35457 3.60733 67 82 40 20 24 46
10 2 40 48 0.30333 3.47793 67 82 40 20 24 46
10 3 20 52 0.32200 3.57282 67 82 40 20 24 46
10 4 24 51 0.32046 3.56251 67 82 40 20 24 46
10 5 46 47 0.31603 3.35956 67 82 40 20 24 46
11 0 76 45 0.33259 3.79323 76 93 24 20 50 40
11 1 93 42 0.34209 3.94942 76 93 24 20 50 40
11 2 24 56 0.29923 3.77715 76 93 24 20 50 40
11 3 20 57 0.33950 3.91232 76 93 24 20 50 40
11 4 50 51 0.31500 3.87751 76 93 24 20 50 40
11 5 40 53 0.32317 3.68272 76 93 24 20 50 40
12 0 67 59 0.30231 4.09554 67 97 72 40 40 45
12 1 97 53 0.27991 4.22933 67 97 72 40 40 45
12 2 72 58 0.29857 4.07573 67 97 72 40 40 45
12 3 40 64 0.33600 4.24832 67 97 72 40 40 45
12 4 40 64 0.33600 4.21351 67 97 72 40 40 45
12 5 45 63 0.32550 4.00822 67 97 72 40 40 45
13 0 95 34 0.38325 4.47879 95 60 54 50 0 8
13 1 60 41 0.33017 4.55950 95 60 54 50 0 8
13 2 54 43 0.32069 4.39642 95 60 54 50 0 8
13 3 50 43 0.31500 4.56332 95 60 54 50 0 8
13 4 0 53 0.30917 4.52268 95 60 54 50 0 8
13 5 8 52 0.31304 4.32126 95 60 54 50 0 8
14 0 66 40 0.33889 4.81768 66 69 23 40 20 50
14 1 69 40 0.34204 4.90154 66 69 23 40 20 50
14 2 23 49 0.27594 4.67236 66 69 23 40 20 50
14 3 40 46 0.31500 4.87832 66 69 23 40 20 50
14 4 20 50 0.31500 4.83768 66 69 23 40 20 50
14 5 50 44 0.31500 4.63626 66 69 23 40 20 50
15 0 68 55 0.30954 5.12722 68 75 87 35 30 50
15 1 75 54 0.30625 5.20779 68 75 87 35 30 50
15 2 87 52 0.30032 4.97268 68 75 87 35 30 50
15 3 35 62 0.34125 5.21957 68 75 87 35 30 50
15 4 30 63 0.35000 5.18768 68 75 87 35 30 50
15 5 50 59 0.31500 4.95126 68 75 87 35 30 50
16 0 86 54 0.29316 5.42038 86 64 77 50 30 50
16 1 64 59 0.30553 5.51332 86 64 77 50 30 50
16 2 77 56 0.29799 5.27067 86 64 77 50 30 50
16 3 50 61 0.31500 5.53457 86 64 77 50 30 50
16 4 30 65 0.35467 5.54234 86 64 77 50 30 50
16 5 50 61 0.31500 5.26626 86 64 77 50 30 50
17 0 27 41 0.26241 5.68279 27 42 40 45 28 50
17 1 42 38 0.29671 5.81002 27 42 40 45 28 50
17 2 40 38 0.29167 5.56234 27 42 40 45 28 50
17 3 45 37 0.31033 5.84491 27 42 40 45 28 50
17 4 28 41 0.29601 5.83835 27 42 40 45 28 50
17 5 50 36 0.31500 5.58126 27 42 40 45 28 50
18 0 71 53 0.31206 5.99485 71 69 48 40 35 75
18 1 69 54 0.31101 6.12103 71 69 48 40 35 75
18 2 48 58 0.31537 5.87771 71 69 48 40 35 75
18 3 40 60 0.33133 6.17624 71 69 48 40 35 75
18 4 35 61 0.33950 6.17785 71 69 48 40 35 75
18 5 75 53 0.27417 5.85543 71 69 48 40 35 75
19 0 62 44 0.32844 6.32329 62 72 27 45 28 50
19 1 72 42 0.33964 6.46067 62 72 27 45 28 50
19 2 27 51 0.28924 6.16695 62 72 27 45 28 50
19 3 45 48 0.31675 6.49299 62 72 27 45 28 50
19 4 28 51 0.32167 6.49952 62 72 27 45 28 50
19 5 50 47 0.31500 6.17043 62 72 27 45 28 50
20 0 71 47 0.32676 6.65005 71 80 35 40 32 50
20 1 80 46 0.32900 6.78967 71 80 35 40 32 50
20 2 35 55 0.30800 6.47495 71 80 35 40 32 50
20 3 40 54 0.32433 6.81732 71 80 35 40 32 50
20 4 32 55 0.33054 6.83006 71 80 35 40 32 50
20 5 50 52 0.31500 6.48543 71 80 35 40 32 50
21 0 57 48 0.32039 6.97044 57 63 58 35 32 50
21 1 63 46 0.32622 7.11590 57 63 58 35 32 50
21 2 58 47 0.32191 6.79686 57 63 58 35 32 50
21 3 35 52 0.32375 7.14107 57 63 58 35 32 50
21 4 32 53 0.32634 7.15640 57 63 58 35 32 50
21 5 50 49 0.31500 6.80043 57 63 58 35 32 50
22 0 66 48 0.32396 7.29440 66 67 58 35 32 50
22 1 67 48 0.32412 7.44002 66 67 58 35 32 50
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Table LIX.: (continued)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
22 2 58 50 0.31911 7.11597 66 67 58 35 32 50
22 3 35 55 0.32900 7.47007 66 67 58 35 32 50
22 4 32 55 0.33054 7.48694 66 67 58 35 32 50
22 5 50 52 0.31500 7.11543 66 67 58 35 32 50
23 0 66 47 0.32583 7.62022 66 68 60 30 32 44
23 1 68 46 0.32844 7.76846 66 68 60 30 32 44
23 2 60 48 0.32200 7.43797 66 68 60 30 32 44
23 3 30 54 0.32900 7.79907 66 68 60 30 32 44
23 4 32 54 0.32844 7.81538 66 68 60 30 32 44
23 5 44 51 0.31906 7.43449 66 68 60 30 32 44
24 0 70 46 0.32900 7.94922 70 78 50 25 32 43
24 1 78 44 0.33591 8.10437 70 78 50 25 32 43
24 2 50 50 0.31500 7.75297 70 78 50 25 32 43
24 3 25 55 0.33250 8.13157 70 78 50 25 32 43
24 4 32 53 0.32634 8.14172 70 78 50 25 32 43
24 5 43 51 0.31957 7.75406 70 78 50 25 32 43
25 0 94 42 0.34169 8.29092 94 71 50 20 32 38
25 1 71 47 0.32676 8.43113 94 71 50 20 32 38
25 2 50 51 0.31500 8.06797 94 71 50 20 32 38
25 3 20 57 0.33950 8.47107 94 71 50 20 32 38
25 4 32 55 0.33054 8.47226 94 71 50 20 32 38
25 5 38 53 0.32424 8.07830 94 71 50 20 32 38
26 0 48 36 0.31024 8.60116 48 55 53 10 25 38
26 1 55 35 0.32667 8.75779 48 55 53 10 25 38
26 2 53 35 0.32214 8.39011 48 55 53 10 25 38
26 3 10 44 0.27767 8.74874 48 55 53 10 25 38
26 4 25 41 0.29167 8.76393 48 55 53 10 25 38
26 5 38 38 0.30324 8.38154 48 55 53 10 25 38
27 0 94 40 0.35196 8.95312 94 76 45 0 32 49
27 1 76 44 0.33563 9.09342 94 76 45 0 32 49
27 2 45 50 0.31092 8.70102 94 76 45 0 32 49
27 3 0 59 0.34417 9.09291 94 76 45 0 32 49
27 4 32 53 0.32634 9.09027 94 76 45 0 32 49
27 5 49 49 0.31556 8.69710 94 76 45 0 32 49
28 0 80 46 0.32900 9.28212 80 81 57 10 32 50
28 1 81 46 0.32874 9.42216 80 81 57 10 32 50
28 2 57 51 0.31794 9.01896 80 81 57 10 32 50
28 3 10 60 0.35233 9.44524 80 81 57 10 32 50
28 4 32 56 0.33264 9.42291 80 81 57 10 32 50
28 5 50 52 0.31500 9.01210 80 81 57 10 32 50
29 0 75 46 0.32958 9.61170 75 33 89 15 32 60
29 1 33 54 0.30429 9.72645 75 33 89 15 32 60
29 2 89 43 0.33866 9.35762 75 33 89 15 32 60
29 3 15 58 0.34358 9.78882 75 33 89 15 32 60
29 4 32 54 0.32844 9.75135 75 33 89 15 32 60
29 5 60 49 0.30683 9.31894 75 33 89 15 32 60
30 0 75 52 0.31208 9.92378 75 65 100 20 32 42
30 1 65 54 0.31325 10.03970 75 65 100 20 32 42
30 2 100 47 0.30917 9.66679 75 65 100 20 32 42
30 3 20 63 0.36050 10.14932 75 65 100 20 32 42
30 4 32 60 0.34104 10.09239 75 65 100 20 32 42
30 5 42 58 0.32657 9.64551 75 65 100 20 32 42
31 0 46 35 0.30483 10.22861 46 44 60 20 32 20
31 1 44 36 0.30016 10.33986 46 44 60 20 32 20
31 2 60 32 0.34067 10.00746 46 44 60 20 32 20
31 3 20 40 0.28000 10.42932 46 44 60 20 32 20
31 4 32 38 0.29484 10.38723 46 44 60 20 32 20
31 5 20 40 0.28000 9.92551 46 44 60 20 32 20
32 0 81 32 0.37938 10.60799 81 74 34 0 31 22
32 1 74 34 0.36316 10.70302 81 74 34 0 31 22
32 2 34 42 0.28289 10.29035 81 74 34 0 31 22
32 3 0 48 0.28000 10.70932 81 74 34 0 31 22
32 4 31 42 0.30214 10.68937 81 74 34 0 31 22
32 5 22 44 0.29671 10.22222 81 74 34 0 31 22
33 0 92 58 0.26404 10.87203 92 82 87 5 67 50
33 1 82 60 0.27617 10.97920 92 82 87 5 67 50
33 2 87 59 0.27011 10.56046 92 82 87 5 67 50
33 3 5 76 0.43575 11.14507 92 82 87 5 67 50
33 4 67 63 0.27057 10.95995 92 82 87 5 67 50
33 5 50 67 0.31500 10.53722 92 82 87 5 67 50
34 0 68 58 0.30324 11.17527 68 64 75 70 32 47
34 1 64 58 0.30716 11.28636 68 64 75 70 32 47
34 2 75 56 0.30042 10.86087 68 64 75 70 32 47
34 3 70 57 0.27533 11.42041 68 64 75 70 32 47
34 4 32 65 0.35154 11.31149 68 64 75 70 32 47
34 5 47 62 0.32109 10.85831 68 64 75 70 32 47
35 0 45 49 0.31033 11.48560 45 66 65 50 32 30
35 1 66 44 0.33143 11.61778 45 66 65 50 32 30
35 2 65 45 0.32900 11.18987 45 66 65 50 32 30
35 3 50 48 0.31500 11.73541 45 66 65 50 32 30
35 4 32 51 0.32214 11.63363 45 66 65 50 32 30
35 5 30 52 0.32433 11.18264 45 66 65 50 32 30
36 0 50 50 0.31500 11.80060 50 69 56 50 32 43
36 1 69 46 0.32874 11.94653 50 69 56 50 32 43
36 2 56 49 0.31906 11.50893 50 69 56 50 32 43
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Table LIX.: (continued)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
36 3 50 50 0.31500 12.05041 50 69 56 50 32 43
36 4 32 54 0.32844 11.96207 50 69 56 50 32 43
36 5 43 51 0.31957 11.50221 50 69 56 50 32 43
37 0 85 50 0.31092 12.11152 85 63 80 40 32 35
37 1 63 54 0.31409 12.26062 85 63 80 40 32 35
37 2 80 51 0.31150 11.82043 85 63 80 40 32 35
37 3 40 59 0.33017 12.38057 85 63 80 40 32 35
37 4 32 61 0.34314 12.30521 85 63 80 40 32 35
37 5 35 60 0.33775 11.83996 85 63 80 40 32 35
38 0 85 46 0.32725 12.43877 85 59 81 39 32 21
38 1 59 52 0.31731 12.57793 85 59 81 39 32 21
38 2 81 47 0.32513 12.14556 85 59 81 39 32 21
38 3 39 56 0.32758 12.70815 85 59 81 39 32 21
38 4 32 57 0.33474 12.63995 85 59 81 39 32 21
38 5 21 59 0.34613 12.18609 85 59 81 39 32 21
39 0 87 49 0.31327 12.75204 87 65 51 55 32 43
39 1 65 54 0.31325 12.89118 87 65 51 55 32 43
39 2 51 56 0.31498 12.46054 87 65 51 55 32 43
39 3 55 56 0.30742 13.01557 87 65 51 55 32 43
39 4 32 60 0.34104 12.98099 87 65 51 55 32 43
39 5 43 58 0.32529 12.51138 87 65 51 55 32 43
40 0 77 43 0.33894 13.09098 77 66 47 35 32 33
40 1 66 45 0.32956 13.22074 77 66 47 35 32 33
40 2 47 49 0.31234 12.77288 77 66 47 35 32 33
40 3 35 51 0.32200 13.33757 77 66 47 35 32 33
40 4 32 52 0.32424 13.30523 77 66 47 35 32 33
40 5 33 51 0.32214 12.83352 77 66 47 35 32 33
41 0 77 47 0.32634 13.41732 77 75 57 30 32 41
41 1 75 47 0.32667 13.54740 77 75 57 30 32 41
41 2 57 51 0.31794 13.09082 77 75 57 30 32 41
41 3 30 56 0.33367 13.67123 77 75 57 30 32 41
41 4 32 56 0.33264 13.63787 77 75 57 30 32 41
41 5 41 54 0.32361 13.15713 77 75 57 30 32 41
42 0 62 47 0.32424 13.74156 62 70 64 25 32 42
42 1 70 45 0.33133 13.87874 62 70 64 25 32 42
42 2 64 46 0.32676 13.41758 62 70 64 25 32 42
42 3 25 54 0.32958 14.00082 62 70 64 25 32 42
42 4 32 53 0.32634 13.96421 62 70 64 25 32 42
42 5 42 51 0.32004 13.47717 62 70 64 25 32 42
43 0 68 52 0.31584 14.05740 68 73 92 20 32 42
43 1 73 51 0.31607 14.19481 68 73 92 20 32 42
43 2 92 47 0.31794 13.73552 68 73 92 20 32 42
43 3 20 61 0.35350 14.35432 68 73 92 20 32 42
43 4 32 59 0.33894 14.30315 68 73 92 20 32 42
43 5 42 57 0.32564 13.80281 68 73 92 20 32 42
44 0 51 49 0.31579 14.37319 51 66 55 50 32 43
44 1 66 46 0.32769 14.52250 51 66 55 50 32 43
44 2 55 48 0.31908 14.05460 51 66 55 50 32 43
44 3 50 49 0.31500 14.66932 51 66 55 50 32 43
44 4 32 53 0.32634 14.62949 51 66 55 50 32 43
44 5 43 51 0.31957 14.12238 51 66 55 50 32 43
45 0 88 45 0.33007 14.70327 88 77 45 40 32 33
45 1 77 48 0.32319 14.84569 88 77 45 40 32 33
45 2 45 54 0.31325 14.36785 88 77 45 40 32 33
45 3 40 55 0.32550 14.99482 88 77 45 40 32 33
45 4 32 57 0.33474 14.96423 88 77 45 40 32 33
45 5 33 56 0.33206 14.45444 88 77 45 40 32 33
46 0 85 31 0.38850 15.09177 85 69 7 30 32 19
46 1 69 35 0.35313 15.19882 85 69 7 30 32 19
46 2 7 47 0.22671 14.59456 85 69 7 30 32 19
46 3 30 42 0.30100 15.29582 85 69 7 30 32 19
46 4 32 42 0.30324 15.26747 85 69 7 30 32 19
46 5 19 45 0.29619 14.75063 85 69 7 30 32 19
47 0 87 45 0.33054 15.42231 87 80 53 10 32 50
47 1 80 46 0.32900 15.52782 87 80 53 10 32 50
47 2 53 52 0.31619 14.91075 87 80 53 10 32 50
47 3 10 60 0.35233 15.64815 87 80 53 10 32 50
47 4 32 56 0.33264 15.60011 87 80 53 10 32 50
47 5 50 52 0.31500 15.06563 87 80 53 10 32 50
48 0 65 47 0.32550 15.74781 65 70 60 50 32 25
48 1 70 46 0.32900 15.85682 65 70 60 50 32 25
48 2 60 48 0.32200 15.23275 65 70 60 50 32 25
48 3 50 50 0.31500 15.96315 65 70 60 50 32 25
48 4 32 54 0.32844 15.92855 65 70 60 50 32 25
48 5 25 55 0.33250 15.39813 65 70 60 50 32 25
49 0 70 42 0.33833 16.08614 70 78 61 40 32 0
49 1 78 41 0.34571 16.20253 70 78 61 40 32 0
49 2 61 44 0.32758 15.56032 70 78 61 40 32 0
49 3 40 48 0.31733 16.28048 70 78 61 40 32 0
49 4 32 50 0.32004 16.24859 70 78 61 40 32 0
49 5 0 56 0.32667 15.72480 70 78 61 40 32 0
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Table LX.: Data from experiments: 6 small suppliers - with transport costs - Cohort 5 (Players 0-2 - Home to
Market A; Players 3-5 - Home to Market B)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
0 0 94 58 0.25956 0.25956 94 76 80 42 44 50
0 1 76 62 0.28103 0.28103 94 76 80 42 44 50
0 2 80 61 0.27650 0.27650 94 76 80 42 44 50
0 3 42 69 0.33684 0.33684 94 76 80 42 44 50
0 4 44 68 0.33096 0.33096 94 76 80 42 44 50
0 5 50 67 0.31500 0.31500 94 76 80 42 44 50
1 0 85 56 0.28642 0.54598 85 66 82 44 37 50
1 1 66 60 0.30156 0.58259 85 66 82 44 37 50
1 2 82 56 0.29111 0.56761 85 66 82 44 37 50
1 3 44 64 0.32816 0.66500 85 66 82 44 37 50
1 4 37 65 0.34291 0.67387 85 66 82 44 37 50
1 5 50 63 0.31500 0.63000 85 66 82 44 37 50
2 0 63 55 0.31257 0.85855 63 62 86 45 33 50
2 1 62 55 0.31304 0.89563 63 62 86 45 33 50
2 2 86 51 0.30576 0.87337 63 62 86 45 33 50
2 3 45 59 0.32317 0.98817 63 62 86 45 33 50
2 4 33 61 0.34197 1.01584 63 62 86 45 33 50
2 5 50 58 0.31500 0.94500 63 62 86 45 33 50
3 0 22 52 0.28364 1.14219 22 50 94 42 25 47
3 1 50 46 0.31500 1.21063 22 50 94 42 25 47
3 2 94 37 0.36736 1.24073 22 50 94 42 25 47
3 3 42 48 0.31724 1.30541 22 50 94 42 25 47
3 4 25 51 0.32083 1.33667 22 50 94 42 25 47
3 5 47 47 0.31584 1.26084 22 50 94 42 25 47
4 0 7 59 0.28691 1.42910 7 57 94 54 41 49
4 1 57 49 0.31957 1.53020 7 57 94 54 41 49
4 2 94 42 0.34169 1.58242 7 57 94 54 41 49
4 3 54 50 0.31183 1.61723 7 57 94 54 41 49
4 4 41 52 0.32151 1.65818 7 57 94 54 41 49
4 5 49 51 0.31579 1.57663 7 57 94 54 41 49
5 0 49 60 0.31544 1.74454 49 47 95 46 60 50
5 1 47 60 0.31619 1.84639 49 47 95 46 60 50
5 2 95 50 0.29925 1.88167 49 47 95 46 60 50
5 3 46 60 0.32209 1.93933 49 47 95 46 60 50
5 4 60 57 0.29750 1.95568 49 47 95 46 60 50
5 5 50 59 0.31500 1.89163 49 47 95 46 60 50
6 0 75 54 0.30625 2.05079 75 57 85 46 37 45
6 1 57 58 0.31222 2.15861 75 57 85 46 37 45
6 2 85 52 0.30275 2.18442 75 57 85 46 37 45
6 3 46 60 0.32209 2.26142 75 57 85 46 37 45
6 4 37 62 0.33836 2.29404 75 57 85 46 37 45
6 5 45 60 0.32375 2.21538 75 57 85 46 37 45
7 0 93 54 0.28189 2.33268 93 95 53 43 35 45
7 1 95 54 0.27825 2.43686 93 95 53 43 35 45
7 2 53 62 0.31269 2.49711 93 95 53 43 35 45
7 3 43 64 0.33019 2.59161 93 95 53 43 35 45
7 4 35 66 0.34825 2.64229 93 95 53 43 35 45
7 5 45 64 0.32608 2.54147 93 95 53 43 35 45
8 0 86 37 0.36456 2.69724 86 23 51 41 30 39
8 1 23 49 0.27594 2.71280 86 23 51 41 30 39
8 2 51 44 0.31638 2.81349 86 23 51 41 30 39
8 3 41 46 0.31521 2.90682 86 23 51 41 30 39
8 4 30 48 0.31500 2.95729 86 23 51 41 30 39
8 5 39 46 0.31474 2.85621 86 23 51 41 30 39
9 0 68 49 0.32214 3.01938 68 40 80 36 37 50
9 1 40 54 0.31033 3.02314 68 40 80 36 37 50
9 2 80 46 0.32900 3.14249 68 40 80 36 37 50
9 3 36 55 0.32839 3.23521 68 40 80 36 37 50
9 4 37 55 0.32774 3.28503 68 40 80 36 37 50
9 5 50 52 0.31500 3.17121 68 40 80 36 37 50
10 0 40 47 0.30217 3.32155 40 40 84 28 34 48
10 1 40 47 0.30217 3.32530 40 40 84 28 34 48
10 2 84 38 0.35943 3.50191 40 40 84 28 34 48
10 3 28 49 0.31654 3.55175 40 40 84 28 34 48
10 4 34 48 0.31649 3.60152 40 40 84 28 34 48
10 5 48 45 0.31514 3.48635 40 40 84 28 34 48
11 0 22 59 0.30651 3.62805 22 57 91 38 62 47
11 1 57 52 0.31712 3.64243 22 57 91 38 62 47
11 2 91 45 0.32839 3.83031 22 57 91 38 62 47
11 3 38 56 0.32844 3.88019 22 57 91 38 62 47
11 4 62 51 0.30184 3.90336 22 57 91 38 62 47
11 5 47 54 0.31829 3.80464 22 57 91 38 62 47
12 0 4 51 0.23879 3.86685 4 44 92 36 36 47
12 1 44 43 0.30506 3.94749 4 44 92 36 36 47
12 2 92 33 0.38654 4.21685 4 44 92 36 36 47
12 3 36 45 0.31206 4.19225 4 44 92 36 36 47
12 4 36 45 0.31206 4.21542 4 44 92 36 36 47
12 5 47 42 0.31409 4.11873 4 44 92 36 36 47
13 0 19 64 0.32151 4.18836 19 88 100 25 55 50
13 1 88 50 0.30791 4.25539 19 88 100 25 55 50
13 2 100 47 0.30917 4.52601 19 88 100 25 55 50
13 3 25 62 0.35292 4.54517 19 88 100 25 55 50
13 4 55 56 0.30742 4.52284 19 88 100 25 55 50
13 5 50 57 0.31500 4.43373 19 88 100 25 55 50
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Table LX.: (continued)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
14 0 47 58 0.31549 4.50385 47 64 92 42 40 50
14 1 64 54 0.31369 4.56909 47 64 92 42 40 50
14 2 92 49 0.30814 4.83415 47 64 92 42 40 50
14 3 42 59 0.32751 4.87268 47 64 92 42 40 50
14 4 40 59 0.33017 4.85301 47 64 92 42 40 50
14 5 50 57 0.31500 4.74873 47 64 92 42 40 50
15 0 27 54 0.29729 4.80114 27 63 68 50 36 52
15 1 63 47 0.32471 4.89379 27 63 68 50 36 52
15 2 68 46 0.32844 5.16259 27 63 68 50 36 52
15 3 50 49 0.31500 5.18768 27 63 68 50 36 52
15 4 36 52 0.32349 5.17650 27 63 68 50 36 52
15 5 52 49 0.31374 5.06247 27 63 68 50 36 52
16 0 6 50 0.23903 5.04016 6 67 81 17 33 50
16 1 67 37 0.34594 5.23973 6 67 81 17 33 50
16 2 81 35 0.36853 5.53112 6 67 81 17 33 50
16 3 17 47 0.30114 5.48882 6 67 81 17 33 50
16 4 33 44 0.30826 5.48476 6 67 81 17 33 50
16 5 50 41 0.31500 5.37747 6 67 81 17 33 50
17 0 87 58 0.27442 5.31459 87 70 93 14 62 50
17 1 70 61 0.29400 5.53373 87 70 93 14 62 50
17 2 93 57 0.26684 5.79796 87 70 93 14 62 50
17 3 14 72 0.40236 5.89118 87 70 93 14 62 50
17 4 62 63 0.28504 5.76980 87 70 93 14 62 50
17 5 50 65 0.31500 5.69247 87 70 93 14 62 50
18 0 69 42 0.33761 5.65220 69 30 54 33 41 50
18 1 30 49 0.28933 5.82307 69 30 54 33 41 50
18 2 54 45 0.31976 6.11772 69 30 54 33 41 50
18 3 33 49 0.31817 6.20935 69 30 54 33 41 50
18 4 41 47 0.31626 6.08606 69 30 54 33 41 50
18 5 50 45 0.31500 6.00747 69 30 54 33 41 50
19 0 41 49 0.30576 5.95796 41 63 74 19 38 49
19 1 63 44 0.32926 6.15232 41 63 74 19 38 49
19 2 74 42 0.34076 6.45848 41 63 74 19 38 49
19 3 19 53 0.32513 6.53448 41 63 74 19 38 49
19 4 38 49 0.31864 6.40470 41 63 74 19 38 49
19 5 49 47 0.31533 6.32280 41 63 74 19 38 49
20 0 51 49 0.31579 6.27375 51 62 84 15 37 48
20 1 62 47 0.32424 6.47656 51 62 84 15 37 48
20 2 84 43 0.33959 6.79807 51 62 84 15 37 48
20 3 15 56 0.33542 6.86989 51 62 84 15 37 48
20 4 37 52 0.32319 6.72789 51 62 84 15 37 48
20 5 48 50 0.31631 6.63910 51 62 84 15 37 48
21 0 52 51 0.31607 6.58982 52 68 88 17 34 48
21 1 68 48 0.32424 6.80080 52 68 88 17 34 48
21 2 88 44 0.33451 7.13258 52 68 88 17 34 48
21 3 17 58 0.34349 7.21338 52 68 88 17 34 48
21 4 34 55 0.32956 7.05745 52 68 88 17 34 48
21 5 48 52 0.31677 6.95588 52 68 88 17 34 48
22 0 50 50 0.31500 6.90482 50 72 87 15 33 43
22 1 72 46 0.32937 7.13018 50 72 87 15 33 43
22 2 87 43 0.33917 7.47175 50 72 87 15 33 43
22 3 15 57 0.33950 7.55288 50 72 87 15 33 43
22 4 33 53 0.32611 7.38355 50 72 87 15 33 43
22 5 43 51 0.31957 7.27545 50 72 87 15 33 43
23 0 96 49 0.30319 7.20802 96 68 90 15 32 40
23 1 68 55 0.30954 7.43972 96 68 90 15 32 40
23 2 90 50 0.30567 7.77742 96 68 90 15 32 40
23 3 15 65 0.37217 7.92505 96 68 90 15 32 40
23 4 32 62 0.34524 7.72879 96 68 90 15 32 40
23 5 40 60 0.33133 7.60678 96 68 90 15 32 40
24 0 3 46 0.20862 7.41664 3 60 91 10 30 41
24 1 60 35 0.33717 7.77688 3 60 91 10 30 41
24 2 91 29 0.40493 8.18235 3 60 91 10 30 41
24 3 10 45 0.28233 8.20738 3 60 91 10 30 41
24 4 30 41 0.29867 8.02746 3 60 91 10 30 41
24 5 41 39 0.30786 7.91464 3 60 91 10 30 41
25 0 42 52 0.30977 7.72641 42 66 95 17 37 45
25 1 66 47 0.32583 8.10271 42 66 95 17 37 45
25 2 95 41 0.34650 8.52885 42 66 95 17 37 45
25 3 17 57 0.33964 8.54702 42 66 95 17 37 45
25 4 37 53 0.32471 8.35217 42 66 95 17 37 45
25 5 45 51 0.31850 8.23314 42 66 95 17 37 45
26 0 98 51 0.28924 8.01565 98 67 91 16 38 44
26 1 67 57 0.30627 8.40898 98 67 91 16 38 44
26 2 91 53 0.29013 8.81897 98 67 91 16 38 44
26 3 16 68 0.38323 8.93025 98 67 91 16 38 44
26 4 38 63 0.33824 8.69041 98 67 91 16 38 44
26 5 44 62 0.32676 8.55990 98 67 91 16 38 44
27 0 47 56 0.31479 8.33044 47 62 92 17 63 44
27 1 62 53 0.31584 8.72482 47 62 92 17 63 44
27 2 92 47 0.31794 9.13691 47 62 92 17 63 44
27 3 17 62 0.35889 9.28914 47 62 92 17 63 44
27 4 63 52 0.29892 8.98933 47 62 92 17 63 44
27 5 44 56 0.32256 8.88246 47 62 92 17 63 44
28 0 55 54 0.31558 8.64603 55 63 99 25 38 43
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Table LX.: (continued)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
28 1 63 52 0.31712 9.04195 55 63 99 25 38 43
28 2 99 45 0.32186 9.45877 55 63 99 25 38 43
28 3 25 60 0.34708 9.63622 55 63 99 25 38 43
28 4 38 57 0.32984 9.31917 55 63 99 25 38 43
28 5 43 56 0.32366 9.20612 55 63 99 25 38 43
29 0 46 48 0.31089 8.95692 46 60 81 20 35 45
29 1 60 45 0.32550 9.36745 46 60 81 20 35 45
29 2 81 41 0.34683 9.80560 46 60 81 20 35 45
29 3 20 53 0.32550 9.96172 46 60 81 20 35 45
29 4 35 50 0.32025 9.63942 46 60 81 20 35 45
29 5 45 48 0.31675 9.52287 46 60 81 20 35 45
30 0 53 49 0.31724 9.27416 53 61 68 34 34 46
30 1 61 47 0.32373 9.69117 53 61 68 34 34 46
30 2 68 46 0.32844 10.13404 53 61 68 34 34 46
30 3 34 52 0.32396 10.28568 53 61 68 34 34 46
30 4 34 52 0.32396 9.96338 53 61 68 34 34 46
30 5 46 50 0.31743 9.84030 53 61 68 34 34 46
31 0 71 44 0.33411 9.60827 71 35 73 32 36 45
31 1 35 51 0.30100 9.99217 71 35 73 32 36 45
31 2 73 44 0.33486 10.46890 71 35 73 32 36 45
31 3 32 52 0.32424 10.60992 71 35 73 32 36 45
31 4 36 51 0.32186 10.28524 71 35 73 32 36 45
31 5 45 49 0.31733 10.15763 71 35 73 32 36 45
32 0 70 50 0.31967 9.92794 70 63 75 33 37 44
32 1 63 52 0.31712 10.30930 70 63 75 33 37 44
32 2 75 49 0.32083 10.78973 70 63 75 33 37 44
32 3 33 58 0.33602 10.94595 70 63 75 33 37 44
32 4 37 57 0.33077 10.61601 70 63 75 33 37 44
32 5 44 56 0.32256 10.48019 70 63 75 33 37 44
33 0 34 53 0.30343 10.23136 34 63 75 46 36 44
33 1 63 47 0.32471 10.63400 34 63 75 46 36 44
33 2 75 45 0.33250 11.12223 34 63 75 46 36 44
33 3 46 50 0.31743 11.26337 34 63 75 46 36 44
33 4 36 52 0.32349 10.93951 34 63 75 46 36 44
33 5 44 51 0.31906 10.79925 34 63 75 46 36 44
34 0 67 56 0.30826 10.53962 67 65 75 55 31 55
34 1 65 57 0.30800 10.94200 67 65 75 55 31 55
34 2 75 55 0.30333 11.42556 67 65 75 55 31 55
34 3 55 59 0.30567 11.56904 67 65 75 55 31 55
34 4 31 63 0.34869 11.28820 67 65 75 55 31 55
34 5 55 59 0.30567 11.10492 67 65 75 55 31 55
35 0 89 48 0.31591 10.85553 89 69 76 21 29 45
35 1 69 52 0.31544 11.25745 89 69 76 21 29 45
35 2 76 51 0.31439 11.73996 89 69 76 21 29 45
35 3 21 62 0.35628 11.92532 89 69 76 21 29 45
35 4 29 60 0.34391 11.63211 89 69 76 21 29 45
35 5 45 57 0.32200 11.42692 89 69 76 21 29 45
36 0 39 46 0.29934 11.15487 39 67 77 15 26 47
36 1 67 41 0.33801 11.59545 39 67 77 15 26 47
36 2 77 39 0.35154 12.09150 39 67 77 15 26 47
36 3 15 51 0.31500 12.24032 39 67 77 15 26 47
36 4 26 49 0.31556 11.94767 39 67 77 15 26 47
36 5 47 45 0.31514 11.74206 39 67 77 15 26 47
37 0 60 47 0.32317 11.47804 60 78 75 11 27 46
37 1 78 44 0.33591 11.93136 60 78 75 11 27 46
37 2 75 44 0.33542 12.42691 60 78 75 11 27 46
37 3 11 57 0.33866 12.57898 60 78 75 11 27 46
37 4 27 54 0.32949 12.27716 60 78 75 11 27 46
37 5 46 50 0.31743 12.05948 60 78 75 11 27 46
38 0 74 49 0.32116 11.79920 74 69 75 31 25 45
38 1 69 50 0.31988 12.25124 74 69 75 31 25 45
38 2 75 49 0.32083 12.74775 74 69 75 31 25 45
38 3 31 58 0.33761 12.91659 74 69 75 31 25 45
38 4 25 59 0.34417 12.62133 74 69 75 31 25 45
38 5 45 55 0.32083 12.38032 74 69 75 31 25 45
39 0 73 44 0.33486 12.13406 73 58 76 11 28 45
39 1 58 47 0.32191 12.57314 73 58 76 11 28 45
39 2 76 43 0.33866 13.08641 73 58 76 11 28 45
39 3 11 56 0.33411 13.25070 73 58 76 11 28 45
39 4 28 53 0.32681 12.94813 73 58 76 11 28 45
39 5 45 49 0.31733 12.69765 73 58 76 11 28 45
40 0 89 49 0.31136 12.44542 89 60 82 24 35 45
40 1 60 55 0.31383 12.88698 89 60 82 24 35 45
40 2 82 51 0.30977 13.39618 89 60 82 24 35 45
40 3 24 62 0.35383 13.60452 89 60 82 24 35 45
40 4 35 60 0.33775 13.28588 89 60 82 24 35 45
40 5 45 58 0.32258 13.02023 89 60 82 24 35 45
41 0 100 47 0.30917 12.75458 100 61 84 16 27 45
41 1 61 54 0.31474 13.20172 100 61 84 16 27 45
41 2 84 50 0.31183 13.70801 100 61 84 16 27 45
41 3 16 63 0.36339 13.96792 100 61 84 16 27 45
41 4 27 61 0.34827 13.63416 100 61 84 16 27 45
41 5 45 58 0.32258 13.34282 100 61 84 16 27 45
42 0 92 46 0.32284 13.07742 92 62 82 13 26 45
42 1 62 52 0.31724 13.51896 92 62 82 13 26 45
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Table LX.: (continued)
Round Player OwnMove MS Earnings SubTotal Player0 Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5
42 2 82 48 0.32097 14.02898 92 62 82 13 26 45
42 3 13 61 0.35644 14.32436 92 62 82 13 26 45
42 4 26 59 0.34356 13.97772 92 62 82 13 26 45
42 5 45 55 0.32083 13.66365 92 62 82 13 26 45
43 0 88 46 0.32564 13.40306 88 62 80 16 25 45
43 1 62 51 0.31864 13.83760 88 62 80 16 25 45
43 2 80 47 0.32550 14.35448 88 62 80 16 25 45
43 3 16 60 0.35149 14.67585 88 62 80 16 25 45
43 4 25 58 0.34125 14.31897 88 62 80 16 25 45
43 5 45 54 0.32025 13.98390 88 62 80 16 25 45
44 0 83 49 0.31654 13.71960 83 84 81 11 24 45
44 1 84 49 0.31579 14.15339 83 84 81 11 24 45
44 2 81 49 0.31789 14.67237 83 84 81 11 24 45
44 3 11 63 0.36596 15.04181 83 84 81 11 24 45
44 4 24 61 0.35079 14.66976 83 84 81 11 24 45
44 5 45 57 0.32200 14.30590 83 84 81 11 24 45
45 0 92 48 0.31304 14.03264 92 82 81 13 20 45
45 1 82 50 0.31351 14.46690 92 82 81 13 20 45
45 2 81 50 0.31428 14.98665 92 82 81 13 20 45
45 3 13 64 0.36939 15.41120 92 82 81 13 20 45
45 4 20 63 0.36050 15.03026 92 82 81 13 20 45
45 5 45 58 0.32258 14.62848 92 82 81 13 20 45
46 0 97 45 0.32377 14.35642 97 79 74 9 18 45
46 1 79 49 0.31906 14.78596 97 79 74 9 18 45
46 2 74 50 0.31836 15.30501 97 79 74 9 18 45
46 3 9 63 0.36666 15.77786 97 79 74 9 18 45
46 4 18 61 0.35457 15.38483 97 79 74 9 18 45
46 5 45 55 0.32083 14.94932 97 79 74 9 18 45
47 0 100 45 0.32083 14.67725 100 84 70 8 16 47
47 1 84 48 0.31976 15.10572 100 84 70 8 16 47
47 2 70 51 0.31733 15.62234 100 84 70 8 16 47
47 3 8 63 0.36694 16.14480 100 84 70 8 16 47
47 4 16 62 0.35943 15.74426 100 84 70 8 16 47
47 5 47 56 0.31899 15.26831 100 84 70 8 16 47
48 0 96 40 0.35149 15.02874 96 67 64 11 15 45
48 1 67 46 0.32809 15.43381 96 67 64 11 15 45
48 2 64 47 0.32513 15.94747 96 67 64 11 15 45
48 3 11 57 0.33866 16.48346 96 67 64 11 15 45
48 4 15 57 0.33950 16.08376 96 67 64 11 15 45
48 5 45 51 0.31850 15.58681 96 67 64 11 15 45
49 0 93 44 0.33206 15.36080 93 85 66 13 11 46
49 1 85 46 0.32725 15.76106 93 85 66 13 11 46
49 2 66 50 0.32023 16.26770 93 85 66 13 11 46
49 3 13 60 0.35212 16.83558 93 85 66 13 11 46
49 4 11 61 0.35686 16.44062 93 85 66 13 11 46
49 5 46 54 0.31929 15.90610 93 85 66 13 11 46
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